An economic analysis of regulatory objectives and enforcement. by Walker, David J.
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND ENFORCEMENT 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
David J. Walker 
University of Canterbury 
1989 
CHAPTER 
1. 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW. 
1-1 Introduction . . . . . 
1-2 Theories of regulation . 
( 1 ) Public interest . . 
(2) Regulation as contract .. 
(3) Bureaucratic preferences. 
( 4 ) 
( 5 ) 
Capture theory .. 
Life cycle. . . 
1-3 Costs and effects of economic regu-
lat ion . . 
1-4 Enforcement and compliance . 
1-5 Aims and synopsis .. 
Notes. . 
l. 
PAGE 
ix 
1 
1 
4 
4 
6 
8 
10 
18 
19 
26 
29 
34 
2. REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT: A PARTIAL 
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH. 
2-1 Introduction. . 
2-2 Derivation of the unregulated compe-
titive equilibrium . . 
2-3 Regulated equilibrium .. 
2-4 The effect of a sales tax on the 
individual firm. . . . . 
2-5 The effect of a sales tax on the 
industry . 
38 
38 
39 
46 
48 
73 
2-6 The effects of an output quota . 83 
2-7 Forms of the expected penalty function 96 
2-8 Conclusion 
Notes .... 
124 
127 
ii. 
CHAPTER PAGE 
3. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REGULATOR: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR POLICY IN PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM. 129 
3-1 Introduction. . . 
· · 
. . . . 129 
3-2 Naive public interest theory: 
optimal policy. . 
· · 
. . . . . . . . 130 
3-3 Naive public interest theory: policy 
responses to parameter changes. . . .. 142 
(1) The level of aggregate consumer 
income . . . 
(2) The state of externality-abatement 
technology . 
(3) The state of enforcement tech-
nology . . 
· · · · · · 
. . 
3-4 Capture theory: optimal policy 
(1 ) Regulation by output quota 
(2 ) Regulation by sales tax. 
· 
3-5 Capture theory: policy responses to 
parameter changes 
· · · · · · · 
(1) Regulation by output quota 
(2 ) Regulation by sales tax. 
· 
3-6 Capture theory: the choice of regu-
latory instrument 
· · · · · · · 
. . . 
3-7 A comparison of regulation under NPIT 
and CT hypotheses . 
3-8 Monopoly ... 
3-9 Concl us ion. . 
Notes . . . . . 
. 
. 
144 
152 
154 
162 
167 
175 
185 
185 
203 
222 
234 
258 
265 
270 
CHAPTER 
3. Appendix 
Appendix 
Appendix 
Appendix 
3-l. 
3-2. . 
3-3. 
3-4. 
. . 
iii. 
PAGE 
274 
278 
282 
290 
4. REGULATION OF A COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE: 
THE OPEN-ACCESS FISHERY. 
4-1 Introduction 
297 
297 
4-2 Review of the literature. . 300 
4-3 Equilibrium in an open-access fishery 304 
4-4 The effects of regulation on an open-
access fishery. 
( 1 ) Regulation of a "low-cost" fishery 
(2 ) Regulation of a "high-cost" 
fishery. . . . . . . . . . . . 
4-5 The objectives of the regulator: NPIT 
regu la tion. . 
(1) Optimal policy in a "low-cost" 
fishery. . . 
(2) Policy responses to parameter 
316 
321 
325 
332 
334 
changes in a "low-cost" fishery.. 340 
(3) Optimal policy in a "high-cost" 
fishery. . 
(4) A comparison of regulation in a 
"low-cost" and "high-cost" 
fishery. 
4-6 The objectives of the regulator: CT 
regulation. 
(1) optimal policy in a "low-cost" 
fishery. 
345 
350 
355 
355 
CHAPTER 
4. 4 6 (2) Policy responses to parameter 
changes in a IIlow-cost" 
fishery. . 
(3) Optimal policy in a Uhigh-cost" 
fishery .... 
(4) A comparison of regulation in a 
"low-cost" and "high-costll 
fishery. . 
iv. 
PAGE 
362 
377 
383 
4 7 A comparison of CT and NPIT regulation. 388 
4-8 Conclusion. 
Notes . . . . . 
Appendix 4-1. 
Appendix 4-2. 
5. REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT: A SIMPLE 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS . 
5-1 Introduction 
5-2 Competitive equilibrium with an 
externality . . . . . . . . 
5 3 Regulated equilibrium . 
5 4 Regulation according to NPIT. . 
5 5 Regula on according to CT. 
. . . . 
5 6 A comparison of NPIT and CT regulation. 
5 7 Conclusion. 
Notes . . • 
Appendix 5 
. 
Appendix 5-2. 
Appendix 5 3. 
Appendix 5-4. 
. . . . . . . . . . 
402 
409 
413 
415 
417 
417 
418 
425 
440 
450 
458 
463 
466 
468 
470 
473 
475 
CHAPTER 
5. 
6 . 
Appendix 5~5 .. 
Appendix 5-6. 
CONCLUSION . . . . . 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
REFERENCES . . . 
v. 
PAGE 
477 
481 
483 
498 
499 
FIGURE 
121 
131 
2 2-1 
2-2-2 
241 
2-5-1 
2 6-1 
2-6 2 
2-7 1 
2 7-2 
273 
274 
275 
2-7-6 
277 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Comparison of the equilibrium "quantity" 
of regulation under actual and revealed 
demands. . . . 
The costs of monopoly .. 
Unregulated competitive equilibrium. 
Unregulated competitive equilibrium with 
an externality . 
Firm supply with an enforced sales tax . 
Industry equilibrium with an enforced sales 
tax ... 
The effect of an output quota on the 
individual firm. 
The effect of an output quota on the 
industry . 
The effect of an output quota with a 
constant unit rate expected penalty .. 
An expected penalty function that increases 
with tax evasion 
Expected penalty functions that are non-
PAGE 
13 
24 
44 
45 
58 
73 
36 
90 
102 
104 
convex in the extent of constraint violation 105 
The effect of an output quota enforced by a 
concave expected penalty function. . . . .. 109 
The effect of a unit rate sales tax enforced 
by a concave expected monetary penalty 
The effect of an output quota enforced by a 
bounded concave expected penalty function. 
The effect of an output quota enforced by a 
bounded locally convex expected penalty 
function . 
III 
115 
119 
FIGURE 
3 4-1 
3 6-1 
3-6-2 
4-3-1 
4-3-2 
4-3-3 
4 3-4 
4-3-5 
4-3-6 
4-3-7 
4-4-1 
4-4-2 
4-5 1 
4-5-2 
4-6-1 
4-6-2 
5-2 1 
Comparison of profit levels under competi-
tive behaviour and monopoly control of an 
vii. 
PAGE 
industry . . . . 163 
A comparison of industry profitability under 
regulation by sales tax and output quota. 223 
The effect of a change in available quota at 
a given 
Sustainab 
1 of enforcement . 
yield curve .... 
Parametric changes in stock size . 
Sustainab harvest function . 
Christy and Scott open-access equilibrium. 
Sustainable total cost curve 
Steady-state supply curve .. 
Competitive equilibrium in an open-access 
fi shery. . _ . . 
The effect of regulation by output quota on 
a "low-cost" open-access fishery . 
The effect of regulation by output quota on 
a "high-cost" open-access fishery. 
NPIT regulation of a "low-cost" open-access 
fishery_ 
NPIT regulation of a "high-cost" open-
access fishery . 
CT regulation of a "low-cost" open-access 
fishery. . 
CT regulation of a "high-cost" open-access 
fishery. . . 
Production possibilities in the presence of 
an externality . 
231 
305 
306 
307 
309 
311 
313 
315 
324 
330 
334 
347 
361 
378 
419 
FIGURE 
5-2-2 
5-3 1 
5-3-2 
Comparison of the competitive equil 
and pareto optimum . ..... 
Supply and income in the regulated 
environment .... 
Locus of regulated equilibria. 
ium 
viii. 
PAGE 
422 
428 
436 
ix. 
ABSTRACT 
Theories of regulation are many. No single theory 
however explains the observed contrasts in regulatory beha-
viour and no clear criteria exist by which to identify a 
particular regulation as according to one theory or another. 
This is because there is no consistent theoretical structure 
which links the various approaches. 
constructed here. 
Such a framework is 
A partial equilibrium model of regulation in a com-
petitive, negative externality generating industry is 
formulated and the concept of a regulated equilibrium 
defined. Regulatory controls over economic behaviour are 
ineffective without enforcement. In the absence of 
enforcement the regulated equilibrium coincides with the 
unregulated competitive equilibrium. Enforcement is by 
means of an expected monetary penalty. The effects of 
changes in policy instruments on the regulated equilibrium 
are derived. 
Within this otherwise identical framework two com-
peting hypotheses concerning the aims of regulation are 
introduced, namely the Naive Public Interest Approach and 
the Capture Theory. Each objective is defined within the 
regulatory environment realizing that enforcement is costly. 
Optimal regulatory policy under each hypothesis is deter-
mined and policy responses to parameter changes are 
analysed. 
Most theories of economic regulation are set in a 
partial equilibrium framework. The implications for 
x. 
regulation and enforcement of the regulation's impact on 
sectors of an economy other than that which is directly 
affected are therefore not considered. These ignored sec-
tors may, however, affect the outcome. In light of this 
the present model is reformulated in a simple general 
equilibrium context. Resource requirements for enforcement 
are explicitly considered in the derivation of the economy's 
regulated equilibrium locus of which the optimal equilibria 
under the competing regulatory hypotheses form a part. The 
behavioural characteristics of these policies are derived 
and compared. It is shown that potentially observable 
differences in regulatory policy exist from which the regu-
lator's objectives can be inferred. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1-1 INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, man has organised himself into 
societal groupings in which the individual is subject to a 
central governing authority. The form of governnent, and 
the nature and extent of its powers, varies between 
different societies and within particular societies over 
time. The delineation of the central authority's powers 
and the extent of an individual's obligation to it have long 
been the topic of debate. This has been so from the writings 
of early philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, through 
to Hobbes, Locke and Hume in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century England, and to the present day. 
One of the most common and also most contentious 
areas of government involvement continues to be in the 
economic sphere of life. The economic activities of a 
government can range from the provision of simple legal 
structures which facilitate private commerce to detailed 
controls over individuals' economic actions and explicit 
state ownership and operation of commercial ventures. 
The essentially liberal writings of Locke laid the 
foundation for the libertarian, laissez-faire nature of 
modern economic thought espoused initially by Hume and 
enshrined in Smith's notion of the "invisible hand". This 
intellectual trend continued largely unchallenged in the 
mainstream literature for the next century, culminating in 
the writings of Marshall. 
2 • 
because of its pre-eminent position, a degree 
of complacency pervaded the liberal school. This compla-
cency has been berated by Stigler. 
So much for the century of laissez-faire. The main 
school of economic individualism had not produced 
even a respectable modicum of evidence that the 
state was incompetent to deal with economic problems 
of any or all sorts ... the doctrine of non-
intervention was powerful only so long and so far 
as man wished to obey. [Stigler, 1975; 45] 
Beginning in England from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
and following slightly later in the United States, a greater 
degree of publ control began to be exercised over economic 
life. Demands for increased state intervention followed 
from the ident ication of what are now called "market 
failures" caused by factors such as externalities, public 
goods, and informational asymmetries, and a concern that 
insufficient information often led to individual agents 
making incorrect decisions with respect to time preference. 
These arguments were strengthened by the massive 
supposed market lure that was the Great ssion in 
1 the years 1929-1933. The response in the United States 
was the 'New Deal' [Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; 420] which 
incorporated a much greater involvement of the state in 
economic aff than had previously been the case, and 
paved the way for the explosion of detailed regulatory 
activity that has subsequently occurred. 
It is important to remember that, for the most part, 
markets don't fa Indeed, western-style economies are 
based on the bel f that the market mechanism general, 
the most eff ient method of determining resource allocation. 
Nevertheless, economists' attentions are naturally drawn to 
the pathological cases where they do fail. Concentration 
on such aberrations tends to create an impression that 
market failure is the norm. 
3 . 
As the welfare economists espoused their views on 
the failures of the market, there was a concomitant belief 
in the omnipotence of the state to correct these misalloca-
tions. Regulations were enacted to protect the pub at 
from the evils of others and even from themselves. 
It was argued that consumers needed to be protected from 
shoddy merchants and monopolists, and that producers 
required a degree of protection from the vagaries of 
unstable market conditions in order to ensure continuous 
and efficient service to their customers. These arguments 
were apparently successful in initiating many regulatory 
inst utions [Owen and Braeutigam, 1978; 10]. 
This view held that regulation served the public 
interest. With the passage of time, however, it became 
increasingly obvious that regulation was not fulfilling its 
imagined role as public protector. Regulations often 
at best ineffective in restraining monopoly, and 
at worst fac ated restrictive practices through processes 
akin to cartel management. In the 1960's and early 1970's, 
the role of regulation as a promoter of the public interest 
began to be questioned in the professional literature2 
search began for a theory to explain the regulatory 
phenomenon. 
as a 
Proposed theor s of economic regulation are many and 
varied. The next two sections of the Chapter briefly out-
line some of the major theories concerning the existence of 
regulation and s effect on the regulated industry. 
Section 1-4 introduces an aspect of regulation that was 
ignored in the early literature and has received only rela-
tively recent attention; namely the necessity for enforce-
mente This aspect of the regulatory problem is developed 
and a summary of the analysis undertaken in the remaining 
chapters of the Thesis is presented. 
1-2 THEORIES OF REGULATION 
Stigler defines regulation as 
... an attempt by the state to use its legal powers 
to direct the conduct ... of nongovernmental bodies. 
[Stigler, 1981; 73] 
He goes on to say that this implies that public regulation 
includes 
... most of public finance, large parts of monetary 
and financial economics and international trade, large 
sectors of labour economics, agricultural and land 
economics, and welfare economics. [Stigler, 1981; 73] 
The scope of economic regulation would appear, from 
4 . 
this definition, to be extremely broad and indeed the theo-
ries and hypotheses advanced to explain its existence are 
too numerous to attempt an exhaustive coverage here. Some 
of the main approaches however are presented below. 
(1) Public Interest 
The traditional approach to regulation was based on 
the assumption that it facilitated the 9ublic interest. 
This now-called "naive public interest" view held that 
regulation was supplied in response to public demand for 
the correction of inefficient or inequitable market prac-
tices. It was based on the dual belief that markets, if 
left alone were inefficient and inequitable, and that the 
panacea for these ills was government regulation which was 
essentially costless. This implies that the supply and 
demand for regulation itself is somehow immune from market 
failure, an implication which forms the bas of much of 
the subsequent attacks on the public interest theory. 
Posner [1974] suggests that if the public interest 
hypothesis was a true characterization of the regulatory 
process, regulations would be imposed rna in highly 
5 • 
concentrated industries where the threat of monopoly exists, 
and that substant external costs or benef s would be 
generated. He then asserts that ne her of these charac-
teristics is observable in practice. He goes on to say that 
several attempts have been made to reformulate the naive 
public interest theory into a more empirically relevant 
explanation of the regulatory process. In these, regulatory 
agencies are viewed as being created for legitimate concerns, 
but then are either mismanaged or engage in honest but 
unsuccessful efforts to promote the public interest. 3 The 
efforts are unsuccessful because firstly, many of the tasks 
an agency is required to perform, such as industry cost 
determination, are extremely difficult, and secondly, trans-
actions costs deter sufficient effective legislative super-
vision of agencies' performance [Posner, 1974; 337-340]. 
One of the major problems with these theories is 
that they contain no clear ~inkage mechanism whereby per-
ception of the publ interest is translated into legislative 
action. Presumably in a democratic system, this must occur 
in some manner through the political system. It is pre-
cisely this pol process however that other writers 
have concentrated on to show that regulation delivered in 
a democratic system does not primarily serve the public 
interest. 4 This will be further discussed later in the 
section when private interest theories are introduced. 
(2) Regulation as Contract 
6 . 
Goldberg [1976] draws an analogy between regulation 
and long term contracts. He analyses the features of long 
term contracts between producers and consumers in which the 
parties to the agreement voluntarily limit their future 
options in order to minimize uncertainty and costs of adjust-
ment. He suggests that there are strong similarities 
between these contract ural arrangements and the process of 
economic regulation and that the regulatory body may be 
viewed as an agent of a consumer group in negotiating and 
administering a contract. 
It is possible using this theory to explain restric-
tion of entry in decreasing cost, natural monopoly indus-
tries, such as public utilities, as a rational response by 
consumers to avoid the over-capitalization that could 
initially occur under competition. The theory however does 
not easily accord with regulation of essentially competitive 
industries unless, in this case, the regulator is acting as 
an agent of the producers in order to achieve positive 
industry profits. The most likely role of the regulator 
in this framework then is that of an arbiter, not unlike a 
judge in court, who considers the advocacies of both sides 
in determining regulatory policy. The theory then becomes 
similar to that of Peltzman [1976] and Becker [1983] where 
the arbiter is the political process. 
Owen and Braeutigam [1978; 18-32] also concentrate 
7 • 
on the legal aspects of regulation. They stress the role 
of law in providing economic justice or fairness S as the 
objective of, and motivating force behind, the creation of 
regulations. The two features of the legal system that 
they emphasize are delay, and "derivative": the granting 
of equity rights to individuals or groups in the status 
quo [Owen and Braeutigam, 1978; 20] . 
... the effect of administrative procedure, the 
legal rules that constrain the forms of regulatory 
decision making, is to slow down or delay the 
operation of market forces. [Owen and Braeutigam, 
1978; 18-19] 
They argue that the contrast between the ideological prin-
ciple that markets should be free from the incompetence of 
government, and the fact that regulation has rapidly 
increased over the last fifty years, can be explained by 
6 
examining the preferences and incentives of voters. 
Voters, they suggest, may be expected to be risk 
averse whereas the free market is a risky institution. In 
a free market, the only vote an agent has is his purchasing 
power. Regulation in effect enshrines a legal right to 
prices, quality of goods and services, and market share. 
All of these are easily disturbed in the free market, often 
adversely for many agents. The effect of the administra-
tive process is to increase the voting power of the harmed 
agents by granting them due process. Compensation of some 
kind is often granted in the form of subsidy or time delay 
to facilitate adjustment, and,if the compensation is 
insufficient, 7 the change can often be effectively blocked. 
The administrative system of regulation then is seen 
as providing some leverage for people particularly when 
confronted by unexpected economic loss. The argument is 
that legislators have been steadily replacing markets by 
courts in response to the wishes of voters for fair proce-
dure in resource allocation decisions, and that this 
explains the recent history of regulation. 
There appear to be two presumptions in this theory. 
First, that market risk cannot be avoided and second that 
there is little if any risk in being regulated. Both of 
these ideas seem dubious. It is exactly agents' risk 
aversion which gives rise to market institutions such as 
private insurance and joint-stock companies. These are 
8 . 
designed to share and limit an individual's risk in any 
market and occur without the necessity for regulation. 
Alternatively, even though the process of regulation may be 
slower than market forces, there is no guarantee that the 
outcome will be any more or less favourable for a given 
individual than that achieved through the market. Regula-
tion then delays risk but does not necessarily reduce it. 
Owen and Braeutigam's theory seems to be based on 
the assumption that individuals would like to be able to 
avoid responsibility for their actions. Thus an individual 
wishes to take credit for any success but would like to be 
compensated for an unfavourable market outcome. While this 
is a believable inference about human nature, it is not a 
practicable way to govern an economy_ 
There are a variety of other theories which all 
stress the role of the private interest of particular groups 
in determining the form and substance of economic regulation. 
(3) Bureaucratic Preferences 
Niskanen [1968, 1971, 1975] seeks to explain the 
existence of regulation in terms of the preferences of the 
9 . 
bureaucrats who staff the agencies. The behaviour of a 
regulatory agency, he suggests, can be interpreted as the 
administrators attempting to maximize their satisfaction 
in the face of constraints imposed by legal restrictions 
and opposing interest groups. Bureaux have two charac-
teristics in this model. First, it is assumed that bureau-
crats seek to maximize the total budget of the bureau. All 
arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function, such as 
salary, perquisites, reputation, power and prestige, are 
taken to be monotonically increasing in the size of the 
budget. Secondly, a bureau is assumed to exchange a 
specific output for a specific budget. This, it is argued, 
... gives the bureau the same type of 'market' 
power as a monopoly that presents the market with 
an all or nothing choice. [Niskanen, 1968; 294] 
This hypothesis would seem to provide an explanation 
for continual increases in regulatory budgets and largesse 
that is commonly perceived to exist in bureaucracies and 
quasi-autonomous non-government organisations (lcnown as 
Quangos) . It does not however, in this early form, ade-
quately consider the demand side of the market for regula-
t ion. For instance, some bureaucrats are rewarded for 
making their bureau more efficient and for "trimming the 
fat" from the budget yet this is not compatible with the 
original theory. A later version [Niskanen, 1975] attempts 
to deal with this criticism. The utility function of the 
bureaucrat is slightly reformulated so that the objective 
is to maximize the "discretionary budget" which is the 
difference between total expenditure and the minimum cost 
of producing the expected amount. This gives the optimal 
quantity of regulatory services, as determined by 
10. 
bureaucratic preferences, which constitutes the supply of 
regulation. The demand side is assumed to come from vote-
maximizing legislators. 
The reformulated model is a model of bilateral 
monopoly in the market for regulation between the legisla-
ture and a bureau and, as such, the market equilibrium is 
indeterminate. Niskanen suggests that the process of regu-
lation could be made more efficient by creating competitive 
behaviour on both sides of the market whereas Becker [1976, 
1983] argues that it already exists. 
Eckert [1973] echoes the Niskanen approach. However 
he contrasts the objectives of bureaucrats seeking to maxi-
mize their budget by extending the scope of regulation with 
those of the regulatory commissioners. Eckert suggests 
that regulatory commissioners have a commonality of interest 
with their respective regulated industries as they are 
frequently employed in the regulated industry upon the 
termination of their term with the regulatory body. This, 
he argues, is consistent with the creation and maintenance 
of regulated monopolies in otherwise competitive industries. 
(4) Capture Theory 
The main economic theory of regulation opposed to the 
naive public interest approach is the capture theory, of 
which it could be argued that Eckert [1973] is a variant. 
This agency-capture approach was developed and presented in 
various forms by Friedman [1962; 137-160], Stigler [1971] 
and Posner [1974]. The theory has since been extended and 
modified among others by Peltzman [1976] and Becker [1983]. 
The basic hypothesis of the theory is as follows. 
11. 
Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, 
or it may be thrust upon it ... as a rule, 
regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit. 
[Stigler, 1971; 3] 
The central idea of the theory is that the state has 
the power to coerce, which can be used to confer benefits 
or costs upon individuals and groups. Regulation is a 
commodity allocated by the laws of supply and demand. On 
the demand side, industry in particular is identified as 
being able to use the power of the state to increase its 
profitability through such measures as subsidies, entry 
control, price fixing and policies which affect substitute 
and complementary commodities. The other major group on 
the demand side of the market is that of consumers. 
Consumers' objectives, and hence demand patterns, depending 
on the form of ownership of the industries [Manning, 1986], 
may be expected to differ from those of industry. The state 
is the supplier of regulation and acts as an arbiter between 
the interest groups in determining the 'market equilibrium'. 
This role of the state within the political process is 
considered further when Peltzman [1976] and Becker [1976, 
1983] are discussed later in the section. 
The political decision process is different from the 
market in two important respects. First, because under a 
disaggregated system large numbers of agents must simulta-
neously make decisions, a process which would incur 
prohibitive transactions costs, decision making in the 
political system is commonly delegated to representatives. 
Secondly, the opportunity to absent from the effects of any 
decision is not readily available to an individual agent. 
12. 
Conversely, those not directly involved have a potential 
voice in the decision. These factors combined imply that 
the political decision making process doesn't allow for 
participation in proportion to interest or knowledge, and, 
because of the ence of externalities, neither does it 
provide correct incentives for the acquisition of in for-
mation on which to better base decisions [Stigler, 1971; 
10-11]. 
This frequently leads to situations with concen-
trated interest groups on one side of an argument and 
dispersed interests on the other. As industry interests 
are usually more concentrated than those of consumers, the 
consequence is that industry interests prevail often through 
intensive lobbying efforts and the 'buying' of legislation 
with inducements such as campaign contribut ns. This argu-
8 
ment is illustrated in Figure 1-2-1 below. 
The interpretation of Figure 1-2-1 as follovJs. 
Curves 01 and 02 in panel (i) show respectively the true and 
revealed demands of consumers for the regulation. Because 
of the dispersed nature of consumers, their erests are 
not communicated effectively to the regulation "market". 
Curve 03 in panel (ii) shows industry demand. Summing 
horizontally in panel (iii), if 01 were correctly revealed, 
the composite demand curve would be 04 resulting in an 
equilibrium at Q*, the socially optimal quant of regula-
tion. Given however that only 02 is revealed by consumers, 
curve Os emerges and the equilibrium regulation produced at 
A 
Q is socially excessive. 
Under the extreme version of the capture theory, that 
which is implied by the earlier quote from Stigler, industry 
13. 
F ison of the e 
t ion under 
revealed demands 
(i) Consumer 5' demand (ii) Producers' demand 
P P 
o Q o Q 
(iii) Market equilibrium 
P 
o Q* Q 
14. 
interests always prevail. Regulation under this process 
may be viewed as somewhat akin to cartelization. A cartel 
attempts to increase the profits of its members by restrict-
ing output, the success of which depends on the elasticity 
of product demand and ease of entry to the industry. Against 
this benefit must be weighed the costs of cartelization 
which include the initial transactions costs of forming the 
agreement and the maintenance cost of the internal enforce-
ment necessary to overcome the individual firm's incentive 
to exceed its quota allocation. Regulation uses the power 
of the state to accomplish the same objective thus exter-
nalizing some of these costs that are otherwise internal to 
the industry. 
Posner [1974] suggests that the theory of cartels 
may provide some information about the supply and demand for 
regulation. He maintains however that, while cartels are 
relevant, they cannot form the basis of a theory of regula-
tion because of a lack of historical empirical coincidence 
between the formation of cartels and the imposition of regu-
lations. In particular he notes that the demand for 
regulation is often greater among industries for which 
private cartelization is prohibitively costly. 
This observation is entirely consistent with the 
hypothesis of regulation as cartelization [Posner, 1974; 
344-347]. It is likely that for some industries where 
large numbers of contractual parties are involved, the 
benefits of cartelization can be obtained much more cheaply 
through political lobbying for regulations, and that this 
option may make cartelization viable in situations where an 
industry-funded operation would be infeasible. Cost savings 
15 
to the industry could occur at the initial bargaining or 
contract stage and with respect to the internal enforcement 
expenditure incurred during the operation of the cartel. 
It is evident, however, that private cartel arrangements 
exist. s can be understood if the strict form of the 
capture theory is relaxed. Under the assumption that indus-
try interests are fully reflected in the actions of the 
state, externally funded cartelization through regulation 
would be preferred to a private industry arrangement as the 
same benefit could be achieved at lower cost to the industry. 
If however it is assumed that regulation results from a 
comprom resolution of conflicting interests achieved 
through the political process, then cartelization by regu-
lation confers benefits that are likely to be distributed 
differently and perhaps reduced in aggregate when compared 
with those obtained in a private profit-maxim ing strategy. 
In t case, the costs to the industry of cartelization 
achieved through regulation are less than those of engaging 
in a private industry contract but so are the benefits. 
The pattern of regulation and private cartelization should 
therefore reflect the relative profitability of industries 
under the respective arrangements. If the theory is relevant 
then, it should be possible to explain the pattern of regu-
lation and private cartelization us several key indicators 
of each industry such as the number of contractural parties. 
Peltzman [1976] extends and formalizes the initial 
framework of Stigler and Posner. He argues that the capture 
theory is ultimately a theory of the optimum size of effect-
ive political coalitions set within a general model of the 
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political process. His interpretation of the Stiglerian 
framework is that it views regulation as a political auction 
in which the highest bidder receives the right to tax the 
wealth of everyone else. Peltzman's model then seeks to 
explain why the successful bidder is usually a numerically 
compact group as in the case of competing producer and con-
sumer interests. The key factor which emerges is the 
diminishing returns to group size which exist with respect 
to the costs of using the political process. 
The basis of Peltzman's formulation is that the 
regulator wishes to maximize votes or more correctly, the 
., . 9 
ma]Orlty margln. In doing this, political candidates must 
choose the size of the beneficiary group, the amount of 
contributions required to mitigate opposition, and the size 
of the transfer to the beneficiaries. Among the first 
order conditions resulting from this frame,vork is that the 
marginal political return from a transfer must equal the 
marginal political cost of the associated tax. Analysis of 
this condition reveals that the benefits to a group from 
government regulation are less than if a private cartel 
was formed because of the need to consider and placate 
opposing factions, a result which accords with the analysis 
of Stigler [1971; 6-7]. 
The conclusions that Peltzman draws from his formu-
lation are twofold. First, the effect of imperfect informa-
tion regarding the gains and losses of regulatory decisions, 
and the cost of political lobbying, is to limit the size of 
the winning group. This provides the justification for the 
claim that compact groupings, such as industry interests, 
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will prevail at the expense of dispersed interests. Second, 
as argued above, the gain to the winning group is not as 
great as the political process could grant because political 
entrepreneurship will produce a compromise or coalition of 
interest groups which includes members of the losing group 
or groups. That is, the winning group is unable to capture 
all of the gains from trade through the political process. 
The fact that rational maximizing agents pursue regulation 
however suggests, as earlier implied, that the reduction in 
benefits granted is not as large as the cost saving which 
the state organization provides. 
Becker [1976; 245-246] shows that Peltzman1s model 
requires the existence of a positive deadweight loss. 
Concentrating on this aspect of the model and assuming that 
"voters perceive correctly the gains and losses from all 
pOlicies" [Becker, 1976; 247], he argues that regulatory 
policies such as quotas are used because they involve 
smaller deadweight losses than cash transfers and suggests 
that 
industries are regulated ... because industrial 
regulation may be a relatively efficient way of 
transferring benefits to specified groups. 
[Becker, 1976; 247] 
Becker [1983] extends this analysis in a model of competition 
among pressure groups. The central results of this model 
are that the successful groups are small relative to the size 
of the groups that are taxed to pay the subsidies [Becker, 
1983; 385] and that competition amongst the groups generates 
controls that are efficient methods of conferring benefits 
on the winning group [Becker, 1983; 386]. These results 
emerge from the effects of marginal changes in deadweight 
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loss on the political pressure exerted by the competing 
groups. 
A final interesting variant of the producer- erest 
theory of re ion, that illustrates the po about 
compact groups winning through the regulatory process, is 
that of Salop and Schefman" [1983]. Their analysis considers 
the case of a dominant firm, facing a compet ive fringe, 
which uses regulation to raise its rivals' costs. 
Disadvantaging competitors can provide a benef 
that exceeds its costs, if the strategy allows 
the dominant firm to increase price or market 
share. [ and Schefman, 1983; 268] 
They examine the effect of regulations on the indus-
try demand curve, the fringe supply curve and the residual 
demand and average cost curves for the dominant firm, The 
dominant firm can use the political arena to inf t costly 
regulation on s rivals and possibly even on itself. A 
sufficient cond ion for this to be a prof able strategy 
is if it shifts the dominant firm's residual demand curve up 
by more than its average cost curve at the original output 
level. This s depends on the product elastic y of 
demand facing the industry and the elasticity of the fringe 
supply curve. Empirical justification for this hypothesis 
is alluded to in Section 1-3. 
The final approach considered here is the L -Cycle 
hypothesis [Bernstein, 1977] which concentrates on the 
evolution of regulatory behaviour over time. Bernste 
[1977; 11-12] argues that sh6rt term coalitions of consumer 
interest groups form to have regulations passed in the 
legislature through political pressure. As time goes by. ' 
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the issue loses its political importance partly because of a 
sense of accomplishment, the coalition fades in potency, 
and the regulatory machinery becomes captured by the 
industry to use for its own purposes. 
One criticism of this hypothesis is its generality. 
Too many different regulatory patterns can fit tolerably 
well with this explanation, but no particular behaviour is 
predictable. This means that there is no basis for testa-
bility and empirical verification. It is also strange that 
the possibility of a once powerful consumer action group 
reforming when it observes outcomes contrary to its object-
ives, is ignored in this framework. This is in contrast to 
the competitive nature of the political process alluded to 
by Stigler and Peltzman and extended by Becker. Under 
Becker's assumptions such a change in regulation could 
result only from a fundamental change in the perceived dead-
weight losses of regulation to the respective interest groups. 
This is because the change in regulatory behaviour would 
cause a significant redistribution of wealth amongst the 
competing interest groups and 
... even heavily taxed groups can raise their 
influence and cut their taxes by additional 
expenditures on political activities. [Becker, 
1983; 372] 
1-3 COSTS AND EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 
Another branch of the regulation literature is con-
cerned not so much with the explanation of the existence of 
regulations, but rather with its effect on economic agents, 
particularly firms and individuals directly subject to it. 
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One of the most significant contributions in this area was 
made by Averch and Johnson [1962]. Their article on the 
behaviour of a monopoly under a rate of return regulatory 
constraint spawned a proliferation of research and comment 
on the so named Averch-Johnson effect commonly referred to 
in the literature as the A-J effect. 10 
This A-J effect is concerned with capital padding 
under certain conditions. Their article shows that if the 
allowed rate of return is greater than the cost of capital, 
but less than the unconstrained profit maximizing rate, then 
the firm will substitute capital for the other factor of 
production, which is usually labour in a two factor model, 
and operate with factor proportions that are not cost mini-
mizing for that level of output. Operating in this way is 
not efficient from an economy wide, resource use viewpoint, 
but it is a rational response for the firm within the regu-
latory context as it minimizes reductions in profit. 
The importance of the work of Averch and Johnson 
cannot be overstated; not so much for the result derived but 
because, by demonstrating that under certain assumptions 
regulation could induce unintended detrimental side effects, 
it provided a focal point for intellectual disenchantment 
with regulation. Given the knowledge that these potential 
side effects existed, the question of the cost effectiveness 
of regulations arose. This prompted studies that attempted 
to identify and quantify the effects of particular policies 
in order to derive some measure of the costs of specific 
regulations. 
Most studies use an incremental cost approach where 
the costs attributed to the regulation are measured as the 
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difference between the costs that occur in the presence of 
regulation and those that would exist in its absence. 
Deciding on the base level involves a certain degree of 
value judgement. In the area of compliance costs for 
example, not all expenditure which seems related to the 
regulation is necessarily able to be correctly attributed 
to it. It is possible that the agent would have engaged in 
some voluntary expenditure in the same area even in the 
absence of any compulsion to do so [Kosters, 1979; 18-19]. 
Several types of costs are commonly identified in 
these studies including administrative costs, compliance 
costs, and induced or indirect effects. Administrative costs 
are those costs covered by the budgets of the regulatory 
s, which are incurred by government and financed out 
of general taxation. Compliance costs are those costs 
incurred by firms subject to the regulations which are 
d ly attributable to the regulations. These include 
such costs as designing, implementing, and operating 
changes in productive processes to meet new standards, and 
also the costs involved in maintaining records of perform-
ance that may be required to demonstrate compliance. 
In one such study, Simon [1981] found that in 1977, 
for the corporations covered by the study, the overall 
effect of federal regulations was equivalent to an increase 
in the corporate tax rate of approximately fourteen percent, 
and also that the effects were very disparate between 
different types of industr s. These increased costs are 
ultimately passed on to consumers in the form of higher 
prices or, where necessary, to the shareholder in the form 
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of reduced dividend payments, and represent a "hidden tax" 
of the regulation that is transferred from the government to 
individual agents in the economy [Weidenbaum, 1980; 6]. 
It may appear as if such cost increases are contrary 
to the predictions of the various theories of regulation. 
A regulation-induced price increase for instance reduces 
consumer surplus and thus may be thought to be against the 
public interest. If however the commodity in question 
generates a negative externality, the price increase, by 
reducing consumption and hence, in equilibrium, production 
of the good, is quite possibly in the public interest. 
Alternatively a policy which increases industry costs 
appears to be inconsistent with the results of the capture 
1 "t 'f 11 theory, at east In l s strlct orm. Maloney and 
McCormick [1982; 104] however identify conditions under 
which regulation-induced cost increases enhance industry 
profitability and, as stated earlier, Salop and Schefman 
[1983] show that it is possible for cost inflation to bene-
fit the dominant subset of an industry. 
The third major category of costs are those which 
arise from the indirect or induced effects of regulation. 
These costs are the source of most of the deadweight losses 
attributable to regulation because they lead to inefficiency 
in production and consumption. As Weidenbaum notes; 
While costs arising from inefficiency are more subtle 
to grasp and more difficult to measure than the other 
types of costs, they are in a sense the most serious 
because they represent pure waste of resources. 
[Weidenbaum, 1980; 24] 
These effects include firstly, less product research 
and development, and a reduced rate of introduction of new 
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products. Under some regulations, the length and costs of 
the approval process make the creation of new products less 
viable. According to Peltzman [1977] this espec 
true in the pharmaceutical industry where Food and 
Administration controls in the United States delay or pre 
vent the introduction of many new drugs. Secondly, many 
industries, the compliance costs of meeting government 
requ s are so great that expenditures in this area 
replace productive investment in new plant and equipment. 
Thirdly, in some instances, regulations directly d tort 
the market in which they apply. An example of this 
minimum wage legislation which prices low productivity 
labour out of the market and necessitates further government 
involvement in the form of unemployment benefits. 12 
Fourthly, activities such as lobbying, which are 
undertaken in an effort to procure regulation, represent 
additional costs of the regulatory process. Such act s 
are usually categorized as rent-seeking behaviour. Tollison 
[1982] defines rent-seeking as "the expenditure of scarce 
resources to capture an artificially created transfer" 
[Tol on, 1982; 576]. 
The theory of rent-seeking assumes that the process 
of ing the artificially created rents is competitive. 
'11 ' 1 d' h l' 13, h An 1 ustratlon common y use 1n t e 1terature 1S t at 
of monopolization in a competitive industry. This is shown 
in F 1 3-1 below. 
The diagram shows an industry with constant marginal 
costs. Under competition equilibrium output is QC and zero 
profit is generated in the industry. If monopolisation 
occurs, output is restricted to Qm where marginal revenue 
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Figure 1-3-1: The costs of monopoly 
P 
r---------~b-----------~~----------------- Me 
o 
o Q 
and marginal cost are equated. The usual analysis assumes 
c m that the rectangle P P BA represents a simple transfer of 
surplus from consumers to producers and thus shows industry 
profits under monopoly. The triangular area ABE represents 
the deadweight loss of monopoly. This is the amount of lost 
consumer surplus that is not appropriated by producers. 
The rent-seeking literature holds that expenditures 
incurred in the process of attaining monopolistic control 
of the industry aggravate the social cost of monopoly. 
Posner [1975] indeed argues that the entire trapezoidal 
area pCpmBE represents the cost to society of monopolisation. 
Much debate exists in the literature between this type of 
approach which states that all such expenditures are 
directly unproductive, [see, for example, Bhagwati, 1982], 
and others which suggest that, by entering the utility func-
tions of some agents, these expenditures do not represent a 
total loss to society in their entirety, [see for example 
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Brooks and Heijdra, 1986]. Regardless of the quantitat 
merits of these respective arguments,however, it evident 
that, to the extent which the process of currying favours 
through the political system is competitive, the usual 
angular deadweight-loss measure underestimates the soc 
costs of obtaining monopoly through regulation. 
Another possible effect, which is central to the 
analysis of Salop and Schefman [1983], is that the burden 
of a regulation may be disproportionately heavy on smaller 
enterprises because of diseconomies in paper work and other 
ities of compliance. In effect, regulation may add a 
fixed cost to production. In this case, the cost structure 
of these small firms is biased upwards relative to larger 
entities. If this effect is significant enough, the small 
firms will become uncompetitive, and greater concentration 
in the industry concerned will result in increased mono-
pol tic distortions. 
Finally, there is what Weidenbaum labels the 
"bureaucratization of corporate activity" [Weidenbaum, 1980; 
13], whereby management's attention is diverted, to a 
er or lesser extent, from normal activities such as 
product development, production, and marketing, to 
menting government mandated requirements. This change of 
focus strikes at the very heart of the private enterpr 
tem, the entrepreneurial spirit, and, if the redirection 
significant, the effects on patterns of production and 
consumption in the economy could be far reaching and 
severe albe difficult to measure. 
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1-4 ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
The regulatory costs and distortions presented above 
are extensive but by no means exhaustive. Most of the 
theories and empirical studies discussed in Sections 1-2 and 
1-3 appear to implicitly assume that the regulatory con-
straint is binding, absolute and inviolate. The possibility 
of illegal evasion of the constraint is either ignored or 
quickly skirted. Indeed, Smith [1976] states when discuss-
ing other theoretical treatments of regulation that; 
... analyses have in general neglected the conflict 
between the incentive for individuals to evade 
regulations and the effort of governments to 
enforce regulations. [Smith, 1976; 394] 
a sentiment echoed by Veljanowski [1983]. 
Enforcement is a neglected topic in the economics 
of regulation. The formal analysis of regulatory 
standards invariably assumes that all firms comply 
with the law and, implicitly, that enforcement is 
costless and complete. [Veljanowski, 1983; 123] 
This assumption however largely flies in the face of reality. 
Almost without exception, enabling legislation for regula-
tion contains provisions for the imposition of penalties. 
By its very nature, a regulation is designed to 
modify existing behaviour or limit future courses of action. 
If this were not so, the measure is redundant and would not 
be enacted. Assuming however that economic agents are 
rational, individual decisions prior to the introduction of 
any outside control would be made on the basis of profit or 
utility maximization at the private level irrespective of 
any "market failure" which mayor may not exist. Compliance 
with a regulatory constraint then involves a reduction in 
either profit or utility providing a clear incentive for 
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eva by some agents and thus "the law must be enforced if 
it to have any impact" [Veljanowski, 1984; 171]. 
The incentive to evade is apparent no matter which 
theory of economic regulation 1S advanced. It is obvious 
that producers would seek to evade regulations of pure 
public interest type enacted on behalf of consumer groups, 
but even under the strict interpretation of the c theory 
there is an incentive to evade on the part of the individual 
firms within the industry, analogous to that which s r 
to ternal policing problem in a cartel. 
In these circumstances, questions relating to 
methods and costs of enforcement are clearly relevant to the 
regulation decision. 
En difficulties, increasingly signi 
reduce the net benefits from government regul 
and should affect choices about whether and/or how 
to regulate. [McKean, 1980; 269] 
Recently, discussions and theoretical analyses of 
enforcement have appeared in the regulation literature. In 
one such scussion McKean [1980] identifies factors wh h 
influence enforcement including the measurability of v 
tions and ab ity to identify their source, the number 
of agents subject to the regulation, the size of the lty, 
and the elast ity of demand for the product being regu 
This last is significant in determining publ 
for ions; itself a significant issue. 
The for public support as a prerequisite for 
economic controls seems obvious. [Bern-
1977; 217] 
If the case for regulation is comparatively clear 
and a substantial majority of the public approves 
of , those being regulated experience extra 
pressure to accept the rule instead of bargaining, 
and to obey the rule instead of violating it. As 
a consequence, compliance will be comparatively 
high. [McKean, 1980; 285] 
support 
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Several other writers discuss the minutiae and practi-
1 " f 1 t f " '1 14 ca ltles 0 regu a ory en orcement In a Slml ar manner. 
Valjanowski [1983] discusses what he refers to as the "com-
pliance enforcement system" which consists of a process of 
direct negotiations and cooperative bargaining between regu-
lator and regulatees that results in "discretionary flexible 
enforcement" [Veljanowski, 1983; 123]. Regulatory offenses 
result not so much from the calculated risks of a profit-
maximizing firm as from the genuine ~istakes of a bumbling 
organizational structure and regulatory agencies are not a 
police force whose function is detection and prosecution but 
rather engage in "bargaining in the shadow of the law" 
[Veljanowski, 1983; 126]. 
To this multi-di~ensional model of Veljanowski, Kagan 
and Scholz [1984] add that non-compliance may be the result 
of principled disagreement by a concerned political citizen 
and argue that 
... one implication of the diverse sources of non-
compliance is that indiscriminate reliance on any 
single theory of noncompliance is likely to be wrong, 
and when translated into an enforcement strategy, is 
like ly to be counterproductive. [Kagan and Scholz, 
1984; 85] 
These discussions are interesting and contain many 
relevant and important points. They cannot escape however 
the central idea that regulation must be enforced. Several 
articles concentrate on this in presenting more theoretical 
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analyses of regulatory enforcement. Such models almost 
exclusively concentrate on a partial equilibrium approach 
to the problem of regulation and enforce~ent. Much of the 
analytical framework used in these models stems from the 
pathbreaking article on the economics of crime by Becker 
[1968] . In Becker's approach, the decision to engage in 
29 
crime, as with any other economic activity, is based on an 
evaluation of the costs and benefits involved. With out-
comes uncertain, an individual engages in those activities 
which maximize cted utility.16 
Most of the regulatory models derive that an agent1s 
compliance with a regulatory constraint is determined where 
the marginal cost of noncompliance is equal to the marginal 
cost of so doing and that under an enforced regulatory 
constraint 
... socially optimal control is found to occur at the 
point where marginal damages equal marginal control 
costs plus the marginal costs of enforcing these 
controls. [Linder and McBride, 1984; 328] 
Lee [1984] argues in addition that 
... by sUbstituting harsh penalties for effective 
enforcement the deterrent effect of a given expected 
penalty can be maintained at less cost. [Lee, 1984; 
153 ] 
This reduces the marginal cost of enforcement and allows an 
increase in the extent of socially optimal control. The 
logical conclusion is then to have an infinite fine with no 
enforcement. In this situation enforcement costs are zero 
and hence control and compliance can be comp 17 In prac-
tice,however, fines are not infinite because of the necessity, 
as Stigler [1970] notes, to maintain marginal deterrents 
sufficient to prevent IIspillovers" between different classes 
of offense. Enforcement therefore requires resources and 
thus 
There is one decisive reason why the society must 
forego "complete" enforcement of the rule: enforce-
ment is costly. [Stigler, 1970; 124J 
1-5 AIMS ~~D SYNOPSIS 
Discussion of 1I 0ptimal" behaviour raises questions. 
Optimal behaviour typically results from the constrained 
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optimization of some objective function. Relevant questions 
therefore concern the arguments of the objective function 
and the optimization strategy. 
Polinsky [1979] argues that enforcement agents' 
objectives are most likely to be different from those which 
constitute social welfare while Veljanowski [1984] states 
that 
the observation that regulatory law is often 
not vigourously enforced indicates to proponents 
of a penalty system government insincerity and 
agency capture, if not corruption. [Veljanowski, 
1984; 176] 
and Diver [1980] notes that enforcement agencies "concentrate 
on the relatively most trivial offenses to the exclusion of 
the most serious" [Diver, 1980; 260]. 
No attempt is made in the literature to reconcile 
these differing observations concerning penalty structures 
and enforcement practice in any consistent theoretical 
model. Perhaps this is because there is no consistent 
basis to compare the various theories of regulation either. 
Although the models outlined in Section 1-2 have 
become increasingly sophisticated, none, of itself, is 
capable of explaining observed variations in regulations, 
and there are no clear criteria which can be used to cate-
gorize a particular regulation as belonging to one approach 
or another. It 'may be possible in certain cases to infer 
regulatory objectives from a reinterpretation of historical 
evidence, [Kolko, 1863; 98-108; Rose, 1985], but this luxury 
is seldom afforded when dealing with contemporary problems. 
To make a valid comparison of the various approaches 
to explaining regulation each must be embedded in the same 
31. 
theoretical structure and the results generated by the 
models evaluated and contrasted. This is the first aim of 
the present thesis. A simple structural model of an 
enforced regulation is developed, initially within a 
equilibrium framework and later in a general equilibrium 
model of a simple economy. Into this otherwise ident 
behavioural model are embedded two contrasting regulat 
hypotheses; the Naive Public Interest Theory (NPIT) and the 
1 
Capture Theory (CT). The behavioural implicat resulting 
from the hypotheses can then be derived and compared. 
The second aim of the thesis concerns these beha-
vioural implications of the varying regulatory hypotheses. 
Each hypothesis contains the objectives of the regulator. 
On the basis of these objectives the implications 
which emerge from the optimization process of the model may 
be termed to be optimal for that regulator. Th emergent 
behaviour includes the penalty structure and enforcement 
practice. Working in reverse it then possible to infer 
regulatory objectives from observed behaviour with respect 
to the decision variables of the or. 18 A theoretical 
structure is established therefore whereby it is possible 
to consistently explain variations in enforcement practice 
and to infer objectives from observed enforcement behaviour. 
This is the second aim of the thes 
The great majority of analyses of regulation, and 
particularly of those which expl 
are set in a partial equilibrium 
ly consider enforcement, 
Regulation and 
its enforcement are likely, however, to affect sectors of an 
economy other than that which is directly controlled. 
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These impacts in other sectors may then feed back into the 
regulated sector and alter the effectiveness of the 
tion in the sector to which it directly applies. The 
impl ions for regulatory policy of such a process cannot 
be explored within a partial equilibrium approach. Because 
of this, the thesis includes the construction of a simple 
two sector general equilibrium model. This model used 
to examine whether the results derived in the part 
equ ibrium framework hold true in a general equilibrium 
context. The structure of the thesis is as follows. 
Chapter Two develops the partial model of regulation 
which consists of a tax or quota used to control a negative 
external y generated by a competitive industry. Given 
that the regulatory instrument is enforced by an expected 
monetary penalty, a regulated equilibrium defined and its 
properties examined. 
Chapter Three incorporates the two competing hypo-
theses concerning regulatory objectives and derives optimal 
regulatory policies in each case. The responses of these 
policies to parameter changes are explored and the results 
compared and contrasted. 
Chapter Four provides an application of this partial 
equilibrium model to another area of market , namely 
the common-property externality as portrayed through the 
example of an open-access fishery. A brief literature 
review precedes the development of the f model and 
the application of the regulatory cons to it. Here 
the assumption is that regulation by means of enforced 
output quotas. The behavioural implications of the two 
hypotheses are compared and contrasted. 
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Chapter Five incorporates the regulatory framework 
within a simple two sector general equilibrium model of a 
Ricardian economy_ As previously a regulated equilibrium 
is defined but in addition the economy's locus of all regu-
lated equilibria is derived. The inclusion of the regulatory 
hypotheses determines the optimal regulatory policies which 
correspond to differing points on the locus of regulated 
equilibria. The results are presented in general form and 
also using a Cobb-Douglas utility function for illustrative 
purposes. 
Chapter Six concludes and indicates areas for future 
development. 
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NOTES 
1. Subsequently, notable theorists, including Milton 
Friedman, have argued that state intervention with the 
money supply was responsible for the Depression. 
From the cyclical peak in August 1929 to the 
cyclical trough in March 1933, the stock of 
money fell by over a third ..• The monetary 
collapse was not the inescapable consequence 
of other forces but rather a largely inde-
pendent factor which exerted a powerful 
influence on the course of events ... it is 
hardly conceivable that money income could 
have declined by over one-half and prices 
by over one-third in the course of four years 
if there had been no decline in the stock of 
money. [Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; 299-301] 
2. See for example Averch and Johnson, 1962; Friedman, 
1962; Posner, 1969 and 1974; st , 1971; and 
Stigler and Friedland, 1962. These and other 
approaches to regulation are outlined in the following 
sections of the chapter. 
3. This approach is similar in spirit to the "Life-cycle" 
hypothesis of Bernstein [1955] which is presented 
later in the section. 
4. See for example Peltzman, 1976; and Becker, 1983. 
5. The authors' acknowledge that "justice" and "fairness" 
are "fuzzy" concepts. They def these terms as 
"treating equals equally" and emphasize "procedural 
fairness" as the ability to "rank economically identi-
cal outcomes on the basis of the manner in which they 
were attained" [Owen and Braeutigam, 1978; 20]. 
6. An alternative hypothesis is of course that the 
ideological pr iple is not widely shared. 
7. An illustration of this in New Zealand occurs in the 
area of environmental regulation. In this case 
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development proposals which will adversely affect the 
environment must go through the Planning Tribunal where 
concessions are often granted to conservationists and 
minority ethnic groups who, of themselves, have little 
economic power. 
8. The demand curves are drawn as shown for illustrative 
purposes only. Precise conditions on their shape, 
slope, and position,would require careful consideration 
which is not attempted here. The horizontal axis shows 
some index of the degree of intervention. The diagram 
reflects the assumption that the regulation favours 
producers at the expense of consumers. 
9. Assuming that the regulator and politician are identi-
cally one, Hirschliefer [1976] argues that the utility 
function of the regulator is more than uni-dimensional. 
In particular he suggests that wealth maximization is 
a more appropriate objective. Given this, the 
majority margin is only one argument of the objective 
function. A politician or regulator can be induced by 
an appropriate amount of money to accept a greater 
risk of defeat; that is a smaller majority. There are 
diminishing returns then to the size of the majority. 
A multivariate objective function requires modifica-
tions to the first-order conditions present in the 
Chapter. It does not, however, alter the fundamental 
result that concentrated interests prevail in the 
political process at the expense of more diffuse 
interest groups as typically the concentrated interest 
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groups are those able to make some form of "compensa-
tory payment" for the risk that the politician incurs 
in supporting their cause. 
10. Peltzman [1976; 224] notes that the regulation of both 
natural monopolies and naturally competitive industries 
can be consistent with regulation delivered through the 
political process. The prevailing interest group in 
each case may be expected to differ. 
11. That is, using the assumption that the industry cap-
tures all the benefits of regulation. 
12. In New Zealand rigidities in the labour market are 
caused not so much by government-set minimum wage 
levels but by union-negotiated award wages. Unions 
are structured on a craft basis and often have juris-
diction over a number of industries as membership is 
compulsory. The award wage sets a floor on the wage 
that must be paid to members of the union and thus 
creates distortions in the labour market both within 
and between industries which employ unionised labour. 
13. See for example Brooks and Heijdra, 1986; Posner, 1975~ 
Putsay,1978; Tollison, 1982;and Tullock, 1967. 
14. See for example Diver, 1980; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984; 
Kagan and Scholz, 1984; and Veljanowski, 1983 and 1984. 
15. These include Harford, 1978; Lee, 1984: Linder and 
McBride, 1984; Papps,1985: Smith,1976: Storey and 
McCabe, 1980;and Viscusi and Zeckhauser,1979. 
16. Subsequent extensions and developments of Becker's 
model have been presented by Ehrlich,1972, 1973 and 
1982; Kemp and Ng,1979; Polinsky and Shavell,1979: 
and Stigler,1970: among others. 
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17. The result depends on defining the limit of the 
expected penalty which is the product of an infinite 
fine multiplied by a zero probability of detection. 
From limit theory, this product can take any value 
depending on the rates of convergence of its component 
terms. The implications of this "optimal penalty" 
result are discussed further in Chapter Two, Section 
2-7. Suffice it to say here that infinite fines are 
not observed in practice. 
18. Ross [1984, 1985] poses a similar question in a model 
without enforcement. Ross assumes that the regulator 
seeks to maximize some weighted sum of consumers' and 
producers' surpluses, subject to a profit constraint 
for the regulated form. The weights are not directly 
observable but can be imputed by using data on prices, 
marginal costs, and demand elasticities. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT: A PARTIAL 
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 
2-1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter One Section 1-1 it was observed that the 
necessary conditions required for the perfectly competitive 
paradigm are seldom, if ever, satisfied in real economies. 
The existence of factors such as externalities, increasing 
returns, market concentration, and public goods, causes the 
private and social costs of economic activity to diverge and 
invalidates the efficiency results of the first-best market 
outcome. 
In these circumstances, governments in mixed econo-
mies often seek to either indirectly supplement or directly 
alter market outcomes via any of a plethora of policy instru-
ments including taxes, subsidies, price and profit controls, 
entry restrictions, and output quotas. The relevant ques-
tions for policymakers and interest groups concern firstly 
which, if any, of these instruments to use and secondly the 
appropriate degree of control to exercise. The answers 
1 depend on the objectives of the regulator and an evaluation 
of the relative performance of intervention, as compared with 
the original market outcome, in achieving them. 
The problem of whether and how to control a particu-
lar market then requires an understanding of the way in 
which the introduction of a regulatory constraint affects 
agents' decisions within the market. It is this question 
which the present chapter addresses. 
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The chapter begins by characterizing the competitive 
market outcome in a partial equilibrium framework showing the 
incentives of individual agents within the market and how 
they interact to produce the aggregate result. The competi-
tive equilibrium is assumed to diverge from the socially 
optimal or f t-best outcome and regulatory truments are 
introduced to correct this imbalance. 
Discussion has occurred in the literature on the 
relevant s of 'price-oriented' instruments, such as 
taxes and subsidies, and quantitative restrictions such as 
licencing and quotas. 2 In light of this, the present 
analysis employs one instrument of each type; a un sales 
tax and an output quota. The effects of these pol ies on 
individual decisions and the market outcome are derived 
after introducing the concept of a regulated equil ium. 
Some of the many differing theories of ion 
that exist in the literature were outlined in Chapter One, 
Section 1 2. Of these, two are used in this analys the 
Naive Public erest Theory (NPIT) and Capture Theory (CT). 
The regulated equilibrium structure provides a consistent 
basis for the ion of the differing hypotheses 
concerning regulatory objectives which arise from the two 
theories, and allows for a valid comparison of the 
dicted outcomes. 
pre-
2-2 DERIVATION OF THE UNREGULATED COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
The economy is assumed to comprise many different 
industries each producing one unique commodity. One industry 
visits a negat externality on other industries in the 
economy. This industry is analysed here. In the present 
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partial ibrium context, the rest of the economy is 
ignored from consideration of the effects of the 
external 
The demand side of the market for the commod pro-
duced in the externality-generating industry assumed to 
cons t of a finite number of individual consumers with 
ident well-ordered preferences. Individual demands are 
assumed to be decreasing in price and differentiable. 
(2 2 1) d q. = d.(P,y.) 
~ 1. 1. 
ad. 
~ 
a P < 0 , i== 1 , ... n 
represents the quantity demanded of the commodity by the 
ith consumer where P is the price of the commodity and y. 
~ 
the consumer's income. 
Summation over all individual demand curves g s the 
market demand curve for the commodity which is itself con-
tinuous and negatively sloped. It is assumed that individual 
demand functions exhibit identical income effects, therefore 
(2-2-2) 
where Y 
= D(P,Y) < 0 
n 
l: y. is aggregate income. 
. 1 ~ ~= 
+ ... + d (P,y ) 
n n 
The existence of a single market equilibrium 
together h the negatively sloped market demand curve 
causes a divergence between price and value in consumpt n 
on all intra-marginal units of the commodity known as 
Marshall consumer surplus. This measure of aggregate 
surplus will be used in assessing the welfare effect of 
1 . 3 regu atory act~ons. 
The area under the market demand curve at any quan 
tity represents the aggregate valuation of that quant of 
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the commodity by all consumers. The market demand curve 
therefore shows the marginal valuation of the commodity 
consumption and may be termed the marginal social benef 
(MSB) curve. 
It is assumed that the supply side of the market 
comprises a finite number of individual firms with identical 
increasing marginal cost curves. An individual producer's 
supply curve shows the maximum quantity that the producer 
will willingly supply at various prices or alternatively. 
the minimum price that the producer must receive in order to 
induce the production of a particular unit of output. This 
is derived on the basis of profit maximization which involves 
maximizing revenue subject to the constraints of technology 
and factor prices embodied in the cost function. 
For the representative firm in the industry facing a 
fixed market price, profit is given by the following express-
ion. 
(2-2 3) 'IT .(q.) = P.q. - c(q.) 1 1 1 1 i=1, ... m 
where q. represents the amount of the commodity produced by 
1 
h . th f' . th . d t e 1 1rm 1n e 1n ustry. 
Differentiating (2-2-3) with respect to output and 
assuming an interior solution gives the first-order condi~ 
tion for prof maximization 
(2-2 4) 
Prof 
opt 
a 1T • 
1 
a q. 
1 
P - c l (q.) = 0 
1 
maximization requires that, in the neighbourhood of the 
, c"(q.) > 0:. the firm's cost function is convex. 
1 
in turn implies that the profit function is strictly 
concave and ensures that the solution to (2-2-4) is unique. 
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Assuming that the profit function is globally concave, the 
solutions to (2-2-4) over all P map out the individual f 's 
supply curve 
(2 2 5) s q. = s.(P) 
~ ~ 
i=l, ... m 
where represents the quantity supplied of the commod 
b h . th f' . h . d y t e ~ ~rm ~n t e ~n ustry. 
With strictly increasing marginal costs, individual 
supply is increasing in price. Totally different ing 
(2-2-4) and rearranging gives 
(2-2-6) 
s dq. 
~ 
dP > 0 e" ( q. ) 
~ 
1 i=l, ... m 
Using the assumptions here, the ind firm's 
supply curve is its entire marginal cost curve. The proper-
ties of the industry supply curve depend on assumptions 
made regarding the size of individual firms in relation to 
the total market, and entry conditions. With free entry, 
industry and firm profits will be either zero or arbitrarily 
close to it. If the market equilibrium quantity is a mul-
tiple of the minimum efficient individual output level, 
equ ium price will be equal to the individual firm's 
minimum average cost and profits, individual and aggregate, 
will be zero. If this is not the case, the price will be 
such that the marginal firm cannot profitably enter the 
industry but all incumbent firms make arbitrarily small 
positive profits. The long run industry supply curve is 
then essentially horizontal at a pr in the neighbourhood 
of the minimum average cost level. 
If free entry does not exist, any expansion in indus-
try output requires expansion by individual firms which, from 
(2-2-6),requires an increase in market price. 
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It is assumed in the following analysis that there are 
sufficient firms for the industry to be competitive in that 
each firm acts as if it faces a fixed price in making its deci-
sions but not perfectly competitive in the sense that entry 
is not free. In this case therefore the market supply curve 
is positively sloped thus 
(2-2-7) sl{P) + s2{P) + ••• sm{P) 
S (P) dS dP > 0 
The upward sloping nature of the market supply curve 
together with a single market equilibrium price implies 
that, at any positive equilibrium quantity, the price 
exceeds the supply reservation price on intramarginal units 
and thus positive economic profits or producer surplus is 
generated in the industry. 
Market equilibrium in an unregulated environment 
occurs at the price which equates aggregate supply and demand 
decisions. Thus 
(2-2-8) S{P*) = D{P*) 
where p* is the equilibrium price of the commodity. 
At this price p* all consumers are maximizing utility 
subject to their budget constraint and all producers are 
maximizing profits subject to the technological and financial 
constraints on production. In unregulated competitive 
equilibrium all individual plans are mutually consistent 
and the only constraints upon behaviour are those of the 
market. Figure 2-2-1 below illustrates industry equilibrium 
i~ the unregulated environment. 4 
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Me 
D 
Q 
c The competitive equilibrium occurs at E where price 
equals marginal cost of production and aggregate surplus is 
maximized at magnitude AEcH. No individual firm has an 
incentive to restrict output as this would merely serve to 
reduce its profit. Under a cartel or legalized monopoly 
however, output is restricted to the level Qm where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. At this output level, the 
industry enjoys profits of pmEmFA which exceed the competi-
tive level of pCEcA. ~he demand pr or marginal social 
benefit of the commodity exceeds the marginal cost. Assum-
ing that the marginal cost curve in Figure 2-2-1 reflects 
true marginal social cost, monopolist control of the 
industry results in an aggregate welfare loss of area 
FEmEc when compared with the competitive outcome. 
ly, however, for reasons such as those out-
lined in Section 2-1, it is not the case that marginal 
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private costs and marginal social costs of production coin-
cide. The implications of the assumption that the output 
produced in the industry exerts a negative externality on 
the rest of the economy are now examined. 
Increased output in this industry reduces the pro-
ductivity of factors employed elsewhere. This represents 
a cost to the economy as a whole which is not reflected in 
the private decisions in this market. The marginal private 
cost (MPC) understates the true marginal social cost (MSC) 
of production as shown in Figure 2-2-2 below. 
Figure 2-2-2: Unregulated competitive equilibrium 
with an externality 
P 
MSC 
H 
T pl\ 
MPC 
Q 
1\ 
t 
1 pc 
A 
D= MSB 
o Q 
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The competitive equilibrium EC involves a er 
industry output than the socially optimal level 6 where the 
marginal social benefit and marginal social cost are equal. 
The competitive outcome therefore produces an aggregate 
" c 
welfare loss of area EBE . 
Figure 2-2-2 illustrates the competitive equilibrium 
in the industry which generates the negative externality. 
It is possible to envisage the case when monopoly control 
" 
would also result in an output greater than Q. It is true, 
however, with constant or decreasing returns to scale in the 
production of a commodity which has a decreasing marginal 
soc benefit and non-decreasing marginal social cost, 
that restriction of output by a monopolist reduces the size 
of the social loss from that associated with the competitive 
outcome. Monopolization of a competitive industry in these 
circumstances is a policy instrument available to the regu-
lator which may be welfare improving. 
2 3 REGULATED EQUILIBRIUM 
The result illustrated in Figure 2-2-2 is an example 
of what is commonly termed "market failure". When this 
occurs, the government may decide to directly influence 
resource a ation by regulatory control of the industry. 
Before proceeding with detailed analysis of individual 
instruments, must be noted that there are two necessary 
conditions for any regulatory control to be effective. In 
Chapter One Section 1-4, it was shown that these issues have 
begun to be considered in the literature with varying 
de s of rigour. 
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Firstly, the control must be bi~ding on the plans of 
the agent. With reference to Figure 2-2-2, any quota must 
be set at some output level less than the profit maximizing 
c level Q. A nODbinding constraint has no effect whatsoever, 
ceteris paribus, on the behaviour of agents in the market. 
Secondly, the binding control must also be enforced. 
Market equilibrium is derived on the basis of constrained 
maximization. At the competitive equilibrium point each 
individual consumer and producer has maximized utility and 
profits subject to their respective economic constraints. 
The introduction of a further binding constraint on any 
agent must necessarily reduce the value of his objective 
function. A rational maximizing agent will not therefore 
comply voluntarily with such an external control. 
Compliance with a regulation requires inducement in 
the form of either a reward for so doing or punishment for 
violation. These alternatives are identical on efficiency 
criteria, differing only in their distributional effects 
[Coase, 1960]. Here it is assumed that the regulator 
punishes violations of the constraint by means of a monetary 
penalty, the form of which will be discussed with reference 
to each regulatory instrument separately. 
The existence of a penalty of itself has no more 
effect on behaviour than the announcement of the control. 
The essential requirement is that individual agents perceive 
some likelihood of being punished if they violate the con-
straint. It is this probability-weighted expected penalty 
that influences agents' decisions. Given the existence of 
a regulation which embodies both of the above features, a 
regulated equilibrium can be defined. 
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A regulated equilibrium occurs when market supply and 
demand are equated within the regulatory environment and 
emerges as the result of competitive behaviour by individual 
agents. At a regulated equilibrium consumers are maximizing 
utility subject to their budget constraint and producers are 
maximizing profit subject to the technical and financial 
constraints on production. The only difference between this 
process and that described by (2-2-8) is that here individual 
maximization takes place within the additional behavioural 
constraints imposed by the regulatory regime. This clearly 
implies that in the absence of effective regulatory con-
straints, the unregulated competitive equilibrium will 
emerge. 
The following analysis illustrates the derivation of 
a regulated equilibrium firstly in the case of a sales tax 
and secondly under an output quota. 
2 4 THE EFFECT OF A SALES TAX ON THE INDIVIDUAL FIRM 
Assume that a specific sales tax of $t per unit is 
levied on the output of the externality-generating industry. 
The profit function of a representative firm in the industry 
now becomes 
(2-4-1) n(q) = P.q - c(q) - t.q 
Differentiating with respect to output gives the 
following first-order condition 
(2 4 2) P - c' (q) - t = 0 
Comparing (2-2 4) and (2-4-1) it is evident that, with 
any s ly positive tax rate, the before-tax price received 
by the seller from the market must rise by the full amount of 
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the tax in order for the same quantity to be suppl 
That is, the supply curve of the individual firm shifts 
vertically by the amount of the tax. Alternat ly at any 
given market price, with positive and strictly increasing 
marginal costs, the optimal output falls and the individual 
firm's supply curve shifts to the left. 
The aggregation of the individual responses causes a 
reduction in market supply at any given price. Interaction 
with the demand curve results in an increase in market price 
and a decrease in market quantity, the prec measures of 
tax incidence and equilibrium output change being dependent 
on the relative price responsiveness of the market supply 
and demand curves. The first-best socially imal output 
"-
level, Q in Figure 2-2-2, can then be induced by imposing 
"-
the tax rate t 
" (2 4 3) t " " MSB(Q) - MPC(Q) = PQ" - P" 
-Q 
which equates tax-inclusive marginal private cost of produc-
tion with the demand price at this output level. 
This is the traditional analysis of the incidence of 
a tax in a competitive market which shows that the first-best 
solution can be achieved through the use of an appropriate 
Pigouvian tax rate. The analysis however ignores many of the 
realities of taxation. 
Under most taxation regimes, a taxpayer's initial tax 
liability is limited by the level of declaration of 
taxable sales. Individuals base the declaration decisions 
on the effective tax rate which is defined here to be the 
expected tax rate. A deterrent to nonpayment is necessary 
to induce some degree of compliance with the regulation. 
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With no enforcement, the effective tax rate is zero and 
individual behaviour is unaffected. In this case the indus-
try continues to operate at the competitive equilibrium 
irrespective of the announced tax rate. 
Assume therefore that the announced tax rate of $t 
per unit, payable on declared output x, is enforced by a 
monetary fine of $F levied as a result of the detection of 
undeclared output with some probability p. Either or each 
of these components is some function of actual and 
declared output. 
In the following analysis the industry is constrained 
to be in equilibrium so that all output produced, denoted by 
Q and q for the industry and representative firm respectively, 
is also sold and thus liable for tax. The tax-inclusive 
costs of production are now non-deterministic. There are 
of course a range of possible outcomes from undetected vio-
lations to full detection of undeclared output. Concentra-
tion here on the two extremes develops the essential aspects 
of the problem. These extreme outcomes are 
(2-4-4) 
(2-4-5) 
c(q) + tx 
C2 (q,x) = c(q) + tx + F(q,x) 
C1 represents costs in the event of non-detection and 
occurs with probability 1-p while C2 shows costs when any 
violation is punished which occurs with probability P. The 
expected cost of production at any level of output is there-
fore 
(1-p)C1(q,x) + pC 2 (q,x) 
= c(q) + tx + G(q,x) 
substituting from (2-4-4) and (2-4-5) where 
(2-4-6) E[C(q,x)] 
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(2-4-7) G(q,x) PF(q,x) ; G(O,x) = 0 , G(k,k) 0, 
G > a , G < 0, where G. q x ~ dG ( i, j ) / d i 
G is the marginal expected penalty with respect to actual q 
output and is the marginal expected penalty with respect 
to declared output. It is assumed that the expected penalty 
increases with actual output at any given declaration level 
and decreases with declared output at any given production 
level. 
Equation (2-4 7) gives the expected penalty as a 
product of its probability and monetary fine components. 
Individual producers are assumed to be r k neutral there-
fore only the absolute magnitude of the expected penalty is 
relevant to output decisions rather than its component parts. 
Thus a high probability/low fine combination generates an 
identical optimal output to a low probability/high fine 
combination \"lhich yields the same expected penalty" 
No penalty is incurred for overreporting, truthful 
declarations,or at zero output. It must be noted however 
that profit maximization precludes overreporting and so in 
the analysis that follows 
(2-4-8) x .: q 
The expected penalty as shown in (2-4-7) is a product 
of the monetary fine and the probability of detection and 
prosecution. The probability term is of necessity f e. 
(2-4-9) a < p(q,x) < 1 
It is assumed here that the monetary fine is also 
The justification for this assumption will be establ 
in Section 2-7 where further discussion of the form of the 
expected penalty function occurs. If either of the component 
52. 
terms is zero, so is the product. Hence 
(2-4-10) G(q,x) I ::: G(q,x) I 
p(q,X) = 0 F(q,x) = 0 
::: 0 
The firm now acts to maximize profits within the 
regulatory framework. Expected profits for the competitive 
firm are given by 
(2-4-11) n(q,x,a) = p.q - c(q) - tx - G(q,x,a) 
where a is some parameter representing the structure of the 
expected penalty function which is exogenous to the firm. 
(2-4-12) G > 0 
a 
The firm chooses the output and declaration levels 
which maximize the value of (2-4-11). Expected profit is 
assumed to be locally concave jointly in declared and 
actual output. Differentiating with respect to the firm's 
decision variables gives the first-order conditions which 
are sufficient for a maximum. 
(2-4-13 ) 
(2-4-14) 
dn(q,x,a) = P-c'(q) 
dq 
dn(q,x,a) ::: -t - G < 0 
dX x > 
G < 0, < if q* q o 
< if x* o 
> if x* q* 
Solving these first-order conditions gives the firm's 
optimal choices of actual and declared output levels as 
functions of the market price, the unit rate of sales tax, 
and the parameter of the expected penalty function. 
(2-4-15) q* = q*(P,t,a) x* ::: x*(P,t,a) 
Equation (2-4-13) shows that,at the optimal output 
level, price equals marginal cost of production together 
with the effect of marginal changes in output on the 
expected penalty. If, however, the penalty-inclusive marginal 
cost always exceeds the market price, optimal output is zero. 
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Equation (2-4-14) shows that the optimal declaration 
level is found by comparing the unit tax rate with the 
marginal effect of declaration changes on the expected 
penalty. If a unit increase in declaration always reduces 
the expected penalty by a smaller amount than the unit tax 
rate, the optimal declaration is zero. When the reverse 
condition holds, full declaration is the optimal strategy. 
Assuming that conditions sufficient to generate 
interior solutions to equations (2-4-13) and (2-4-14) hold, 
it is possible to examine the effect of parameter changes 
on the firm's behaviour by totally differentiating the first-
order conditions. This gives 
(2-4-16) dP - c" (q) dq - G dq - G dx - G da qq qx qa o 
(2-4-17) - dt - G dq - G dx - G d a = 0 
xq xx xa 
Rewriting in matrix form gives 
(2-4-18) G + c"(q) G qq qx 
G 
xq G xx 
and rearranging 
(2-4-19) dq 
dx 
1 
1':0 
G 
xx 
-G xq 
dq 
dx 
-G qx 
G + c"(q) qq 
dP - G da qa 
-dt - G da 
xa 
dP - G da qa 
-dt - G da Xa 
where 1':0 is the determinant of the coefficient matrix and 
is strictly positive by the assumption of concavity of the 
profit function. Thus 
(2-4-20) 1':0 = (G qq + c"(q)) G -(G )2> O· using G G xx qx ' qx xq 
PROPOSITION 2-4-1: 
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Suppose that an individual profit maxi-
mizing firm in a competitive market is 
faced with a strictly positive unit sales 
tax payable on declared output and 
enforced by means of an expected monetary 
penalty and that the firm's profit 
function is concave: 
( i ) 
( ii ) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Supply increases with price. 
Increases in price may increase 
or decrease the firm's optimal 
output declaration depending on 
the sign of the cross-derivative 
of the expected penalty function 
with respect to declared and 
actual output. 
Increases in the tax rate may 
increase or decrease the optimal 
output of the firm at any given 
price for which supply is strictly 
positive, depending on the sign 
of the cross-derivative of the 
expected penalty function with 
respect to actual and declared 
output. 
The effect of a change in price 
on declared output is equal and 
opposite to that of a change in 
the tax rate on actual output. 
(v) Increases in the tax rate reduce 
the firm's optimal output decla-
ration. 
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Proof: 
(i) Using (2 4-19) with dt = da = 0 
G 
(2-4-21) xx > - 0 if and only if 
< 
> 
- 0 
< 
Concavity of the firm's profit function requires 
overall convexity of the firm's penalty inclusive 
cost structure as shown by (2-4 20). It also 
implies that the convexity in production cost domi-
nates any possible non-convexity in output of the 
expected penalty function. Thus G + c"(q) > 0 qq 
which from (2-4-20) ensures that G is strictly 
xx 
positive and the result holds. 
(ii) Using (2 4 19) with dt = da = 0 
(2-4-22) dx* > < - 0 if and only if G 0 
< xq > 
where G
xq is the cross-derivative of the expected 
penalty function and hence the result holds. 
(iii) Using equation (2-4-19) with dP da o 
(2-4-23) = > - 0 if and only if G - 0 < xq < 
> 
dt 
and the result holds. 
(iv) The result follows from (2-4-22) and (2-4-23). 
(v) Using equation (2 4-19) with dP = da = 0 
(2-4-24) dx* dt -t[Gqq+clI(q)] ~ 0 if and only if 
> G + c"(q) - 0 qq < 
From the assumption of concavity of the prof 
function G + c"(q) > 0 and the result holds. qq 
Results (i) and (v) of Proposition 2-4-1 are intui-
tively appealing. With a marginal expected penalty that 
o 
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increases in size with the severity of the violation, the 
convexity of the expected penalty function reinforces the 
convexity of production cost and hence profitable expansion 
in output requires an increasing market price. With res-
pect to the other choice variable of the firm, a ceteris 
paribus increase in the tax rate raises the cost of any 
given output declaration. Faced with this situation profit 
maximization dictates that the firm's optimal declaration 
falls. 
Result (iii) states that a change in price, which 
from part (i) of the Proposition serves to increase the 
optimal output of the firm at any given tax rate and 
penalty structure, may alter the firm's optimal declaration 
in either direction or not at all. The qualitative nature 
of the result depends on how the price-induced change in 
output affects the marginal expected penalty with respect 
to changes in declaration. 
Equation (2-4-14) shows that with 0 < x* < q*, the 
optimal declaration is found by balancing the marginal 
expected penalty G with the tax rate. 
x 
If the price-induced 
increase in output acts to increase the absolute size of 
this term at any given declaration, that is G < 0, then, 
xq 
given G > a,the profit-maximizing strategy for the firm 
xx 
in accordance with equation (2-4-14) is to increase the 
size of its output declaration. The converse result is 
established by using the same reasoning with opposite 
assumptions concerning G 
xq 
Result (ii) is also not immediately obvious. For 
instance, together with result (v), it suggests that an 
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increase in the rate of sales tax can reduce the firm's 
optimal output declaration but raise actual output at any 
price leading to a rightward shift in its supply curve. 
Th is directly opposite to the predictions of traditional 
tax analysis which arise from (2-4-2). To preclude t 
possibility,given the conditions sufficient to generate the 
other results in Proposition 2-4-1,it is necessary to assume 
that G = G < O. qx xq 
Finally, (2-4-22) and (2-4-23) show that the effect 
of a change in the tax rate on produced output equal and 
opposite to that of a change in price on declared output. 
This type of cross-symmetrical result is commonly found and 
arises from maximization over a continuous surface which 
ensures that marginal responses to parameters are effect 
equalized. 
Figure 2-4-1 below gives a graphical presentation of 
these results for the representative firm. The diagram is 
for illustrative purposes only; the precise nature of the 
expected penalty function and its implications are discussed 
in Section 2-7. 
As Figure 2-4-1 illustrates, actual output produced 
is a composite of declared and undeclared output. Panel 
(i) shows declared output against while undeclared 
output is given in panel (ii). Panel (iii) compares 
declared output from panel (i), sented by the dashed 
line, with actual output in the ed environment and 
pre-tax supply given by the solid I and dotted line 
respectively. All prices shown are tax-inclusive consumer 
prices and the curves are constructed using a given rate of 
sales tax to > 0 and a given expected penalty function 
structure a~. 
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Figure 2-4 1 shows the initial ql units produced by 
the firm as all undeclared. 
PROPOSITION 2-4-2: Suppose that an individual firm with 
strictly increasing marginal production 
cost operating in a competitive market 
is faced with a strictly positive unit 
sales tax payable on declared output 
and enforced by means of an expected 
monetary penalty which does not totally 
prohibit undeclared output but is convex 
in output and the size of violation. At 
sufficiently low prices, the firm pays 
no taxes and sells all output illegally_ 
Proof. 
Expressions (2-4-13) and (2-4-14) show the s es of 
actual and declared output at any price level, given values 
of the tax rate and the expected penalty function, and 
hence also reveal the extent of undeclared output q* - x*. 
The assumption that the expected penalty does not 
totally 
(2 4-25) 
undeclared output can be expressed as 
Lim 
q+O+ 
o 0 G (q,O,a ) > -t 
x 
which from (2-4-14) results in zero declaration being the 
optimal strategy. Given (2-4-25) then, in the neighbourhood 
of q* := 0, q* x* > 0 and all output produced is undeclared. 
Assuming that no output is declared, the penalty-
lusive marginal cost of producing an additional unit of 
undeclared output is 
(2 4 26) o Me ( 0) = C I (q) + G (q, 0 , a ) q 
Alternatively, the marginal cost of produc g a unit of 
declared output is 
6 0. 
(2-4-27) MC ( q) = c I ( q) + to 
Comparing (2-4-26) and (2-4-27), profit maximization 
requires that if an additional unit is produced, it is 
undeclared for all units such that 
(2-4-28) ° to G (q,O,a ) < q 
It is assumed that the expected penalty is convex in 
the size of undeclared output and,from (2-4-21), actual out-
put increases with price. Assume then that there is some 
pi > ° such that 
(2-4-29) 
Using (2-4-25) and (2-4-28) therefore, for all prices p < pi, 
x* = 0, no taxes are paid and any output that the firm 
produces is sold illegally. 
IJ 
The result of Proposition 2-4-2 is appealing. If 
there was no enforcement of the tax, the supply price of 
declared output would exceed that of undeclared output at 
any quantity by the tax rate to. Assuming consumers face no 
penalty,S arbitrage dictates that there be one market price 
irrespective of whether output is legal or illegal and 
hence no output will be declared [Smith, 1976]. Neither 
will output be declared if the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output, given that no output is declared, 
is always less than the tax rate. This implies that high 
enough taxes with a given expected penalty structure will 
make criminals of all producers. 
Figure 2-4-1 portrays the particular case where, for 
prices exceeding pi, all additional output produced is 
declared and hence undeclared output remains constant at ql. 
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In general this will not occur. 
PROPOSITION 2-4-3: Suppose that an individual firm in a 
competitive market is faced with a 
strictly positive unit sales tax payable 
on declared output and enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty and that 
the firm1s profit function is strictly 
concave. An increase in market price, 
from a level at which both actual and 
declared output are strictly positive, 
increases, decreases, or leaves unchanged 
Proof. 
(2-4-30) 
the extent of undeclared output, as the 
effect on the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to declared output of an 
increase in output declaration exceeds, 
is less than, or equals the negative of 
that of an increase in actual output. 
~(q* - x*) dP 
dq* 
dP 
G 
xx 
= ---
dx* 
dP 
using (2-4-21) and (2-4-22). Therefore 
(2-4-31) d > dP (q* - x*) '( o if and only if G >-G xx < xq 
Another result which is closely related to this 
concerns the possibility of different degrees of price 
responsiveness in actual output in the regulated and 
unregulated frameworks. 
o 
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PROPOSITION 2 4 4: S an individual f 
market is faced 
strictly positive unit sales tax payable 
on declared output and enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty and that 
the firm's profit function is concave. 
In the region where both declared output 
and actual output are strictly positive, 
the firm's supply curve in the presence 
of the sales tax is less price responsive 
than the untaxed supply curve if the 
expected penalty function is convex. 
Proof. 
Comparing (2-2-6) and (2-4-21) shows that 
dq* > 
dP < dP 
(2-4-32) 
if and only if 
G 
xx 
(G + c"(q))G qq xx 
> 1 
(G ) 2 
xq < c"(q) 
where q* represents supply in the presence of the sales tax 
s 
and q represents untaxed supply_ Simplifying and rearrang-
> ~s 
ing (2-4-32) yields the result that dP < dP if and only if 
(2-4-33) < G G - (G )2 - 0 qq xx xq > 
ss~on (2-4-33) is a determinant of the matrix 
of second part 1 derivatives of the expected penalty 
function G. If G is convex, (2-4-33) has a positive sign 
and the taxed supply curve is less pr responsive than 
untaxed supply. 
o 
result is intuitively ing. The convexity 
of the expected penalty function reinforces the convexity 
a 
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present in production cost. Any given increase in 
output therefore requires a larger increase in price than 
in the unregulated environment and hence supply is less 
price responsive with the sales tax than without. 
The effect of a change in the tax rate on a firm's 
behaviour can also be examined. In standard tax analysis 
the effect would be to alter the supply price at any given 
quantity by the change in the tax rate leading to a vertical 
shift in the supply curve. Here, where tax violations are 
allowed for, the precise nature of the effect of a change in 
the tax rate on the firm's supply curve depends on the 
properties of the expected penalty function. 
ITION 2-4 5: 
Proof. 
that an individual f 
strictly positive unit sales tax payable 
on declared output and enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty and that 
the firm's it function i 
Assuming that the cross-derivative of 
the expected penalty functi?n with 
respect to actual and declared output 
is negative and that the expected penalty 
is convex in actual out 
in the t s the amount 
output that is produced illegally before 
From (2-4 29) the maximum level of output that is 
produced before any is declared occurs where the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output, given that no 
output is declared, is equal to the tax rate. In Figure 
2-4-1 this output level is given by g' in panel (ii). 
If the tax rate is increased to some t' > to then 
(2-4-34) G (gl,O,CI O ) < t' q 
Given the assumption that G > 0, equality between the qq 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output, given 
that no output declared, and the tax rate,is restored 
at some q" > ql. Therefore 
I 2 - 4 - 3 5 ) d~ [qmax I x. 0] > 0 
and the result holds. 
Alternat the result can be demonstrated by 
examining the profit-maximizing declaration strategy at 
any output level and tax rate. At the original tax rate 
to and output level q' in Figure 2-4-1 
(2 4-36) Lim 
x+O+ 
which results from the equality condition in (2-4-14). 
If the tax rate increased to some t I > to then 
(2-4-37) 
Given the assumption that G < 0, equal y between the 
xq 
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o 
marginal expected penalty with respect to declared output, 
given that no output is declared, and the tax rate, is 
restored at some q" > ql. This approach then also generates 
the result presented (2 4 35) and hence proves the 
Proposition. 
Equations (2 4 23) and (2-4-24) ensure that, provided 
the firm's profit function is strictly concave and G < 0, 
xq 
an increase in the tax rate will lower both declared output 
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and actual output at any given price. From (2-4-35) it may 
be expected that an increase in the tax rate will also lead 
to an increase in undeclared profit. This is not in 
general so, however. 
PROPOSITION 2-4-6: Suppose that an individual firm in a 
competitive market is faced with a 
strictly positive unit sales tax payable 
on declared output and enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty and that 
the firm's profit function is concave. 
At any price level for which both actual 
and declared outputs are strictly 
positive, an increase in the tax rate 
increases, decreases, or leaves unchanged, 
the extent of undeclared output, if and 
only if the combined effect on the mar-
ginal expected penalties with respect 
to declared output and actual output of 
a change in actual output exceeds, is 
less than, or equals, the negative of 
the effect of a change in actual output 
on marginal production cost. 
Proof. 
(2-4-38) d dq* dx* dt(q* - x*) = dt - dt 
Substituting from (2-4-23) and (2-4-24) 
d( * * _> 0' d 1 'f dt q - x ) < If an on y l 
(2-4-39) Gqx - [G qq + c" ( q)] :: 0 11 - 11 < 
Rearranging and using G = G qx xq 
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d~(q* - x*) ~ 0 if and only if 
> (2-4-40) G + G --c"(q) xq qq < 
where the left-hand side of (2-4-40) is the combined effect 
of a change in actual output on the marginal expected penal-
ties with respect to declared output and actual output 
respectively, and the right-hand side is the effect of a 
change in actual output on marginal production cost. 
D 
If ">" holds in (2-4-40), an increase in the tax rate 
will increase the extent of undeclared output. This is an 
intuitively appealing result but, as shown in Proposition 
2-4-6, is by no means a necessary consequence of enforce-
menta It is possible that the magnitude of the effect of 
a change in output on the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to declared output exceeds that of its effect on the 
marginal expected penalty with respect to actual output. 
This could be so if the structure of the expected penalty 
function is designed to encourage more truthful declaration 
as output levels rise. In this case, G + G < O. The 
xq qq 
direction of the inequality in (2-4-40) then depends on the 
degree of convexity of the firm's penalty-exclusive produc-
tion cost. 
Propositions 2-4-1 to 2-4-6 are based on the assump-
tion of a given expected penalty function exogenous to the 
firm. Changes in this function, however, through the para-
meter a, will affect the firm's behaviour. 
PROPOSITION 2-4-7: Suppose that an individual firm in a 
competitive market is faced with a 
strictly positive unit sales tax payable 
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on declared output and enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty, that the 
cross-derivative of the expected penalty 
function with respect to actual and 
declared 
the firm' 
There is an equivalence between the 
effects on actual and declared outputs 
of a change in the expected penalty and 
t in taxes and 
An increase in the expected penalty 
reduces actual output if the effect on 
the marginal expected penalty with res-
pect to actual output of the change in 
penalty is sufficiently large whereas 
it increases declared output if the 
effect of the change in penalty on the 
marginal expected penalty with respect 
to actual output is sufficiently small. 
Proof. 
using (2-4-19) with dp = dt 0 
(2-4-41) dq* dCi 
G 
xx 
- --!J 
substituting from (2-4-21) and (2 4 23) gives 
(2-4-42) s!.q* == da 
dq* 
- G dt XCi 
s!.q* G 
dP qa 
which shows the equivalence between the effects, on actual 
output, of a change in the expected penalty parameter and 
those of changes in taxes and price. 
do* > From (2-4-42) ~ < 0 and only if 
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(2-4-43) G qa 
< dq* dq* 
>" [d t / dP ] Gxa 
Given the assumptions that G < 0 and G < 0, the right-
xq xa 
hand side of (2-4-43) is some positive number. From (2-4-43) 
then, increases in penalties reduce actual output if and only 
if G is sufficiently large. qa 
Again from (2-4-19), with dp dt = 0 
dx* 
da 
G 
xq G 
-6,- qa 
[(G + c"(q)] qq (2-4-44) 
Substituting from (2-4-22) and (2-4-24) gives 
(2-4-45) dx* dx* dx* =-G --G da dt Xa dP qa 
which shows the equivalence between the effects, on declared 
output, of a change in the expected penalty parameter and 
those of changes in taxes and price. 
dx* > Rearranging (2-4-45) reveals that da < 0 if and 
only if 
(2-4-46) 
Given the assumptions that G and G are negative, the 
xq xa 
right-hand side of (2-4-46) is some positive number. From 
(2-4-46) then, increases in penalties increase declared out-
put if and only if G is sufficiently small. qa 
Intuitively, an increase in the structure of the 
penalty function may be expected to raise the marginal 
expected penalty cost of output expansion at any given 
declaration level and raise the marginal expected penalty 
saving of increased declaration at any given actual output 
level where undeclared output is produced. This is the 
reasoning behind the assumption that Gqa > 0 and Gxa < O. 
D 
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A result which is widely held in the deterrence and 
crime literatures, both theoretical and empirical, is that 
increases in expected penalties reduce the extent of illegal 
behaviour. 6 This is now investigated in the present context 
of tax declarations. 
PROPOSITION 2-4-8: Suppose that an individual firm in a 
competitive market is faced with a 
strictly positive unit sales tax payable 
on declared output and enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty and that 
the firm's profit function is concave. 
Assuming that the cross-derivative of 
the expected penalty function with respect 
to actual and declared outputs is-negative, 
that the effect of an increase in the 
expected penalty is to increase the 
absolute values of the marginal expected 
penalties with respect to actual and 
declared output, and that the expected 
penalty function is convex in output, an 
increase in the expected penalty reduces 
the amount of output that is produced 
illegally before any is declared. 
Proof. 
In Proposition 2-4-2 the maximum amount of output 
produced before any is declared is given by the value of q 
that satisfies (2-4-29) given to and aO This is taken to 
occur, as portrayed in Figure 2-4-1, at output level ql and 
price pl. Assuming that G > ° then at some a l > aO qa 
(2-4-47) G (g*(P I ,to,cy' ),O,cy') > to g 
Given that G > 0, the eguality between the marginal gg 
7 0. 
expected penalty with respect to output, given that no out-
put is declared, and the tax rate,is restored at some 
gil < g' which from (2-4-21) occurs at some P" < pl. There-
fore 
(2-4-48) 
and the result holds. 
Alternatively, as for Proposition 2-4-5, the result 
can be demonstrated by examining the profit-maximizing 
declaration strategy at any output level and tax rate. 
Using (2-4-36) and assuming that Gxcy < ° 
(2-4-49) Lim 
x+O+ 
G (g' ,x,cy') < _to 
x 
o 
Given that G > ° (2-4-14) implies that the optimal decla-
xx 
ration is strictly positive at the output level g' and 
penalty parameter cy = cy'. 
With G < 0, eguality between the marginal expected 
xg 
penalty with respect to declared output, given that no out-
put is declared, and the tax rate,is restored at some 
gil < g'. This approach then also generates the result 
presented in (2-4-48) and hence proves the Proposition. 
This result is consistent with the thesis that 
increased penalties reduce illegal behaviour. However, it 
does not of itself imply that the extent of undeclared out-
put, at any price level for which both declared and actual 
output are strictly positive, will be reduced by an increase 
in the expected penalty. 
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It may be expected that an increase in the expected 
y at any given level of illegal activity would encour-
age a more truthful declaration of production act ies and 
thus dx*/da > O. Assuming that this is the case, the extent 
of undec output unambiguously decreases if the increase 
in penalty reduces the level of actual output. This is 
suffic to ensure the result but is not necessary. A 
necessary and sufficient condition to ensure greater com-
pliance with the tax is that the effect on declared output 
of the increase in expected penalty exceeds that on actual 
output. 
2-4-9: Suppose that an individual firm in a 
competitive market is faced with a 
strictly positive unit sales tax payable 
on declared output and enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty, that the 
cross-derivative of the expected penalty 
with to declared and actual 
ive and that an increase 
the expected penalty acts to increase 
the absolute values of the marginal 
expected penalties with respect to actual 
and There is an 
equivalence between the effect on 
undeclared out of a chan in the 
expected penalty and that of a change in 
taxes and price. Higher penalties reduce 
the extent of undeclared output if it 
increases with the tax rate and this 
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that occurs h an increase in 
Proof. 
Using (2-4-42) and (2-4-45) 
(2-4-50) 
(2-4-51) 
d dq* 
da q*-x*) = da 
d (q*-x*)G 
xa 
dx* > 0 if and 1 . f da < on y l 
From (2-4-50) and (2-4-51), a reduction in the extent of 
undeclared output as a result of an increase in the expected 
penalty requires that "<" holds in (2-4-51). 
Given that the extent of undeclared output increases 
~ith the tax rate, and that G < 0 and G > 0, (2-4-51) 
xa qa 
is unambiguously ne ive if the extent of undeclared output 
increases with pr If however undeclared output decreases 
in price then from (2 4-51) 
(2-4-52) d d dt (q*-x*) > --(q*-x*) dP G
xa 
in order that undeclared output decreases as expected penal-
ties are increased. 
o 
Propositions 2 4 1 to 2-4-9 describe aspects of how 
the behaviour of an individual firm is affected by the 
introduction of an enforced sales tax given that the firm's 
profit function is concave. Many of the intu ively appealing 
results which are widely held in similar form in the deter-
rence and crime 1 eratures are present here but depend on 
the properties of the expected penalty function. These 
results are further d cussed in Section 2 7 where different 
forms of the expected penalty function are examined. 
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2-5 THE EFFECT OF A SALES TAX ON THE INDUSTRY 
As the behaviour of individual firms at any given 
price is altered by the existence of a sales tax and 
expected penalty function for false output declaration, so 
the competitive equilibrium of the industry will be affected 
leading to the regulated competitive equilibrium. This is 
shown in Figure 2-5-1 below. 
o 
Figure 2-5-1: 
A 
Q 
Industry equilibrium with an enforced 
sales tax 
I 
I 
I 
IK 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
D 
I • 
Q 
Curves MPC and MPC' are constructed on the assumption 
that there is technical and economic efficiency within the 
industry so that, with identical firms, they differ only in 
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aggregation scale from those of the individual firm in Figure 
2-4-1. All relevant curves are drawn for a given fixed value 
of the expected penalty function parameter a = a O• 
c The initial competitive equilibrium at E occurs at 
an output QC which exceeds the socially optimal level Q from 
Figure 2-2-2. A unit tax of to is imposed which under tra-
ditional tax analysis would lead to a vertical shift in the 
industry supply curve of AB = FT. 
Allowing for evasion of the tax, an illustrative 
expected penalty function gives a penalty-inclusive marginal 
cost curve ATK. From (2-4-14) the aggregate optimal amount 
of undeclared output is given by Qt - Xt at point T where the 
marginal expected penalty, given that no output is declared, 
equals the tax rate. 
The regulated competitive industry equilibrium occurs 
at some point such as E~ where the marginal expected penalty 
is equal to the difference between the demand price and 
private marginal p~oduction cost evaluated at that quantity 
which mayor may not equal the tax rate. Thus at the regu-
lated competitive equilibrium 
(2-5-1) 
A 
( * * 0) _ G (Q* X* 0) - p* _ pAt':: to Gqqt,x,a - Q t' ,a - t 
where Pt - Pt is the difference between the demand price 
and private marginal production cost at the regulated 
equilibrium quantity Qt' and 
(2-5-2) o < Q* < QC : Qt* = zq* 
- t t 
where z represents the number of firms in the industry. 
Expressions (2-5-1) and (2-5-2) show that there are 
several possibilities at the regulated competitive equili-
brium. 
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First , from equation (2-5-1), the tax rate mayor may 
not be binding on behaviour. Figure 2-5-1 illustrates a 
situation where it is, but, if the tax rate exceeded amount 
JK, behaviour would be solely determined by the expected 
penalty function and the rate of tax would be levant. 
A binding tax rate requires an expected penalty function such 
that the marg expected penalty with re to actual 
output, given that no output is declared, exceeds the tax 
rate at some output level which does not exceed the regulated 
competitive equ ibrium level. Thus, assuming a marginal 
expected penalty that is non-decreasing in output, the tax 
rate is binding on behaviour if 
(2-5-3) o GQ(Q1x,a ) ~ t for some Q' : Qt 
Secondly, from expression (2-5-2) the regulated com-
petitive equilibrium is bounded from above and below. It may 
coincide with the unregulated competitive equilibrium. For 
this to occur with a non-negative expected pe function 
either the tax rate must be zero or any strictly pos ive tax 
rate must be accompanied by a zero expected penalty. Alter-
natively it is possible to regulate the industry out of 
existence. 
In Figure 2 5 1, Po - ~o represents the difference 
between demand price and marginal private cost of production 
for the initial unit of output from the industry. The regu-
lated equilibrium occurs at zero output if either of the 
following circumstances eventuates. 
Given Po - ~o' no output will be produced in the 
regulated environment if t = Po - ~o and the expected 
is such that the unit of output is declared. This 
requires 
y 
(2 5 4) 
If however the tax rate is t > Po - ~o then the 
penalty function must be such that 
(2 5 5) 
ed 
In this case it is the marginal expected penalty at zero 
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output which is binding and causes the regulated competitive 
equilibrium to emerge at this level. A regulated competitive 
equilibrium at zero output cannot be generated h tax 
rate t < Po ~o irrespective of the penalty used. 
F , the regulated competitive equilibrium may 
occur at some intermediate point such as that shown on Figure 
2-5 1. This requires either a binding tax rate t < Po ~o 
or any non binding tax rate with an expected penalty ion 
such that 
(2-5-6) 
Th is the interesting case and is that most extens 
treated in the following analysis. 
From Figure 2-5-1 it appears that the regulated 
competitive equilibrium for a strictly positive tax rate 
and ed penalty occurs at an increased market 
brium price and reducGd market quantity compared with the 
unregulated competitive equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 2 5-1: Suppose that an industry which comprises 
number of ident 
competitive firms subject to a unit sales 
on declared out and 
penalty such that the firms· profit 
functions are concave, faces a market 
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demand curve with non-zero finite price 
elasticity. Assuming that an increase 
in output increases the absolute value 
of the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to declared output, that the 
expected penalty function is convex in 
actual output, and that an increase in 
the expected penalty sufficiently raises 
the marginal expected penalty with respect 
to actual output; 
(i) An increase in the tax rate raises 
the market equilibrium price and 
reduces industry equilibrium output 
only if the tax rate is binding at 
the initial regulated industry 
equilibrium. 
(ii) An increase in the expected penalty 
at any given declaration and output 
in general raises the market 
equilibrium price and reduces 
industry equilibrium output. Sup-
pose however that the effect on the 
marginal expected penalty with 
respect to declared output of an 
increase in declared output is 
equal and opposite to that of an 
increase in actual output and equal 
to the effect of a change in actual 
output on the marginal expected 
penalty with respect to actual 
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output. In this case, if the 
marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output, given that no 
output is declared, is not binding 
at the initial regulated equili-
brium, a change in the expected 
penalty has no effect on market 
equilibrium quantity or price. 
Proof. 
From (2-4-15), (2-2-2) and (2-2-7) it is evident that 
market equilibrium price is a function of the tax rate and 
the expected penalty. Thus in industry equilibrium 
(2-5-7) D(P(t,a)) = S(P(t,a),t,a) 
where S(.) is the regulated industry supply function defined 
as the summation of individual firm supply curves in the 
regulated environment as for (2-2-7) in the unregulated 
environment. 
There are two possibilities for the regulated industry 
equilibrium Qt. Firstly, 
(2-5-8) 
Here the regulated equilibrium occurs at some quantity Qt 
where the marginal expected penalty with respect to output, 
given that no output is declared, is equal to the difference 
between the demand price and private marginal production 
cost at that output level. The tax rate exceeds the value 
and hence does not directly affect behaviour. In Figure 
2-5-1, this would occur if the tax rate exceeded amount JK. 
Alternatively, 
(2-5-9) ~* t = t e 
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In this case the marginal expected penalty with respect to 
output, given that no output is declared, exceeds the tax 
rate at the regulated industry equilibrium Qt. This is the 
situation il c in Figure 2-5 1 at Et . Here, increases 
in the expected penalty function may not affect the regulated 
industry equil ium. 
(i) Totally differentiating (2-5-7) gives 
(2-5-10) ~~~~~~t~a) ap(t,a) as ) + as(.) ap(t,O:) at + t ap ao: 
as ( . ) 
+ --
ao: 
Rearranging with ao: = 0 gives 
o 
(2-5-11) ap*(t,o:) 
at 
> o if and only if 
< 
as ( . ) / at "> 0 
If (2-5-8) holds, as{ .)/at = 0 and from (2-5-11) 
market equilibrium price is unaffected by changes in 
the tax rate. If this is not the case however, then, 
given G < 0, an increase in the tax rate reduces 
xq 
individual firm supply at any price level by (2-4-33), 
and hence as( .)/at < O. From (2 5 11) therefore, an 
increase a binding tax rate raises market equili-
brium price. Noting from (2-5-7) that 
(2-5-12) Q* t D(P*(t,o:)) 
where Qt is the regulated industry equilibrium output 
level 
aQ* t (2-5-13) = D'(P(t,o:)) ap*(t,o:) > o if and only if 
< at 
ap* to:) 5 0 
> 
Using (2-5 11) then, an increase a binding tax 
rate reduces market equilibrium output in the regu-
lated industry. 
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(ii) Rearranging (2-5-10) with at o gives 
(2-5-14) ;:: p < o if and only if 
< 
> 0 
If (2 5 9) does not hold, then,given G is suffi-qa 
ciently positive, an increase in the expected penalty 
reduces individual firm supply by (2 4 42), and hence 
as(.)/aa < O. From (2-5-14) therefore, an increase 
in a binding expected penalty s market equili-
brium price. Using (2-5-12) 
(2-5-15) D'(P(t, a))ap;~t,a) : 0 if and only if 
< 
- 0 
> 
substituting from (2-5-14) then, an increase in a 
binding expected penalty reduces market equilibrium 
output in the regulated industry. 
This result is true in general, given the assumptions 
of concavity of the individual firm's profit function 
and convexity in output of the ed penalty func-
tion, even if the marginal expected penalty, given 
that no output is declared, exceeds the tax rate at 
the regulated industry equilibrium. 
Using (2-4 19), for any given expected penalty func-
tion and tax rate, there is a maximum amount of output 
in ially produced before any is declared. At this 
output level the marginal expected penalty with res-
pect to output, given that no output is declared, is 
equal to the tax rate. This gives a certain amount 
of undeclared output. From (2 4 33), however, the 
optimal extent of undeclared output is, in general, 
not independent of the output level of the firm, and 
hence the industry. 
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An increase in the expected penalty function will, 
from Proposition 2-4-8, reduce the amount of output 
that is initially produced before any is declared. 
If the optimal extent of undeclared output is not 
independent of the level of actual output, then. given 
that G is sufficiently positive and using (2 5-14) qCi 
and (2-5-15), the increase in expected penalty raises 
the market equilibrium price and lowers industry 
equilibrium output even though (2-5 9) holds. 
If however (2-5-9) holds and G = G qq xx 
that G > a and hence the individual f qq 
such 
IS profit 
function is concave, from (2-4-33) the optimal extent 
of undeclared output is independent of actual output 
and determined by the output level where the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output, given that 
no output is declared, is equal to the tax rate. In 
t case, therefore, individual firm and hence indus-
supply at the regulated equilibrium pr level 
unaffected by an increase in the expected y 
and so from (2-5-14) and (2-5-15) the increase in 
expected penalty leaves the regulated industry 
equilibrium unchanged. 
D 
Equations (2-5-11) and (2-5-14) show that an 
in the expected penalty function or tax rate, which acts to 
decrease individual firm and hence industry supply at every 
price, es the market equilibrium price. Multiplying 
this result by the price responsiveness of the demand curve 
in (2-5-12) and (2-5 15) gives the effect of the increase 
in the expected penalty function and tax rate respect ly 
on the equilibrium quantity in the market. Given the new 
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market equilibrium price, the individual firm's optimal 
regulated output can be found by solving (2-4-13) at this 
price which gives q~ consistent with (2-5-2). 
Following Proposition 2-5-1 and the discussion of the 
conditions required to generate each of the possible out-
comes in (2-5-2) it is evident that, with an appropriate mix 
of the tax rate and the expected penalty, it is possible to 
A 
restrain industry output to the socially optimal level Q in 
Figure 2-5-1. This can be accomplished by setting the tax 
rate and expected penalty so that either 
A A 0 (2-5-16) t = t GQ(Q,O,a ) > PA - PA or Q -Q 
A A 0 PA (2-5-17) t > t GQ(Q,D,a ) = - PA Q ~ 
Expression (2-5-16) describes the situation where the 
tax rate is set equal to the marginal externality at Q and 
the expected penalty is sufficient to ensure the declaration 
of at least the marginal unit of output. Alternatively 
(2-5-17) shows the case where the tax rate is prohibitive at 
this output level but the marginal expected penalty is such 
that Q is the regulated competitive equilibrium. Whether or 
not this occurs and which method is employed depends on the 
objectives of the regulator. These are discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
While Proposition 2-5-1 shows that changes in a non-
binding expected penalty or tax rate will not alter market 
equilibrium price and quantity, these changes will affect the 
size of the aggregate gain in industry profitability from 
tax evasion shown by area ABT in Figure 2-5-1. This point, 
which has implications for the policy mix used in regulating 
the industry, will also be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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2 6 THE EFFECTS OF AN OUTPUT QUOTA 
Assume that instead of being regulated by a 'pr 
oriented' control such as the sales tax in Sections 2-4 and 
2 5, firms in the externality-producing industry are now 
subject to quantitative restrictions. Denoting the unregu-
lated equilibrium by QC from Figure 2-2-2, the industry 
subject to a strictly binding quota of R units. 
(2 6-1) 
This aggregate quota is tradeable in a compet 
manner among firms within the industry. The assumption of 
identical profit maximizing firms ensures that, ss 
of the init allocation mechanism, in equilibrium the 
representative firm in the industry is subject to a quota of 
r units 
(2 6 2) c r = R/z < q 
where z is the number of firms in the industry and qC the 
individual firm's unregulated equilibrium output level. 
At the equilibrium trading price of the quota, any 
firm holding more than r units of quota would lower the 
expected penalty cost on its marginal unit of output but 
would be reducing its profit through the opportunity cost of 
hold g the excessive quota. Alternatively, any firm hold 
less than r un s of quota may have a lower opportunity cost 
of holding the quota but, with an expected penalty that 
increases in the size of the constraint violation, profits 
will be reduced by the increased expected penalty cost t 
incurs at any given output level with the smaller quota 
holding. sion (2-6-2) therefore gives the prof 
maximizing level of quota holding for the individual f 
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The initial allocation of quota then determines the distri~ 
bution of income within the industry but total industry 
income is dependent only on its aggregate size. 7 
As in the sales tax case, the imposition of an addi-
tional constraint on behaviour necessarily reduces profits. 
In the absence of deterrents to noncompliance, individual 
profit-maximizing behaviour will result in the competitive 
equilibrium outcome and therefore enforcement is required to 
make the control effective. Enforcement is carried out, here 
as before, by means of an expected monetary penalty H(q,r,S) 
which exhibits similar properties to the expected penalty 
function G(q,x,a) in the sales tax case, thus 
(2-6-3) H(q,r,S) = pF(q,r,13) H(O,r, S) = 0; H(k,k, 13) = 0, k 20; 
H > 0, H < 0, H13 > 0 q r 
where H is the marginal expected penalty with respect to q 
output, H is the marginal expected penalty with respect to 
r 
changes in quota holding and HS is the marginal expected 
penalty with respect to changes in the value of the parameter 
S. It is assumed that the expected penalty increases with 
output at any given quota level and decreases in the size of 
quota holding at any output level. 13 is a shift parameter 
in the expected penalty function external to the firm. 
Increases in S raise the expected penalty that the firm 
faces at any given output level and quota violation. 
From (2-2-3) the firm1s profit function becomes 
(2-6-4) TI(q,r) = P.q - c(q) - H(q,r,S) 
The firm chooses output so as to maximize the value 
of this expression. Differentiating with respect to q gives 
the first-order condition. 
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(2-6-5) 3TT(q,r,S) =P-c l (q) -H < 0; < only if q* = 0 3q q -
Solving (2-6-5) gives the firm's optimal output level 
as a function of the quota level and the expected penalty 
function at any given price. 
(2-6-6) q* = q*(P,r,S) 
Assuming that the market equilibrium price exceeds 
the marginal production cost for the initial unit of output, 
and that marginal production cost is non-decreasing in out-
put, the firm produces zero output if and only if it is 
faced with a zero quota enforced by an expected penalty 
function such that the marginal expected penalty for the 
initial unit of production exceeds the difference between 
marginal production cost and demand price. The most 
interesting and realistic case, however, is that when prohi-
bited activity occurs and it is this which is treated most 
extensively in the following analysis. 
Equation (2-6-5) shows that, at any positive quantity, 
the market price must rise by the amount of the marginal 
expected penalty evaluated at that quantity or alterna-
tively, with increasing marginal costs, quantity will fall 
at any given price. This is significant when considering 
the equivalence between price-oriented and quantitative 
controls. The expected penalty is essentially a tax which 
must be levied to support the quota. The allocation of 
quota reduces the quantity of output on which this "tax" is 
paid. 
The firm's marginal cost curve beyond the quota level 
shifts vertically by the amount of the expected penalty as 
is shown in Figure 2-6-1 below. 
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Me 
q 
Recalling that r is the firm's equilibrium holding 
of quota, the vertical distance between the Me curve and the 
dashed locus Me' shows the size of the marginal expected 
penalty at that level of violation such as amount AB at out-
put q' and violation ql-r. With a tradeable quota, the 
marginal expected penalty represents the minimum additional 
cost of il production or the maximum amount paid to 
acqu a legal right to produce and is thus the trading 
price of the quota. 
As has been assumed that an interior solution to 
equation (2-6-5) exists, the effect of parameter changes on 
the firm's output decision can be found by totally dif 
tiating the t-order condition. This gives 
(2-6-7 ) dP - c" (q) dq H dq - H dr - HqadS = 0 qq qr i-J 
and rearranging 
(2-6-8) [ C II (q) + H ] dq = dP - H dr - H d 6 qq qr qS 
PROPOSITION 2-6-1: 
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Suppose that an individual profit 
maximizing firm in a competitive market 
is faced with a strictly binding trade-
able quota enforced by means of an 
expected monetary penalty which is 
dependent on the firm's quota holding 
and output level and that the firm's 
profit function is concave; 
(i) Supply increases with price. 
(ii) An increase in the available 
quota increases, decreases, or 
leaves unchanged, the optimal 
output of the firm at any given 
price level for which supply is 
strictly positive if and only if 
the increase in quota decreases, 
increases, or leaves unchanged, 
the marqinal expected penalty with 
respect to output. 
(iii) An increase in the expected 
penalty at any given output and 
quota level increases, decreases, 
or leaves unchanged, the output 
level of the firm and hence 
increases, decreases, or leaves 
unchanged the extent of con-
straint violation, as it decreases, 
increases, or leaves unchanged, 
the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output. 
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Proof. 
(i) Using (2-6-8) with dS = dr = 0 gives 
(2 6 9) dq* _ 1 dP - c" (q) + H qq 
2:< 0 if and only if c ll (q) + H > 0 qq < 
From the second-order conditions, as in Propos ion 
2 4-1, concavity of the firm's profit function 
requires overall convexity in output in the firm's 
penalty-inclusive cost structure. 
> 0 and hence, from (2-6-9), supply 
price. 
Thus c" (q) + H qq 
ses with 
(ii) Using (2-6-8) with dS = dP = 0 
(2 6 10) 
- H dq* _ qr 
dr c" (q) + H qq 
> 
- 0 if and only if 
< 
< 0 
> 
where Hqr is the effect of a change in quota on the 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output. 
(iii) Using (2-6-8) with dP = dr = 0 
(2 6-11) dq* = d8 
- H 
q8 > 0 as H < 0 
C II (q) + H < q 8 > qq 
where HqS is the effect of a change in the expected 
penalty on the marginal expected penalty with respect 
to output at any given output level and quota 
holding. 
o 
Result (i) is intuitively appealing. With a convex 
penalty-inclusive cost function, profitab expansion in 
output requires an increasing market If the expected 
penalty function is convex in output, in addition to the 
normal condition on production cost, supply is less price 
responsive in the presence of the quota than in the unregu-
lated environment. 
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Result (ii) raises the possibility of the perverse 
result that when the quota level is increased or decreased, 
iurn output changes in the opposite direction. Thus 
instance a tightening of the quota on the firm could 
lead to an expansion in the firm's output at any price. 
This represents a rightward shift in its supply curve. Given 
the other assumptions of the model, a necessary and 
cient condition to preclude this occurrence is H < o. qr 
Th result together with the price responsiveness result 
from part (i) of the Proposition will be discussed 
in Section 2 7 when specific forms of the expected penalty 
function and their behavioural implications are considered. 
Finally, result (iii) also contains the poss lity 
of a perverse outcome. As outlined in Section 2 4, the 
generally accepted result in the deterrence literature is 
that increased penalties reduce non-compliance. From (2-6-11) 
this occurs if and only if HqS > O. That is, the increase 
in expected penalty must of necessity raise the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output in order for 
increased penalties to facilitate compliance. As argued 
with reference to (2-6-5), Hq is essent ly the price of 
illegal activity. The assumption that HqS > 0 is nothing 
more than a requirement that the increase in the expected 
penalty structure raises the price il activity. A 
well-designed enforcement strategy could be expected to 
exhibit this property but the alternative policy is further 
discussed in Section 2-7. 
This result showing that increased penalties increase 
compliance with regulations is cons with Proposition 
6-2 and the same comments apply_ 
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The rst-order condition given in (2 6 5) showed 
that, with a non-zero marginal expected penalty, the firm's 
marginal costs, inclusive of the expected penalty, increase 
with the imposition of a quota leading to ftward or 
upward shi in t~e supply curve shown in F 2-6-1. The 
industry result is illustrated in Figure 2-6 2 below. 
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Figure 2-6-2. The effect of an output quota on the 
industry 
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Curves MPC and MPC' are constructed on t~e assumption 
that there is technical and economic ef ciency within the 
so that with identical firms, they differ only in 
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egation scale from those of the individual firm. 
Beyond the level of the aggregate quota R, the indus 
supply curve shifts vertically by the marginal expected 
penalty at each quantity and consequent violation 1. 8 
As shown in Figure 2-6-2, the competitive regulated 
industry equilibrium occurs at some point such as where 
the marginal expected penalty is equal to the dif 
between the demand price and private marginal production 
cost evaluated at that quantity. 
Thus at the regulated competitive equilibrium 
(2-6-12) 
where PR - PR is the difference between the demand and 
private marginal production cost at the regulated equ ibrium 
quantity QRo The assumption of identical compet firms 
ensures that, at the regulated equilibrium, the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to the expansion of indu 
output, HQ, is identical to that faced by any individual firm 
in the industry. 
The regulated competitive equ ibrium at QR is such 
that 
(2-6-13) R < Q* < QC i Q* 
- R - R zq* r 
Expression (2-6-13) shows that there are three 
possibilities for the regulated compe equilibrium. 
Firstly, it may coincide with the unregulated competitive 
equilibrium. "(lI]ith a non-negative penalty, as given 
in expression (2-6-3) f the quota sets a lower bound on 
industry output while the unregulated competitive equili-
brium sets an upper bound. This resu then requires either 
c that the quota be set at Q ln which case the expected penalty 
is irrelevant to the decisions of firm or that the 
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expected penalty is zero in which case the specific quota 
vel is irrelevant. 
Secondly, the regulated competitive equilibrium may 
coincide with an output quota which is strictly less than 
the unregulated competitive equilibrium. This requ s that 
marginal expected penalty be at least as great as the 
difference between the demand price and the marginal 
duction cost at the quota level. Thus in Figure 2-6-2, 
(2 6-14) lim + H (q, r , (3) ;: lim + HQ (Q, R, (3) ~ PQ=R -
q+r q Q+R -
where PQ=R - ~Q=R is the difference between the demand 
price and private marginal production cost at the quota 
1 R, would ensure that the regulated competitive equil 
brium occurs at W with zero violation of the quota. 
Finally, the regulated competitive equilibrium may 
occur at some intermediate point between EC and W as is 
shown in Figure 2-6 2. This will be the case if the margi-
nal expected penalty at the quota level R is less than the 
value of the difference between the demand price and private 
marginal cost at the quota level R and is that treated most 
extensively in the llowing analysis. 
From Figure 2-6 2 it appears that the regulated 
competitive equilibrium involves an increa market price 
and reduced market quantity when compared with the unregu-
lated competitive equil ium. This leads to the following 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2-6-2: se that an indu a 
finite number of identical titive 
market demand with 
non- finite elastici and is 
to a str tradeab 
Proof. 
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enforced means of 
expected monetary penalty function which 
is dependent on the ~ndividual firm's 
quota holding and output level; 
(i) As that an increase i avail-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=== 
able quota reduces the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to 
output at any given output level 
and quota violation, an increase 
in quota increases industry equili-
brium output and reduces equil 
brium price. 
(ii) Assumi that an increase ~n the 
expected penalty function raises 
the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output at any given 
output level and quota holding, an 
increase in the expected penalty 
reduces ilibrium out-
put and raises the equilibrium 
price. 
(i) From (2-6-6), (2-2-2) and (2-2 ), it is evident 
that the market equilibrium price is a function of 
the expected nalty thus at the industry equilibrium 
(2 6 15) D(P(R,[3)) S(P(R,[3) ,R,S) 
where S(P(R,S),R,S) is industry supply within the 
regulated environment defined as summation of 
individual regulated supply curves which are derived 
from (2-6-5). 
Totally differentiating (2-6-15) gives 
(2-6-16) as(.) ap(R,S) + as(.) + as(.) ap(R,S) + as(.) 
ap aR aR ap as as 
_ O'(P(R,S)) ap(R,S) 
aR 
Rearranging with dS = 0 
(2-6-17) ap*(R,6) = 
aR 
as(.)/aR 
O'(P(R,S)) - as(.)/dp < 0 
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given the assumption that H < 0 which from Propo-qr 
sition 2-6-1 and (2-2-7) ensures that as(.)/aR > O. 
Noting from (2-6-15) that 
(2-6-18) Q* = O(P*(R,S)) R 
where QR is the regulated industry equilibrium output 
level, 
(2-6-19) =O'(P(R,S)) ap*(R,S) > 0 
aR 
using (2-6-17) 
(ii) Rearranging (2-6-16) with dR = 0 
(2-6-20) oP* (R, S) = 
as 
as(.)/as > 
0' (P(R,S)) - as(.)/ap 0 
given the assumptions that HS > 0 and HqS > 0 which 
from Proposition 2-6-1 and (2-2-7) ensure that 
as(.)/dS < O. From (2-6-18) 
(2-6-21) 0' (P(R,S)) ap*(R,S) 
as 
< O. 
Equation (2-6-17) shows that an increase in the 
o 
available output quota, which increases supply at every price, 
decreases the market equilibrium price of the commodity. 
Multiplying this result by the price responsiveness of the 
demand curve in (2-6-19) gives the effect of the change in 
95. 
quota on the equilibrium quantity in the Given the 
new market librium price, the individual firm's regu-
lated output can be found by solving (2 6-5) at this price 
which gives q* consistent with (2-6-13). Equations (2-6-20) 
r 
and (2-6-21) provide a similar analysis of the effects of a 
change in the expected penalty on market equilibrium output 
and price levels. 
From Proposition 2-6-2 and the discussion of the 
conditions that generated each of the possib outcomes in 
expression (2-6-13) it is evident that, with an appropriate 
mix of quota and expected penalty, it is possib to restrict 
industry output to the socially optimal level 6 in Figure 
2-2-2. This requ s that either, 
(2-6-22) R 6 ; 
or 
(2-6-23) R < 6 
Expression (2-6-22) describes the situation of a 
quota set at the desired output level accompanied by an 
expected penalty which prohibits violation whereas expres-
sion (2-6-23) uses a more severely restrictive quota with 
an expected lty structure which produces violation con-
sistent with the desired output target. 
Whether or not this occurs and which method is 
chosen depends on the objectives of the regulator as will 
be discussed in Section 2-8. In the situation i strated 
c In Figure 2-6-2, the area TERS shows the total expected 
fine payments incurred by the industry while the 
distance SE~ shows the marginal expected penalty at GR" 
From the discussion of Figure 2-6-1 this becomes the 
1 
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equ ibrium trading pr~ce of the quota and determines the 
aggregate rent which accrues to the industry shown by area 
( 'I< A MNVT which equals PR - P R) R. The relative sizes of these 
magnitudes will also prove significant when the objectives 
of the regulator are discussed. 
2 7 FORMS OF THE EXPECTED PENALTY FUNCTION 
In Sections 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6, the propert s of 
expe penalty functions necessary and/or suf ient to 
provide certain results were established and these results 
were qualitatively illustrated for the individual firm and 
the total industry. The analysis however avoided considera-
tion of specific functional forms which mayor may not 
exhibit the assumed properties. Several types of function 
are now examined. 
Firstly, the expected penalty may con st of a lump-
sum fine incurred with constant probability regardless of 
the size of the violation. In this case there is a known 
and fixed expected cost of illegal activity. Once the non-
compliance decision has been made, marginal expected 
penalty is zero and the per unit expected penalty cost 
declines as the extent of violation increases. This type of 
penalty structure is biased against relatively small viola-
tions of the constraint so that any evasion that did occur 
would be extensive. The firm's profit function becomes 
scontinuous and hence the r conditions do not 
apply. 
PROPOSITION 2-7-1: 
Proof. 
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Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms, which have concave profit func-
tions in the unregulated environment, 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject to 
either a strictly positive unit rate 
sales tax or strictly binding tradeable 
output quota. If the regulatory con-
straint is enforced by means of a lump-
sum expected monetary penalty which is 
independent of the extent of illegal 
behaviour, then for sufficiently low 
values of the penalty firm and industry 
behaviour is unaffected while for 
sufficiently high values of the penalty 
full.compliance is ensured. 
At the unregulated competitive industry equilibrium, 
each individual firm is maximizing profits subject to the 
technological and financial constraints of its production 
process. At the market equilibrium price, its output is 
given by the value of its supply function at that price. 
From the assumption of a fixed number of identical competi-
tive firms, each firm in the industry produces the same 
quantity of output and earns the same amount of profit. This 
level of profit is now denoted by TI eE . 
As has been previously argued, the imposition of any 
additional binding constraint on the firm will of necessity 
reduce its profit, ceteris paribus, below the competitive 
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equilibrium level IT CEo The level of profit which the firm 
would enjoy under full compliance with the regulatory con-
straint is denoted as 1T F C. Hence, 
(2-7-1) o < 1T F 
- C 
At the prevailing equil ium. price, profit associated with 
full compliance is strictly less than that at the profit-
maximizing output level. Profits cannot be negat under 
full compliance with the regulatory constraint as the firm 
always has the option of producing nothing which, with no 
fixed production costs, generates zero profit. 
If the regulation is not enforced then prof maximi-
zation dictates that the regulated equilibrium 80incides with 
the unregulated competitive equilibrium. If, as assumed here, 
the regulation is enforced by a lumpsum expected penalty, 
there is a fixed and known cost of illegal behaviour. This 
is equivalent to a poll tax or pure profit tax which has no 
marginal effects. First-order conditions therefore are not 
applicable. 
Denoting the size of the lumpsum expected penalty by 
K, profit at the unregulated competit equilibrium output 
level within the regulated environment, defined as lTCEP,is 
(2-7-2) K > 0 
For all values of K such that 
(2-7-3) 1T CE - K > 1T Fe 
individual firm behaviour is unaffected by the regulation and 
enforcement. Profitabil y is reduced but marginal conditions 
are unchanged and therefore the regulated industry equilibrium 
coincides with the unregulated competitive industry equili-
brium. 
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For all values of K such that 
(2-7-4 ) 
individual profit maximization dictates that full compliance 
is the optimal strategy. The regulated industry equilibrium 
then exhibits full compliance with the regulatory constraint. 
Denoting by K the value of the lump sum expected 
penalty such that 
(2-7-5) K = TT - TT CE FC 
from (2-7-3) and (2-7-4), for all K < K industry behaviour 
is unaffected by the introduction of the regulation while 
for all K > K, full compliance is ensured. 
o 
A second possibility is that of a constant unit rate 
expected penalty set at some level k. In this case for a 
tax G -G = k and G = G = G = 0, and for a quota q x qq xx xq 
H = -H = k and H = H = 0 given fixed values of the q r qq qr 
parameters ex and B • The slope of the firm IS supply, curve 
in both cases is unchanged by this form of expected penalty 
function but it is possible to ensure full compliance by 
setting the rate sufficiently high. 
PROPOSITION 2-7-2: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms, which have concave profit func-
tions in the unregulated environment, 
faces a market demand curve with non-zero 
finite elasticity and is subject to 
either a strictly positive unit rate 
sales tax or strictly binding tradeable 
output quota enforced by means of a con-
stant unit rate expected monetary penalty. 
Proof. 
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(i) For sufficiently low values of 
the no 
output is declared in the sales 
tax case. 
(ii) In the case of an output quota, 
changes in the 1 of quota, 
which remain binding at any given 
expected penalty rate, do not 
affect the regulated equilibrium. 
(iii) In each case, full compliance can 
be ensured by sufficiently high 
expected penalty rates. 
(i) Using (2 4-2) and (2-4-13) profit from selling an 
(2-7-6) 
(2-7-7) 
additional unit of declared and undec output, 
denoted by TID and TIil respectively, compares as 
follows. 
TI' = P D C I (q) 
> 
t :( p - C I (q) - k = TIU it> 0, k > 0 i 
if and only if 
> 
k < t 
Profit maximization ensures that the declaration 
strategy on the marginal unit is determined by the 
action which increases profit by the greatest amount. 
For the unit to be produced at all, at least one 
TI' TIl must D' U non-negative. 
If k = 0, which corresponds to the situation of no 
enforcement, then clearly TI U > TID and, assuming that 
TIil ~ 0, the output unit will be produced and not 
declared. By the same argument, (2-7-6) and (2 7 7) 
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show that for any expected penalty rate which is less 
than the tax rate, the marginal unit of output, if 
produced, will be undeclared. 
As the marginal expected penalty and tax rate are 
constant, any output that is produced will be 
undeclared if k < t. 
(ii) With a constant unit rate expected penalty, a change 
in the quota level which remains binding on behaviour 
does not alter the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output. Hence H = 0 at any given value qr 
of the penalty parameter and from (2 6 10) and (2-2-7) 
individual behaviour and the regulated industry equi-
librium are unaffected by the change in quota. 
(iii) In the case of a sales tax, from (2-7-6) and (2-7-7) 
(2-7-8) 
(2 7-9) 
any output that is produced will be fully declared 
if k > t. In the case of an output quota, profit on 
the marginal unit of output using (2-6 5) is 
TTl 
r 
P - c'(q) - k 
From profit maximization, the marginal unit of out-
put will be produced if and only if TTl > O. Using 
r 
(2-6-14), full compliance with an output quota is 
ensured if marginal profit is zero at the level of 
the quota. For the industry and the firm, this 
requires an expected penalty rate k 
k ::: P*(R) - c' (R) 
where P*(R) is the market equilibrium at the 
quota level of output, being the demand price at this 
output, and c'(R) is the level of production 
cost at the quota level of output for the industry. 
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From the assumption of identical f , this is equal 
to c' (r) for the individual firm where r = R/z and z 
is the number of firms in the industry. 
At any expected penalty rate k > k therefore, full 
compliance with the output quota assured. 
o 
The situation of an output quota enforced by a constant 
unit rate expected penalty in accordance with Proposition 
2-7-2 is illustrated in Figure 2-7 1. 
P 
K 
A 
o 
Figure 2-7-1: The effect of an output quota with a 
constant unit rate expected penalty 
r q' c q 
Me 
q 
With the constant unit rate expected penalty, (2-6 9) 
shows that the slope of the firm's supply curve is ident 
in both regulated and unregulated environments. Beyond the 
quota level r, the firm's regulated supply curve shifts ver-
tically by the amount of the expected penalty rate and runs 
parallel with the original curve. This is shown by the 
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stepped marginal cost curve ABFJ. All output in excess of 
the quota attracts the same expected penalty shown by FB 
the diagram. As was established in Section 2-6, arbitrage 
dictates that this also becomes the unit trading price of 
the quota. The f 's optimal regulated output at price pc 
is then given from the new supply curve Me' at q'. 
Once a quota r : ql is established together with the 
expected unit rate penalty FB = KA, the s of the aggre-
gate shaded area AKJT, which represents the increase in 
costs on Oql units of output produced in the regulated 
environment, is uniquely determined. With output invariant, 
changes in the quota level merely serve to determine the 
decomposition of the aggregate magnitude between area (I), 
the rent accruing to the original holder of the quota, and 
area (II) representing the total expected penalty payment. 
Thirdly the expected penalty function may exhibit 
changing marginal rates which are either increasing or 
decreasing with the extent of undeclared output. Figure 
2-7-2 illustrates the case of an expected penalty function 
I 
for which the marginal expected penalty increases with tax 
evasion. 
Panel (il lustrates the expected penalty function 
in output space for two given values of declared output 
while panel (ii) shows the same function in declared output 
space for two values of actual production. This function 
is consistent with the results shown in Figures 2-4-1 and 
2-5-1. The increase in declaration in panel (i) decreases 
the marginal expected penalty with respect to output at a 
given output level while an increase in actual output 
increases the negative slope in panel (ii). Hence G :=: G < 0 
xq qx 
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and the function satisfies the conditions of Propositions 
2-4-1 and 2-5-1 (i) required to generate the intuitive 
results presented there. 
Figure 2-7-2: An expected penalty function that 
increases with tax evasion 
(i) Output space with a (ii) Declaration space 
given level of declared with a given level 
output of actual output 
o 0 G(q,x,a ) G(q,x,a ) 
o q o q x 
Not all enforcement regimes, however, exhibit the pro-
perties which ensure that the firm's penalty-inclusive profit 
function is strictly concave. The expected penalty function 
may be only locally convex or locally and globally concave. 
Two such examples are illustrated in Figure 2-7-3 below for 
the case of an output quota. Each curve is drawn for a fixed 
value of the parameter 8 = 8 0 . 
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Figure 2-7-3: Expected penalty functions that are 
non-convex in the extent of constraint 
violation 
(il Concave expected (ii) Bounded expected 
penalty function penalty function 
H 
o o 
r r' q q r rl q q 
Panel (il illustrates an expected penalty function 
that is concave in output so that H < O. The effect of an qq 
increase in quota from r to r' causes the value of the mar~ 
ginal expected penalty, evaluated at any given output level, 
to rise. Thus the slope at vb' exceeds that at 'a' and 
H > O. qr 
Panel (ii) portrays an expected penalty function that 
is locally convex in output so that for particular output 
levels H > O. The effect of an increase in quota from qq 
r to r' causes the value of the marginal expected penalty, 
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evaluated at these output levels, to fall. Thus the slope at 
'b' is less than that at 'a' and H < O. The expected qr 
penalty,however,is bounded from above by some finite value 
H. For all output levels beyond that at which the expected 
penalty reaches its maximum value, given the available quota 
level, the marginal expected penalty with respect to output 
is zero. 
PROPOSITION 2-7-3: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms, which have concave profit functions 
in the unregulated environment, faces a 
market demand curve with non-zero finite 
elasticity and is subject to a strictly 
binding output quota enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty that is 
concave in output. Assuming that the 
convexity of production cost dominates 
the non-convexity of the expected 
penalty and that an increase in available 
quota increases the marginal expected 
penalty with respect to output at any 
output level; 
( i) Supply increases with price. 
(ii) An increase ~ecreas~ in available 
quota decreases ~ncrease~ supply 
at every price and hence raises 
(lowers) market equilibrium price 
and reduces (increases) industry 
equilibrium output. 
10 7 . 
(iii) An increase in the ed 
penalty reduces supply at every 
ice and hence raises 
e ilibrium ice and 
industry equilibrium output if 
expected penalty with respect to 
exceeds the a. 
Proof. 
(i) Given the assumption that the convexity of production 
( ii) 
( iii) 
cost in output dominates the non-convexity of the 
expected penalty function, c"(q) + H > a and, from qq 
(2-6-9), individual firm supply s with price 
in the regulated environment. Hence, by the aggrega-
tion in (2-2-7), the industry supply curve is upward 
sloping. 
With H > a and c"(q) + H > a, then, from (2-6 10), qr qq 
an increase (decrease) in available quota~ such that 
the quota remains binding on behaviour, will reduce 
(increase) individual supply at every price. By aggre-
gation, industry supply will also fall e)at every 
price and hence, from (2-6-17) and (2 6 19), industry 
equilibrium output will decrease (increase) while market 
equilibrium price rises ~alls)as a result of the 
increase (decrease) in quota. 
If Hq8 > 0, from (2-6-11) an increase in the expected 
penalty reduces individual supply at every price given 
that c" ( q) + H > O. By aggregat qq , industry supply 
also declines at every price and hence, from (2-6-20) 
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and (2-6 21) f industry equilibrium output is reduced 
and market equilibrium price raised by the increased 
expected penalty associated with quota violations. 
o 
The situation of an industry subject to a concave 
expected penalty function in accordance with Proposition 
2-7-3 is illustrated in Figure 2-7-4 below. 
Panel (il illustrates results (il and (ii) of Propo-
sition 2-7-3 for the individual firm. The supply curve in 
the unregulated environment is shown by curve Me. Each of 
Me' and Me" is drawn for a fixed value of the penalty para-
meter 6 = 60 , 
From (2-6-5) the supply curve of the firm shifts 
vertically by the amount of the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output for all output levels exceeding the 
quota. As illustrated in panel (i) of Figure 2 7-3 the 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output for a con-
cave expected penalty function is maximized for the initial 
unit of illegal output and declines thereafter. The assump-
tion of a non negative marginal expected penalty ensures 
that the regulated supply curve never lies below the unregu-
lated curve. 
At the in ial quota level rl the penalty-inclusive 
supply curve is by the line ABFG denoted as Me' . 
Optimal output at the original unregulated market equili-
brium price pc is given by ql at point G. A reduction in the 
quota from r' to r", by the assumption that H > 0, serves qr 
to reduce the marginal expected penalty at any output level 
which exceeds the original quota level. Thus at q' the 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output falls from 
p 
A 
o 
p 
L 
o 
The effect of an 
(il The effect on an individual firm of a c 
in available ta 
I 
JJ- -
I 
I 
I 
r" r' q'q" c q 
MC' 
(ii) The effect on the indust of an increa 
in the e structure 
R 
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MC 
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TG to TW. The effect of the reduction in quota then to 
c increase the optimal output level of the firm at P from q' 
to q" associated with point K. The reduction in quota there-
fore induces an increase in supply at any price level for 
which illegal output is produced. This is a perverse outcome 
which severely limits the effectiveness of a regulatory body 
in restraining the output of an industry. 
Panel (ii) of Figure 2-7-4 illustrates the effect of 
an increase in expected penalty on the industry equilibrium. 
The unregulated industry supply curve is given by MPC. 
Curves MPC' and MPC" denote regulated supply at penalty 
levels S' and S" respectively with S" > 8'. Following the 
assumption that H > 0, the marginal expected penalty with qS 
respect to output at any illegal output level is raised by 
the increase in the expected penalty structure. Thus the 
marginal expected penalty for the initial illegal unit of 
output r es from MN to MS. As a result, the increase in the 
penalty parameter from S' to S" reduces industry equilibrium 
output from Q' at point E' to Q" associated with E". Full 
compl with the quota can be ensured by increasing the 
structure of the expected penalty until the marginal expected 
penalty for the initial unit of illegal output is equal to VM. 
The effect of such an expected penalty function on an 
indus regulated by a unit rate sales tax can be examined 
with reference to Figure 2-7-5 below. 
As in the above case of the quota, the convexity of 
production cost is assumed to dominate the concavity in out-
put of the expected penalty function and hence c"(q) + G qq 
> O. From the assumed concavity of the expected penalty 
function < 0, which, using (2-4-20) and (2-4-21), shows 
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that the firm's supply curve in the regulated environment 
remains upward sloping. 
Figure 2-7-5: The effect of a unit rate sales tax 
enforced by a concave expected monetary 
p 
penalty 
F 
o 
q' c q 
MC' 
MC" 
.,/ 
MC 
q 
The unregulated supply curve is shown on the diagram 
by MC and the tax-inclusive supply curve at rate to is given 
by MC'. The curve labelled MC" illustrates the firm's 
penalty-inclusive marginal cost curve given that no output 
is declared. As with the quota, the marginal expected 
penalty with respect to output is maximized for the initial 
illegal unit of output and declines thereafter. The assump-
tion that G ~ 0 again ensures that MC" does not lie below q 
the unregulated curve MC. 
Clearly if the marginal expected penalty for the ini-
tial illegal unit is less than the tax rate, from (2-4-14) 
zero declaration is the optimal strategy_ When, as is the 
112 . 
case in dec lara-
tion strategy at any price such as pc is determined by 
cons the profit level at the output levels ql and qt 
associated with zero declaration and full declaration respec-
tive Any ermediate strategy is not optimal in these 
circumstances as, given that G > 0, reducing the qx of 
declared output increases the marginal return at level 
of illegally produced output. 
Examining Figure 2-7-5, the compar on of it levels 
at ql and involves consideration of the relat s es of 
areas FGB and GHJ. Beginning at point H which is associated 
with the fully declared output level qt' a move to zero 
declaration at J reduces profit on initial units of output 
by FGB and raises it by GHJ on later output units. At any 
level then,output is fully declared if FGB > GHJ and no 
output is declared if GHJ > FGB. 
Assuming in ially that output is fully declared, an 
increase in the tax rate reduces area FGB and raises GHJ. 
Sufficiently high tax rates result in no output being 
declared. Successive increases in the tax rate from low 
levels, at any given expected penalty structure, result in 
reductions in the regulated equilibrium output level of the 
industry until some critical rate is reached when ed 
equilibrium output jumps suddenly to that level associated 
with zero declaration. 
Conversely, assuming that initially no output 
declared, optimal output given price pc is ql. Increases in 
the structure of the expected penalty function, given that 
Gqa > 0, increase the s e of area FGB and reduce GHJ 
lower the regulated equilibrium output level of the f 
and industry. Sufficiently high levels of the expec 
lty function result in output being fully decl 
Succes increases in the structure of the expected 
1 
function, which raise the marginal expected penalty with res-
to output at any illegal output level, result in reduc-
tions the regulated equilibrium output level of the 
industry until some critical penalty structure is reached 
when regu ted equilibrium output jumps to that level asso-
ciated with full declaration. 
These results are summarized in the following Propo-
sition. 
PROPOSITION 2-7-4: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms which have concave fit func-
tions in the unregulated environment, 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject to 
a strictly positive unit rate sales tax 
enforced by means of a concave expected 
monetary penalty. Assuming that the 
convexity of production cost dominates 
the concavity in output of the expected 
penalty function, supply increases with 
Erice. 0Etimal firm and industry beha-
viour in the regulated environment is 
determined by global profit maximization 
which mayor may not produce outcomes 
consistent with first-order conditions. 
In Earticular it is possible that changes 
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in the rate of sales tax 
expected penalty structure, or alterna-
tively, in the expected penalty structure 
at any given tax rate, induce discon-
tinuous responses in regulated equilibrium 
output levels. 
It is possible with an expected penalty function that 
is concave in output that this concavity outweighs the con-
vexity of unregulated production cost so that, in the case of 
a quota, c"(q) + H < O. In this case, from (2-6 9), the qq 
firm's penal inclusive supply function is negatively 
sloped for at least some range of output levels. Given the 
assumptions of strictly convex production cost and that the 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output is non-
negative, regulated supply curve cannot be negatively 
sloped for all illegal output levels. 
It is likely in these circumstances that the expected 
penalty is bounded as is.the case in 2- 6 below. 
The concavity of the expected penalty function ensures 
that the marginal expected penalty with respect to output is 
maximized at the initial illegal unit of output. The marg 
nal expected penalty with respect to output declines as 
illegal output increases until output level q where it 
becomes zero. At this level, the expected penalty is maxi-
mized at size BFK. 
Optimal output at any price is found at that level 
which maximizes global profits. In this situation, the 
first-order conditions are irrelevant and optimal output 
occurs at either the quota level r or the unregulated compe-
titive librium level qC. This involves a consideration 
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of the relative sizes of GFJ and JEK. 
p 
A 
a 
ABFKE. 
Figure 2-7-6: The effect of an output quota enforced 
r 
by a bounded concave expected penalty 
function 
q c q 
Me 
q 
The penalty-inclusive marginal cost curve is shown by 
Beginning at the full compliance output level r, a 
decision to produce at qC reduces profit by GFJ but increases 
it by JEK. Optimal output therefore occurs at full com-
pliance with the quota when GFJ > JEK and at the unregulated 
equilibrium level qC where JEK > GFJ. 
Following panel (i) of Figure 2-7-3, H > a and a qr 
reduction in available quota reduces the expected penalty 
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at any given illegal output level thus increasing area JEK 
without increasing GFJ or the total size of the expected 
penalty. Sufficiently small levels of quota at any given 
expected penalty structure will result in optimal output at 
the unregulated competitive equilibrium output level qC. 
Conversely, increases in the expected penalty struc-
ture at any given quota level increase area GFJ and decrease 
JEK. This reduces the likelihood that the unregulated com-
petitive equilibrium output level is optimal and indeed, for 
sufficiently high levels of the expected penalty function, 
full compliance is the optimal strategy. 
Similar results occur when the industry is regulated 
by a unit rate sales tax. In each case changes in the regu-
latory constraint or in the structure of the expected 
penalty function may at some critical level cause the regu-
lated equilibrium output level of the firm and industry to 
switch from the unregulated competitive equilibrium value to 
that associated with full compliance with the constraint. 
These results are s~~arized in the following 
Proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2-7-5: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms, which have concave profit func-
tions in the unregulated environment, 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject to 
either a strictly positive unit rate 
sales tax or a strictly binding tradeable 
output quota each enforced by an expected 
monetary penalty. 
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As that the 
tion is concave and bounded 
of the expected penalty dominates the 
convexity of production cost so that the 
firm's regulated marginal cost curve is 
negatively sloped over a certain output 
range. Optimal output is determined by 
global profit maximization and occurs at 
either the unregulated competitive 
ilibrium level or at that level asso-
ciated with full compliance with the 
constraint. Changes in the regulatory 
constraint at any given expected penalty 
structure, or alternatively, in the struc-
ture of the expected penalty function at 
any given level of the regulatory con-
straint, may induce discontinuous res-
ponses in the regulated equilibrium out-
put level of the firm and industry. This 
will occur, if at all, at particular 
critical combinations of penalty struc-
ture and constraint level. At all other 
combinations of the policy parameters a 
change in either parameter has no effect 
on the regulated equilibrium output of 
the firm or indu 
Returning to Figure 2 7 3, panel (ii) illustrates an 
expected penalty function that is locally convex but is 
bounded from above by some finite level H. Many enabling 
regulatory statutes contain maximum penalties that may be 
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imposed. Given that the probability of detection is bounded, 
then so too, in these cases, is the expected penalty. 
If the upper bound on the expected penalty is set at 
a sufficiently high level so that it is seldom, if ever, 
binding, then the industry operates in the output region 
where the expected penalty function is locally convex. In 
this case the expected penalty may be treated as if the 
firm's profit function is concave and the analysis of Section 
2-6 and, in the sales tax case, Sections 2-4 and 2-5, is 
applicable. 
This type of penalty structure however can exhibit 
difficulties associated with the "spillover" problem [Stigler 
1970]. With a very high upper bound, the penalty may not be 
believable given other penalties, or marginal deterrents may 
be insufficient to prevent other offences of a potentially 
more serious nature being committed in an effort to avoid 
detection of the original offence. 
Assuming then that the upper bound is relevant to 
industry decisions, a bounded convex expected penalty func-
tion may exhibit some of the properties associated with a 
lumpsum expected penalty. This can be shown with reference 
to Figure 2-7-6 below. 
The fir~'s supply curve in the unregulated environment 
is given by MC. In the context of Section 2-6, with a 
strictly convex expected penalty function and strictly con-
cave profit function, the firm's regulated supply curve is 
MC' running through points ABGH. This would give the firm's 
optimal regulated output level, consistent with price pc and 
quota r, at q' where (2-6-5) is satisfied with equality. 
p 
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Figure 2-7-7: The effect of an output quota enforced 
a bounded local 
penalty function 
MC' 
r q' q 
convex 
c q 
MC 
q 
In the present context, the firm's profit function is 
not globally concave and hence ql associated with po G need 
not represent a global profit-maximizing output level at ice 
c P and quota level r. To see this area 'a' and 'b ' must be 
compared. It assumed in the diagram that, given the 
level r, the expected penalty reaches its maximum value, shown 
by area BHJ, at output level q. 
Beginning from q' at G, an increase in output to E 
an ambiguous effect on overall profitability. The initial 
qlq units reduce profit from its level at ql by area GHK 
denoted by 'a I • - c The subsequent qq units however increase 
prof by KEJ denoted by area 'bl. The global profit-
. c 
maximizing output level for the firm at prlce P occurs at 
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c q when b > a and ql when b < a. 
Assume initially that the profit-maximizing output 
level is at G in accordance with (2-6-5). If quota level 
is reduced from r without adjustment to the upper bound on 
the expected penalty, area 'bl will increase while area 'a' 
will ase. The smaller is the quota assoc with any 
given bounded expected penalty function the more 1 ly it 
is that the quota will be disregarded. In particular it is 
possible that the act of attempting to tighten control on 
the industry by reducing the available quota will suddenly 
induce a ap back to the unregulated equilibrium output 
level. 
Conversely an increase in the upper bound on the 
expected penalty at any quota level acts to increase the 
size of area 'a' in Figure 2-7-6 and reduce 'b'. Increasing 
the upper bound from a situation where the quota has no 
effect on equilibrium can therefore suddenly induce 
a leap in industry output from the unregulated competitive 
equilibrium 1 to that associated with an unbounded convex 
expected nalty given the quota r. 
Following Proposition 2-7-1 similar results hold when 
the industry is regulated by a sales tax with a bounded 
convex expected penalty function. Unless the penalty func-
tion incorporates an initial unit rate component that is 
independent of the violation, full declaration in the case 
of a sales tax or compliance with an output quota 
cannot be achi The results of the above analysis are 
now summarized. 
PROPOSITION 2-7-6: 
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Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms, which have concave profit func-
tions in the unregulated environment, 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject to 
either a strictly positive unit rate 
sales tax or strictly binding tradeable 
output quota enforced by means of a 
bounded expected penalty function that 
is otherwise convex in output. Optimal 
firm and industry behaviour in the regu-
lated environment is determined by global 
profit maximization which mayor may not 
produce outcomes consistent with first-
order conditions. In particular it is 
possible that changes in the regulatory 
instrument, at any given bounded expected 
penalty function for which the upper 
bound is relevant to industry behaviour, 
will induce discontinuous responses in 
regulated equilibrium output levels. Thus 
sufficiently high tax rates or suffi-
ciently small output quotas may result 
in the regulated industry equilibrium 
coinciding with the unregulated competi-
tive equilibrium level. Similarly, 
changes in the upper bound of the expec-
ted penalty at any value of the regulatory 
constraint may also induce discontinuous 
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responses in firm and industry behaviour 
and hence in regulated equilibrium output 
levels. 
Given that many penalty structures are a composite of 
fixed and variable components and enabling legislations often 
stipulate maximum fines, it appears from the analysis con-
tained in this section that discontinuity and other perverse 
responses to parameter changes are likely to occur in a 
regulated environment. This suggests that the ability of a 
regulatory body to control an industry in any systematic 
manner is severely limited. However,the literature provides 
evidence consistent with the intuitively appealing deterrence 
results presented in Sections 2-4 to 2-6 [Ehrlich, 1973; 
Epple and Visscher, 1984] and hence the implications of 
enforcement within the context of a non-concave expected 
penalty function is further explored in the following sections. 
Finally it must be noted that for all forms of the 
expected penalty function considered here, deterrence requires 
the use of scarce, otherwise productive resources in enforce-
mente Recalling (2-4-10), given that both the probability 
term and the monetary fine, over the relevant output range, 
are finite, the expected penalty if either component is zero 
is also zero. If no resources are devoted to enforcement 
activities, the probability of detection is zero and no 
effective deterrent exists. 
This was not always recognized in the early litera-
ture on the optimal structure of expected penalty functions. 
Following Becker1s seminal paper on the economics of crime 
[Becker, 1968], the analysis of the optimal penalty was 
extended to produce an optimal fine that is infinitely large 
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[Carr Hill and Stern, 1979; 303]. From limit theory, 
an infinite fine, any positive expected penalty can be 
generated with a zero probability of detection, the precise 
value depending on the rates of change of its component 
s. This leads to an "optimal penaltyU structure which 
comprises an infinite monetary penalty and zero probability 
of detection. 
This result, which is motivated by a desire to mini 
mize the social cost of offences and is assisted by the 
assumption of risk aversion, is theoretically appealing but 
has little empirical validity as has been demonstrated in 
more recent literature where the concept of a lower 
bound "tr..reshold probability" sufficient to ensure deterrence 
introduced [Block and Lind, 1975; Polinsky and Shavell, 
1979; Pyle, 1983]. 
Often, as was mentioned above, enabling legislation 
regulation provides for a maximum penalty that may be 
impo This maximum fine is usually set so as to maintain 
marginal terrents sufficient to prevent spillover effects 
between different classes of offence. Even if this is not 
so, the constraints of market conditions will inevitably 
result in the industry and hence the individual firm producing 
te output levels in equilibrium. For any finite output, 
even given an expected penalty function that is strictly con~ 
vex in output and violation size, the expected penalty is 
also finite 
In these circumstances the "optimal penaltyll result 
could supported if the assumption was made that informa-
tional di create misperceptions on the part of 
individual agents leading to pessimistically incorrect 
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estimates of the probability term. This assumption seems 
unreasonable in the context of rational maximizing agents, 
at st in the longer run, with any rational or adaptive 
expectation forming process. It must be assumed there 
that, with a finite monetary fine, any effective deterrent 
involves the employment of scarce otherwise productive 
resources. This represents a cost to the economy of any 
regulation which has important implications in the cons 
tion of regulatory objectives in the following Chapter. 
2-8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has dealt with the regulation of a com-
titive, negative-externality-generating industry in a 
partial equilibrium framework. The concept of a regulated 
ilibrium was defined and the effects on this equilibrium 
of changes in policy variables were derived. Specific 
consideration and treatment of the necessity for enforcement 
confirmed the major results of the deterrence literature and 
showed that they depend crucially on the form of the expected 
penalty function. In particular, the examination of specific 
of expected penalty function in Section 2-7 revealed 
that the deterrence capabilities of the regulator are 
severely limited in certain cases. 
The assumption of global concavity of firms' profit 
functions in the regulated environment, which is. used in the 
major of the chapter, facilitates continuity of behaviour. 
As such it provides a useful framework for analysing the 
ef ts of regulation on the industry and the responses of 
regu ry policy to parameter changes. This assumption 
however is not necessarily valid in enforcement practice. 
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In many instances, enabling legislation contains maximum 
penalties which may be imposed on offenders. The existence 
of a maximum fine implies that the expected penalty is 
bounded fro~ above which invalidates the assumption of 
globally concave profit functions. with this form of 
penalty, as is shown ln Section 2-7, local optima are not 
necessarily globally optimal and hence industry behaviour 
within the regulated environment is likely to exhibit dis-
continuities. 
Given enforcement by means of an expected monetary 
fine, the analysis showed the policies employing traditional 
"price-oriented" instruments, such as a sales tax, could 
be designed to have identical aggregate outcomes to those 
using "quantitative" instruments such as output quota. In 
each case the marginal expected penalty is the per unit 
"price" of engaging in illegal activity. It is this price 
which supports the existence of either regulatory instrument. 
Hhen illegal behaviour and enforcement are allowed for then, 
there is a sense in which any form of regulatory control 
works fundamentally through the pricing mechanism. 
There are differences between the output quota and 
sales tax however. These stem from the fact that the exist-
ence of a non-zero output quota reduces the number of units, 
at any given output level which exceeds the quota, on which 
the "price" for illegal behaviour must be paid. 
To the extent that a change in the amount of available 
quota alters this price, the regulated equilibrium output 
level of the industry is affected. with an expected penalty 
function that is strictly convex in the extent of illegal 
output and a fixed level of enforcement, a reduction in 
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available quota increases the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output at any given output level which exceeds the 
quota and hence, following Proposition 2-6-2, leads to a 
decrease in the regulated equilibrium output level of the 
industry. Given that the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output varies directly with the level of enforce-
ment, any regulated equilibrium output level can be achieved 
by a smaller quota coupled with a lower level of enforcement. 
This suggests that the costs of regulation are not indepen-
dent of the type and level of the regulatory instrument used. 
The other major difference between an output quota 
and a sales tax is in their distributional effects. Under a 
sales tax, agents can avoid the price of illegal behaviour 
only by paying the price of legal behaviour; that is, by 
incurring tax liability. vlith a tradeable output quota,how-
ever, holders of the quota are in effect paid the penalty 
that would have otherwise been incurred if those units had to 
be produced illegally. These payments accrue to agents 
initially allocated quotas in the form of either implicit 
rentals to those who are members of the industry or explicit 
windfall gains to those who are not. 
The distributional and cost-effectiveness aspects of 
regulatory policy become important when questions concerning 
optimal regulation are raised. These issues are discussed 
in the following Chapter in the context of two competing and 
conflicting theories of economic regulation, the Naive Public 
Interest Theory and the Capture Theory. 
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NOTES 
1. In the discussion that follows, the government and the 
regulator are assumed to be synonymous bodies. 
2. See for example Baumal and Oates,1981: Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1975; Harford ,1978 i ~!igue, 1977; Montgomery ,1972 i 
Papps,1985; Storey and McCabe,1980: and Weitzman,1974 
and 1978. 
3. The pitfalls of using this measure are well known 
[Hausman, 1981; 663]. For consumer surplus to 
sent an exact measure of welfare change requires, among 
other things, that consumers' utility functions are 
quasi-linear and, in a two good world, that both commo-
dities are consumed [Manning, 1986; 92]. Given the 
assumptions sufficient to ensure consistent aggreg~tion 
in (2-2-2), this condition will not be satisfied 
[Manning, 1986; 98J but nevertheless, in the context 
of the present analysis, the use of consumer surplus 
represents a tolerable simplifying assumption [wi ig, 
1977] . 
4. In most diagrams demand and supply schedules are drawn 
as linear functions for graphical simplicity. This 
does not affect the qualitative nature the lus-
trated results. 
5. Penalizing consumers of illegal comrnodit s is not 
uncommon. This would in general depress the demand side 
of the market and hence reduce the scope for regulating 
producers. It is assumed here, however, that producers 
represent a more compact group than consumers and thus 
pose fewer difficulties from spective of 
enforcement. 
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6. See for example Becker, 1968: Block and Lind, 1975: 
Carr-Hill and Stern,1979; Cloninger,1975: Erhlich,1972 
and 1973; Epple and Visscher, 1984: Harford, 1978~ 
Mathur, 1978~and Polinsky and Shavell,1979. 
7. This assumes that the quota is initially allocated only 
to firms within this industry. 
8. The precise nature of this shift lS as yet unspecified 
and is drawn as shown in Figure 2-6-2 for illustrative 
purposes only. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REGULATOR: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY IN 
PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
3-1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of regulated equilibrium in Sections 
2-4 to 2-7 presented the effects of regulatory control on 
firm, and industry, behaviour and illustrated several 
possible outcomes. It was shown that the aggregate outcome 
and, in particular, the distributional effects of a regula-
tion, depend on the instrument used and the form of the 
expected penalty function. 
From an examination of the implications of Sections 
2-4, 2-5 and 2-6, it is clear that the regulator can design 
a tax/expected-penalty or quota/expected-penalty policy mix 
that will result in identical output levels, both for the 
industry and individual firms, which mayor may not be at 
A 
the first-best output Q in Figure 2-2-2. 
If the aggregate outcome is independent of the instru-
ment used but not of the instrument/expected-penalty mix, 
and any output level not exceeding the unregulated competi-
tive equilibrium level is technically feasible with a non-
negative expected penalty, the actual policy employed must 
be dependent on something other than a particular output 
objective. 
In Chapter One several theories of regulation were 
outlined. Of these two are examined here; the Naive Public 
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Interest Theory (NPIT) and the Capture Theory (CT). 
3-2 NAIVE PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY: OPTIMAL POLICY 
Under NPIT the regulator is motivated by a desire to 
achieve the maximization of social welfare. In the context 
of the present partial equilibrium analysis the regulator 
acts to maximize aggregate social surplus generated in this 
industry. In Figure 2-2-2, assuming costless implementation 
of the regulation, this occurs at Q where social surplus is 
A 
shown by area AEH. 
At this stage it must be recalled that implementa-
tion of a regulation is not cost less because of the 
necessity for enforcement which, as stated in Section 2~7, 
requires the employment of scarce, otherwise productive, 
resources. 
The expected penalty function in both the sales tax 
and output quota cases has hitherto been portrayed as a 
non-decreasing function of the firm's output and degree of 
constraint violation, given values of the parameters a and 
B respectively. Here these parameters are taken to repre-
sent the size of resources devoted to enforcement activities 
denoted by L . 
e 
(3-2-1) o < L < L 
- e e 
where L is the minimum level of enforcement activity that 
e 
ensures a probability of detection of unity. If L 
e 
o and 
no resources are devoted to enforcement, the probability of 
detection is zero and hence, from (2-4-12) and (2-6-3), the 
expected penalty at all levels of illegal activity is also 
zero. 
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The cost of enforcement activity (w) is the oppor-
tunity cost of the resources used in the enforcement process 
which is assumed to be strictly positive with an ing 
marg cost, thus 
(3-2-2) w = W(L
e
), w(O) = 0, w > 0, w" > 0 
The benefit from enforcement is the increase in the 
value of the regulator's objective function which results 
from the increase in industry compliance with the regulation 
that enforcement engenders. For a NPIT regulator, the 
benef from enforcement is the increase in aggregate sur-
plus which it generates. 
Beginning, in Figure 2-2-2, from the competitive 
equilibrium output level at QC, the maximum increase in 
C A 
aggregate social surplus is shown by area E BE and occurs 
when output is restricted to the first-best level O. The 
marginal benefit of a unit reduction in output caused by 
enforcement is given by the difference between the demand 
price, which shows the marginal social benefit of output, 
and the marginal social cost, at any given output level. 
In Figure 2 2-2 this value is maximized at ECB which occurs 
at the competitive equilibrium output level QC and, given 
the assumptions which underly the diagram, is strictly 
A 
decreasing to zero as output falls to Q. 
With a non-decreasing marginal cost and strictly 
decreasing marginal benefit of enforcement there is a 
unique optimal amount of enforcement effort. It may be 
that, because of prohibitive costs, the optimal amount of 
enforcement is zero and hence the unregulated competitive 
equilibrium output level is the socially optimal regulated 
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output even though it involves a degree of lost potential 
surplus. To preclude this possibility it is assumed that 
(3-2-3) Wi (0) < MSC(QC) - MSB(QC) 
Given the conditions on the cost of enforcement 
assumed in (3-2-2), this ensures that the NPIT optimal 
regulated output level Q* occurs at some intermediate point, 
(3-2-4) 
The determination of Q* is derived in the following analysis. 
From the analysis of Sections 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6, it 
follows that equilibrium industry output in the regulated 
environment is a function of the regulatory instrument used 
and, through the expected penalty function, of the level of 
enforcement. Thus 
(3-2-5) aQ > 0 
aSG < 
where SG is a proxy for the size of the regulatory instru-
mente It some cases therefore SG is a tax rate while in 
others it represents a quota level. The properties of the 
function Q(.) depend on the instrument used and upon the 
expected penalty function. The regulated equilibrium is 
defined for fixed values of some as yet unspecified para-
meters contained in the parameter vector Z. Various factors 
affect the supply and/or demand for the regulated commodity 
and are therefore relevant to the decisions of the regulator. 
Factors to be considered here include the income level of 
consumers, technological improvements which reduce the 
extent of externality generated by the industry, and the 
state of enforcement technology. 
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In the case of an output quota, following Proposition 
2-6-2, industry equilibrium output is assumed to be monoto-
nically decreasing in L provided that output exceeds the 
e 
quota. Once full compliance is attained, any further 
increase has no effect on behaviour and thus aQ/aLe = O. 
From Proposition 2-5-1, industry equilibrium output is 
assumed to be monotonically decreasing in the case of 
a sales tax provided that the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output, given that no output is declared, 
at the regulated equilibrium output level is less than the 
tax rate. 
G qq G xx 
If however GQ(Q,O,a) : t, Gq = 
- G , the n a Q / a L = O. 
xq e 
G and 
x 
Propos ions 2 5-1 and 2-6-2 also show how a change 
in the value of the regulatory instrument s regulated 
equilibrium output. In the case of a sales tax it is 
assumed, following Proposition 2-5-1, that an 
the tax rate reduces regulated equilibrium output provided 
that the tax rate is less than the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output, given that no output is declared, 
evaluated at the regulated equilibrium output level. If 
the tax rate exceeds this value, further increases in the 
tax rate do not affect behaviour and hence aQ/an 0 
In the case of an output quota, it is assumed, following 
Proposition2 6 2, that an increase in available quota, 
which remains binding on behaviour, raises industry regu-
lated equilibrium output. If the quota is enforced by a 
constant unit rate expected penalty, changes in the quota 
level which remain binding do not affect the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output and hence aQ/an = O. 
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The range of the function in (3 2-5) is restr ted 
to the set of feasible illegal output levels given a non-
zero expected penalty, thus 
(3 2 6) o :s. Q FC :s. Q ( .) < Q C 
C 
where Q is the unregulated competitive equilibrium level 
and QFC the output level consistent with full compliance 
with the announced regulatory instrument. 
From the market demand function shown in (2-2-2) the 
demand function, showing the demand price at any 
regulated equilibrium quantity given values of the relevant 
parameters, can be derived. Thus 
(3-2-7) P ::: h(Q( ,:Il'fl'Y),Y) 
where Y represents aggregate consumer income and fl the 
state of enforcement technology. It is assumed that the 
demand curve is negat ly sloped and that the regulated 
commodity is a normal good. The enforcement-exclusive 
soc cost of production is given by 
(3 2 8) SC 
where fl and Yare as defined in (3-2-7) and <I> represents 
the state of technology in the regulated industry which 
determines the degree of externality that the industry 
generates. Following the analysis of Chapter Two, it is 
assumed that enforcement-exclusive social cost is strictly 
convex in outp~t. It also assumed that an increase in 
<I> represents an improvement in technology in that it 
reduces the extent of externality generated the industry. 
The derivation and propert s of (3-2-7) and (3-2-8) are 
further explained in Appendix 3-1. 
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The NPIT regulator, in maximizing the social surplus 
generated in the industry, seeks to solve the following 
expression. 
Q(L
e
,Q,l-I,Y) 
(3 2-9) Maximize WR L,Q e 
f [h (Q, Y) - SC 1 (Q, <p ) ] dQ - w (L ) 
C e 
e Q 
In terms of Figure 2-2-2, regulating the industry is 
equivalent to reducing industry output from QC. The payoff 
to regulatory activity is then the recovery of the lost 
potent aggregate surplus that exists at QC when compared 
"-
w h the first-best outcome at Q. This is shown by the 
inte term of (3-2-9). The second term is the resource 
cost of enforcing the regulation. 
The first-order conditions of (3-2 9) 1 are 
(3-2-10) 
aWRe 
(3-2-11) 
[ h ( Q ( L ~ , Q * , Z ) , Y) - SC 1 ( Q ( L ~ , Q * , Z ) , <p ) ] a L 
e 
- w'(L*) < 0 
e -
< only if L~ == 0 
[ h ( Q ( L ~ I Q * , Z ) , Y) - SC 1 ( Q ( L ~ , Q * , Z ) , <p ) ] an 
< 0 < only if Q* o 
The first term of (3-2-10) is the difference between 
the mar social cost of production and the demand pr 
or marginal social benefit of output, at the optimal level 
of enforcement, multiplied by the marginal effect of enforce-
ment on output. This gives the marginal benefit of enforce 
ment while the second term is the marginal cost of an 
additional unit of enforcement. At the optimum level of 
enforcement, assuming that enforcement takes place, these 
are equated. If the marginal cost of enforcement 
exceeds its marginal benefit, no enforcement will occur. 
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Conditions (3-2-10) and (3-2-11) must be sat fied 
simultaneously at the optimal NPIT regulated equilibrium 
output level Q* 
LEMMA 3-2 1: se an indus 
Proof. 
number of identical titive firms 
concave fit functions faces a 
demand curve with non-zero finite elasticity 
and is subject to either a strictly binding 
output quota or strictly positive unit rate 
sales tax enforced means of an 
monetary penalty. Assuming that an increase 
in enforcement reduces the equilibrium output 
level of the industry and that the marginal 
cost of enforcement is strictly positive, at 
the NPIT-optimal regulated industry equilibrium 
out level the mar inal social cost of 
output strictly exceeds the demand price. 
This follows immediately from (3-2-10). Given that 
> 0 and that aQ/8L < 0, then,if any enforcement is 
e 
to occur under the NPIT framework so that L* > 0, the term 
G 
[h(Q( *,Q*,Z),Y) - SC 1 (Q(L:,Q*,Z),$)] must be negative. 
If,however,L* = 0 then no deterrent to non-compliance with 
e 
the regulation exists and hence the regulated equilibrium 
coincides with the unregulated compet ive equilibrium. 
Recalling the assumption that the unregulated compe~ 
t ive equilibrium output level t externality-
generating industry is socially excessive, the term 
[h(Q( *,Q*,Z),Y) - SC 1 (Q(L:,Q*,Z),$)] is negative in this 
137. 
case also. Hence, at any feasible NPIT-optimal regulated 
equilibrium output level, the marginal social cost of output 
strictly exceeds the demand price. 
o 
Using Lemma 3-2-1 in (3-2-11), the optimal value of 
~Q 
the regulatory instrument ~ occurs when aIT = O. If, however, 
an increase in the value of the regulatory instruments 
always acts to increase regulated equilibrium output, the 
optimal value of the instrument is zero. 
PROPOSITION 3-2-1: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms with concave profit functions 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject 
to either a strictly positive unit rate 
sales tax or a strictly binding output 
quota each of which is enforced by 
means of an expected monetary penalty. 
Given that regulating the output of the 
industry necessitates the use of scarce 
resources to enforce the regulation and 
that the marginal cost of enforcement is 
non-decreasing, NPIT-optimal regulation 
of the industry exhibits the following 
characteristics: 
(i) Given that the expected penalty 
function is binding on the 
industry's behaviour, the optimal 
amount of enforcement occurs 
where the marginal social benefit 
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of enforcement equals its margi-
nal social cost and is uniquely 
determined giving a regulated 
equilibrium output level which 
exceeds the first-best optimum. 
(ii) The optimal quota is zero. This 
is not always uniquely optimal 
however. For instance, if the 
quota is enforced by a constant 
unit rate expected penalty, the 
level of the quota is irrelevant 
to the NPIT regulator provided 
that it remains binding. 
(iii) In the case of regulation by a 
unit rate sales tax the optimal 
tax rate will be set at a rate 
no less than that which equates 
the difference between market 
price and the marginal private 
cost of production at the output 
level consistent with part (i) 
of the Proposition. 
Proof. 
(i) The assumptions that the expected penalty is binding 
on behaviour and that the firm1s profit function is 
strictly concave ensures, following Proposition 
2-5-1, that aQ/aL < O. The result then follows 
e 
using (3-2-2), (3-2-3) and Lemma 3-2-1. 
139. 
(ii) Given that, from part (i) of the Propos it is 
optimal to control the industry so that * > 0, 
there is some level of quota strictly less than the 
unregulated competitive output level that is 
optimal for the NPIT regulator. This is obvious 
from the realization that enforcement can be optimal 
only if there is some binding constraint to 
enforce. 
Following Proposition 2-6-2, with an expected 
y function that is convex in output and the 
extent of constraint violation, aQ/an > 0 and any 
reduction in available quota reduces regulated 
equilibrium output. Thus, using Lemma 3-2-1 in 
(3 2 11), at any strictly positive quota level 
aWR Ian < 0 and hence the optimal quota level 
e 
zero. 
If the expected penalty is a constant unit rate 
f , then a change in quota level, providing t 
the quota remains binding on behaviour, does not 
affect the marginal expected penalty with respect 
to output and hence, from Proposition 2-6-2, 
aQ/an o. Thus in (3-2-11), aW R Ian e o at any 
binding quota level and hence, providing that the 
quota binding, the level of quota is irrelevant 
to the NPIT regulator. 
(iii) By the same reasoning as in part (ii) of the Propo-
sition, given that, from part (i) of the Propos ion, 
it is optimal to control the industry so that 
L* > 0, there is some strictly positive tax rate 
e 
that is optimal for the NPIT regulator. 
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Following Proposition 2-5-1, with an expected 
penalty function that is convex in output and the 
extent of constraint violation, aQ/an < 0 provided 
that the tax rate is less than the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output, given that 
no output is declared, evaluated at the equilibrium 
output level that is consistent with full compliance 
with the tax. 
Thus for any tax rate t such that 
(3-2-12) 
< GQ(Q(L*,t,Z) ,O,L*) 
e e 
using Lemma 3-2-1 in (3-2-11) gives aWR Ian > 0 and 
e 
it is optimal for the NPIT regulator to increase the 
tax rate. This is the case for all tax rates such 
that aQ/an < o. 
From Proposition 2-5-1, aQ/an = 0 for all tax rates 
= 
t > t where 
(3-2-13) t 
From (3-2-11) therefore, using Lemma 3-2-1, all tax 
rates t ~ t are optimal under NPIT regulation. Tax 
rate t, which equals the difference between the 
demand price and marginal private cost of production 
evaluated at the equilibrium output level consistent 
with the marginal expected penalty, given that no 
output is declared, generated by the optimal enforce-
ment level L*, represents the lower bound on the 
e 
NPIT optimal unit rate of sales tax. 
o 
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Proposition 3-2-1 is intuitively appealing. The 
first result, that optimal enforcement from a public 
interest objective occurs where its marginal social benefit 
is equal to its marginal social benefit, is widely found, 
. .. 1 f . th d . 2 In Slml ar orms, In e eterrence llterature. The most 
significant implication of this result is that, with an 
enforcement cost which is positive and increasing in 
enforcement activity, a NPIT regulator will never seek to 
restrict the output of an externality generating industry 
to the first-best level. 
Results (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3-2-1 show 
that, in the case of a sales tax or output quota with an 
expected penalty which is convex in output and the extent 
of constraint violation, the optimal level of enforcement, 
and hence the optimal degree of control exercised on the 
industry, is independent of the regulatory instrument used. 
The optimal level of the regulatory instrument itself how-
ever is not. 
Result (ii) suggests that a NPIT regulator will 
never choose to regulate the industry by strictly positive 
output quota given the assumption of convexity of the 
expected penalty function. This is consistent with econo-
mists' general preference for "price-oriented" restrictions 
such as taxes rather than quantitative controls. 
Given that no tax is voluntarily complied with3 
result (iii) shows that any tax that is fully complied with 
in the enforced regulatory environment is too low to be 
optimal for a NPIT regulator. In fact the NPIT-optimal tax 
rate is set so that, given the optimal amount of enforce-
ment and hence the optimal regulated equilibrium output 
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level, at most only the marginal unit of output is 
declared. 
In each case it is the expected penalty that is 
directly binding on behaviour. The expected penalty then 
represents an unavoidable tax on the actions of the offend-
ing firms and industry and it is through the marginal 
effects of this "tax" that behaviour is modified. The 
problem of the NPIT regulator is therefore to select the 
appropriate level of the "tax" given the resource costs of 
its implementation. In both part (ii) and part (iii) of 
Proposition 3-2-1, the value of the regulatory instrument 
is set so as to maximize the extent of constraint violation 
at any given output level. Following the assumption of the 
convexity of the expected penalty in violation size and out-
put, this action minimizes the resource cost of enforcement 
necessary to generate an expected penalty that is suffi-
cient to restrict output to any given level. 
3-3 NAIVE PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY: POLICY RESPONSES TO 
PARAMETER CHANGES 
The problem of the NPIT regulator given in (3-2-9) 
is implicitly defined for some fixed value of the para-
meter vector Z and of the other parameters which do not 
appear in Z. Thus the first-order conditions (3-2-10) and 
(3-2-11) provide the optimal amount of enforcement and 
level of the regulatory instrument as functions of these 
parameters. 
Assuming that WR is concave, solving (3-2-10) and 
e 
(3-2-11) simultaneously gives the optimal values of enforce-
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ment and the level of the regulatory instrument 
(3-3-1) L'* = L *' (w <I> Y) • ~*' = ~ '* ( w, <1>, Y ) e e" , 
where W represents the state of enforcement technology, <I> 
the state of technology in the regulated industry and Y the 
aggregate level of consumer income. 
Totally differentiating (3-2-10) and (3-2-11) allows 
the use of comparative static analysis to examine the 
qualitative effects of changes in these parameters on the 
NPIT regulator's choice of optimal regulatory policy_ 
From (3-2-10) 
(3-3-2) AdL
e 
+ Bd~ + EdW + FdY - Jd<l> o 
where 
A [ h ( . ) - sc 1 ( . ) ] aa ~ Q 2 + [h (.) ~~ - sc 11 ( . ) ~~ ] a Q - w" (L ) 
e 1 e e aLe e 
E 
J 
and from (3-2-11) 
(3-3-3) MdL
e 
+ Nd~ + Sdw + TdY - Ud<l> o 
where 
M ::: 
N 
S 
a2 Q [h ( . ) - sc 1 ( • ) ] a ~ a L 
a2 Q [h( . )-SC 1 ( .) ]-2 a~ 
e 
aQ aQ aQ 
+ [ hI ( . ) aL - SC 11 ( . ) aL ] an 
e e 
+ aQ aQ aQ [ hI ( . ) an - SC 11 ( . ) a ~ 1 a ~ 
T 
U 
solving 
(3 3-4) 
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[ h ( . ) - se 1 ( . ) 1 a Q; Y + [ hi ( . ) ~~ + h 2 ( . ) - se 11 ( . ) ~-~ 1 a Q 
Rearranging (3-3-2) and (3-3-3) in matrix form and 
[:~e 1 = ~ [-: -: 1 [-Ed~ - FdY + Jd~ -Sd~ - TdY + Ud<\lJ 
where [~ : 1 is the 2 x 2 matrix of coefficients of the 
terms 
(3 3-5) 
dL and dQ from (3-3-2) and (3-3-3) and 
e 
t:. = AN - EM > 0 
is the determinant of this coefficient matrix which posi-
tive by the assumption of concavity of (3 2 9). In addi-
tion, concavity implies that A and hence N are ne 
The first parameter change considered concerns the 
level of aggregate consumer income. 
(1) The Level of Aggregate Consumer Income 
PROPOSITION 3-3-1: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical itive 
firms with concave fit functions 
faces a curve with non-
violation. 
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tion t cost of 
enforcement is non-decreasing so that 
the NPIT regulator's objective function 
is strictly concave, and hence that the 
NPIT-optimal regulatory policy at some 
fixed vector of er values is in 
accordance with the results of 
sition 3-2-1: 
(i) Suppose that a change in aggre-
consumer income he 
marginal productivity of the 
regulator's policy instruments 
unchanged. An increase in aggre-
gate consumer income, which 
increases demand 
of the 
increases the NPIT-
imal level of enforcement and 
increases the NPIT-
rate if the 
induced increase in demand ice 
brium exceeds (is less than) the 
income-induced change in the per 
on the inal unit of 
(ii) Suppose that an increase in 
aggregate consumer income, which 
improves (reduces) the marginal 
productivity of the regulator's 
truments. If t 
income-induced rise in 
price at the initial regulated 
ibrium less than 
the income-induced change in the 
per unit loss of aggregate sur-
lus on the inal unit of out-
put, the increase in income 
raise the NPIT-
tax rate and increases reduces 
the NP imal level of enforce-
ment f however the income-
induced increase in demand price 
exceeds (is less than) the change 
in the unit rate loss of aggregate 
s the effect of the 
in income on NP T- imal 
regulatory policy is ambiguous. 
Proof. 
(i) Using (3-3 4) with dW = d¢ = 0 gives 
(3-3-5) 
dL* 
e 
dY 
In the case of a sales tax, following Proposition 
2-5-1, aQ/aLe < 0 and aQ/aQ ~ 0, while, from the 
assumption of concavity of (3-2-9), ~ > 0 and N < O. 
The discussion of the component terms of (3-3-4) in 
(3-3-6 ) 
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in Appendix 3-2 shows in addition that B > O. Using 
this information in (3-3-5) reveals that 
dL* 
e 
dY 
> 
< 0 > if F, T < 0 
Given the assumption that a change in aggregate con-
sumer income does not affect the marginal productivity 
of the regulator's policy instruments, the component 
terms a 2Q/aL aY and a2Q/a~aY, from F and T as defined 
e 
in (3-3-2) and (3-3-3) respectively, are both zero. 
Following Appendix 3-1, the increase in income acts 
to increase the regulated equilibrium output of the 
industry and thus aQ/aY > O. 
(3-3-3) then, assuming aQ/a~ 
From (3-3-2) and 
4 
< 0, 
(3-3-7) F T >< 0 , if 
The term h 2 (.) denotes, following (3-2-7), the 
income-induced change in demand price at the initial 
regulated equilibrium. The term [hl( o)-SC ll ( .)] 
shows the unit rate of change in the difference 
between demand price h(.) and marginal social cost 
SC l (.). Given that, from Lemma 3-2-1, the demand 
price is less than marginal social cost over the 
relevant output range, multiplying this square-
bracketed term by aQ/ay gives the income-induced 
change in the unit loss of social surplus on the 
marginal unit of output. Applying the conditions 
from (3-3-7) in (3-3-6), it is clear that the result 
of part (i) of the Proposition, concerning income-
induced changes in the NPIT-optimal level of enforce-
ment, holds in the case of a unit rate sales tax. 
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In the case of an output quota, following Proposition 
2-6-2, aQ/aL < 0 and aQ/a~ > 0 while the conditions 
e 
on Nand 6 remain from the concavity of the objective 
function. From Appendix 3-1, as a reduction in quota 
is qualitatively equivalent to an increase in the tax 
rate, B < O. Using this information in (3-3-5) shows 
that 
(3-3-8) 
dL* 
e 
dY 
~ 0 if F ~ 0 and T ~ 0 
Given the assumption that a 2Q/aL
e
ay = a2Q/a~ay = 0, 
and that aQ/aL and aQ/a~ are of opposite signs as 
e 
indicated above, then from (3-3-2) and (3-3-3) 
(3-3-9 ) > < F < 0 and T > 0 if 
The right-hand side of condition (3-3-9) is the same 
as that of (3-3-7). Following the same arguments 
therefore and applying them in (3-3-8) it is clear 
that the result in part (i) of the Proposition con-
cerning income-induced changes in the NPIT-optimal 
level of enforcement holds in the case of a binding 
output quota also. 
Again from (3-3-4) with dW 
(3-3-10J d~* dY 
d<j> o 
In the case of a sales tax, in addition to the results 
out lined above, A < 0 by the assumpt ion of concavity 
of (3-2-9) and, following the discussion of (3-3-4) 
in Appendix 3-2, M > O. Hence in (3-3-10) 
(3-3-11) d~* > 0 dY < if 
> F,T < 0 
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The right hand side of condition (3 3-11) is the same 
as that of (3-3-6) and hence the same conclusions 
apply_ The result of part (i) of the Proposition 
concerning income-induced changes in the NPIT-
optimal tax rate therefore follows. 
Given that, as shown in part (ii) of Proposition 
3-2-1 from the analysis of (3-2-10) and (3 2-11), 
the NPIT optimal quota level is zero, it is not 
possible to determine the parameter-induced policy 
response from differentiating the relevant first-
order conditions. Rather, with an expected penalty 
function that is convex in the extent of legal 
output the enforcement/quota-size tradeoff is such 
that it is always optimal for a NPIT regulator to 
reduce the size of a strictly positive output quota. 
Regardless of the value of a parameter, therefore, 
the NPIT-optimal quota is zero and thus, in the case 
of regulat ion by output quota, 3S1 '* /3 YO. 
(ii} If, in the case of regulation by sales tax, an 
increase income improves the marginal productivity 
of the regulator's policy instruments then 3 zQ/3L 3y 
e 
and 3zQ/3S13Y are both negative. Following Lemma 
3-2 I, marginal social cost exceeds demand price 
over the relevant output range. In (3-3 2) and 
(3-3-3) therefore, the first composite term of both 
F and T is positive. Applying (3-3 7) to (3 3-6) 
and (3 3 10), if h2 ( .) < - [ hI ( . ) - sc 11 ( • ) ] 3 y' an 
increase in aggregate income leads unambiguously 
to an in the NPIT-optimal tax rate and 
level of enforcement. Alternatively, if an increase 
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in income reduces the marginal productivity of the 
regulator's policy instruments, a 2Q/aL ay and 
e 
a2Q/a~ay are both positive and the opposite result 
aQ 
emerges. If, however, h 2 (·) > -[h l (· )-Se ll ( .)lay, 
in each case the signs of F and T are ambiguous and 
hence so also is the policy impact of the income 
change. 
In the case of an output quota an increase in income 
which improves the marginal productivity of the 
regulator's policy instruments, a 2Q/aL ay < 0 and 
e 
a2Q/a~ay > O. Following Lemma 3-2-1 therefore the 
first composite term of F is positive while that of 
T is negative. Applying (3-3-9) to (3-3-8), if 
h 2 (.) < -[h l ( .)-Se ll ( .)l~~, an increase in aggregate 
income leads unambiguously to an increase in NPIT-
optimal enforcement. As in the sales tax case, if 
the increase in income reduces the productivity of 
the regulatory instruments, the result is reversed. 
aQ If however h2 (.) > - [h l ( . i-sell ( .) lay the effect 
of the increase in income on the NPIT-optimal enforce-
ment policy is ambiguous. Finally, as observed in 
the proof of part (i) of the Proposition, the NPIT-
optimal quota level is unaffected by changes in 
parameter values. 
o 
The results of Proposition 3-3-1 are intuitively 
appealing if not immediately obvious. An increase in income 
which increases the demand for the output of the regulated 
industry may well reduce the benefit to society of res-
tricting its output. Society is more willing to incur 
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negative externalit s associated with a commodity 
which demand is high than it is when there is little aggre-
gate demand for the product. Hence it might be expected 
that when demand rises the NPIT regulator seeks to reduce 
the extent to which the industry is restricted. As Propos 
tion 3 3 1 shows however, this is not necessarily the case. 
The income-induced increase in demand acts to 
increase the socially optimal output level of the industry 
from that shown as Q in Figure 2-2-2. This of self 
suggests that the marginal social benefit of restr ing 
the output of the industry, at any given level less than 
the unregulated competitive equilibrium QC, reduced. 
This effect captured by the term h 2 ( .)~~. The increase 
e 
in income however also increases the regulated e ium 
output level of the industry at any given regulatory policy. 
Given the assumptions of a negatively sloped demand curve 
and strictly convex social cost, and the result of Lemma 
3-2 1, the loss in aggregate surplus on the marg unit 
is increased at the new equilibrium. This is shown by the 
aQ term [h1 (.) Se ll ( .)laY' Multiplying this term by aQ/a Le 
gives the change in marginal benefit to the NPIT regulator 
of restricting industry output whereas the term h 2 ( ')aL 
e 
gives the change in marginal cost. 
Assuming that the change in income does not affect 
the marginal productivity of the regulatory instruments, 
the optimal policy response is a familiar marginal cost/ 
marginal benefit decision and the intuition 
Changes in marginal productivity of the instruments however 
may reinforce the policy response or reverse depending 
on the relative magnitudes of the change in marg 
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effect ness of the instruments and the change in the 
marginal benefit of restricting output at the 
instrument productivity. 
The second parameter change to be considered 
that of the state of technology in the regulated industry 
which determines the degree of negative-ext 
generated. As stated in Appendix 3-1, an example of 
such a parameter is the state of pollution abatement 
technology in an industry. 
(2) The State of Externality-Abatement Technology. 
PROPOSITION 3 3-2: Under the ass ions in the of 
----------------~----------------~~----
Proposition 3-3-1, an improvement in 
technology in the regulated industry 
which reduces the social cost of its 
activities reduces the to 
which it is imal for the NPIT 
regulator to control the industry. 
Thus the optimal level of enforcement 
is reduced and the optimal tax rate is 
lowered. 
Proof. 
Using (3 3 4) with dY ~ d~ = 0 and substituting 
J and U gives 
(3-3-12) 
dL* 
e 
Following the assumption contained in (A3-1-9), 
se 12 (.) < O. Hence, applying the information concerning 
the other component terms of (3-3-12) as stated in the 
proof of Propos ion 3-3-1, irrespective of whether 
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regulation is by sales tax or output quota, the effect of 
the introduction of new technology which lowers the soc 
cost of output from this industry is to reduce the NPIT-
optimal level of enforcement activity. 
Again from (3-3-4) with dY = dU o and subst uting 
for J and U gives 
(3 3 13) dQ* dtj) 
Given the previously derived conditions on the com-
ponent terms of (3-3-13), in the case of a sales tax 
dQ*/dtj) < 0 and the effect of the introduction of new tech-
nology which lowers the social cost of output from the 
industry is to reduce the NPIT-optimal rate of sales tax. 
Given that, by Proposition 2-5-1, aQ/a < 0 and 
aQ/aQ < 0 in the case of a sales tax, and that, by Propos i-
tion 2-6-2, 3Q/aL < 0 in the case of an output quota, the 
e 
above policy responses correspond to a reduction in the 
extent of NPIT-optimal control over the industry. 
o 
In this case, the introduction of improved 
externality-abating technology reduces the marginal social 
cost of production at every output level. In terms of 
Figure 2-2-2 this corresponds to an increase in the 
"'-
socially-optimal industry output level Q The marginal 
benefit to the NPIT regulator of contro industry 
output to any given level which less than the unregulated 
competitive equilibrium is therefore reduced. This then 
leads to a reduction in NPIT-optimal control of the 
industry through some combination of tax cuts, quota 
increases and enforcement cuts. 
154 0 
If it was allowed that the technology changes 
affected marginal production costs, the regulated equili-
brium would then be affected and the analysis would be 
similar to that of the income change in Proposition 3-3-1. 
Assuming however that the introduction of externality-
abating technology increases marginal private production 
costs, regulated equilibrium output at any regulatory policy 
combination falls. This further reduces the marginal 
benefit to the NPIT regulator of restricting industry out-
put and hence reinforces the result of Propos ion 3-3-2. 
The final parameter to be considered in this section 
is the state of enforcement technology. 
(3) The State of Enforcement Technology. 
PROPOSITION 3-3-3: U~der the assumptions the stem of 
ion 3-3-1 the fol 
results emerge: 
( i) effect of an nt in 
enforcement technology on regu-
latory policy depends on the 
izes of its effect on 
regulator's policy instruments 
new technology improves the 
and the regulatory instrument 
sufficiently more than it reduces 
(ii) 
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the regulated equilibrium output 
then it is 
NPIT re or to increase 
to which it control 
industry. Thus the optimal level 
of enforcement is increased 
the optimal tax rate is raised. 
If however the effect of t 
technology on the marginal 
efficiency of enforcement and 
the regulatory instrument is 
sufficiently small relative to its 
effect on the 
output level, then it is optimal 
for he NPIT re or to reduce 
enforcement and the level of the 
tax rate. 
se that the introduction of 
new enforcement technology raises 
iveness of an 
increase in the tax rate suffi~ 
ion to its e 
ilibrium 
output level at any given regu-
latory policy combination so that 
the welfare impact of a change in 
the tax rate is increased. 
Suppose also that this increase 
in marginal welfare impact is 
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ssible that the ef 
new technology is to increase the 
NPIT-optimal tax rate and decrease 
the NPIT- level of 
resources devoted to enf 
activity. 
Proof. 
(i) Using (3-3-4) with dY dlj) o gives 
(3-3-14) 
d1* 
e 
jJ 
N B 
= __ .E + -.S 
/::, /::, 
Given that N < 0 by the concavity of (3-2-9) and 
that, from the discussion of (3-3 3) in Appendix 
3-2, B > 0 in the case of a sales tax, then 
d1*/djJ > 0 if terms E and S are both positive and 
e 
d1*/djJ < 0 if E,S < O. From (A3-2 5), E ~ 0 if and 
e < 
only if 
(3-3-1S) 
while from (A3-2-7), S > 0 if and only if 
< 
(3-3-16) a
2 Q/anal1 > 
aQ/all < 
aQ [hI (. )-SC ll (.) Jan 
. )-
From the discussion of the component terms of 
( 3 3-15) and (3-3-16) in Append 3-2, the right-
hand side of each expression is positive. Following 
(A3-1-10) it is assumed that a
2 Q aQ 
< O. 
a jJ 'a1 ajJ'all 
e 
The terms aQ/a1 and aQ/an may be interpreted as 
e 
the marginal effectiveness or eff iency of each 
policy instrument in rest the output of the 
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industry. 
the change in the marginal effectiveness of enforce-
ment and the rate of sales tax respectively. 
Using conditions (3-3-15) and (3-3-16) in (3 3-14) 
then, if the introduction of the new technology 
raises the marginal efficiency of the tax rate and 
enforcement activity sufficiently in relation to the 
reduction in equilibrium output which induces 
at any given policy combination, so that positive 
inequalities hold in both (3 3-15) and (3-3-16), it 
optimal for the NPIT regulator to increase the 
level of enforcement activity. ernatively, if 
the effect of the new technology on the marginal 
effectiveness of the tax rate and enforcement is not 
sufficiently large relative to aQ/a~. the negative 
inequality holds in both (3-3-15) and (3-3-16) and 
hence it is optimal for the NPIT regulator to reduce 
the level of enforcement activity. 
In the case of an output quota, from the discussion 
of (3-3-2) in Appendix 3-2, B < O. Hence using 
(3-3-14), dL:/d~ > 0 if E > 0 and S < 0 and 
dL*/d~ < 0 if E < 0 and S > O. The required condi-
e 
tion on the term E follows from (3-3-15) and is the 
same as in the tax case d cussed above. Thus from 
(A3 2-7), S ~ 0 if and only if (3-3-16) holds. 
< 
Following Proposition 2 6 2 and (A3-1-10) however, 
both sides of (3-3-16) are negative in the case of 
an output quota. 
a2 Q From (A3-l-l0), aQa~ > 0 with an output quota show-
ing that the introduction of the new enforcement 
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technology increases the marginal effectiveness of 
an output quota also. Hence, using (3-3-15) and 
(3-3-16) in (3-3-14), if the effect of the new 
technology on the marginal effectiveness of 
ment and the quota level is sufficiently large 
relative to aQ/a~, so that the pos ive inequality 
holds in (3-3-15) and the negative inequality holds 
in (3-3 16), it is optimal for the NPIT regulator to 
increase the level of enforcement activity. The 
converse result emerges with the opposite inequal 
t s in (3-3-15) and (3-3-16). 
Again from (3-3-4) with dY ; d~ = a 
(3-3-17) M A = XoE - £loS 
In the case of a sales tax M > 0, and A < 0 by the 
concavity of (3-2-9). From (3 3-17) there 
d~*/d~ > 0 if E,S > 0, and d~*/d~ < 0 if E,S < O. 
These conditions are identical to those applying 
to (3-3-14) in the sales tax case and hence the same 
assumptions on the relative s s of the increase in 
marginal efficiency of enforcement and tax rate com-
pared with aQ/a~ apply here also. Thus the condi-
> > tions sufficient for dL*/d~<O so imply dn*/d~ < 0 
e 
in the case of regulation by sales tax. 
(ii) From (3-3-14) and (3-3-17) 
dL* d~e < 0 if and only if ~eS (3 3 18) 
and 
(3-3-19) d~* . f d 1 ';f M d~ > 0 1 an on y ~ XoE 
The assumption contained in 
N XoE < 0 
A 
XeS> 0 
Proposition 1S that 
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the effect of the new enforcement technology is to 
increase the marginal efficiency of the tax rate 
sufficiently so that, from (3-3-16), S > o. Using 
this and rearranging the condition given ln (3-3-18) 
(3-3-20) B E < N. S 
and manipulating the condition given in (3-3-19) 
(3-3-21) 
Thus dL*/dW < 0 and d~*/dW > 0 if and only if both 
e 
(3-3-20) and (3-3-21) are satisfied. Given that the 
right-hand sides of both (3-3-20) and (3-3-21) are 
negative, this condition is satisfied only if 
(3-3-22) 
Rearranging, (3-3-22) simplifies to AN-BM > 0 which 
as given in (3-3-5) necessarily follows from the 
assumption of concavity of (3-2-9). Thus it is 
possible that both conditions given in (3-3-20) and 
(3-3-21) are satisfied and hence that the effect of 
the introduction of new enforcement technology is to 
reduce the NPIT-optimal amount of resources devoted 
to enforcement activities and to raise the NPIT-
optimal tax rate. 
Denoting the right-hand sides of the conditions in 
(3-3-20) and (3-3-21) by k1 and k2 respectively, 
dL*/dW < 0 and d~*/dW > 0 if and only if 
e 
(3-3-23) 
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Examining the right-hand side inequality of (3-3-23) 
and rearranging gives 
(3-3-24) 
Following the assumptions and results from Appendix 
3-2 used above in the proof of this Proposition, 
the left-hand side of (3-3-24) is some positive 
number. Given that kl < 0, the inequality in 
(3-3-24) is satisfied only if kl is sufficiently 
small in absolute value which, from (3-3-20), corres-
ponds to the assumption in the Proposition that the 
increase in marginal welfare impact of the tax rate, 
induced by the introduction of the new enforcement 
technology and denoted by S, is sufficiently small. 
Rearranging (3-3-23) reveals that, given the assump-
tions of the Proposition, dL*/d~ < 0 and d~*/d~ > 0 
e 
if and only if 
(3-3-25) < 
< 
Thus, given that a 2 Q/aL a~ < 0 by assumption in 
e 
(A3-1-10), (3-3-25) shows that if the increase in 
marginal effectiveness of enforcement is bounded 
from above and, depending on the magnitude of k2' 
from below, then the introduction of improved 
enforcement technology resulti in an increase in the 
NPIT-optimal rate of sales tax and a reduction in the 
NPIT-optimal level of resources devoted to 
5 
enforcement. 
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o 
Proposition 3-3-3 deals with the introduction of 
improved enforcement technology and its results essentially 
reflect the substitution and output effects of this techni-
cal progress. It is clear that the introduction of 
technology which significantly enhances the marginal 
deterrent capabilities of both enforcement resources and 
the regulatory instrument could lead to a greater degree of 
control over industry output being optimal. This may occur 
as in result (iii) where more resources are devoted to 
enforcement activities or as in result (iv) where less 
resources are employed in enforcement but, as shown by the 
directional change in the tax rate, a greater level of 
restriction is achieved. 
In the first case the substitution effect reinforces 
the output effect so that the increased marginal effective-
ness of enforcement now outweighs its previously prohibitive 
marginal cost and hence it is optimal to devote more 
resources to enforcement. In the second case the output 
effect dominates the substitution effect. The assumption 
that aQ/aW < 0 implies that any level of enforcement 
activity is enhanced by the new technology resulting in 
greater deterrence and a reduced output level. The increase 
in marginal effectiveness of enforcement in this case is 
small relative to this output effect. The NPIT regulator 
then reduces the level of resources devoted to enforcement. 
Deterrence remains higher, and hence regulated equilibrium 
output lower, than before the introduction of the tech-
nology. This is implied by (3-2-11) given that the optimal 
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tax rate rises. 
The case in part (i) of the Proposition when both 
the optimal tax rate and optimal enforcement levels are 
reduced is not immediately obvious. Given that aQ/a~ < 0, 
if the new technology did not alter the marginal deterrent 
capabilities of enforcement activity, the marginal benefit 
of enforcement would fall as a result of the smaller 
difference between the demand price and marginal social 
cost at the reduced output level. If then the new tech-
nology increases the marginal efficiency of enforcement by 
only a small amount, it is optimal for the NPIT regulator 
to reduce the amount of enforcement. A similar argument 
applies to the tax rate. Recalling from (3-2-11) that the 
optimal tax rate is set so that aQ/a~ = 0, it is possible 
in this case that the substitution effect outweighs the 
output effect and that the degree of control over industry 
output is lessened. 
3-4 CAPTURE THEORY: OPTIMAL POLICY 
In contrast to the public interest motivation of the 
NPIT regulator, the CT regulator serves the private 
interest of the industry that is regulated. 6 In the present 
partial equilibrium framework the CT regulator is assumed 
to act so as to maximize aggregate profits generated in the 
industry. This is equivalent to the problem of forming and 
maintaining a cartel in a competitive industry with a fixed 
number of firms. Figure 3-4-1 below illustrates the 
situation. 
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Fi~ure 3-4-1: Comparison of profit levels under 
competitive behaviour and monopoly control of an 
industry. 
p 
H 
DMSB 
A 
Q 
The competitive industry equilibrium at EC with 
output level QC involves a loss of potential industry 
profits of JKEC. If the formation and operation of a 
cartel was costless, the cartel would operate as a pure 
M 
monopolist and produce at output level Q where marginal 
revenue, which shows the marginal private benefit of output 
(MPB), equals marginal private production cost and industry 
profits are maximized at AJH. As previously mentioned, QM 
mayor may not exceed the first-best output level Q in 
Figure 2-2-2, but, irrespective of this, it sets a lower 
bound on the optimal regulated output under CT regulation. 
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n any effective regulation s 
enforcement and that any enforcement activity s 
strictly pos and increasing resource costs, is not 
unreasonab to assume that the industry will be levied 
some fraction of the total cost of regulating If. 
Using (3-2-2) the resource cost of enforcement incurred by 
the industry is 
(3-4-1) o < b < 1 
In addition, the industry faces the payment of any 
fines d as a result of the detection of legal activi-
ties. To be consistent with the assumption of funded 
enforcement activities, it is assumed that any revenue 
raised from fine payments is redistributed in some way 
throughout the economy. 
Expected fine payments are given from the expected 
penalty function. Following Sections 2-4 and 2-5 and 
using (3 2 ) the expected penalty in the sa s tax case is 
given by 
(3 4 2) EP t = (1-a) G ( Q (L , t , Z ),X (L , t , Z) , 
e e 
G(Q(.),X(.),O) = 0, 0 < a < 1 
where X( ,t,Z) is the optimal declared output level of the 
industry at given values of some parameters contained in 
the parameter vector Z, and ral is the 
revenue that is redistributed to the indu 
Differentiating (3-4-2) with re 
(3-4-3 ) 
of fine 
aQ 
'aL e 
< 0 
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Given the signs of the component terms of (3-4 3), which 
result om the analysis of Sections 2-4 and 2 5, the effect 
on total fine payments of an increase in resources devoted 
to enforcement in the case of a sales tax is ambiguous. 
The marg fine revenue generated by additional enforce-
ment,however, assumed to be strictly decreasing at any 
level of enforcement for which the expected penalty is 
defined and hence a 2 EP t / aLe 2 < 0. 
From (2-6-3) and (3-2-5) the expected penalty in the 
case of an output quota is given by 
(3-4-4) EP R = (l-a)H(Q(Le,R,Z) ,Le,R); H(Q(.) ,O,R) = 0, 
° < a < 1 
where la' is as in (3-4-2) above. Differentiating, 
(3-4-5) 
< ° 
and hence effect on total fine payments of an increase 
in resources devoted to enforcement in the case of an out-
put quota also ambiguous. As in the case of a sales 
tax, 3 2 EP /a R 2 < 0. 
There I using (3-4-1) and (3-4-5), the total cost 
of any level of enforcement activity incurred by the 
industry in the case of an output quota is 
(3-4-6) 
Differentiating with respect to L 
e 
dW aEPR a
2 w 
(3-4-7) R bw ' (Le) + 0 R 
° ~ 
> ; aL2 > -
e e 
From (3-2-2), Wi (Le) > ° and w" (Le) > ° and it is assumed 
here in (3-4-7) that the convexity of the resource cost 
enforcement dominates the concavity of the expected 
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penalty payments. 
In the case of regulation by sales tax, there is the 
additional cost to the industry of the tax paid on any out-
put that may be declared. This is given by 
(3 4-8) 
Differentiating with respect to L 
e 
(3 4 9) aT aL 
e 
> 0 
assuming that an increase in enforcement increases com-
pliance with the tax at a diminishing rate; and with respect 
to the tax rate 
(3 4-10) 
From its component terms, (3-4-10) also has ambiguous sign. 
It is assumed that the reduction in compliance as the tax 
rate is increased at any given enforcement level produces 
tax revenues somewhat akin in shape to the 
and hence a 2 T/at 2 < 0. 7 
curve 
Using (3-4-1), (3-4-2) and (3-4 8) I the total cost 
of any level of enforcement activity incurred by the 
industry in the case of a sales tax is 
(3-4-11) 
Differentiating (3 -11) with respect to the level 
of enforcement activity 
4-12) 
As in (3-4-7) it is assumed that the resource cost of 
enforcement is the dominant component in determining the 
properties of the net cost of enforcement to the industry. 
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A special case of the preceding analysis occurs when 
the funding of enforcement activities and dispersal of f 
revenues is carried out on a per capita poll-tax basis. In 
this case, assuming that the industry comprises z individual 
s, each of which owns one firm, from an economy of m 
(3 4-13) o < a = b = ~ < 1 
m 
For enforcement of either regulatory instrument to 
take place, it is necessary that industry pro are 
increased through enforcement activities. Assuming that 
this is the case for initial enforcement ef , and that 
marginal benefit of enforcement is maximi at QC and 
strictly decreases to zero at QM while, from (3-4-7) and 
(3 4-12), the marginal cost of enforcement is non-
decreasing, the optimal regulated equilibrium output level 
-
under CT regulation occurs at some intermed output Q 
where 
(3 4 14) Q = Q(L ,n,Z) 
e 
is the regulated equilibrium consistent with the CT optimal 
-levels of enforcement (L ) and the regulatory instrument 
e 
(n) at some fixed values of the parameters contained in the 
vector Z, such that 
(3-4-15) 
-The determination of Q proceeds as lows, firstly 
the case of an output quota. 
(1) Regulation by Output Quota 
Using (3-2-5) r (3-2-7), (3 -6), and the industry 
cost function which generates the supp curve of (2-2-7), 
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the CT regulator chooses the size of quota and the amount 
of enforcement that maximizes profit within the regulatory 
framework according to the following expression. 
(3-4-16) Maximize TIR (L ,R,Y,~,a,b) 
e e 
= h(Q(L ,R,Y,~),Y)Q(L ,R,Y,~) 
e e 
Expression (3-4-16) shows the amount of increase in 
net profit as a result of reducing output from QC in 
Figure 3-4-1 by enforced output quota and is assumed to be 
concave. The components of the parameter vector Z to be 
considered include respectively the level of aggregate 
consumer income (Y) and the state of enforcement technology 
(w). In addition, 'a' is the proportion of fine revenue 
that lS redistributed to the industry and 'b' is the pro-
portion of the resource cost of enforcement that is funded 
by the industry. These are assumed not to affect marginal 
production or consumption decisions and hence do not, of 
themselves, alter the regulated equilibrium. 8 
Differentiating (3-4-16) gives the following first-
order conditions which describe a maximum. 
(3-4-17) 
and 
(3-4-18) 
dTIRe 
dL 
e 
= [h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) 
dQ dWR 
- C I (Q (. ) ) ] aL - aL < 0 
e e 
< only if L = 0 
e 
dTIRe 
dR = [hl(Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) 
dQ 
- C' (Q(.))]dR - -> only if R = Q 
< only if R = 0 
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When solved simultaneously, these conditions generate the 
opt 1 vel of enforcement and size of the quota as 
functions of the various parameters, thus 
~ 
(3 4-19) Le = Le(a,b'll'Y) R :::.: R(a,b'll'Y) 
The initial bracketed term of (3-4-17) gives the 
f between marginal revenue and marginal private 
cost which, when multiplied by the output effect of 
rcement, gives the marginal benefit of enforcement. 
second term gives the marginal cost of enforcement to 
industry which,from (3-4-7), is positive and non-
asing. At the optimum level of enforcement, assuming 
that enforcement takes place, these are equated. If the 
marginal cost of enforcement everywhere exceeds its 
marginal benefit, no enforcement will occur. The assump-
tion that this is not the case is implicit in (3 4 15). 
The component terms of (3-4-18) have a similar 
interpretation to those of (3-4-17) and show the net 
marginal benefit to the industry of increasing the quota. 
From (3-4-4) and (3-4-6) 
(3 4-20) 
Following Propositions 2-6-1 and 2-6-2 it is assumed that, 
as an increase in quota reduces the extent of illegal 
output and reduces the marginal 
illegal output level, H2 dominates the 
quota and hence dwR/dR.< O. If the marg 
penal at every 
effect of the 
benefit of 
increasing the available quota everywhere exceeds the 
marginal cost of so doing, it is optimal the CT regu-
lator to set the quota at the regul equilibrium output 
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level of the industry. 
Cond ions (3~4-17) and (3-4-18) must be sa sf 
simultaneously at the CT-optimal regulated equil ium 
output level Q. 
LEMMA 3 4-1: Suppose an industry comprising a finite 
number of identical itive firms with 
concave profit functions faces a market 
demand curve with non-zero finite ela 
and is sub ect to either a stric 
output quota or strictly positive unit rate 
sales tax each of which is enforced means 
of an expected monetary penalty. Assuming 
that an increase in enforcement reduces the 
equilibrium output level of the industry and 
that the marginal cost of enforcement to the 
industry is strictly positive, at the CT-
optimal regulated industry equilibrium output 
level the marginal private production cost 
exceeds revenue. 
Proof. 
In the case of an output quota this follows imme-
diately (3 4 17). Given that, from (3-4-7) and (3-4-12), 
the marg cost of enforcement is strictly positive and 
that, following Propositions 2-5-1 and 2-6-2, dQ/dLe < 0 
for both an output quota and sales tax provided that the 
expected penalty is directly binding on behaviour, then,if 
any enforcement is to occur under the CT framework so that 
> 0, the reduction in industry output which enforcement 
induces must increase industry profitability. This necessi-
tates that at the output level associated with L marginal 
e 
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cost exceeds marginal revenue. That is 
(3-4-21) h 1 (Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) - C'(Q(.)) < 0 
If however L = 0 then no deterrent to non-compliance 
e 
with the regulatory instrument exists and hence the 
regulated equilibrium coincides with the unregulated compe-
titive equilibrium. Recalling the assumption that the 
unregulated competitive equilibrium level in this industry 
exceeds the monopoly profit-maximizing level, (3-4-21) 
holds in this case also. Hence at any feasible CT-optimal 
regulated equilibrium output level, marginal private 
production cost exceeds marginal revenue. 
o 
PROPOSITION 3-4-1: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms with concave profit functions 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject 
to a strictly binding output quota 
which is enforced by means of an 
expected monetary penalty. Given that 
regulating the output of the industry 
necessitates the use of scarce 
resources to enforce the regulation 
and that the marginal cost of enforce-
ment is non-decreasing, CT-optimal 
regulation of the industry exhibits the 
following characteristics: 
(i) Given that the expected penalty 
is binding on the industry's 
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behaviour and that enforcement 
increases industry profitability, 
the optimal amount of enforcement 
occurs where the marginal private 
benefit of enforcement equals its 
marginal private cost and is 
uniquely determined giving a 
regulated equlibrium output which 
exceeds the pure monopoly level. 
(ii) Given that the optimal regulatory 
policy occurs when both first-
order conditions are simultaneously 
satisfied, the optimal level of 
quota depends on the form and 
magnitude of the expected penalty_ 
If the expected penalty function 
is strictly convex in the extent 
of constraint violation and does 
not include a flat rate component 
the optimal quota level occurs 
where the marginal private cost 
of increasing the quota equals 
the marginal private benefit of 
so doing and is uniquely deter-
mined at a level which is strictly 
less than the regulated equilibrium 
output of the industry. It is 
possible in these circumstances 
that the marginal cost to the 
industry of increasing the quota 
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everywhere exceeds the marginal 
benefit of so doing and hence 
that the CT-optimal quota is 
zero. 
(iii) If the quota is enforced by a 
constant unit-rate marginal 
expected penalty the CT-optimal 
quota is set at the regulated 
equilibrium output level that is 
consistent with Le from Part (i) 
of the Proposition. 
Proof. 
(i) The assumptions that the expected penalty is binding 
on behaviour and that the firm's profit function is 
concave ensures, following Proposition 2-6-2, that 
3Q/3L < O. The result then follows using (3-4-7) 
e 
and Lemma 3-4-1. 
(ii) Given that, from part (i) of the Proposition, it is 
optimal to control the industry so that L > 0, there 
e 
is some level of quota strictly less than the unregu-
lated competitive output level that is optimal for 
the CT regulator. This results from the fact that 
enforcement occurs only if 3Q/3L < a which requires 
e 
that there be some binding constraint to enforce. 
Following Proposition 2-6-2, with an expected 
penalty function that is convex in the extent of 
constraint violation, 3Q/3R > a and any increase in 
available quota that is binding on behaviour 
increases regulated equilibrium output. From Lemma 
3-4-1 therefore, which shows that marginal cost 
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exceeds marginal revenue over the relevant output 
range, an increase in quota of self acts to 
reduce industry profits. This corresponds to the 
f t composite term of (3-4-18) which thus repre-
sents the marginal cost to the industry of quota 
expansion. From (3-4-20),however, an increase in 
the quota reduces the expected penalty faced by the 
industry. This signs the second term of (3-4-18) 
which thus represents the marginal benefit of 
ing the quota. The CT-optimal quota occurs 
where the marginal benefit and marginal cost of 
quota expansion are equated. 
Given the assumptions that the expected penalty func-
tion is convex in the extent of constraint violation 
and contains no fixed unit rate component, the 
expected penalty is zero at the output level 
corresponding to full compliance with the quota and 
increases continuously as output expands illegally. 
With this form of expected penalty function, the 
marginal expected penalty for the initial illegal 
unit of output is less than the difference between 
marginal production cost and the demand price at 
the quota level of output Hence, from the assump-
tion of competitive maximizing behaviour, 
full compliance with the quota is impossible to 
achieve through enforcement and therefore the CT-
optimal output quota is ly less than the 
regulated equilibrium output level consistent with 
L from part (i) of the Proposition. 
e 
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If the marginal cost of quota expansion, given the 
CT-optimal enforcement level, everywhere exceeds the 
marginal benefit of so doing, then from (3-4 18) any 
strictly positive output quota reduces industry 
profit and hence the CT-optimal output quota is zero. 
(iii) If the quota is enforced by a constant unit rate 
expected penalty function then, following Propos ion 
2-6-2, any change in available quota which remains 
binding on behaviour will not affect the regulated 
equilibrium output of the industry and hence 
dQ/dR = O. In this case, using (3-4-20), any 
increase in quota which remains binding increases 
industry profit and therefore, from (3-4-18), the 
CT-optimal quota is set at the regulated equili-
brium industry output level consistent with the CT-
optimal enforcement level L . 
e 
(2) Regulation by Sales Tax 
o 
With reference to (3-4-15) the determination of the 
CT-optimal regulated equilibrium in the case of regulation 
by an enforced unit rate sales tax proceeds as follows. 
Using (3-2-5), (3-2-7), (3-4-11), and the industry 
cost function which generates the supply curve of (2-2-7). 
and modifying these formulations to include the para-
ion used in the above discussion of an output 
CT regulator chooses the amount of enforcement 
and t rate of sales tax which together maximize profit 
within the regulatory framework according to the following 
sion: 
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(3-4-22) Maximize TIR (L ,t,Y,~ ,a,b) 
e e 
h(Q(L ,t,~,Y),Y)Q(L ,t,~,Y) 
e e 
- C ( Q (L , t , ~ , Y )) - wt (L , t ,)J , a , b ) e e 
ssion (3-4-22) shows the amount of 
net profit as a result of reducing output from QC 
Figure 3 4-1 by the enforced sales tax and is assumed to 
in 
be concave. Differentiating gives the following f -order 
conditions which describe a maximum. 
(3-4-23) 
(3-4-24) 
The in 
(h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) • Y ) -C • {Q ( • ) ) 1 ~ ~ 
e 
~ 
< only if L = 0 
e 
[ hI ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -C I ( Q ( . ) ) 1 ~ ~ 
-
< only if t = 0 
bracketed term of (3-4-23) gives the 
difference between marginal revenue and marginal private 
production cost which, when multiplied by the output 
effect of enforcement, gives the marginal benefit of 
enforcement. The second term gives the marginal cost to 
the industry of enforcement which, from (3-4-12), pos ive 
and non-decreasing. At the optimal level of enforcement, 
assuming that enforcement takes place, these are equated. 
If the marginal cost of enforcement everywhere exceeds its 
marginal benef , no enforcement takes place. The assump-
tion that this not the case is implicit in (3-4 15). 
The component terms of (3-4-24) have a similar 
interpretation to those of (3-4-23) and show the net 
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marginal benefit to the industry of increasing the tax 
rate. Using (3-4-10) and (3-4-11) 
(3-4-25) 
where from (3-4-2) 
(3-4-25) 
Given the signs of the component terms of (3-4-26), which 
result from the analysis of Sections 2-4 and 2-5, the 
effect on total fine payments of an increase in the tax 
rate is ambiguous. It is assumed however that the effect 
of the reduction in declared output dominates that of the 
reduction in actual output and hence that aEPt/at > O. 
Substituting in (3-4-2S), and using the analysis of 
{3-4-10),it is assumed that the positive effect on expected 
penalty payments outweighs any possible decrease in tax 
payments so that aWt/at > O. It is also assumed that 
a2wt/at2 > 0 so that the marginal cost to the industry of 
increasing the tax rate is non-decreasing. 
These results hold only if the tax rate is directly 
binding on industry behaviour. Once the tax rate has 
reached the level above which no output is declared, fur-
ther increases in the tax rate have no effect on the regu-
lated equilibrium or on optimal declaration strategy and 
hence aQ/at = 0 and aWt/at = O. Conditions (3-4-23) and 
(3-4-24) must be satisfied simultaneously at the CT-
optimal regulated equilibrium output level 6. Solving 
-gives the CT-optimal enforcement level (L ) and tax rate 
e 
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(t) as functions of the parameters specified in (3~4-22), 
thus 
(3-4-27) = L (a,b,l-l,Y) 
e 
t = t(a,b,~,Y) 
PROPOSITION 3-4-2: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms with concave profit functions 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject 
to a strictly positive unit rate sales 
tax which is enforced by means of an 
expected monetary penalty. Suppose 
also that regulating the output of the 
industry necessitates the use of 
scarce resources to enforce the regula-
tion and that the marginal cost of 
enforcement is non-decreasing: CT-
optimal regulation of the industry ex-
hibits the following characteristics: 
(i) Given that the expected penalty 
function is binding on the 
industry's behaviour and that 
enforcement increases industry 
profitability, the optimal 
amount of enforcement occurs 
where the marginal private bene-
fit of enforcement equals its 
marginal private cost and is 
uniquely determined giving a 
regulated equilibrium output 
(ii) 
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level. 
policy occurs when both first-
conditions are s 
neously satisfied, the oEtimal 
tax rate 
magnitude of the expected penalty 
function. If the eXEected 
penalty function is strictly con-
vex in the extent of constraint 
violation, does not include a flat 
rate component, and the matrix of 
second-order Eartial derivatives 
of the expected penalty function 
with respect to actual and 
declared output is non-singular, 
then the optimal tax rate is set 
at a level such that, given the 
optimal enforcement level Le from 
part (i) of the Proposition, 
either no outEut is declared or 
some output is declared, but 
never where all output is 
declared. 
i) Suppose that the expected penalty 
function is strictly convex in 
the extent of the violation and 
does not include a flat rate 
component but that the matrix of 
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second-order 
of the expected penalty function 
with respect to actual and 
declared output is singular such 
that the effect on the 
expected penalty with respect to 
declared out 
in declared out 
that of an 
in o 
the effect of a in actual 
on the 
out imal tax e is 
not less than the dif 
between the demand and 
ion cost 
at the equilibrium output level 
consistent with from part (i) 
is declared. 
Proof . 
(i) The assumptions that the expected penalty binding 
on behaviour and that the firm's prof function is 
concave ensures, following Proposition 2 5 1, that 
aQ/aL < O. The result then follows us 
e 
and Lemma 3-4-1. 
(3 4-12) 
(ii) Given that, from part (i) of the Propos ion, it is 
optimal to control the industry so that > 0, there 
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is necessarily some strictly positive tax rate that is 
optimal for theCT regulator. This results from the 
implication of (3-4-23) that enforcement occurs only 
ao/aL < 0 which requires that there be some con-
e 
to enforce. 
Following Proposition 2-5-1, with an expected penalty 
function that is convex in the extent of undeclared 
output, ao/at < 0 and any increase in the rate of tax 
which is binding on behaviour decreases regulated 
equilibrium output. 
From (3-4-24) the CT-optimal tax rate occurs where the 
marginal benefit and marginal cost, to the industry, 
of increasing the tax rate, are equated. Given that 
the marginal benefit is strictly decreasing and the 
marginal cost is non-decreasing when the tax rate is 
binding on behaviour, it is not optimal for the CT 
regulator to indefinitely raise a binding tax rate. 
Whether or not the tax is directly binding on behaviour 
at the CT-optimal regulated equilibrium output level 
depends on the simultaneous evaluation of (3-4-23) and 
(3424). It may be the case that the relative net 
marg benefits to the industry are such that it is 
optimal to enforce a sales tax to the point where 
output is partially declared. Here the optimal tax 
rate t such that 
(3428) t 
- -
< GQ ( Q ( L e ' t , ll, Y) ,0 , L e ,j..!l 
In this case the marginal benefit of any tax less than 
-t exceeds its marginal cost, given Let and the marginal 
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-benefit of any enforcement less than L exceeds its 
e 
marginal cost, given t. 
Alternatively, it may not be optimal to enforce a 
tax to the point where output is declared. In this 
case, any tax rate t > t is not directly binding on 
behaviour and hence at any t > t, a Q /a t = 0 and 
awt(. )/at = O. In these circumstances, any tax rate 
t > t is optimal for the CT regulator where 
-(3-4-29) t = h(Q(Le,t,f.!,Y),Y) - C'(Q(Le,t,f.!,Y)) 
(iii) 
GQ ( Q (L- , t , f.! , Y ) , 0 , L , f.! ) e e 
Given that there is no flat rate component in the 
expected penalty, it is not possible to ensure full 
declaration of output with any strictly positive tax 
rate and from (3-4-23) it is not optimal to enforce 
a zero-rate tax. 
Following Propositions 2-4-4 and 2-5-1, if the matrix 
of second-order partial derivatives of the expected 
penalty function with respect to actual and declared 
output is singular, then for any tax rate t < t as 
expressed in (3-4-29), aQ/aL = 0, and thus, from 
e 
(3-4-23), the enforcement level Le cannot be optimal. 
Hence, in these circumstances, the CT-optimal tax rate 
t can be no less than the difference between demand 
price and marginal private production cost at the 
regulated equilibrium output level associated with the 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output given 
that no output is declared. 
o 
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In the case where the matrix of second-order partial 
derivatives of the expected penalty function is singular 
such that G = G 
xx qq -G xq' it follows from Propostion 
2-5-1 that increasing enforcement beyond the level at which 
the marginal expected penalty with respect to output, given 
that no output is declared, is equal to the tax rate, has 
no effect on the regulated equilibrium output level of the 
industry. Suppose that, beginning from a regulated equili-
brium where the marginal expected penalty with respect to 
output, given that no output is declared, is equal to the 
tax rate, enforcement is increased. Ceteris paribus, this 
results in an increase in the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output at the regulated equilibrium output level. 
Given demand price and production cost the marginal unit of 
output is not profitable to produce. 
In order to reduce the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output firms can reduce output, increase the 
level of declared output, or implement some combination of 
the two. Given that G - G the effect on the marginal qq qx' 
expected penalty with respect to output of a unit reduction 
in actual output is the same as that of a unit increase in 
declared output. The dynamics of the competitive equilibrium 
ensure that the response of the firm to the enforcement-
induced increase in the marginal expected penalty will be to 
increase the amount of declared output at the margin as a 
decision to decrease actual output would create a divergence 
between the penalty-inclusive marginal cost of production 
and the demand price on the marginal unit of output. 
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The fact that the regulated equilibrium output level 
is not affected by an increase in enforcement which ra s 
the marginal expected penalty with respect to output, given 
that no output is declared, beyond the level of the tax rate, 
implies from (3-4-23) that such a change in enforcement is 
not opt Conversely this implies that the CT-optimal 
tax rate is no less than the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output, given that no output declared, 
generated by the CT-optimal level of enforcement which, at 
the regulated equilibrium output level, equal to the 
difference between marginal production cost and the demand 
price on the marginal unit of output as in part (iii) of the 
Proposition. 
In the case where the expected penalty function is 
strictly convex in the extent of constraint violation, does 
not contain a flat-rate component, and the matrix of second-
order partial derivatives of the expected penalty function 
with respect to actual and declared output is non-singular, 
as described in part (ii) of Proposition 2-5 1 an increase 
in enforcement in the circumstances described above acts to 
reduce the regulated equilibrium output level of the industry. 
Following (2-4-33) G G - (G )2 > 0 in this instance and 
, qq xx xq 
therefore it will not be the case that G = 
xx 
G or that qx 
G = - G qq xq An increase in the amount of output that is 
declared in response to the increase in enforcement will then 
reduce the marginal expected penalty with respect to output 
but will not preserve the equality in absolute values between 
G and G that is necessary at equilibrium. If, however, it 
x q 
is the case that G -G then it also follows from (2-4-33) 
xx qx 
that G > qq G qx That is, the firm can reduce the marginal 
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expected penalty with respect to output at a faster rate by 
reducing actual output than by increasing declared output. 
In either case, the optimal response of the firm involves a 
combination of an increase in declared output and a decrease 
in actual output. It is possible therefore, depending on the 
marginal benefit and marginal resource and tax liability cost 
of so doing, that it is optimal for a CT regulator to 
enforce partial compliance with a sales tax. 
3-5 CAPTURE THEORY: POLICY RESPONSES TO PARAMETER CHANGES 
Expressions (3-4-19) and (3-4-27) show that the CT 
regulator's optimal policy decisions are functions of various 
parameters. Assuming interior optimum solutions for all 
policy instruments, the response of the regulator to changes 
in parameter values can be examined. This is done here 
firstly for the case of regulation by output quota. 
(1) Regulation by Output Quota 
Totally differentiating (3-4-17) gives 
(3-5-1) AdL + BdR + Ed~ + FdY + Jda + Kdb 
e 
where 
o 
, 3 2 Q 3 2wR A= [h1(Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),Y)~C (Q(.))]aI;"2 - 3L 2 
e e 
I 3 2 Q B= [h1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+ h(Q(.),Y)-C (Q(·))]3L 3R 
e 3L 3 R e 
+ [r h 11 r Q ( • ) • Y ) Q ( • ) + h 1 ( Q ( • ) • Y ) + hl ( Q ( • ) • y ) -c .. ( Q ( • ) ) 1 ~ ~ ] ~ ~ e 
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E = [h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) I Y ) -C I (Q ( • ) )] L a 
a e 11 
+ [[ h 11 ( Q ( • ) I Y ) Q ( ) + h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) + h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -C II ( Q ( • ) ) ]~] ~ 
e 
a2 F = [h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -C I (Q ( • ) ) ] a a Y 
+ [[ h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) + h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -C " ( Q ( • ) ) ] ~ 
-a :2 
J 
aL aa e 
K 
-a 2 WR 
b 
and totally d ferentiating (3-4-18) gives 
(3-5-2) MdL
e 
+ NdR + Sdll + TdY + Uda + Vdb 0 
where 
+ [[ h II ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + hI (Q ( • ) , Y ) + hI ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -C" (Q ( • ) ) 1 L J ~ ~ 
I .a.:9. a N := [h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) • Y ) -C (Q ( • ) ) ] a R 2 - -a-R"""';";'" 
+ [[hll(Q( .),Y)Q( .)+h1(Q( .),Y)+h1(Q( .),Y)-C"(Q( .))l:~]:~ 
I a2 Q a2wR 
S:::[h1(Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),Y)-C (Q(·»)]aRall - a ]J 
+ [[ hll ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h 1 (Q ( • ) , Y ) + hI (Q ( • ) , Y ) -C " ( Q ( • ) ) 1 :~] :~ 
T 
(j2Q [ hI ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( ) + h ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -C I (Q ( . ) ) ] a R(j Y 
+ [[ h 11 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + hI { Q ( . ) , Y ) + h 1 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -C" ( Q ( . ) ) ] a Y 
+ h I2 (Q(,),Y)Q(.)+h2 (Q(·),Y)] 
U :::: 
v :::: 
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Rewr ing (3-5-1) and (3-5-2) in a matrix form and 
solving gives 
(3-5-3) 
where 
terms in 
(3-5 4) 
1 
t:. ::: : ::: : ~:: : ::: 1 
the 2 x 2 matrix of coefficients of the 
and dR from (3-5-1) and (3-5-2) and 
t:.:::: AN 8M > 0 
is the determinant of this coefficient matrix and is pos 
by the assumption of concavity of (3-4-16). Concavity also 
implies here that A and N are negative. The first 
change considered concerns the level of aggregate consumer 
income. 
(a) The level of aggregate consumer income 
~~~~~~~~~l Suppose that an industry comprising a 
fin number of identical ive 
f fit functions 
a demand curve with non-zero 
finite elasticity and is subject to a 
188. 
strictly binding output quota enforced 
by means of an expected monetary 
penalty which is convex in output and 
the extent of quota violation. Suppose 
also that regulating the output of the 
industry necessitates the use of scarce 
resources for enforcement that t 
regulator's objective function is 
strictly concave, and that the CT-
optimal regulatory policy at some fixed 
vector of parameter values involves 
strictly positive levels of enforcement 
and quota in accordance with Proposition 
3-4-1. 
(i) Suppose that a change in aggregate 
consumer income leaves the 
marginal productivity of the regu-
lator's policy instruments 
unchanged. An increase in aggregate 
consumer income, which increases 
demand for the output of the regu-
lated commodity, reduces (increases) 
1 of enforcement 
and increases (reduces) the CT-
optimal quota level if the combined 
he income-induced 
increase in demand price and change 
in the price responsiveness of 
demand, evaluated at the initial 
regulated equilibrium output level, 
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less than 
unit of her with 
change in the marginal cost to the 
industry of restricting output 
through the use of the relevant 
regulatory policy instrument. 
Ceteris ibus the in 
income is more likely to lead to 
increase in enforcement a 
decrease in quota if it reduces 
the price responsiveness of demand 
than if it increases it. 
(ii) Suppose that an increase in aggre-
gate income,which increases demand 
for the output of the regulated 
industry, improves (reduces) the 
marginal productivity of the regu-
lator's policy instruments. If the 
combined effect of the income-
induced r in demand ice and 
change in price responsiveness of 
demand is less than (exceeds) the 
income-induced change in the per 
unit loss of industry profit on the 
marginal unit of output, the 
increase in income raises (lowers) 
the CT-optimal level of enforcement 
and reduces (increases) the CT-
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optimal quota level. If, however, 
the combined effect of the 
induced rise in demand 
change in the price responsiveness 
of demand exceeds (is ss than) 
the income-induced 
per unit loss of industry pro 
on the marginal unit of output, the 
effect of the increase in income on 
CT-optimal regulatory policy is 
ambiguous. 
Proof. 
(i) Using (3-5-3) with d~ = da = db = 0, 
(3-5 5) 
(3-5 6) 
(3 5 7 ) 
and 
dL-
e 
dR 
dY 
:;; 
:;; 
Following Proposition 2-6-2, aQ/aL < 0 and aQ/aR > 0, 
e 
while, from the assumption of concavity of (3-4-16), 
~ > 0 and A,N < o. The discussion of the component 
terms of (3 5 3) in Appendix 3-3 shows in addition 
that B,M < o . Using this information in (3-5-5) and 
(3 5 6 ) reveals that 
-dL -
e > 0 and dR < 0 < dY > 
if F ~ 0 and < 0 T > 
Given the assumption that a change in aggregate con-
sumer income does not affect the marginal productivity 
of the regulator's policy instruments, the component 
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fined 
(3 5-1) and (3-5-2) respectively, are both zero. 
Following Appendix 3-1, an increase in income which 
increases demand for the output of the regulated 
commodity acts to increase the regulated equilibrium 
output of the industry and thus aQ!aY > O. From 
(3-5 1) then 
(3 5 8) F [ [h 11 (Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) +2 h 1 (Q ( . ) , Y) - C" (Q ( . ) ) 1 ~~ 
(3 5-9) 
+ h 12 (Q(·I,YIQ(.1 + h2(Q(·I'Y)]~~e -
Rearranging (3-5-7) F > < 0 if and only if 
h12 (Q(.) ,Y)Q(. )+h 2 (Q(.) ,Y) 
[h1l (Q (.) ,Y) Q (.) + 2hl (Q (. ) ,Y) -C" (Q (.) ) 1 ~~ 
Following (A3-3-10) a2wR!aLeay < 0 while from (A3- 2) 
it is assumed that [h1l (Q (.) ,Y) Q (.) + 2hl (Q (.) ,Y) 
- C"(Q(.»] < O. Given these results, and those of 
the previous discussion, the right-hand side of (3-5-9) 
is some po tive number. The square bracketed term 
shows the unit rate of change in the difference 
between marginal revenue and marginal cost. Given 
that, Lemma 3-4-1, marginal revenue is less than 
marg cost over the relevant output range, multi-
plying s square bracketed term by aQ!ay gives the 
income-induced change in the unit loss of industry 
productive profit on the marginal unit of output. The 
other compo te term on the right-hand side of (3-5-9) 
is the income-induced change in the marginal cost to 
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the industry of a unit of enforcement divided by the 
marginal productivity of enforcement which shows the 
income-induced change in the marginal cost to the 
industry of restricting output through enforcement. 
On the left-hand side of (3-5-9), the term h 2 (Q(.) ,Y) 
denotes the income-induced change in demand price at 
the initial regulated equilibrium quantity which, 
following the assumption of the Proposition, is posi-
tive. The term hI (Q(.) ,Y) represents the slope of 
the demand curve which, as previously defined, is 
negative. The effect of a change in income on the 
slope of the demand curve is given by h 12 (Q(.) ,Y). 
If this term is negative (positive), an increase in 
income increases (reduces) the absolute value of the 
slope of the demand curve or alternatively reduces 
(increases) the price responsiveness of demand. 
From (3-5-2), using the assumption of part (i) of the 
Proposition 
(3-5-10) T = [[hll(Q(.),Y)Q(.)+2hl(Q(.),Y)-CII(Q(.))]~~ 
] 
aQ a 2 wR 
+ h 12 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h2 (Q(·),Y) aR - aRay 
Rearranging (3-5-10), T ~ 0 if and only if 
(3-5-11) 
- [h11 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +2h1(Q(·),Y)-CII(Q(.))]~~ 
Following (A3-3-13) a 2 wR/aRay > 0 while from (A3-3-2) 
it is assumed that the square bracketed term on the 
right-hand side of (3-5-11) is positive. Given 
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these results, and those of previous discussions, the 
right-hand side of (3-5-11) is some positive number. 
The interpretation of (3~5-11) is essentially the same 
as that of (3-5-9), the only difference being in the 
regulatory policy instrument which is relevant to 
each expression. 
Using (3-5-9) and (3-5-11) In (3-5-7) reveals the 
validity of part (i) of the Proposition. From (3-5-7) 
the increase in income leads to an increase in CT-
optimal enforcement and a decrease in the optimal quota 
level if F > 0 and T < O. As shown in Appendix 3-3, 
these inequalities, from (3-5-9) and (3-5-11) respec-
tively, are more likely to hold if h 12 (Q(.) ,Y) < 0 
than if h12 (Q(.) ,Y} > o. Ceteris paribus, therefore, 
the increase in income is more likely to lead to an 
increase in CT-optimal enforcement and a decrease in 
the CT-optimal quota if it reduces the price respons 
ness of demand than if it increases it. 
(ii) Following (A3-3-10), if the change in income increases 
the marginal productivity of enforcement then 
8 ZwR/8Le 8Y is unambiguously negative. Using (3-5-9), 
if the combined effect of the income-induced rise in 
demand price and change in the price responsiveness of 
demand is less than the income-induced change in the 
unit loss of industry profit on the marginal unit 
of output, the inequality is preserved by the addition 
of another positive term on the right-hand side of the 
expression. Using the discussion of (A3-3-13), in 
Appendix 3 3, a similar result can be derived from 
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(3 5 11). If,however,the change in income reduces 
t marginal productivity of the regulatory 
ments then, following (A3-3-10) and (A3 3 13), the 
signs of d2wR/dLedY and d 2 WR/dRdY are ambiguous. It 
is possib in this case that the respect assumed 
lities in (3-5-9) and (3-5-11) are 
The ef of a change in income.on CT-optimal regu-
latory policy in these circumstances is therefore 
ambiguous. The bracketed result of this part of the 
Propos ion can be established by using above 
argument with assumed inequalities reversed. 
o 
Given that, following Lemma 3-4-1, marginal production 
cost exceeds marginal revenue over the relevant output range, 
the CT regulator increases industry profit by restricting 
output. An increase in income which raises the demand price 
at any given quantity may be expected to reduce the marginal 
benefit to the CT regulator of restricting output. The 
increase in income however also increases the regulated 
equilibrium output level of the industry at any given regu-
latory policy. Given the assumptions of a negatively sloped 
demand curve and strictly convex production cost, and the 
result of Lemma 3 4 1, the loss of aggregate surplus on the 
marginal unit of output is increased at the new equilibrium 
This effect of self would suggest an increase in the CT-
optimal extent of control over the industry. Disregarding 
the effect of the change in income on the marginal cost to 
industry of restricting output through the use of the re 
tive regulatory policy instruments, the policy response 
the CT regulator to the change in income depends on the 
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relative size of these two effects together with the income-
induced change in the price responsiveness of demand. 
The Proposition showed that, ceteris paribus, an 
increase in income which reduces the price responsiveness of 
demand is more likely to lead to an increase in the CT-
optimal extent of control over the industry than an increase 
in income that increases it. This is because the CT regu-
lator is essentially acting as a monopolist in restricting 
the output of the industry and the less price responsive is 
demand, the greater is the potential profitability of 
exercising monopoly power. 
Part (ii) of the Proposition considers the implications 
for CT regulatory policy if the increase in income affects 
the marginal productivity of the regulatory policy instru-
ments. Depending on the magnitude and qualitative nature of 
these effects, the overall policy impact of a change in 
income may be either enhanced or reversed. For instance, an 
income-induced increase in the marginal productivity of 
enforcement leads to a ceteris paribus increase in the 
marginal benefit of additional enforcement to the CT regu-
lator. This may cause CT-optimal enforcement to increase 
where, in the absence of such an effect, the reverse would 
hold. 
The second parameter change considered concerns the 
proportion of the resource cost of enforcement that the 
industry is required to fund. 
(b) The resource cost of enforcement to the industry 
PROPOSITION 3-5-2: Under the assumptions contained in the 
stem of Proposition 3-5-1, an increase 
in the proportion of the resource cost 
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of enforcement that the industry is 
required to fund reduces the extent to 
which it is optimal for the CT regulator 
to control the industry. Thus the CT-
optimal level of enforcement activity is 
reduced and the CT-optimal quota size is 
increased. 
Proof. 
Using (3-5-3) with dY = da = d~ = 0 gives 
(3-5-12) 
and 
(3-5-13) 
Following (3-4-20), a 2 wR/aRab = O. Using (3-5-2) 
- -therefore, V = 0 and the signs of dL /db and dR/db depend 
e 
only on the term in K. From (A3-3-6) and given the pre-
-
viously derived results on the signs of M, Nand 6, dL /db 
e 
< 0 and dR/db> O. Hence an increase in the proportion of 
the resource cost of enforcement that the industry is required 
to fund reduces the CT-optimal enforcement level and increases 
the CT-optimal amount of quota. Given that, from Proposition 
2-5-2, aQ/aL < 0, and that, from Proposition 2-6-1, aQ/aR > 0, 
e 
these policy responses correspond to a reduction in the extent 
of control over the industry. 
o 
Proposition 3-5-2 is intuitively obvious. An increase 
in the requirement for the industry to fund the resource cost 
of enforcement unambiguously raises the marginal cost to the 
industry of restricting output and thus it is clearly 
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profitable for the CT regulator to reduce 
which it controls the output of the indus 
the extent to 
The t parameter change considered concerns the 
proportion of fine payments that are redistributed to members 
of the industry. 
PRO 
Proof. 
(c) Net industry fine payments 
ITION 3-5-3: Under the assumptions contained in the 
f an increase in 
quota is to reduce the expected fine 
payments incurred by the industry, if an 
increase in enforcement activity 
increases the expected fine payments 
incurred by the industry then an increase 
ion of fines that 
distributed to members of the industry 
s the extent to which it 
optimal for the CT regulator to control 
1 of enforcement rises and the CT-
regulator to unambiguously reduce the 
an increase in enforcement activity 
su!ficiently reduces the eXEected fine 
Eayments incurred by the industry. 
se 
Using (3-5 3) with dY = db = d~ o gives 
(3 5 14) 
and 
(3 5 15) 
-dL 
e 
-dR 
da 
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= 
From (3-4-20) the effect of an increase in avai Ie 
quota on the expected fine payments incurred by the indus 
try, denoted as dEPR/aR, is negative as assumed here and 
only if 
(3-5 16) 
Differentiating (3-4-20) with respect to la' 
(3-5 17) 
which is positive by (3-5-16). 
From (3-4-5), the effect of an increase in enforce-
ment on the expected fine payments incurred by the industry 
(3-5-18) 
> o if and only if 
< 
As shown in (A3-3-7) 
(3-5-19) 
aL aa 
e 
If, as assumed in the Proposition, aEPR/a > 0, then, from 
ing this 
result and (3-5-17) into (3-5-14) and (3-5 15) then reveals 
that dLe/da > 0 and dR/da < O. Thus, if an increase in quota 
reduces expected fine payments incurred by the industry and 
an increase in enforcement increases them, it is optimal for 
the CT regulator to increase the extent to which it controls 
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the industry in response to an increase in the proport of 
refunded fine payments. 
Control over the industry is unambiguously reduced 
only if enforcement is decreased given that the quota not 
or the quota is increased given that enforcement 
not increased. If then dL Ida < 0 and dR/da > 0, the extent 
e 
of control over the industry is unambiguously decreased. 
Using (3 5-14) and (3-5-15) 
(3 5 20) 
and 
(3 5 21) 
dL 
e 
da 
8 2W R 
< 0 if and only if 8L 8a 
e 
dR > 0 8
2W
R 
if and only if 8L 8a 
e 
> 
A 
M 
where the right-hand side of the both conditions is positive 
and by (3 5-4) 
(3 5 22) 
Following (3-5-20), (3-5-21) and (3-5-22), the extent 
of CT optimal control over the industry is unambiguously 
reduced if the cond ion in (3-5-21) is satisfied. From 
(3 5 18) and (3 5-19) this requires that the expected fine 
payments incurred by the industry are sufficiently reduced 
by an in enforcement. 
D 
The int ion of Proposition 3-5-3 is similar to 
that of sition 3-5-2. If the expected fine payments 
by the industry increase with greater levels of 
enforcement and reductions in the amount of quota, an 
in the proportion of fine payments that are redis-
tributed to members of the industry reduces the marginal 
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cost to the CT regulator of increasing the extent to which 
output is restricted and allows this to profitably occur. 
The final parameter change considered concerns the state of 
enforcement technology. 
(d) The state of enforcement technology 
PROPOSITION 3-5-4: Under the assumptions contained in the 
stem of Proposition 3-5-1 the effect of 
an improvement in enforcement technology 
on CT-optimal regulatory policy depends 
on the relative sizes of its effect on 
the marginal productivity of the regu-
lator's policy instruments and its 
effect on the regulated equilibrium at 
any given level of the policy instru-
ments. If the new technology improves 
the marginal efficiency of enforcement 
and the quota sufficiently more than it 
reduces the regulated equilibrium output 
level at any policy combination, then it 
is optimal for the CT regulator to 
increase the extent to which it controls 
the industry. Thus the CT-optimal 
enforcement level is raised and the CT-
optimal quota reduced. If, however, the 
effect of the new technology on the 
marginal efficiency of enforcement and 
the quota is sufficiently small relative 
to its effect on the regulated equili-
brium output level at any policy 
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combination, then it is optimal for the 
CT regulator to reduce enforcement and 
increase available quota. 
Proof. 
Using (3-S-3) with dY da db o gives 
(3-S-23) 
dL 
e 
dW 
N B ~.E + ~.s 
and 
(3-S-24) 
From (3-S-23) and (3-S-24) given that A,B,M,N < 0 
- -
and 6 > 0 then dL /dW > 0 and dR/dW < 0 if E > 0 and F < 0 
e 
- -
and dL /dW < 0 and dR/dW > 0 if E < 0 and F > O. Following 
e 
the discussion of (A3-3-1S) and (A3-3-20), E > 0 if 
d 2 Q/dL dW is sufficiently negative which also requires that 
e 
its absolute value be sufficiently large relative to that of 
dQ/dW, and F < 0 if d 2 Q/dRdW is sufficiently positive 
which requires that it be sufficiently large relative to the 
absolute value of dQ/dW. 
Recalling the interpretation that d 2 Q/dL dW < 0 and 
e 
d 2 Q/dRdW > 0 reflect the increase in marginal effectiveness 
of enforcement and the quota respectively as deterrents 
against illegal behaviour which is induced by the improve-
ment in enforcement technology, and that dQ/dW < 0 shows 
the reduction in regulated equilibrium output at any combi-
nation of enforcement and quota caused by the improvement 
in technology, the result concerning the increase in the 
extent of CT-optimal control of the industry in response to 
the improvement in enforcement technology clearly follows. 
Conversely, from (A3-3-1S) and (A3-3-20), if 
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-a 2 Q/aL a~ and a2Q/aRa~ are sufficiently small in relation 
e 
to -aQ/a~, E < 0 and F > 0 which, in (3-5-23) and (3-5-24), 
reveals that it is optimal for the CT regulator to reduce 
the level of enforcement and increase the amount of quota 
in response to the improvement in technology. 
Proposition 3-5-4 shows that the introduction of new 
D 
enforcement technology which significantly enhances the mar-
ginal deterrent capabilities of both enforcement and the 
level of the quota can lead to a greater degree of control 
over the industry being optimal for the CT regulator. The 
case when it is optimal for the CT regulator to reduce the 
level of enforcement and increase the size of the quota has 
a similar interpretation to its NPIT counterpart in Proposi-
tion 3-3-3. Given that aQ/a~ < 0, if the new technology did 
not alter the marginal deterrent capabilities of enforcement 
and the quota, the marginal benefit of both policy instru-
ments would fall as a result of the smaller difference 
between marginal revenue and marginal cost at the reduced 
regulated equilibrium output level. If then the new tech-
nology increases the marginal efficiency of enforcement and 
the quota by only a small amount, it is optimal for the CT 
regulator to reduce the amount of enforcement and increase 
the size of available quota. Whether such action results in 
an overall increase or reduction in the ~xtent of control 
over industry output depends on the relative sizes of these 
substitution and output effects of the introduction of the 
new technology. 
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This completes the analysis of CT-optimal regulation 
by output quotas. Regulation by taxes is now discussed. 
(2) Regulation by Sales Tax 
As shown in (3-4-27), the simultaneous solution of 
first-order conditions (3-4-23) and (3-4-24) yield CT-
- -
optimal values of the tax rate (t) enforcement level (L ) 
e 
as functions of the various parameters outlined in the pre-
vious analysis of CT regulation by output quota. Assuming 
interior optimum values for both policy instruments, their 
responses to changes in parameter values are now examined. 
Totally differentiating (3-4-23) gives 
(3-5-25) AdL
e 
+ Bdt + EdW + FdY + Jda + Kdb o 
where 
A 
B 
E 
(PO [ hi ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + h ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -C ' (Q ( . ) ) 1 a L 2 
e 
+ [[ h II (Q ( • ) • Y) Q ( • ) + 2 hl (Q ( • ) • Y) -C" (Q ( • ) ) 1 ~~e] ;~e 
, a2 Q [h 1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),Y)-C (Q(.))laL at 
e 
aL at 
e 
+ [[ hll (Q ( • ) • Y) Q ( • ) +2h 1 (Q ( • ) • Y) -c" (Q ( • ) ) 1 ;~J ~ ~e 
I a 2Q [ hi ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + h ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -C (Q ( . ) ) ] aL a 
e W 
+ [[ hll (Q ( • ) • Y) Q ( • ) +2hl (Q ( • ) • Y) -C" (Q ( • ) ) 1; ~]; ~e 
+ [[ h 11 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + 2 h 1 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -C " ( Q ( . ) )] ~ 
J 
aL aa 
e 
K = - aL ab 
e 
and totally different ing (3-4-24) 9 
(3-5-26) MdL + Ndt + Sd~ + TdY + Uda + Vdb 
e 
o 
where 
M 
N 
I a 2Q [h1(Q( .),Y)Q( .)+h(Q( .),Y)-C (Q( '))]at3L 
e 
ataL 
e 
+ [[ h II ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 h 1 (Q ( • ) ,Y ) -c " ( Q ( • ) ) 1; ~ e 1 ;~ 
a 2 a 2 W t [ hI ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -C I (Q ( • ) ) ] - at'2 
+ [[ hll (Q( • ) ,Y) Q( • ) +2hl (Q( • ) ,Y) -C" (Q( • ) ) 1 ;~] ;~ 
I 3 2 Q 3 2 wt 
s= [h1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),y)-C (Q('))]3t3~ - t ~ 
+ [[ h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 h 1 (Q ( • ) , Y ) -C " ( Q ( • ) ) 1 ; ~] a t 
a2 Q a2w t T= [h 1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),Y)-C'(Q(·))]atay - t Y 
+ [[ h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 hI (Q ( • ) , Y ) -C II ( Q ( • ) ) ] ~ 
U :::: 
at3a 
v == 
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Rewriting (3-5-24) and (3-5-25) in matrix form and 
solving gives 
(3-5 27) 
1 
/), [
N -81 
-M A [ Ed~ + FdY + Jda + Kdb] Sd~ + TdY + Uda + Vdb 
where [~ : 1 is the 2 x 2 matrix of coefficients of the terms 
in dL and dt from (3-5-25) and (3-5-26) and 
e 
(3-5-28) /), = AN - 8M > 0 
is the determinant of this coefficient matrix and positive 
by the assumption of concavity of (3-4-22). Concavity also 
impl s here that A and N are negative. The first parameter 
change to be considered concerns the level of aggregate 
consumer income. 
(a) The level of aggregate consumer income. 
PROPOSITION 3 5 5 Suppose that an industry comprising a 
fin number of identical 
firms with concave profit functions faces 
a market demand curve with non zero 
finite elasticity and is subject to a 
strictly positive unit rate sales tax 
which is enforced by means of an expected 
monetary penalty. Suppose also that the 
CT regulator's objective function is 
strictly concave and that CT-optimal 
regulatory policy at some fixed vector 
of parameter values involves strictly 
tax rate in accordance with Proposition 
3-4-2. 
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(i) Suppose that a change in aggregate 
consumer income leaves the margi-
nal productivity of the regulator's 
policy instruments unchanged. An 
increase in aggregate consumer 
income which increases demand 
the output of the regulated 
commodity, increases (reduces) the 
CT-optimal level of enforcement and 
the imal tax rate if the 
combined effect of the income-
induced increase in demand 
and change in the price responsive-
ness of demand, evaluated at the 
initial regulated equilibrium out-
put level, is less than (exceeds) 
the income-induced in the 
per unit loss of industry profit 
on the marginal unit of output 
together with the change in the 
marginal cost to the industry of 
restricting output through the use 
of the relevant policy instrument. 
Ceteris paribus, the increase in 
income is more likely to lead to 
an increase in enforcement and the 
tax rate if it reduces the price 
responsiveness of demand than if 
it increases the price responsive-
ness of demand. If the effect of 
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the increase in income is to raise 
the marginal cost to the industry 
of restricting output through the 
use of regulatory policy, it is 
possible that it is optimal for the 
CT-regulator to increase the extent 
to which it controls the industry, 
in response to the change in income, 
only if the increase in income 
sufficiently reduces the price 
responsiveness of demand. 
(ii) Suppose that an increase in aggre-
gate income, which increases demand 
for the output of the regulated 
industry, improves (reduces) the 
marginal productivity of the regu-
lator's policy instruments. If 
the combined effect of the income-
induced rise in demand price and 
change in the price responsiveness 
of demand is less than (exceeds) 
the income-induced change in the 
per unit loss of industry profit on 
the marginal unit of output 
together with the change in the 
marginal cost to the industry of 
restricting output through the use 
of the relevant policy instrument, 
the increase in income raises 
(lowers) the CT-optimal level of 
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enforcement and tax 
however the combined 
the income-induced 
price and change in the price res-
ponsiveness of demand exceeds (is 
less than) the income-induced 
change in the per unit loss of 
industry profit on the marginal 
unit of output together with the 
change in the marginal cost to the 
industry of restricting output 
through the use of the relevant 
policy instrument, the effect of 
the increase in income on CT-
optimal regulatory policy is 
ambiguous. 
Proof. 
( i) Using (3-5-27) with d~ = da = db a 
dL-
(3 5 29) e N B - -;;.F + -;;.T 
and 
(3 5 30) dt dY 
Following Proposition 2-5-1, aQ/aL , aQ/at < 0, while 
e 
from the assumption of concavity of (3-4-22), 6 > 0 
and A,N < O. The discussion of the component terms 
of (3 5-27) in Appendix 3-4 shows in addition that 
8,M > o. Using this information in (3-5-29) and 
(3 5 30) reveals that 
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(3-5-31) dL dt > dye and dY ~ 0 if F, T < 0 
Given the assumption that a change in aggregate 
consumer income does not affect the marginal produc-
tivity of the regulator's policy instruments, the 
component terms 3 2 Q/3L 3Y and 3 2 Q/3t3Y from F and T, 
e 
as defined in (3-5-25) and (3-5-26) respectively, are 
both zero. From (3-5-25) then 
(3-5-32) F [ [h 11 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + 2 ~( Q ( . ) , Y ) - C " ( Q ( . ) ) 1 ~ ~ 
> Rearranging (3-5-32), F < 0 if and only if 
(3-5-33) 
- [h 11 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( .) + 2 hI ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -C" ( Q ( . ) ) 1 ~ ~ 
The interpretation of the component terms of (3-5-33) 
is the same as that of their counterparts in (3-5-9). 
From (3-5-26), using the assumption of no productivity 
change 
(3-5-34) T = [[hl1(Q(.),Y)Q(.)+2hl(Q(.)'Y)-C"(Q(.»]~~ 
3zw 
+ h 12 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h2(Q(·),Y)]~~ - 3t3~ 
and rearranging, T ~ 0 if and only if 
(3-5-35) 
- [h11(Q( .),Y)Q(.) + 2h1 (Q( .),Y)-C"(Q( .))]~~ 
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As with (3-5-33), (3-5-35) has a counterpart in the 
proof of Proposition 3-5-1. The interpretation of 
the component terms of (3-5-35) is therefore the same 
as those of (3-5-11). Given these similarities, using 
(3-5 33) and (3-5-35) in (3-5-31), the validity of the 
first part of section (i) of Proposition 3 5 5 clearly 
follows. 
If, following Appendix 3-4, conditions are such to 
ensure that a2wt/aLeay and a2wt/atay are both nega-
tive, the right-hand sides of (3-5-33) and (3 5 35) 
are unambiguously positive. Given the assumption in 
the Proposition that the increase in income es 
the demand price of the regulated commod y at every 
quantity, h 2 (Q(.) ,Y) > O. Following the d cussion 
of component terms in the proof of Proposition 3-5-1, 
h 12 (Q(.) ,Y) < 0 reflects an income-induced reduction 
in the price responsiveness of demand. From (3 5 33) 
and (3-5-35), F and T are more likely to be positive 
if h 12 (Q( .),Y) < 0 than if it is pos ive. Using 
(3-5-31) therefore, it follows that, ceteris paribus, 
the increase in income is more likely to lead to an 
increase in enforcement and the tax rate if it 
reduces the price responsiveness of demand than if it 
increases it. 
If the effect of the increase in income to raise 
the marginal cost to the industry of restricting out-
put through the use of regulatory policy, a2Wt/aLedY 
and a2wt/atay are both negative. The right-hand sides 
of (3-5-33) and (3-5-35) in t case are ambiguous 
(ii) 
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in sign. It is possible in particular that the right-
hand sides of both expressions are negative. If this 
is so it will be optimal for the CT regulator to 
increase the extent to which it controls the industry 
in response to the increase in income only if the 
increase in income sufficiently reduces the price 
responsiveness of demand. 
If the increase in income acts to change the marginal 
productivity of the regulator's policy instruments, 
the terms a 2Q/aL aY, a2Q/ataY, a2X/aL aYand a2X/ataY 
e e 
are non-zero. In particular, if the increase in 
income raises the marginal productivity of the regu-
latory instruments, a 2 Q/aL ay, a 2Q/atay < 0 and 
e 
a 2 x/aL ay, a 2 x/atay > O. Incorporation of these terms 
e 
in (A3 4 10) and (A3-4-12) reveals that the signs of 
ment of the Proposition, however, circumvents this 
diff ulty by assuming a clearly defined inequality 
between the combined effect of the income-induced 
rise in demand price and change in the price respon-
siveness of demand, and the income-induced change in 
the per unit loss of industry it on the marginal 
unit of output together with the change in marginal 
cost to the industry of restricting output through 
the use of the relevant policy instrument. Assuming 
that the "less-than" inequal holds between these 
component terms and that the change in income leaves 
the marginal productivity of the regulatory instru-
ments unchanged, then, from (3 5 33) 
212. 
(3-5-36) 
- [ h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c " ( Q ( • ) ) 1 ~ ~ 
Using the formulation of F from (3-5-25), given Lemma 
3-4-1, the incorporation of the assumption concerning 
an income-induced rise in the marginal productivity 
of the regulatory instruments results in the addition 
of another positive term on the right-hand side of 
(3-5-36). The inequality in (3-5-36) is therefore 
preserved by this type of change. If, however, the 
effect of the change in income is to reduce the 
marginal productivity of the regulatory instruments, 
a negative term is added to the right-hand side of 
(3-5-36) and the inequality is not necessarily pre-
served. This argument can also be determined through 
the use of (3-5-35) and can be extended to cover the 
bracketed case by reversing assumed inequalities. 
Using (3-5-31) therefore, the validity of part (ii) 
of the Proposition is established. 
o 
The results and interpretation of Proposition 3-5-5 are 
essentially the same as those of Proposition 3-5-1 except 
that in this case increases in the level of enforcement and 
in the tax rate are mutually reinforcing deterrents. The 
second parameter change considered concerns the proportion 
of the resource cost of enforcement that the industry is 
required to fund. 
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(b) The resource cost of enforcement to the industry. 
PROPOSITION 3-5-6: Under the assumptions contained in the 
stem of Proposition 3-5-5, an increase 
in the proportion of the resource cost 
of enforcement that the industry is 
required to fund reduces the CT-optimal 
level of enforcement and the CT-optimal 
tax rate thus reducing the CT-optimal 
extent of control over industry output. 
Proof. 
Using (3-5-27) with dW = da = dY o gives 
(3-5-37) 
and 
(3-5-38) 
-dL 
e 
db 
N 
- ~.K + B ~.V 
dt M 
db = K"0K A ~.V 
From (3-4-25) and (3-4-26), as defined in (3-5-26), V = O. 
Given that t:. > 0 and A, N < 0 by the assumption of concavity of 
(3-4-22) and that, following the discussion in Appendix 3-4, 
B,M>O, the signs of (3-5-37) and (3-5-38) depend only on 
the sign of K. In particular 
(3-5-39) 
-dL 
e 
db 
-
dt > 0 'f d 1 'f K > 0 
'db < 1 an on y 1 < 
From (A3-4-5) and (3-5-25), K < 0 and hence, following 
- -(3-5-39) dL Idb and dt/db are both negative. 
e 
Proposition 3-5-6, as was the case for Proposition 
3-5-2, is intuitively obvious. The next parameter change 
o 
considered concerns the proportion of fine payments that are 
redistributed to members of the industry. 
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(c) Net industry fine payments 
3-5-7: ions contained in t 
ef 
fine payments and taxes that the industry 
incurs if an increase in the tax 
similarly raises the overall value of 
fine payments and taxes which the indus-
try incurs, then an increase in the 
proportion of fines and tax revenue that 
is tributed to members of the 
industry increases the extent to which 
it is optimal for the CT regulator to 
control the industry. Thus the CT-
optimal levels of enforcement and tax 
rate are raised. In these circumstances 
it is optimal for the CT regulator to 
unambiguously reduce the extent of con-
trol over the industry if an increase in 
the tax rate sufficiently reduces the 
overall value of expected fine payments 
and taxes incurred by the industry. 
Using (3-5-27) with d~ = db = dY = 0 gives 
-dL N B e ( 3 5-40) = fioJ + A· U da 
and 
( 3 5-41) dt M A = A· J A· U da 
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From (A3-4-6), the assumption of the Proposition here 
that 
aEPt aT [aL + aL ] > a ensures, assuming (3-5 25), that J > O. 
e e 
Subst uting into (3-5-40) and (3-5-41) reveals that dL Ida 
e 
and dtlda are both positive if U > O. Using (A3-4-7) and 
aEPt aT (3-5-26), u > a if [-- + at] > O. Hence, given that the at 
overall value of expected fine payments and taxes rises as 
result of increased enforcement, if an increase in the tax 
a 
rate has the same qualitative effect, then an increase in the 
proportion of fine and tax revenues that are refunded to 
members of the industry has the effect of increasing the CT-
optimal tax rate and level of enforcement. 
Control over the industry is unambiguously reduced 
only if enforcement activity is reduced given that the tax 
rate not increased or the tax rate is reduced given that 
enforcement is not increased. If then dL Ida and dtlda are 
e 
, 
both negative, the extent of control over the industry by 
the CT regulator is unambiguously reduced. Using (3-5-40) 
and (3 5 41) 
(3 5-42) 
and 
(3 5 43) 
dL 
e 
da 
N 
< a if and only if U < B' J 
dt < a if and only if U < ~.J 
where, using (3 5-25) given the assumption that a 2 wt / aLe aa 
< 0, the right-hand side of both conditions is negative and, 
by concavity of (3-4-22) 
(3 5 44) 
Following (3-5-42), (3-5-43) and (3-5-44), the extent of CT-
opt control over the industry is unambiguously reduced 
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if the condition in (3-5-42) is satisfied. From (A3-4-7) 
this requires that an increase in the tax rate sufficiently 
reduces the overall value of expected fine payments and taxes 
incurred by the industry. 
o 
In comparison with Proposition 3-5-3, Proposition 
3-5-7 is further complicated by the fact that in the case of 
regulation by a sales tax, changes in the rate of tax 
directly affect the cost of regulation to the industry. 
The assumption that the overall value of expected fines and 
taxes paid by the industry increases with increasing levels 
of enforcement and higher tax rates ensures that an increase 
in the proportion of these payments that are refunded to 
members of the industry reduces the marginal cost to the 
industry of increasing the extent to which output is res-
tricted and allows this to profitably occur. 
The final parameter change considered in this section 
concerns the state of enforcement technology. 
(d) The state of enforcement technology_ 
PROPOSITION 3-5-8: Under the as ions contained in the ~~~------~~~~~--~~~~~~~~--~~ 
stem of ition 3-5 1 the effect of 
an improvement in enforcement technology 
regulated equilibrium at any given level 
of the policy instruments. 
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(i) If the new technology improves the 
marginal efficiency of enforcement 
and the tax rate sufficiently more 
than it reduces the regulated 
equilibrium output level at any 
given policy combination, then it 
is optimal for the CT regulator to 
increase the extent to which it 
controls the industry. Thus the 
CT-optimal enforcement level is 
raised and the CT-optimal tax rate 
increased. If, however, the effect 
of the new technology on the 
marginal efficiency of enforcement 
and the tax rate is sufficiently 
small relative to its effect on the 
regulated equilibrium output level 
at any policy combination, then it 
is optimal for the CT regulator to 
reduce both enforcement activity 
and the tax rate. 
(ii) Given that the introduction of 
improved enforcement technology 
raises the marginal effectiveness 
of the tax ~ate as a deterrent 
sufficiently in relation to its 
effect on the regulated equilibrium 
output level so that the impact of 
a change in the tax rate on industry 
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his 
possible that the effect of the 
new technology is to increase the 
CT-optimal tax rate and decrease 
the CT-optimal level of resources 
devoted to enforcement activity. 
Proof. 
( i) Using (3-5-27) with dY da = db = 0 gives 
dL 
e (3-5-45) d\l 
N B 
= - ~.E + ~.S 
and 
(3-5 46) 
where E and S are the coefficients on the state of 
technology parameter in (3 5-25) and (3-5-26) res-
pectively. 
From (3-5-45) and (3-5-46), given that 6 > 0 and 
A,N < 0 by the concavity of (3-4-22) and that 
B/M> 0 following the discussion of Appendix 3 4, 
then dLe/d\l > 0 and dt/d\l > 0 if E,S > 0, and 
E,S < O. Following the 
discussion of (A3-4-14) and (A3-4 17), E,S > 0 if 
a 2Q/a a\l and a 2Q/atajl respectively are sufficiently 
negative which also requires that the absolute 
values be sufficiently large relative to that of 
aQ/afl . 
Recalling the interpretation that a 2Q/aL a\l < 0 and 
e 
a 2Q/ata\l < 0 reflect the increase in marginal 
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effectiveness, as deterrents against illegal behaviour, 
of enforcement and the tax rate respectively which 
induced by the improvement in enforcement technology, 
and that aQ/aw shows the reduction in regulated 
equilibrium output at any given policy comb ion 
which is caused by the improved technology, the result 
concerning the increase in CT-optimal tax rate and 
level of enforcement in response to the improvement in 
enforcement technology clearly follows. 
Conversely, from (A3-4-14) and (A3-4-17), if 
-a 2 Q/aL aW and -a 2 Q/ataw are sufficiently small in 
e 
relation to -aQ/aw, E and S are negative which in 
(3 4-44) and (3-4-45) reveals that it is opt 
the CT regulator to reduce both the level of enforce 
ment and the tax rate in response to the improvement 
in technology. 
(ii) The assumption contained in the Proposition is that 
the effect of the new enforcement technology is to 
increase the marginal efficiency of the tax rate 
sufficiently such that, from (A3-4-17), S > O. Using 
this and rearranging (3-4-44) and (3 4-45) gives 
(3-5-47) 
and 
(3 5 48) 
B 
< 0 if and only if E < N0S 
dt 
> 0 if and only 
dV 
Given that the right-hand side of each condition is 
negative, both conditions can be simultaneously satis-
fied only if 
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(3-S-49) 
Rearranging, (3-S-49) simplifies to AN - 8M > 0 which 
necessarily follows from the assumption of concavity 
of (3-4-22). Thus it is possible that both conditions 
given in (3-S-4S) and (3-S-46) are satisfied and hence 
that the effect of the introduction of new enforcement 
technology is to reduce the CT-optimal amount of 
resources devoted to enforcement but increase the CT-
optimal tax rate. 
Denoting the right-hand sides of the conditions in 
(3-S-4S) and (3-S-46) by kl and k2 respectively and 
substituting for E from (3-S-2S), dL /d~ < 0 and 
e 
dt/d~ > 0 if and only if 
(3-S-S0) k2 < [[ h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -C" ( Q ( • ) ) I a ~:~ ~ 
aL a~ e 
+ [[ h II (Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 h 1 (Q ( • ) , Y ) -C .. ( Q ( • ) ) I ~ ~ J ~ ~ ] 
Examining the right-hand side inequality of(3-S-50) 
shows that it holds if and only if 
(3-S-S1) 
+ [ :~:i~ -[[hll (Q(.) ,Y)Q(. )+2h1 (Q(.) ,Y) 
-C"(Q(.))I~~e]~~] 
Following the assumptions and results in Appendix 3-4, 
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the Ie -hand side of (3-5-51) is some positive number 
while the bracketed term on the right-hand side, 
using (A3 4 14), is positive also. Given that k1 < 0, 
the inequality in (3-5-51) is satisfied only if the 
absolute value of kl is sufficiently small which, from 
the condition in (3-5-47), corresponds to the assump-
tion in the Proposition that the increase in the 
marginal welfa~e impact of the tax rate, induced by 
the introduction of the new enforcement technology 
and denoted by S, is sufficiently small. 
Rearranging (3 5-50) reveals that, given the assump-
tions contained in the Proposition, dL Id~ < 0 and 
e 
< 
-dt/d~ > 0 if and only if 
Thus, given that a2Q/aLea~< 0 by assumption, (3-5-51) 
shows that if the increase in marginal effectiveness 
of enforcement, which is induced by the introduction 
of the new technology, is bounded from above and, 
depending on the magnitude of k2' from below, then the 
introduction of improved enforcement technology 
results in an increase in the CT-optimal tax rate and 
a reduction in the CT-optimal level of resources 
devoted to enforcement. 
D 
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The interpretation of result (i) of Proposition 3-5-8 
is again similar to its counterpart, Proposition 3-5-4. 
Given that dQ/dW < 0, the introduction of the new technology 
reduces the marginal benefit of both policy instruments at 
any given policy combination unless it significantly 
improves their marginal deterrent capabilities. If their 
marginal deterrent capabilities are not sufficiently enhanced 
it will be optimal for the CT regulator to reduce both the 
tax rate and the level of enforcement. Whether or not this 
results in a reduction in the extent to which the output of 
the industry is restricted depends on the relative sizes of 
these substitution and output effects of the technical 
progress. 
Finally result (ii) corresponds to result (ii) of 
Proposition 3-3-3 which concerns NPIT regulation by unit 
rate sales tax. The assumption that dQ/dW < 0 implies that 
any level of enforcement activity is enhanced by the new 
technology resulting in greater deterrence and a reduced 
output level. The increase in marginal effectiveness of 
enforcement in this case is small relative to this output 
effect. The CT regulator then reduces the level of resources 
devoted to enforcement. It is likely, however, that deterrence 
remains higher and hence regulated equilibrium output lower 
than before the introduction of the new technology given that 
the CT-optimal tax rate rises. 
3-6 CAPTURE THEORY: THE CHOICE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENT 
From the analysis of Sections 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6, it is 
evident that the regulated equilibrium in a competitive 
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industry occurs where the marginal expected penalty with 
t to output is equal to the difference between the 
demand and marginal private cost of production. 
of the regulation generates this regulated 
ibrium at a restricted industry output level by 
ing the penalty-inclusive marginal cost structure of the f 
and hence the industry. 
The CT regulator is motivated by the profitability of 
one sector of the economy only and thus will be interested 
in the distributional aspects of regulatory policy which 
will, in general, differ between the sales tax and output 
quota. This is illustrated in Figure 3-6-1 below. 
A comparison of industry profit-
ability under regulation by sales tax and output quota 
(i) Zero output quota or sales tax with zero 
output declaration 
MPC 
o 
Q 
224. 
(ii) Non-zero binding output quota or sales tax 
with partially declared output 
p 
p 
K 
D 
I 
A I 
I 
I 
I 
0 QC R' Q Q 
Suppose there is some CT-optimal price/quantity com-
bination (P,Q) which corresponds to a regulated industry 
equilibrium at F. Figure 3-6-1 shows several different 
policy combinations which generate regulated equilibrium at 
F. In each case MPC shows the marginal private cost of 
production and MPC' represents the penalty-inclusive marginal 
production cost. The form of the expected penalty function 
is fixed and given but the marginal expected penalty at any 
illegal output level varies with the amount of enforcement 
activity. It is assumed in constructing the diagram that 
the expected penalty function is convex in the extent of 
constraint violation and that the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output at any given level of illegal beha-
viour is the same whether the regulatory instrument be a 
sales tax or an output quota. 
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Panel (i) of Figure 3-6~1 illustrates industry profit~ 
ability in the case of either a zero output quota or a sales 
tax set at such a level so that no output declared. 
Following the analysis of Sections 2-4 and 2 5 this requires 
a sales tax with unit rate at least as great as the marginal 
expected penalty at the regulated equilibrium output level, 
given that no output is declared, which corresponds to FB on 
the diagram. The preceding analysis of NPIT regulation 
revealed that the aggregate outcome of these two regulatory 
policies is identical and panel (i) of Figure 3-6 1 shows 
that the distributional impacts of the policies are identical 
also. 
Given the assumptions which underly the d in 
panel (i) of Figure 3-6 1, area ABFP shows the maximum poten-
tial value of monopoly profits to be realised by restricting 
industry output to O. From this, however, a certain propor-
tion, (I-a) using (3-4-2) or (3-4-4), of area ABF, which 
represents expected penalty payments incurred by the indus-
try, must be deducted as must a proportion, 'b' using 
(3-4-1), of the resource cost of enforcement associated with 
the level of enforcement L' which generates expected penal-
e 
ties consistent with MPC. This gives some total level of 
industry prof ab TI I which is the same for each of Re 
the above-mentioned policies. 
Panel (ii) Figure 3-6-1 illustrates industry 
profitability at the same regulated equilibrium as in panel 
(i) but with a str ly positive and binding output quota 
or a sales tax with partially declared output. It assumed 
in the diagram that both the output quota and the level of 
declared output are set at some size R'. The regulated 
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industry equilibrium occurs at F because the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output, given quota size or 
declared output level R~ is again equal to FB, the 
ence between the demand price and marginal private cost of 
production at output level Q. 
Given that the regulated equilibrium is unchanged 
between panel (i) and panel (ii) the value of potential 
monopoly profits at the restricted output level QR shown by 
e 
ABFP is identical to that in panel (i). The total size of 
expected penalty payments incurred by the industry, JBF, is 
unambiguously smaller than its counterpart ABF in panel (i) 
- ~ 
and hence the residual area AJFP exceeds AFP in panel (i). 
Industry profitability however is not unambiguously 
greater in the situation depicted in panel (ii) than it is 
in panel (i). Following Sections 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6, it is 
assumed that an increase in the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output at any level of illegal behaviour 
requires an increase in the amount of enforcement activity. 
Hence the level of enforcement L" associated with the 
e 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output, FB, given 
quota or declaration level RI in panel (ii) exceeds that of 
L I associated with marginal expected penalty with respect 
e 
to output, FB, given a quota or declaration level of zero 
panel (i). An evaluation of the relative profitability in 
the two situat then requires firstly a compar on of the 
saving in expected penalty payments and the extra costs 
incurred from the additional enforcement activity. Thus, 
denoting industry profitability in panel (ii) of 
3-6-1 as a f t approximation to the change indus-
try profitability between the two situations , us (3 -1), 
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(3-6-1) = (1-a) [ABF-JBF] - b[W(L")-W(L I)] 
e e· 
Assuming that (3-6-1) is positive, it would appear 
that the CT regulator would prefer the situation in panel 
(ii) to that in panel (i). Industry profitability in this 
instance however differs between the two regulatory instru-
ments. In the case of an output quota, the analysis of 
Section 2-6 showed that the unit trading price of the quota 
is the marginal expected penalty with respect to output 
evaluated at the regulated industry equilibrium output level. 
Thus in panel (ii) of Figure 3-6-1, the imputed rental income 
-to the holders of the quota is given by area KMNP. To the 
extent that quota is allocated to agents outside the industry, 
the profitability of the industry is reduced. A CT regula-
tor will therefore ensure that all available quota is allo-
cated to member firms of the regulated industry. In the case 
of regulation by output quota then, if (3-6-1) is positive, 
industry profitability in panel (ii) of Figure 3-6-1 exceeds 
that in panel (i). 
Following the analysis of Sections 2-4 and 2-5, out-
put is declared so that the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output, given the amount of output that is 
declared, evaluated at the regulated equilibrium output 
level, is equal to the tax rate. In panel (ii) of Figure 
3-6-1 therefore1the unit rate of tax is equal to FB. If the , 
-industry declares R' units of output, the area KMNP repre-
sents the size of tax payments that it incurs. From (3-4-11) 
the amount (l-a)KMNP is an additional loss of potential 
profit within the regulated environment given that regulation 
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is by enforced sales tax with partially declared output. 
Whether or not industry profitability in this case is larger 
or smaller than that in panel (i) of Figure 3-6-1 is not imme-
diately apparent. It is clear however, given that a < 1 so 
that not all tax payments are refunded, that at any regulated 
equilibrium, if it is optimal for the CT regulator to have a 
non-zero quota, industry profitability, with a positive and 
binding output quota exceeds that with a sales tax whatever 
9 the declaration strategy. A CT regulator will therefore 
choose to regulate by output quota rather than sales tax. 
Algebraically, industry profits in the situation 
illustrated in panel (i) of Figure 3-6-1 are 
(3-6-2) 
and 
(3-6-3 ) 
Q -
TTl =f [h(Q)-MPC(Q)]dQ- (l-a)EP(Qlx=O) - bw(L ') 
toe
Q -
TTl = f [h(Q)-MPC(Q)]dQ - (l-a)EP(QIR=O) - bw(L') 
ROe
where TI~ and TIR are profits in the cases of regulation by 
sales tax with zero output declaration and regulation by 
zero output quota respectively. 
Examining (3-6-2) and (3-6-3), the integral term 
represents industry profit generated at output level Q in 
the absence of any costs of the regulatory process itself. 
The term bw(L I) shows the resource cost to the industry of 
e 
the enforcement level L I 
e 
necessary to generate a regulated 
equilibrium at Q. These two terms are common to both equa-
tions. A comparison of industry profitability within the 
two regulatory regimes, therefore, requires an evaluation of 
the relative magnitudes of the terms EP(Qlx=O) and 
EP(QIR=O) which represent fine payments incurred under the 
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sales tax and zero quota respectively. Given the assumption 
that the form of the fine function is the same in each case, 
as is the extent of illegal output, equations (3-6-2) and 
(3-6-3) are identical in value. Thus, ceteris paribus, there 
is no difference in industry profitability between regulation 
by zero quota and regulation by a sales tax set at such a 
level that it precludes any non-zero output declaration. 
In panel (ii), industry profits are 
(3-6-4) Q -I == J [h(Q)-MPC(Q) ]dQ - (l-a)EP(Q X==R') 
o 
- (1- a h ( R' ) - bw ( L ~' ) 
and 
(3-6-5) Q -I J [h(Q)-MPC(Q) ]dQ - (l-a)EP(Q R=R') 
o 
where TI" represents profits in the case of regulation by sales 
t 
tax with output declaration of R' units and TI" denotes pro-R 
fits in the case of regulation by output quota of R' units. 
The term (l-a)l(R') in (3-6-4) shows net tax payments 
incurred by the industry on the R' units of output declared. 
Comparing (3-6-2) and (3-6-4), the integral term is cornmon 
to both equations. Following the earlier discussion the 
resource cost of enforcement required to generate a regulated 
-
equilibrium at Q in panel (ii) exceeds that in panel (i). 
Expected fine payments, however, are unambiguously reduced 
by the positive output declaration. Relative profitability 
in the two situations therefore is not unambiguously deter-
mined. 
Similarly, a comparison of (3-6-3) and (3-6-5) 
reveals no unambiguous relationship. Following the analysis 
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of Section 2 6, HQ{.) is the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output in the case of regulation by an output 
quota and reflects the imputed rental value of a un of 
quota. The term HQ{ .)[R'-Rrl, where Rr is defined as the 
amount of quota initially allocated to members of the indus-
try, shows the amount of profit lost to the industry from 
any units of quota not initially allocated within the 
industry. As has been previously observed, a CT regulator 
will ensure that all available quota is allocated to members 
of the industry in order that this potential loss of prof s 
does not occur. 
Finally, comparing (3-6-4) and (3-6-5), assuming that 
Rr=R', reveals that industry profit is unambiguously greater 
under regulation by non-zero output quota than under 
tion by sales tax with partial output declaration which 
generates the same regulated equilibrium, given that the 
form of the expected penalty function in both cases is iden~ 
tical. rf, therefore, a zero output quota is not optimal 
for a captured regulator, CT regulation, should it occur at 
all, will involve the use of a non-zero output quota. 
Figure 3 6 1 shows changes in the level of output 
quota and enforcement activity such that the regulated 
brium output level of the industry remains unaltered. 
Following Propos ion 2-6-2, changes in available quota at 
any given level of enforcement which affect the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output at any given illegal 
output level will alter the regulated industry equilibrium. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3-6-2 below where it is assumed 
that 3Q/3R > O. 
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P 
A 
o 
Figure 3-6-2: The effect of a change in avail-
able quota at a given level of enforcement 
R' R" 
/ MPC" ( Le ' , R" ) 
I 
MPC 
o 
With quota level R' and enforcement level L' the 
e 
industry's penalty-inclusive marginal cost curve is 
Q 
MPC'(L~ ,R') and regulated industry equilibrium occurs at ER, 
with total profits of ABER,PR,-bW(L
e
'). An increase in 
available quota to R" decreases the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output at any illegal output level. The 
penalty-inclusive marginal cost curve, given the same amount 
of enforcement activity, falls to MPC"(L~ ,R") and hence the 
regulated industry equilibrium shifts to ERne Regulated 
equilibrium output expands from QR' to QR"o Industry 
profits in this situation are given by AJER"PR,,-bw(L
e
'). 
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Whether or not industry profits are ased by this change 
in quota depends on the relative sizes of the shaded areas 
PR"MER,P R, and BJER"K which respectively show the decrease 
and increase in profits as a result of the change in quota. 
The change in quota size and in the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output evaluated at the regulated equilibrium 
output level affect the value of the imputed quota rents, 
however, given the result that all quota initially allo 
cated to members of the industry, this does not affect aggre-
gate industry profitab y. 
The increase in quota illustrated in Figure 3-6-2 will 
be instituted by a CT regulator only if improves industry 
prof ability. Optimal levels of quota and enforcement are 
determined according to the results of Propositions 3-4-1 
and 3-5 1 to 3-5-4. It may be, however, for reasons that 
are not explicitly dealt with here, that the CT regulator is 
constrained to use a non-optimal instrument such as the sales 
tax. In this case, "optimal" regulatory policy proceeds 
according to the results of Propositions 3-4-2 and 3-5-5 to 
3 5 8. The analysis of optimal policy contained in these 
Propositions is, in effect, a second-best approach for the 
CT regulator. 
These results are now summarized in the following 
Proposition. 
-,-,-.....;...;;;............;...;_;;;;..-_-=--_6_-..;;;..1: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
firms with concave profit functions 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elasticity and is subject to 
or a strictly positive unit rate sales 
tax each of which is enforced by means 
of an expected penalty that is strictly 
convex in the extent of illegal output 
and contains no flat-rate component. 
Suppose also that regulating the output 
of the industry necessitates the use of 
scarce resources to enforce the regula-
tion and that the marginal cost of 
enforcement is non-decreasing. A 
captured regulator will choose to regu-
late the industry by means of a strictly 
binding output quota. Typically this 
quota will be set at a non-zero level 
which is strictly less than the regulated 
eguilibrium output level of the industry. 
A captured regulator ensures that all 
available quota is allocated to members 
of the industry. Following Proposition 
3-4-2, if enforcement is by means of a 
flat rate per unit expected penalty, a 
captured regulator will choose to regu-
late the industry by means of an output 
quota allocated entirely to members of 
eguilibrium output level consistent with 
I level of 
3 7 A COMPARISON OF REGULATION UNDER NPIT AND CT 
HYPOTHESES 
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The analysis in Sections 3-4, 3-5 and 3 6 derived the 
characteristics of optimal regulatory policy under both t 
NPIT and CT hypotheses of regulatory objectives, at given 
values of various parameters, and examined the response of 
optimal policy in each case to changes in these parameters. 
Under the NPIT hypothesis the regulator acts so as to 
maximize aggregate social welfare within the regulated 
environment. The CT regulator however seeks to maximize 
the profits of the industry within the constraints imposed 
by the necessity of enforcement. The CT-optimal regulated 
equilibrium is equivalent to that of a self-regulating cartel 
where formation and operating costs are partially funded by 
external subscription. The CT-optimal enforcement level 
generates profits within the regulated environment by deter-
ring output violations at the regulated equilibrium output 
level. With no potential entrants to the industry, the 
expected penalty at the regulated equilibrium output 
level acts to prevent chiselling by member firms of the 
industry. Regulation within the CT framework therefore is 
a solut to the internal policing problem of a cartel. 
To the extent that the regulator is able to garnish funds 
from other sectors of the economy, the internal funding 
requirements of forming and maintaining the cartel are 
reduced and hence, a regulated cartel may profitably exist 
where an industry-funded operation would be infeasible. 
These regulatory objectives differ markedly implying 
that the behavioural implications for regulatory policy 
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which result from each hypothesis may be expected to vary 
in several respects. Such differences may arise in the 
optimal choices of enforcement levels, tax rates and quota 
s s, and also in the responsiveness of these choices to 
changes in parameter values. 
In general, comparisons can not be made because of 
the simultaneity requirement on the relevant first 
conditions. In some cases, however, valid conclusions may 
be drawn on the basis of one of the relevant first 
cond ions only. This depends on the cross-partial 
tive term in the matrix of second-order coefficients. 
Several possibilities arise. 
Following Proposition 3-2-1, assuming that the 
expected penalty is strictly convex in the extent of the 
violation and that control over the industry is implemented, 
NPIT opt regulatory policy involves some strictly posi-
tive level of enforcement (L *) coupled with either a zero 
e 
output quota or a sales tax, the rate of which is no less 
than the difference between the demand price and marginal 
cost of production at the regulated equilibrium cons 
with the optimal level of enforcement L *. 
e 
In the case of 
a captured regulator, following Propositions 3-4-1 and 3 4-2, 
any s ly positive level of enforcement that is 
optimal for the CT regulator is coupled with either a 
tax (t), the rate of which does not exceed the NPIT-optimal 
rate t*, or an output quota which is strictly less than the 
regulated ibrium associated with L and may be zero. 
e 
Given the assumption that the expected penalty func-
tion is ly convex in the extent of violation, if 
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regulation is by means of an output quota then, following 
Appendix 3-3, the cross derivative term a 2 TIR (.)/aL aR, 
e e 
denoted by B in (3-5-1), is negative. That is, an increase 
in available quota makes the change in profits as a result 
of a change in enforcement smaller in absolute terms. Given 
the result from the above-mentioned Propositions that the 
optimal quota level (R) under CT is at least as great as 
that under NPIT (R*), a result which set L < L * based on 
e e 
the consideration of the first-order condition with respect 
to enforcement only would occur despite the relative size of 
the optimal quotas rather than because of it. In fact, 
exclusion of the cross-derivative effect would tend to bias 
-the conclusion towards L > L *. 
e e 
Alternatively, if regulation is by means of a unit 
rate sales tax then, following Appendix 3-4, the cross 
derivative term a 2 TIR (.)/aL at, represented by B in (3-5-24), 
e e 
is positive. That is, an increase in the tax rate increases 
in absolute terms the change in profit which occurs in res-
ponse to the change in the level of enforcement. Given the 
result which follows from the above-mentioned Propositions 
that the optimal tax rate (t) under CT regulation does not 
exceed that under NPIT (t*), a result which set L > L * 
e e 
based on the consideration of the first-order condition with 
respect to enforcement would occur despite the relative size 
of the optimal tax rate rather than because of it. Here, 
therefore, the bias would be towards L < L * 
e e 
These examples represent instances whereby the con-
clusions of the Propositions which follow in this Section 
may be invalidated. There are two circumstances, however, 
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where comparisons on the basis of the first-order condition 
with respect to enforcement only do provide unambiguous 
results. The first also occurs under the assumption of an 
expected penalty function that is strictly convex in the 
extent of the violation. If, in this case, the NPIT-optimal 
and CT-optimal levels of the regulatory instruments are 
identical, the relative size of the regulatory instruments 
under each policy is not relevant to the result concerning 
the relative sizes of optimal enforcement. 
Secondly, the existence of a flat-rate per unit 
expected penalty allows for valid comparisons to be drawn 
on the basis of consideration of the enforcement first-order 
conditions only. This is because, as shown in Propositions 
3-2-1 and 3-4-1, the NPIT-optimal quota level in this 
instance is boundedly indeterminate as is the tax rate 
while, under CT, the quota is set exactly at the regulated 
equilibrium output level consistent with L and regulation 
e 
by sales tax is not undertaken. Given the assumption that, 
in this case, the quota level can be instantaneously and 
costlessly adjusted, comparisons can again be made on the 
basis of the first-order condition for enforcement only. 
These arguments are summarized in the following Lemma. 
LEMMA-3-7-1: Given the simultaneity requirement on the 
relevant first-order conditions, comparisons 
of optimal regulatory policy under NPIT and 
CT hypotheses made on the basis of one of the 
relevant first-order conditions only are not 
valid in general. In particular, assuming 
that the regulatory instrument is enforced 
by means of an expected penalty that is 
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strictly convex in the extent of the viola-
t derivative term in t 
of second-order conditions implies that CT-
optimal enforcement levels, when comparisons 
are made in the absence of consideration of 
the other relevant first-order condition, are 
biased upwards relative to the NPIT-optimal 
level in the case of regulation by output 
quota and biased downwards in the case of 
regulation by sales tax. If, however, 
optimal levels of the regulatory instrument 
under NPIT and CT hypothesis are identical 
or the regulatory instrument is enforced by 
a flat rate per unit expected penalty, con-
clusions reached on the basis of one rele-
vant first-order condition only are valid. 
The first potential difference to be considered con-
cerns the optimal amount of enforcement under the two 
regulatory regimes. This involves a comparison of the 
solutions to the first-order conditions (3-2-10) and 
(3 4 17) or (3 4 23) where (3-2-10) shows the marginal , 
welfare effect of enforcement in the case of NPIT regulation 
and (3-4 17), (3-4-23) show the marginal profitability of 
enforcement to the industry under CT regulation by output 
quota and sales tax respectively. Unfortunately, as the 
marginal benef s of enforcement in each situation cannot 
be unambiguously compared, a general condition is not 
forthcoming. 
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LEMMA 3 7 2: Suppose that an industry comprising a finite 
number of identical competitive firms with 
concave profit functions faces a market demand 
curve with non-zero finite elasticity and is 
subject to either a strictly binding output 
quota or strictly positive unit rate sales tax 
enforced by means of an expected monetary 
penalty that is convex in output and the 
extent of illegal behaviour. Given that the 
marginal resource cost of an extra unit of 
enforcement is strictly positive and exceeds 
any marginal revenues that it generates 
through the payment of fines and/or taxes, the 
following comparisons can be made: 
(i) If the proportion of the resource cost 
of enforcement that the industry is 
required to fund is no greater than the 
proportion of fine payments, and when 
applicable tax revenues, that are re-
funded to members of the industry, then 
the marginal cost of a given level of 
enforcement is unambiguously greater 
regulator. 
(ii) If, however, the proportion of resource 
costs that are funded by the industry 
exceeds the proportion of fine payments, 
and where applicable tax revenues, that 
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a given level of enforcement is greater 
for the 
regulator. 
Proof. 
(i) In the case of NPIT regulation the marginal cost of 
enforcement is given solely by the marg resource 
cost w'(L). In the case of CT regulation, however, 
e 
the marginal cost of enforcement consists of the 
marginal fine payments, and where applicable marginal 
tax payments, that are incurred by the industry in 
add ion to the proportion of marginal resource cost 
that it required to fund. 
Following (3-4-7) and (3-4-12) a composite function 
,n,~) is taken to represent the additional 
costs incurred by the industry in the CT regulatory 
environment. This follows from the terminology of 
Sections 3 2 and 3-3 where n is a proxy for the 
regulatory instrument which can be e her a quota or 
sales tax. In the case of regulation by sales tax, 
the expression includes tax payments and in both 
cases, ~ represents the state of enforcement tech-
nology. Here, the special case, when funding of 
enforcement activity and disbursement of revenue 
proceeds on a per capita proportional bas , is used. 
It can be shown that this causes no loss of generality 
in the result but merely simpl ies the algebra. 10 
Assume that the opposite conclusion to that pre-
sented in the Lemma holds. Then, using (3 2) and 
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(3-4-13), and the composite function (EP~(Le'~'~) 
(3-7-1) 
a EP 
Z w'(L ) + [l-~l--~- >w'(L ) 
m e m aL e 
e 
a EP~ 
ar:- > 0, Wi (L ) > 0 
e e 
Subtracting aEP~( .)/aL
e 
from both sides of (3-7-1) 
and simplifying gives 
(3-7-2) 
where both sides of (3-7-2) are positive by the 
assumption that the marginal resource cost of 
enforcement exceeds any additional revenues raised. 
The inequality in (3-7-2) therefore holds if and 
only if z > m. This however contradicts (3-4-13) 
and hence the conclusion in the Lemma must hold. 
(ii) From Section 3-4, fb' represents the proportion of 
(3-7-3) 
(3-7-4) 
(3-7-5) 
the resource cost of enforcement that is funded by 
the industry and 'a' the proportion of fines and/or 
taxes that are refunded to members of the industry. 
The marginal cost of enforcement to the CT regulator 
denoted here by w~ is then 
Using (3-7-3) and (3-2-2), awQ/aLe 
and only if 
if 
aEPQ bw'(L ) + (l-a)----
e Le 
W '( L ) 
e 
~ Wi (L ) 
< e 
> aw(L )/aL if and only 
< e e 
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Given the assumption that b > a, then [(l-a)/(l-b)] 
> 1 and the marginal cost of enforcement will be 
greater to the CT regulator than to the NPIT regu-
lator unless the marginal resource cost is suffi-
ciently larger than the additional payments incurred. 
o 
For the purposes of the following Proposition the 
social cost function from (3-2-8) is modified to include 
an additional shift parameter. Thus 
(3-7-6) SC 
where ¢ is the additional shift parameter. An increase in ¢ 
increases marginal social cost at any output level. 
PROPOSITION 3-7-1: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical competitive 
firms with concave profit functions 
faces a market demand curve with non-zero 
finite elasticity and is subject to 
either a strictly binding output quota 
or strictly positive unit rate sales 
tax each of which is enforced by means 
of an expected monetary penalty that is 
convex in output and the extent of ille-
gal behaviour. Given the caveats 
expressed in Lemma 3-7-1: 
(i) If enforcement is costless to both 
the NPIT and CT regulators then 
the NPIT-optimal level of enforce-
ment (L:) is greater than, less 
(ii) 
(iii) 
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than, or equal to the CT-optimal 
level of enforcement (Le) if and 
only if the first-best socially 
optimal output level (0) is less 
than, greater than, or equal to the 
monopoly profit maximizing output 
M level (Q ). 
If the marginal cost of enforcement 
to the NPIT regulator exceeds that 
to the CT regulator and both are 
strictly positive such that it is 
optimal for enforcement to occur 
under each hypothesis, then there 
is some degree of negative exter-
nality such that the NPIT-optimal 
level of enforcement (L/) is 
greater than, less than, or equal 
to the CT-optimal enforcement level 
(L~) if and only if the negative 
externality generated by the 
industry is more severe, less 
severe, or identical to this 
critical value. 
If the marginal cost of enforce-
ment to the NPIT regulator is less 
than to the CT regulator then the 
degree of externality required 
before NPIT-optimal enforcement 
exceeds CT-optimal enforcement is 
smaller than if the marginal cost 
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of 
lator that to t 
in these c 
that the presence of any negative 
externality results in greater 
NPIT 
optimal enforcement. 
Proof. 
(i) Given the assumption that the unregulated competitive 
(3 7-7) 
equilibrium output level is socially excessive and 
exceeds the profit-maximizing monopoly output OM, 
enforcement occurs under each hypothes only if 
ao/aL < O. This follows from previous analysis 
e 
given the assumptions that the expected penalty 
function is convex in the extent of illegal behaviour 
and that additional enforcement act y increases 
the marginal expected penalty with respect to output 
at any illegal output level. 
From (3-2-10) the NPIT-opt level of enforcement, 
in a world of costless enforcement, is that level L: 
which generates a regulated equilibrium at the first 
best socially optimal output level Q such that, using 
the modified social cost function from (3~7-6) 
where W is an additional shift parameter incorporated 
in the social cost function. An increase in ¢ 
increases marginal social cost at any output level. 
(3-7-8) 
(3-7-9) 
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substituting L * into (3-4-17) or (3-4-23) using the 
e 
composite formulation, given that the marginal cost 
to the industry of enforcement is strictly positive, 
gives 
L =L * 
e e 
[h
1
(Q(L *,rl,).l) ,Y)Q(L *,rl,).l) 
e e 
+ h ( Q ( L; , rl , ).l ) , Y) - C I (Q ( L e* • rl , ).l ) ) ] ~~ 
e 
> o 'IT Re Given that oQ/oL < 0, 
e oLe 
< 0 if and only if 
L =L * 
e e 
[h 1 (Q(L *,rl,).l),Y)Q(L *,rl,).l) + h(Q(L *,rl,).l),Y) e e e 
< 
- C' ( Q ( L e* , rl , ).l ) )] )' 0 
The CT-optimal enforcement L occurs where 
e 
o'ITR /oL = 0 which, given that oQ/oL < 0, requires 
e e e 
-that the bracketed term of (3-7-9) evaluated at L 
e 
be equal to zero. This corresponds to the monopoly 
profit-maximizing output level where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. 
Taking the case where the bracketed term in (3-7-9) 
is negative, (3-7-9) shows. that it is optimal for the 
CT regulator to expand the enforcement effort. This 
implies that L > L '* . Given that, as illustrated in 
e e 
Figure 3-4-1, the absolute value of the bracketed 
term is increasing in output over the relevant output 
range, it follows in this case that the CT-optimal 
regulated equilibrium output level QM occurs at a 
A 
lower output level than Q and hence the result holds. 
(ii) 
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The results for the other cases can be established 
using a similar argument. 
Taking L * > 0 as the NPIT-optimal level of enforce-
. e 
ment such that, from (3-2-10) aWR /aL * =: 0, and sub-
e e 
stituting this into the composite form of the CT 
regulator's first-order condition with respect to 
enforcement using the special case of per capita 
proportional funding and redistribution, which from 
Lemma 3-7-2 part (i) creates no loss of generality, 
L ~ L * if and only if 
e < e 
(3-7-10) [h 1 (Q(L *,rl,j.l) ,Y)Q(L *,rl,j.l) + h(Q(L *,rl,j.l),Y) e e e 
[
a EP (L *, rl , j.l) ] 
-C'(Q(L* rl j.l))]aQ _ ~w'(L )+(1-~] rl e 
e" aL m e m aL 
e e 
.: 0 
< 
Rearranging and simplifying (3-7-10) reveals the con-
> dition that L - L * if and only if 
e < e 
(3-7-11) 
- h 1 (Q(L*,rl,j.l),Y)Q(L*,rl,).l) e e 
w' (L ) 
e 
From part (i) of Lemma 3-7-2 the bracketed term on 
the right-hand side of (3-7-11) is negative as, from 
(A3-1-1) and (3-2-10), are h 1 (Q(Le*,rl,).l), Y) and 3Q/3Le 
respectively. Given these conditions, the right-hand 
side is some positive number. 
(iii) 
247. 
Assume that ~ is the value of the shift parameter 
such that its associated marginal social cost level 
SC1(L:,~,w),¢,~) is that which gives equality in 
(3-7-11) . From (3-7-11) then, give~ ~ = ~, L~ is 
also the NPIT-optimal level of enforcement and thus 
L * I e -
~ 
-
== L 0 
e 
An increase in W, following the assumption in 3-7-6, 
results in a higher marginal social cost at any given 
output level. This enlarges the discrepancy between 
marginal social cost and marginal private cost of 
output produced in the industry and corresponds to an 
increase in the severity of the negative externality 
generated by the industry. Any increase in ~ then, 
to some ~ > ~,increases the value of the left-hand 
side of (3-7-11) so that it exceeds the right-hand 
side as the right-hand side is unchanged. Expression 
(3-7-11) then implies that the NPIT regulator can 
raise regulated aggregate surplus by increasing the 
amount of enforcement activity and thus L * I > L-. e _ e 
The converse result can be established by a \imilar 
argument with the opposite assumption on the size of 
~ . 
If the marginal cost of enforcement to the NPIT 
regulator is'less than that to the CT regulator, the 
bracketed term on the right-hand side of (3-7-11) is 
positive. Examining the right-hand side of (3-7-11) 
reveals that it is greater than, less than, or equal 
to zero if and only if 
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(3 7 12) 
3EP" (L *, n,\l ) 
Z "" e W'(Le}+[l-mJ L 
e 
Following the assumptions and conditions on the s 
of the component terms of (3-7-11) both sides of 
(3-7-12) are negative. Assuming that the 'greater 
than' inequality holds in (3-7-12), the right-hand 
side of (3 7 11) is some positive number. Given that 
the bracketed term on the right-hand side of (3-7 11) 
positive, however, the magnitude of the right-
hand side of (3-7-11) here is less than that in part 
(ii) of the Proposition where it was assumed that the 
bracketed term was negative. Using this and the 
assumption in 3-7-6, the critical value of ~ that 
s equality in (3-7-11) occurs at some ~ < ~. 
Thus the degree of externality required before NPIT-
optimal enforcement exceeds the CT-optimal level, 
the marg cost of enforcement to the CT regulator 
exceeds that to the NPIT regulator, is in general less 
than if this inequality is reversed. 
If the 'less than' inequality holds in (3-7-12) then 
the hand side of (3-7-11) is negative. The 
presence of any negative externality implies that 
marginal soc cost exceeds marginal private produc-
tion cost and in these circumstances ensures that, 
following (3-7-11), the NPIT-optimal amount of 
enforcement unambiguously greater than that which 
optimal for a CT regulator. 
o 
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Proposition 3-7 1 shows that, as may have been 
expected, the CT-optimal level of enforcement in general 
different from that which is optimal for the NPIT regulator. 
Result (i) of the Proposition is intuitively obvious. In 
a world of costless enforcement, it is opt to expand 
enforcement to the point where the marginal benef of so 
doing is zero. As previously defined the resulting output 
" M levels are Q and Q for the NPIT and CT regulators res-
pectively and the result follows from equation (3 2-5) given 
that aQ/a < O. 
Enforcement costs are introduced in parts (ii) and 
(iii) of the Propos ion using the results of Lemma 3 7 2. 
In (3-7 11l each component term is fixed and given by the 
demand and cost conditions in the market except for the 
marginal soc cost of output. The condition expressed in 
(3-7-11) impl s that the more severe is the negative exter-
nality, the er will be the NPIT-optimal control of the 
industry in comp son with that under CT regulation. This is 
in effect a ation of result (i) of Proposition 
3-7-1 allowing for the existence of some strictly positive 
cost structure for enforcement activity. An increase in the 
parameter W, which corresponds to a higher level of marginal 
social cost at any given output level and hence reflects an 
increase in the severity of the negative externality, has 
the effect of decreasing the first-best socially optimal 
output level Q relative to a fixed QM and allows for an 
increase in the s e of NPIT-optimal enforcement. 
One illustrative polar case is where there is no 
externality so that marginal social cost is ident to the 
marginal private cost of production. Here the compet ive 
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equilibrium is socially optimal and thus NPIT-optimal 
enforcement is zero but the CT regulator may well seek to 
restrict industry output towards the monopoly prof 
maximizing level with some positive amount of enforcement 
activity. Beginning from this situation then, the emergence 
of a negative externality allows for the possibil y of' 
strictly positive enforcement activity by the NPIT regu-
lator and the greater is the degree of externa I the 
higher is * relative to the fixed amount of CT-optimal 
enforcement. 
Unfortunately, from the perspective of inferring 
regulatory objectives from observed behaviour, the quant a-
tive differences in enforcement activity which emerge from 
Proposition 3-7-1 are not unique and more signif ly, 
except for the particular circumstances outlined in part 
(iii) of the Proposition, or where there is no externality. 
the qualitative nature of the differences are not unambig-
uous. To know whether or not the level of enforcement 
activity reveals a captured regulator requ s enough know-
ledge to solve the optimization problems of the NPIT and CT 
regulators. 
The second behavioural difference between NPIT and 
CT re ion to be considered here occurs in the choice of 
regulatory instrument. This chapter has examined the 
effects of regulation by output quota and unit rate sales 
tax, each of which is enforced by an expected monetary 
penalty. The analysis of Sections 2 4, 2 5 and 2-6 showed 
that is possible to generate the same regulated equili-
brium output using either instrument. The d tributional 
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s of the two instruments are markedly d t • 
A NPIT regulator is assumed not to be interested in 
the distributional impacts of regulatory policy. Any fine 
revenues, tax payments or quota rentals constitute trans 
payments within the economy and as such are irrelevant to 
the decisions of the NPIT regulator. Following Propos Lon 
3-2 1, the expected penalty function is strictly convex 
in the extent of illegal behaviour, no strictly pos ive 
quota level is optimal for the NPIT regulator. This 
because any quota greater than zero increases the resource 
cost of achieving a given regulated equilibrium output level. 
The zero quota then minimizes the resource cost of 
tion and the expected penalty is equivalent to a non 
avoidable tax on output. 
A regulated industry equilibrium occurs where the 
marg expected penalty with respect to output is 
to the difference between the demand price and marginal 
private cost of production. If the expected penalty a 
constant flat-rate amount per unit of output then the mar-
ginal expected penalty with respect to output, and hence 
the regulated equilibrium output level of the industry, is 
unaffected by any change in the level of available quota 
provided that the quota remains binding on behaviour. With 
this form of expected penalty function therefore, the NPIT 
regulator indifferent between any levels of output quota 
that do not exceed the regulated equilibrium output level of 
the industry. If a non-zero quota is used by the NPIT 
regulator, in these circumstances, there is no clear pattern 
of quota allocation that would be expected to emerge. 
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Given that the quota is a valuable asset, if the NPIT regu-
lator is concerned with the distributional impacts of its 
regulatory policies, not all of the available quota will be 
allocated to members of the regulated industry. 
The CT regulator, in contrast to the NPIT regulator, 
is particularly concerned with the distributional impacts 
of its policies as they affect the profits of the regulated 
industry. Proposition 3-6-1 states that a CT regulator will 
choose to regulate the industry by output quota. There the 
argument is established using an expected penalty that is 
strictly convex in the extent of illegal output and contains 
no flat-rate component. The same argument can also be used 
to establish the result if the expected penalty is a con-
stant flat-rate amount per unit of output. In this case 
there is a one to one correspondence between the change in 
quota rentals and the change in expected penalty payments. 
Given that the expected penalty is some constant flat-rate 
amount per unit, a change in the quota level, provided that 
it remains binding on behaviour, will not alter the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output and hence, from 
Proposition 2-7-2, does not affect the regulated equilibrium 
output level of the industry. In these circumstances then, 
as shown in Figure 2-7-1, a unit change in available quota 
serves to directly transfer the value of the marginal 
expected penalty between quota rents and fine payments. As 
shown in Proposition 3-4-1, it is therefore optimal for the 
CT regulator to set the quota at the regulated equilibrium 
output level that is consistent with the optimal enforcement 
level L and, following Proposition 3-6-1, all of this quota 
e 
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is allocated to members of the industry. 
This example of a constant unit rate marginal expected 
penalty illustrates that the existance of a non zero binding 
output quota allocated entirely to members of the regulated 
industry prevents leakage of potential profits from the 
industry by enabling member firms to, in effect, pay fines 
directly to themselves thus avoiding the distribution of 
these payments throughout the economy_ Under a sales tax 
regime, f payments can be avoided only at the expense of 
incurring taxes which also constitute a loss of potential 
profits. The cho of output quota over sales tax as the 
optimal regulatory instrument by the CT regulator is another 
example of the thesis that producers prefer direct controls 
to taxes [Buchanan and Tullock, 1975]. 
These results are summarized in the following Propo-
sition: 
PROPOSITION 3 7-2: 
finite number of identical ive 
firms with concave profit functions faces 
a market with non-zero 
finite elasticity and is subject to 
either a strictly binding output quota 
or strictly positive unit rate sales tax 
each of which is enforced by an expected 
monetary penalty. Suppose also that 
regulating the output of the industry 
resources 
to enforce the regulation and that the 
marginal cost of enforcement is non-
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If the expected monetary penalty is 
strictly convex in the extent of illegal 
output and contains no flat rate compo-
nent, the NPIT regulator is indifferent 
between a zero quota and a tax rate set 
at a level such that only the marginal 
unit of output, if any, is declared. 
The NPIT regulator will not employ a 
non-zero output quota. If, however, the 
expected penalty is some constant flat-
rate amount per unit of illegal output, 
the NPIT regulator is indifferent 
between a tax rate set at a level not 
less than the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output and any level of 
output quota which remains binding on 
behaviour. In this case no unique 
pattern of quota allocation would be 
expected to emerge. 
If the expected monetary penalty is 
strictly convex in the extent of illegal 
output and contains no flat-rate compo-
nent, a CT regulator is also indifferent 
between a zero quota and a tax rate set 
at a level such that only the marginal 
unit of output, if any, is declared. If 
enforcement costs to the industry are 
such that it is profitable to do so, a 
CT regulator will employ a non-zero 
binding output quota in preference to 
255. 
either of these ies and a in 
other tax rate cons 
tent with the same ibrium 
level as the whatever the 
imal declaration re to this tax 
may be. If however the expected monetary I , 
is some constant flat-rate amount 
per unit of output, the CT regulator will 
set the quota at the regulated equili-
brium output level of the industry 
consistent with the CT-optimal enforce 
ment level so that no violations of the 
constraint will occur and hence no fines 
are incurred by the industry. In each 
case, when a non-zero quota is employed, 
the CT regulator ensures that the avail 
able quota is allocated entirely to 
member firms of the indus The exis-
tence of a non-zero quota, given that 
the expected monetary penalty is strictly 
convex in the extent of illegal output 
and contains no flat-rate component, 
reveals unambiguously that the regulatory 
agency is captured. I~ however, the 
expected monetary penalty is some con-
stant flat-rate amount per unit of 
illegal output, the existence of an out-
put quota which is allocated entirely to 
members of the regulated industry and 
set at a level such that no violations 
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occur, and hence no fines are levied, 1S 
an almost certain indication that the 
regulatory agency is captured. 
The final source of behavioural differences between 
NPIT and CT regulators to be considered here is found in 
their responses to parameter changes. Two such changes 
which affect the optimal regulatory policy of both types of 
regulator were analysed in Sections 3-3 and 3-5. These 
were changes in the level of aggregate consumer income and 
changes in the state of enforcement technology. Examination 
of Propositions 3-3-1, 3-3-3, 3-5-1, 3-5-4, 3-5-5 and 3-5-8 
reveals that a comparison of optimal responses by NPIT and 
CT regulators to changes in either of these parameters, as 
in the case of the comparison of optimal enforcement levels 
in Proposition 3-7-1, requires enough information to solve 
the optimization problems of the respective regulators. 
This is not particularly useful in terms of observational 
inference and hence these particular changes will not be 
analysed further. There are, however, particular parameters 
of which changes in value reveal clear differences in regu-
latory behaviour that reflect the motives of the regulator. 
As has been previously assumed, the NPIT regulator, 
motivated by aggregate welfare, is unaffected by distribu-
tional effects whereas the CT regulator seeking to maximize 
industry profit is primarily concerned with the distribu-
tional aspects of regulatory policy. Although not specifi-
cally analysed therefore, NPIT regulatory behaviour is 
invariant to changes in distributional parameters such as 
the proportion of the resource cost of enforcement funded by 
the industry or the proportion of fine payments redistributed 
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to members of the industry. Following Propositions 3- 2, 
3 5 3, 3 5 6, and 3-5-7, however, it is evident that 
optimal of CT regulation is determined by the vel 
of such parameters. These results are summarized in the 
following Proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3 7-3 Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical itive 
firms with concave fi t functions 
faces a market demand curve with non-
zero finite elastic and is sub ect to 
either a strictly binding output quota 
or str sitive unit rate s s tax 
each of which is enforced means of an 
expected monetary penalty which is 
strictly convex in the extent of illegal 
output. Suppose also that regulating 
the output of the industry necessitates 
the use of scarce resources to enforce 
the and that the inal 
resource cost of enforcement is non-
decrea the re of 
behaviour to 
meter values will differ to 
the ob ectives of the In 
in the extent of 
regulatory control of the industry in 
in the value of a 
distributional reveals the 
existence of a 
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3-8 MONOPOLY 
As stated in Section 2-2, it is possible that a 
pro -maximizing monopolist, protected by barriers to 
and rating at Q~ on Figure 2-2-1, may be producing an 
1 
output level which exceeds the first-best level 6 in 
2-2 2. 
With a negatively sloped market demand curve and a 
strictly convex production cost function, the mOnopolistic 
optimum QM occurs at an output level which is strictly less 
than that at the unregulated competitive equilibrium QC. 
Assuming that marginal social cost exceeds marginal private 
cost and that it also increases in output at a faster rate 
than marginal private cost, monopolistic control of the 
industry results in a smaller loss of aggregate social sur 
plus than at the unregulated competitive equilibrium. 
The that there is a loss of aggregate surplus, 
however, provides the impetus for NPIT regulation of the 
industry provided that the cost of so doing is not prohibi-
tive. A necessary condition for this to occur, from (3-2-10) 
is that 
(3-8-1) M M aQ WI (0) < [h(Q ,Y)-SC1 (Q '¢)]aL 
e 
where the side (3-8~1) is the marginal 
resource cost of the initial unit of enforcement and the 
right-hand side the marginal gain in aggregate surplus 
that generates. 
Provided that the inequality in (3-8-1) is satis-
fied, following (3 2) and (3-2 10), NPIT-optimal regulated 
industry equilibrium w 
*M level Q where 
occur at some intermediate output 
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(3-8-2) *M M 11 Q < Q < Q 
LEMMA 3-8 1: se that an a finite 
number of identical firms with concave fit 
functions which faces a market demand curve 
with non-zero finite elastic 
at the pure monopoly profit-maximizing output 
level which exceeds the firs st 
socially optimal output level (0). Suppose 
also that this indu to either 
a strictly binding output quota or a strictly 
sitive unit rate sales tax each of which is 
enforced means of an identical cted 
mone function that is stric 
convex in the extent of both actual and 
illegal output. Assuming that the unregulated 
is less than the 
unregulated competitive equilibrium output 
and that an increase in enforcement 
increases the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output at any given illegal output 
level if the iveness of demand 
does not decrease with an increase in 
the effectiveness as a deterrent of 
an additional unit of labour devoted to 
enforcement at the pure monopoly profit-
maximi level does not exceed that 
at the ibriurn 
level. 
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Proof. 
Under competitive operation of the indu 
lated equil ium is determined at that output 
a regu-
1 where 
the marg expected penalty with respect to output equates 
the dif between marginal private production cost and 
the demand p With monopolistic control the regulated 
equilibr occurs at the output level where the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output equates the dif 
ence between private production cost and inal 
revenue. 
Given that the market demand curve exhibits non-zero 
finite elasticity, the rate of change of marginal revenue 
exceeds that of demand price at any given quantity. 
the additional assumption that the price responsiveness of 
demand does not decrease with an increase in quantity, the 
rate of change of marginal revenue at any given quantity 
also exceeds that of the demand price at all greater quanti-
ties. Following this result, and the assumption that 
QM < QC, the rate of change in marginal revenue at QM 
exceeds the rate of change in the demand price at QC. 
The assumptions that the expected monetary penalty 
is strictly convex in output and the extent of the violation 
and that an increase enforcement raises the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output at any given illegal 
output, together with the assumption that QM < QC, imply 
that the extent of ase in the marginal expected penalty 
with respect to output at QM is no greater than that at QC. 
Using, for the sake of argument, the most pessimistic case 
that the change in the marginal expected penalty is the same 
at both output ,together with the above result 
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concerning the relative rates of change of marginal revenue 
and demand price, it follows that the reduction in regul 
1 ium quantity which results from a unit increase in 
en rcement is smaller at QM than at QC. This proves the 
Lemma. 
Given the other assumptions of Lemma 3 8 1, the con-
dition that the price responsiveness of demand does not 
o 
se with an increase in quantity is sufficient but not 
necessary to ensure the result. If this condition does not 
hold, the validity of the result depends on a comparison of 
the relative rates of change of marginal revenue and the 
demand price and the relative magnitudes of the enforcement-
induced increase in the marginal expected penalty with res-
pect to output. 
PROPOSITION 3-8-1: Suppose that an industry comprising a 
finite number of identical firms with 
concave fit functions which faces a 
market demand curve with non-zero finite 
elastic at the 
monopoly profit-maximizing output level 
(QM) which exceeds the f st-best 
socia 
se also that this is sub-
ect to either a stric 
or a stric itive unit rate 
sales tax each of which is enforced 
means of an 
that is strict convex in the extent of 
Proo 
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illegal output, that regulating the 
of the necessitates the 
use of scarce resources to enforce 
regulation, and that the marginal 
resource cost of enforcement is non-
decreasing. Assuming, in addition, that 
the price responsiveness of demand does 
not decrease with an increase in 
tity and that the same form of the 
expected penalty function is used in 
each case, the NPIT-optimal level of 
enforcement activity under monopoly 
(LlM) is strictly less than that (Le*C) 
in the case when the industry is operat-
ing competitively in the unregulated 
environment. 
NPIT-optimal enforcement is given by the solution to 
(3 2 10) given the optimal value of the regulatory instru-
ment such that (3 2-10) and (3-2-11) are satisfied simul-
taneously. Implicit in the Proposition is the assumption 
that it is optimal for the NPITregulator to enforce the 
ation when the industry is operating competitively so 
that > O. 
Following Proposition 3-2-1 the NPIT-optimal quota 
1 is zero while the NPIT-optimal sales tax is set at a 
rate no s than that which equates the difference between 
and marginal private production cost at the 
output level consistent with the NPIT-optimal level of 
enforcement and can be costlessly adjusted within this bound. 
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Given the assumption that both QC and QM are 
socially excessive, the marginal social cost of production 
exceeds the demand price at each of these levels. Given 
also that the pure monopoly profit-maximizing output level 
QM is less than QC and the assumption in (3-2-8) that 
marginal social cost is non-decreasing in output, it 
follows that 
(3-8-3) 
where both sides of (3-8-3) are negative. Given that the 
same form of expected penalty function is used in both 
cases, following Lemma 3-8-1, 
(3-8-4) aQ aL 
e Q=QM 
> aQ 
aL 
e Q=QC 
and for enforcement to occur in each case, both sides of 
(3-8-4) must also be negative. Finally, the resource cost 
of enforcement at any level of enforcement activity is the 
same irrespective of whether the industry is operated 
monopolistically or competitively. 
From (3-2-10), NPIT-optimal enforcement occurs where 
the marginal benefit and marginal cost of enforcement to 
the regulator are equated. Given the above results, the 
marginal benefit of any level of enforcement activity, 
assuming that it is positive, is less at the unregulated 
monopolistic equilibrium output level of the industry than 
it is at the unregulated competitive equilibrium output 
level. Therefore, with a smaller marginal benefit and 
identical marginal cost of enforcement, the NPIT-optimal 
level of enforcement activity is less in the case when the 
industry is operated monopolistically, in the unregulated 
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environment, than when it is operated competitively. 
o 
Following Proposition 3~8-1 
(3 5) *M *C < L 
e 
and the degree of NPIT-optimal enforcement will be less in 
the event of monopolistic control of the industry than under 
compe ion. This is because the social cost of the exter-
nality is smaller than that caused by competitive behaviour 
wh the resource cost of any given level of enforcement is 
the same in each case. With the exception of this, all 
o behavioural implications of NPIT regulation, which 
follow from equations (3-2-10) and (3-2-11), hold in the 
case of monopoly just as for the competitive case previously 
cons 
12 
Monopolistic control of an industry involves self 
regulation in restricting output to the profit-maximizing 
1 QM. Any additional regulation which would lower output 
from this point, while incurring the additional costs of 
enforcement funding and net expected penalty payments, 
reduces the monopolist's profit and will not be undertaken 
voluntarily by a CT regulator. 
are situations,however,where a CT regulator may 
well the operations of a monopolist. One such 
instance is that of 'strategic' regulation. Here the mono-
po t is threatened with the prospect of hostile NPIT-
motivated regulation and engages in strategic self regula-
t ' t 1 d th' ib'l' 13 ~on 0 prec u e 1S poss ~ ~ty. 
As any reduction in output in this situation reduces 
the monopolist's current profits, the behavioural 
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implications, following Proposition 2-8-7, are that any CT 
regulation will be by means of a quantitative restriction 
set at the maximum level possible with the minimum enforce-
ment effort sufficient to ensure that NPIT regulation does 
not occur. 
In this way the monopolist acts to minimize the 
expected loss of profits from regulatory activity. The 
greater is the quota, within the constraint that it must not 
M 
exceed Q , the smaller is the penalty incurred at any level 
of enforcement. Minimizing enforcement activity minimizes 
net fines paid at any given violation and reduces the 
resource cost to the monopolist. Optimum CT enforcement 
under monopoly is zero which raises the spectre of voluntary 
restraints, however, positive expenditures may be necessary 
to create credible deterrents against the implementation of 
the NPIT threat. Anything other than token regulation of a 
monopolist in these circumstances then is an indication that 
regulatory control is not motivated by the objectives of an 
14 
unfettered CT regulator. 
3-9 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in Chapter Two was concerned with 
developing a model to analyse the effects of regulating a 
competitive, negative-externality generating industry in a 
partial equilibrium framework. Specific recognition was 
made of the necessity for enforcement and the differing 
characteristics of regulation by sales tax and by output 
quota were derived. The present chapter has extended the 
analysis of Chapter Two by incorporating, within this 
otherwise identical amework, two competing hypotheses 
concerning regulatory objectives; the NPIT approach assuming 
that the regulator acts so as to maximize aggregate welfare 
and the CT hypothesis, the pure form of which assumes that 
the regulator seeks to maximize regulated industry pro s. 
In Chapter Two it was discovered that various taxi 
expected penalty and quota/expected penalty combinations 
could be formulated to generate identical aggregate results 
but that distributional implications of such pol s 
differed. se distributional aspects of regulatory policy 
assume great significance when the objectives of the regu-
lator are discussed and form the basis of the different 
behavioural implications for regulatory policy derived in 
this chapter. 
The analysis in this chapter began, under each hypo-
thesis, by determining the optimal regulatory policy in 
terms of the type and level of regulatory instrument 
mented and the level of enforcement employed. Following 
Proposition 3-2 1 a NPIT regulator concerned solely with 
aggregate soc welfare will not, in circumstances where 
the level of the quota directly affects regulated equilibrium 
output, regulate the industry by means of a non-zero output 
quota. This result is in accordance with economists' 
ment on the II ior efficacy of penalty taxes as 
ments for controlling significant external diseconomies" 
[Buchanan and Tullock, 1973; 139]. 
By contrast, the analysis of Sections 3-4 and 3-6 
reveal that a CT regulator favours regulation by output 
quota and is furthermore concerned about the level of such 
a quota. Indeed, Proposition 3-7-2 demonstrated that the 
existence of a non-zero output quota which is allocated 
entirely to members of the regulated industry and which, in 
the case of a constant flat-rate per unit marginal expected 
penalty, 1S set at the regulated equilibrium output level of 
the industry so that no violations occur and no penalties are 
imposed, reveals the existence of a captured regulator. 
Other behavioural differences also exist. 
Firstly, following Proposition 3-7-1, the NPIT-
optimal level of enforcement will, in general, differ from 
that which is optimal for a CT regulator. Unfortunately 
neither the quantitative nor the qualitative nature of this 
difference is unambiguous and hence to infer anything about 
the objectives of the regulator from an observation of the 
level of enforcement activity requires enough knowledge to 
solve the optimization problem of each regulator. 
Secondly, the behavioural response in optimal regu-
latory policy to changes in various parameters also differs 
according to the objective of the regulator. The complexity 
of responses to changes in parameters such as the level of 
aggregate consumer income and the state of enforcement tech-
nology is such as to preclude their use for observational 
inference. Other responses however are more clear-cut. For 
instance, as stated in Proposition 3-7-3, a change in .regu-
latory behaviour in response to an alteration in a distri-
butional parameter, such as the proportion of the resource 
cost of enforcement that is funded by the regulated industry 
itself, is an indication that the regulator is captured. 
Together these behavioural characteristics provide poten-
tially observable and testable empirical criteria by which 
the performance of a regulator can be monitored and by which 
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its objectives may be inferred. 
This chapter has analysed regulation in the case when 
the regulated industry comprises a finite number of competi-
tive firms. Regulation by a CT regulator has been stated to 
be analagous to the formation of an industry cartel. Alter-
natively, with a variable number of firms or free entry, a 
CT regulator may use regulation as a barrier to entry and so 
facilitate a natural monopoly which would not exist in an 
unregulated environment. lS The function of the regulatory 
instrument and enforcement in this instance is to artifi-
cially inflate the cost structures of potential competitors. 
This can be accomplished by allocating quotas to incumbent 
firms,or some subset of them, and then setting the expected 
penalty structure so that industry output does not exceed 
its CT-optimal regulated equilibrium level. In the case of 
the finite number of competitive firms analysed in the text, 
the marginal expected penalty determined the regulated 
equilibrium of the industry and the extent of illegal beha-
viour by member firms. Here the marginal expected penalty 
must be set at such a level that entry by non-quota holders 
is impossible, in the sense that any firm which does not 
hold a quota and attempts to enter incurs an unsustainable 
loss. Depending on the form of individual cost functions in 
the industry, this will require that the expected penalty 
function incorporate a flat-rate component. This type of 
penalty function will also preclude any constraint violation 
by quota holders, if set at such a level to prohibit entry, 
and thus allows the quota to be set at the regulated equili-
brium output level which prevents any loss of industry 
profit through payment of fines. 
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This last point has implications for the analysis in 
the text. There too a CT regulator would, if able, choose 
to enforce an output quota with a flat unit rate expected 
penalty. A penalty of this type allows members of the 
industry, as quota holders, to capture, in the form of 
imputed quota rentals, all expected penalty payments which 
they would otherwise incur. 
Finally, Section 3-8 briefly considered, within a 
similar analytical structure to that used in the preceding 
sections, the regulation of a monopolistic industry. A 
NPIT regulator was shown to devote fewer resources to res-
tricting output in this instance than would be the case in 
regulating a competitive industry. The concept of strategic 
regulation, designed by private industry interests to pre-
clude the possibility of more harmful NPIT measures, was 
considered. It was concluded that anything other than token 
control of the industry was, in these circumstances, an 
indication that the industry was not regulated by an 
unfettered CT regulator. 
The following chapter presents an application of the 
analysis of Chapters Two and Three to the problem of regu-
lating a common-property externality. This is done within 
the particular context of an open-access fishery. 
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NOTES. 
1. Following (3-2-7) and (3-2-8) the parameter vector 
Z, which is used here consistent with the formulat 
of (3 2-5), comprises the state of enforcement 
technology ~ and the level of consumer income Y. 
2. See for example Harford, 1978; Lee, 1984; Papps,1985 j 
and Storey and McCabe, 1980. 
3. Voluntarily is used here in the sense of a freely 
undertaken action. "Voluntary compliance" in the 
literature is often taken to mean compliance without 
direct enforcement. There are in those situations, 
however, other "costs" of noncompliance such as social 
stigma which act as effective deterrents. Here it is 
assumed that all such non-monetary influences are 
either irrelevant to behaviour or are quantified 
within the expected monetary penalty. 
4. In the alternative case when aQ/aQ = 0, T = O. From 
(3-3-5) then dL~/dY ~ 0 if and only if F ~ O. The 
condition on the sign of F from (3-3-7) is therefore 
sufficient to produce the result in this case also. 
5. The bounds k1 and k2 are not constants as is usually 
the case. Rather they are also variable containing a 
term in the variable that they bound. Substituting 
for S in (3-3-20) and (3-3-21) from (3-3-3) each of 
. 3 2 Q klt k2 contaln the term [h(.) - SC 1 ( .)] 3Qa~ and, 
following Lemma 3-2-1, the coefficient of this term 
negative. Given that the Proposition considers 
regulation by sales tax only, the discussion in 
Append 3-2 shows that Band M are positive while 
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the concavity of (3-2-9) ensures that A and N are 
ne ive. using this information in (3 3 20) and 
(3 3-21) shows that the coefficient on the term in 
oZQ10LeOW is positive for both kl and k2" The bounds 
> .. 
k1 and k2 then vary directly with aZQ/a aW and 
provide a ~tunnel" band within which the variable 
1 s. 
6. This is an extreme version of the "captured 
tor" hypothes The constraints of the political 
process may limit the ability of the CT regulator 
to s objective. See for instance Bec 
1983 ; and Peltzman 1976. 
7. It has been suggested [Waud, 1986; 213] that the 
ex tence of tax avoidance and tax evasion is a more 
convincing argument in support of the Laffer curve 
than the original which seeks to explain an 
relationship between tax revenue and tax rates in 
terms of supply-side responses. (For an expos ion 
of the original hypothesis see Fullerton, 1982). 
8. This assumes that a change in the value of these para-
meters does not violate any overall profit con-
straint. 
9. The text deals with zero declaration and part 
declaration. Clearly a strictly positive sales tax 
with full declaration is not optimal for the CT 
regulator as this maximizes the loss in industry 
prof s from tax payments at any given tax rate. 
10. Taking any a, b, 0 ~ a, b ~ 1 such that, following 
Lemma 37 2 part (i), b ~ a, and rewriting (3-7 1) 
in these general terms gives 
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aEP ~( . ) 
b WI (L e) + (1- a ) aL 
e 
and rearranging 
> Wi (L ) 
e 
(I) 
aaEP~(.) 
bw I (L ) -
e aLe 
aEP ~ ( .) 
> w' (L ) -
e aL ( II ) 
e 
Replacing la l by Ib' in (II) and simplifying gives 
aEP~ (.) 
b[w l (Le) - aL 1 
e 
aEP (.) 
> Wl( L ) - ~ 
e aL 
e 
(III) 
Given the above assumption the left-hand side of (III) 
is at least as large as the left-hand side of (II) 
yet the inequality in (III) does not hold because by 
assumption b < 1. Given this, the assumed inequality 
in (II) does not hold either. The simplification 
employed in (3-7-1) therefore does not affect the 
generality of the result. 
11. Here a finite number of identical forms are acting 
together to maximize joint profit. The profit-
maximizing aggregate output level is then the same 
as that of a single owner of all the firms acting as 
a pure monopolist. 
12. Alternatively it is possible that monopoly control 
of the industry will result in an output level which 
is less than is socially optimal. It may be that in 
these circumstances a NPIT regulator would seek to 
expand industry output by setting a quota below 
which output must not fall or by offering a subsidy. 
There is no reason to suspect that the theory is 
symmetric however. This offers an interesting 
extension to the analysis that is not attempted here. 
Recently, some work has been done on the problem of 
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regulating monopoly particularly from the perspec-
tive of designing incentive-compatible regulatory 
mechanisms which induce the monopolist to reveal 
information and also economise on the necessity for 
enforcement. See for example, Baron and Myerson, 
1982: and Loeb and Magat, 1979. 
13. The possibility of strategic regulation has been 
raised before [Salop and Schefman, 1983]. There 
regulation was used as a weapon by a dominant firm 
to inflate the costs of rivals and thus reduce com-
petition. 
14. This point again relates to the process within the 
political arena by which control of the regulatory 
agency is determined and which was alluded to in 
note 5. 
15. This point again relates to the use of regulation as 
a strategic weapon which was mentioned in note 12. 
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APPENDIX 3-1 
From (3-2-7) the equation for the inverse demand 
function, which shows the demand price at any regulated 
equilibrium quantity given fixed values of certain para-
meters is 
(A3-1-1) 
The justifications for the signs of the partial derivatives 
are established in the text. It is evident that the demand 
price at any quantity will increase with a rise in income 
given the assumptions that the commodity is a normal good 
and that the price-elasticity of demand is non-zero. As a 
result of this shift in demand, however, the regulated 
equilibrium quantity will change and thus aggregate income 
(Y) is one of the component parameters of the parameter 
vector Z in (3-2-5). 
Following (2-5-7) and (2-6-15), using the regulatory 
instrument proxy (~) and parameterizing, at the regulated 
equilibrium 
(A3-1-2) D(P(L ,~,jJ,Y),Y) = 8(P(L ,~,jJ,Y),jJ) 
e e 
Totally differentiating (A3-1-2) with dL
e 
= d~ = djJ 0 
gives 
(A3-1-3) aD(.) ap - + ap ay 
and rearranging 
aD ( . ) 
ay 
aD(.)/ay 
as(.) ap 
ap ay o 
(A3-1-4) ap* ay aD(.) a8(.) > 0 if and only if < 
ap ap 
aD(.) > 0 
ay < 
where, following the assumptions of Chapter Two, 
a D ( . ) / a P < 0 and a 8 ( . ) / a P > o. 
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Given the assumption that the commodity is a normal 
good, aD( .)/ay > 0, and hence an increase in aggregate 
income raises market equilibrium price. The effect on 
equilibrium quantity is then found by examining the response 
of supply to the increase in price. Therefore 
(A3-1-S) aQ ay 
as ( .) ap* > , ap* > 
ap ay- < 0 if and only 1f ay- < 0 
and,using the result from (A3-l-4) that ap*/ay > 0, it 
follows that aQ/ay > O. An increase in aggregate income 
therefore increases the regulated equilibrium output of the 
industry. 
Totally differentiating (A3-1-2) with dL 
e 
o gives 
(A3-1-6) aD( . ) ap 
and rearranging 
ap 
a-w-
as ( . ) 
ap 
ap 
aw-
as ( . ) 
a).1 o 
dQ 
(A3-1-7) as(.)/a).1 ~ 0 if and only if as( .) 
< a).1 aD(.) as(.) 
ap ap 
using the assumptions of Chapter Two as for (A3-1-4). 
dY 
< 0 
> 
An improvement in the state of enforcement technology 
may be expected to increase the probability of detection, 
and thus the expected penalty, at any given level of 
enforcement. This is qualitatively equivalent to an 
increase in enforcement. Following Propositions 2-5-1 and 
2-6-2 therefore, assuming that the increase in ).1 suffi-
ciently increases the marginal expected penalty with respect 
to output, as( .)/a).1 < 0 and thus,from (A3-1-7},an improve-
ment in the state of enforcement technology raises the 
market equilibrium price. The effect on regulated equili-
brium quantity is found by examining the response of demand 
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to this change in price. Thus 
(A3-l-8) ao -= aD ( .) a P '* > ap'* < ° ap ° if and only if aw < aw > 
and, using the result from (A3-l-7) that ap*/3W > 0, it 
follows that 30/3W < 0. An improvement in the state of 
enforcement technology therefore reduces the regulated 
equilibrium output of the industry. 
From (3-2-8) the equation for the enforcement-
exclusive social cost of production at any regulated equili-
brium quantity given values of the relevant parameters is 
(A3-l-9) SC SC(O(Le,rG ,W,Y) ,<jJ) SC l > 0, SCll > 0, 
SC 2 < 0, SC 12 < ° 
Marginal social cost of output at any given state of tech-
nology is positive while an increase in <jJ, which represents 
an improvement in technology in that it reduces the extent 
of externality produced, lowers the social cost at any level 
of output produced in the industry. It is also assumed that 
improvements in this technology reduce the marginal social 
cost of output at any given output level. ' An example of 
this would be the implementation of pollution abatement 
technology which, while it may increase costs in the 
industry concerned, reduces the degree of externality 
which the industry generates and thus lowers the social 
cost of the industry's operation. 
The regulated equilibrium, as shown in Chapter Two, 
is determined by individual competitive profit-maximizing 
behaviour within the regulatory environment. The parameter 
~ is assumed not to affect either demand or supply decisions. 
As such, changes in ~ do not affect the regulated equili-
brium and hence <jJ does not appear in the parameter vector 
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Z in (3-2-5). 
Finally, as shown in (A3-1-8), the state of enforce-
ment technology affects the regulated equilibrium output 
level of the industry. This parameter then also appears in 
the parameter vector Z in (3-2-5). Thus 
(A3-1-10) Q = Q(L ,~,w,Y) 
e 
The result that Q3 < 0 was established in (A3-1-8). 
The signs of this and of the other partial derivatives 
reflect the assumption that an improvement in the technology 
of enforcement increases deterrence at any combination of 
the policy instruments and also increases the marginal 
effectiveness of enforcement activity and the level of the 
regulatory instrument. In the case of a sales tax Q2 < 0 
and hence Q23 < 0 whereas in the case of an output quota 
Q2 > 0 and therefore Q23 > O. In both cases this reflects 
the assumption that the marginal deterrent capabilities of 
the regulatory instrument are enhanced by the introduction 
of improved enforcement technology. 
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The assumption of concavity of the NPIT regulator's 
objective function given in (3-2-9) ensures that the deter-
min ant of the coefficient matrix [::] is positive 
ividual components A and N are negative. 
From (3-3-2) 
(A3-2-1) A 
- w"(L ) 
e 
and that 
Following Lemma 3-2-1 [h( .)-SC l ( .)] is negative and, 
from (3-2-2),it is assumed that the resource cost of 
enforcement is non-decreasing in L. The assumptions in 
e 
(3 2 7) and (3-2-8) are that h 1 (.) < 0 and that marginal 
social cost is strictly increasing in output while,from 
(3 2 l),it follows that aQ/aL < O. Given these assumptions 
e 
and results, a sufficient condition for A < 0 is that 
a 2 Q/a 2> O. That is A < 0 if the marginal productivity of 
resources devoted to enforcement in reducing the regulated 
equilibrium output level of the industry declines as the 
level of enforcement rises. 
From (3 3-3) 
Following the discussion of the component terms of 
2 1), and that, from (3-2-11),aQ/a~ > 0 at optimal quota 
levels while it is assumed that aQ/a~ < 0 at non-optimal tax 
rates, a suff nt condition for N < 0 is that a 2 Q/aQ2 > O. 
That , N < 0 if the impact on the regulated industry 
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equilibrium output level of successive increases in the tax 
rate, or successive reductions in available quota, at any 
given level of enforcement, is diminishing. 
Given that A and N are negative then, in order for 
(3-3-2) and (3-3-3) to be satisfied, it is necessary in the 
case of regulation by a sales tax that terms Band M be 
positive and in the case of regulation by an output quota 
that they be negative. This follows from the observation 
that the regulator seeks to restrict the output of the 
industry and hence with a sales tax dL and dD have the same 
e 
sign while with an output quota they have opposite signs. 
As Band M are the cross derivative terms, 
and 3 2 n/aDaL respectively, and are thus identical, a condi-
e 
tion on the sign of one suffices for both. From (3-3-3) 
(A3-2-3) aQ aQ aQ + [hI (. ) aL - sell (. ) aL ] ~ 
e e 
Following the discussion of the component terms of (A3-2-1) 
and that in the case of a sales tax it is assumed that 
aQ/aL < 0, a necessary condition for M > 0 is that 
e -
a 2 Q/aDaL < O. That is Band M are positive only if the tax 
e 
rate and the level of enforcement are mutually reinforcing 
deterrents. 
In the case of an output quota assuming that aQ/aD 
> 0, a necessary condition for M < 0 is that a 2 Q/aDaL > O. 
e 
That is, recalling that the regulator controls output by 
reducing the amount of quota available to the industry, B 
and M are negative only if increases in the level of enforce-
ment and reductions in the size of quota are mutually 
reinforcing deterrents. 
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Using (3-3-2) and (3-3-3) the size of the coeffi-
cients on the change in the enforcement technology parameter 
are now examined. From (3-3-2) the coefficient is 
(A3-2-4) 
and is denoted by E in (3-3-14). Following the assumptions 
in (A3-l-l0) and the results previously derived on other 
component terms of (A3-2-4), the first composite term of 
(A3-2-4) is positive while the second is negative. The 
overall sign of (A3-2-4) is therefore ambiguous. 
Rearranging (A3-2-4), E ~ 0 if and only if 
(A3-2-5 ) 
a2Q/aLea~ > 
aQ/a~ < 
aQ [hI (. )-SC II (·)]aLe 
[h ( . ) -SCI (. ) ] 
given that [h(,)-SC I (.)], ~~ < o. 
From (3-3-3), the second coefficient is 
(A3-2-6) a 2Q [h (. ) -SCI (.) 1 aS1a~ [ aQ] aQ + [hI (.)-SCII (·)]aTI ~
and is denoted by S in (3-3-14). Following the assumptions 
in (A3-l-l0) and the results previously derived on the 
other component terms of (A3-2-6), in the case of a sales 
tax, the first composite term of (A3-2-6) is positive and 
the second negative. The overall sign of S is therefore 
ambiguous also. 
Rearranging (A3-2-6) for the case of a sales tax, 
> S < 0 if and only if 
(A3-2-7) > 
< 
aQ [hI (.)-SCII (.)]~ 
[h(.)-SC l (·)] 
aQ given that [h(.)-SCl (.)], < o. a~ 
Us the assumptions from (A3-1 10) 
an output quota, and that 3Q/3Q > 0 following 
2 6-2, the first term of (A3-2-6) is negative while 
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case of 
ion 
second term is positive. Rearranging (A3-2-6) then, S ~ 0 
if and on if (A3-2-7) holds. Here, with an output quota, 
however, both sides of (A3-2-7) are negative whereas wi a 
s tax both are positive. 
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The assumption of concavity of (3-4-16) ensures that 
the terminant of the coefficient matrix in (3- 4) 
posi ve and that individual components A and 0 are negative. 
From (3 5 1) 
(A3 3 1) A a
2 [hI (Q (.) ,Y) Q (.) + h (Q (.) ,Y) - C1 (Q (.) )] 
a 2 wR ( . ) [ 
+ [h11 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h 1 (Q(·),Y)+h1 (Q(·),Y) 
C" (Q ( »] aQ ] 3Q 
. 3L aL 
e e 
Following Lenuna 3-4-1 [h 1 (Q(.),Y) +h(Q(.),Y) C'(Q(.»] 
is negative and,from (3-4-7), the marginal cost of enforcement 
to industry is assumed to be non-decreasing. From (3-2-7) 
h I (.) < 0 and,from (3-4-17), it follows that 3Q/ < 0 while 
from the concavity of the profit function C" (Q(.» > o. 
Given these assumptions and results, a sufficient condition 
r A < 0 is that 3 2 Q/3L 2 > 0 and that 
e 
3-2) h11 (Q(.),Y) < C"(Q(.» - 2h1 (Q(.),Y) 
is, A < 0 if the marginal productivity resources 
devoted to enforcement in reducing the regulated equilibrium 
output level of the industry declines as the level of 
enforcement rises and the price responsiveness of the demand 
curve does not greatly increase as quantity r s 
From (3-5-2) 
3 2 Q 33) N [h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C 1 (Q(.»]3R2 
3 2wR ( . ) [ 
+ [h1l(Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h1 (Q(·),Y) +h1(Q(.),Y) 
C" (Q ( »] 3Q ]3Q 
. 3R 3R 
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Following the discussion of the component terms of 
(A3-3-1) and that, from (3-4-18),3Q/3R ~ 0 at optimal quota 
levels, a sufficient condition for N < 0 is that 3 2Q/3R2 > 0 
and that 32wR(.)/3R2 > O. That is, N < 0 if the impact on 
the regulated industry equilibrium output level of success-
ive reductions in available quota, at any given level of 
enforcement, is decreasing, and the marginal cost to the 
industry of increasing the quota level is non-decreasing. 
Given that A and N are negative then, in order for 
(3-5-1) and (3-5-2) to be satisfied, it is necessary that 
terms Band M be negative. This follows from the observa-
tion that with an output quota dL and dR have opposite 
e 
signs. As Band M are the cross-derivative terms, a condi-
tion on the sign of one suffices for both. From (3-5-1) 
(A3-3-4 ) 3 2 Q B= [h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y)-C'(Q(.))]3L 3R 
e 
- C" (Q ( .) II ~~ I ~~ 
e 
Following the discussion of the component terms of (A3-3-1) 
a necessary condition for B < 0 is that at least one of 
32Q/3L
e
3R, 32wR (.)/3Le 3R is positive. Using (3-4-5) and 
(3-4-7) 
(A3-3-5) 
H12 , H32 < 0 
From the assumptions on component terms ln (3-4-5) 
and assuming that an increase in quota reduces the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to enforcement, then, if 
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a 2 Q/aL
e
aR> 0, the sign of a 2 W R (.)/aLe aR is ambiguous. This 
suggests that B < 0 only if a 2 Q/aL aR > 0 which implies that 
e 
increases in enforcement and reductions in quota are 
mutually reinforcing deterrents against illegal behaviour. 
Assumptions must also be made about the components of 
the parameter coefficients in (3-5-1) and (3-5-2). From 
(3-4-7) 
(A3-3-6) 
and 
(A3- 3-7) 
which is 
(A3- 3-8) 
aL aa 
e 
ambiguous 
a 2 w R 
aL aa 
e 
aL ab 
e 
= Wi (L ) > 0 
e 
In sign. Therefore 
< 0 if and only if H3 -> 
aQ > 
- - H1aL < e 
From (3-5-1) the coefficient on the change In the 
income parameter is 
" 2Q (A3-3-9) F= [h1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C'(Q(·))]a~ ay 
e 
a
2
wR [ rQ 
- aLe ay + [h11 (Q(.),Y)Q(.) +2h 1 (Q(.),Y) -C"(Q(.))]~y 
Using (3-4-5) and (3-4-7) 
a2W R (A3-3-10) aL ay = 
e 
aL ay 
e 
aQ aQ 
= (I-a) [H llaY aL 
e 
Following (A3-1-5), aQ/ay > O. Using this, the assumptions 
of (3-4-5), and that, from Section 2-6 Hil > 0, if 
a 2 Q/aL ay = 0, which is the case if the change in income 
e 
does not affect the marginal productivity of enforcement, 
a 2 WR/aLe ay < O. If the change in income increases the 
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marginal productivity of enforcement then this result is 
reinforced. If the opposite occurs the result may be 
reversed. 
Following Lemma 3-4-1, the initial bracketed term 
is negative. If the change in income leaves the marginal 
productivity of enforcement unaltered, this term, when mul-
tiplied by d2 Q/aL
e
ay, disappears. In this case, given that 
dQ/dL < 0, F > 0 if 
e 
(A3-3-11) 
- [h11(Q(.),Y)Q(.) + 2h1 (Q(.),Y) - C"(Q(.))];~ 
where, following (A3-3-2), the right-hand side of (A3-3-11) 
is positive. From (3-2-7), h 2 (Q(.) ,Y) > O. The inequality 
In (A3-3-11) therefore is more likely to hold the more 
negative is h 12 (Q(.) ,Y). 
From (3-5-2) the coefficient on the change in the 
income parameter is 
(A3-3-12) _ I a2 Q T- [h1(Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C (Q(.))]aRay 
a
2
WR [ aQ 
aRaY + [h11(Q(·),Y)Q(.) +2h1 (Q(·),Y) -C"(Q(·))]ay 
+ h12 (Q ( . ) ,Y) Q ( .) + h2 (Q (. ) , Y) ] ~~ 
From (3-4-20) 
(A3-3-13) 
a2 EPR (1 ) [H aQ aQ + H a 2 Q] aRay = -a 11 ay aR 1 aRay 
Given the assumptions of (3-4-20) and the discussion of 
(A3-3-10), if the change in income does not affect the 
marginal productivity of the quota, a 2 wR (.)/aRay > O. If 
the marginal productivity of the quota is enhanced by the 
increase in income, then this result is reinforced but, 
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if the opposite occurs, the result may be reversed. 
Assuming that the increase in income does not affect 
the marginal productivity of the quota, and given that 
ClQ/ClR > 0 then T < 0 if the inequality in condition 
(A3-3-11) holds. 
From (3-5-1) the coefficient of the parameter repre-
senting the state of enforcement technology is 
(A3-3-14) E = [hl(Q(.),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C' (Q{.))]Cl~2~jJ 
e 
_ C"(Q() y)ClQ]~ 
., CljJ ClL 
e 
Rearranging (A3-3-14) and using Lemma 3-4-1, E 
only if 
Cl 2Q (A3-3-15) ClL CljJ 
e 
> o if and 
< 
< 
Clw 2 
R 
dL all 
e 
[[hll [Q [. ) , Y) Q [.) + 2hl (Q [. ) ,Y) - c" (Q (. ) ) 1 ~~J ~~ 
-
> [h 1 (Q(.),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),y) - c'(Q{.))] 
Following Lemma 3-4-1 the denominator of the right-
hand side of (A3-3-15) is negative. Using (A3-3-2) and 
that, from (3-4-17), ClQ/ClL < 0, together with the assumption 
e 
in (A3-1-10) that an improvement in the technology of 
enforcement increases deterrence at any combination of the 
policy instruments, it follows that the second term in the 
numerator of the right-hand side of (A3-3-15) is also 
negative. From (3-4-7) 
(A3-3-l6) ClL CljJ 
e 
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Modifying (3-4~4) to include the parameter for the state of 
enforcement technology 
(A3-3-17) EP R H4 > 0, H24 < 0, 
H34 > 0 
where it is assumed that an improvement in the state of 
enforcement technology increases the expected penalty faced 
at any level of illegal behaviour with given values of the 
policy instruments and also increases the absolute values 
of the marginal expected penalties with respect to 
enforcement and quota size at any given illegal output level. 
Using (3-4 5) in (A3-3-l6) 
(A3-3-18) 3Q + H ] 3jJ 34 
Given the assumption of convexity of the expected 
penalty function, H1l > 0, while, as in (A3-1-10), it is 
assumed that an improvement in the state of enforcement 
technology increases the marginal effectiveness of enforce-
ment in reducing the extent of illegal activity so that 
3jJ < O. The sign of (A3-3-l8) is therefore ambiguous. 
If 32wR/3Le3jJ > 0 then the right-hand side of 
(A3 3 15) is negative. The more negative the term 
3 2 Q/3 3jJ becomes, the less positive is 3wR/3LedjJ using 
(A3-3 18) and hence the less negative is the right-hand side 
of (A3-3-l5). Therefore, using (A3-3~15), E > 0 if 
ficiently negative. Here as in the NPIT 
case the relative sizes of the terms 3 2Q/3L djJ and 3Q/3jJ 
e 
is important. The term 3Q/3jJ reflects the magnitude 
the improvement in deterrence at any given policy com-
bination of enforcement and quota. An increase in the 
abso magnitude of this term increases the positiveness of 
d2W /dL dW and hence increases the negat R e 
right-hand s of (A3-3-15). 
5S of the 
From (3-5-2) the coefficient of the parameter 
reflecting the state of enforcement technology is 
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(A3-3-19) 
Cl2 Q Cl2 WR 
[h1 (Q(·),Y) +h(Q(.),Y) -C' (Q('»]aRdW - aRCllJ 
+ [[h11 (Q(.),Y)Q(.) +2h 1 (Q(.),Y) CII(Q(.»]~~] ~~ 
which is deno by S. Rearranging (A3 3 19) using Lemma 
3-4-1, S < > 0 if and only if 
(A3-3-20) 
[[hl1 (Q(.),Y)Q(.) +2h 1 (Q(.),Y) -cn(Q(.»)]~~]~~ 
[hl(Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) - C'(Q(.»] 
Following Lemma 3-4-1 the denominator of the right-
hand side term of (A2-2-17) is negative. Using (A3-3-2) 
and assuming as above that aQ/alJ < 0 whi lowing Proposi 
tion 2 6-2 aQ/ClR > 0, the second term in the numerator of , 
the right-hand side of (A3-3-20) is ive. 
From (3-4 20) using (A3-3-17) 
(A3-3-21) 
Following (A3 1 10) it is assumed that improvement in the 
state of enforcement technology increases the marginal 
effectiveness of the quota in restr ing output so that 
a 2 Q/aRalJ > 0 and similarly, from (A3 17),the improved 
enforcement technology increases absolute size of the 
marginal cted penalty with re to quota size and 
hence H24 < O. Given these assumptions, and the assumptions 
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and conditions on the signs of other component terms 
(A3 3-21), the sign of a2wR/aRa~ is ambiguous. 
If a2wR/aRa~ < 0 then the right-hand side of (A3-3-20) 
is po tive. The more positive the term a2Q/aLea~ becomes, 
however, the less negative is a2wR/aRa~, using (A3-3 21), 
and hence the less positive is the right-hand side of 
(A3-3-20) . Therefore, using (A3-3-20), S < 0 if a 2Q/aL a~ 
e 
is su ient1y positive. As in (A3-3-15) the relationship 
between aZQ/aL a~ and aQ/a~ is important. An increase in the 
e 
abso magnitude of aQ/a~ increases the negativeness of 
a2WR/aRa~ and hence increases the positiveness of the right-
hand s of (A3-3-20). 
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The assumption of concavity of (3-4-22) ensures 
6 > 0 and that the individual components A and N are 
t From (3-5-24) 
+ [[h11 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +2hl(Q(·),Y)-CII(Q(.))]~~ ] ~~ 
e e 
Fa llow ing Lemma 3 - 4 1 [h 1 (Q ( . ) I Y) Q ( .) + h (Q (. ) , Y) 
c' (Q(.))] is negative and, from (3-4-12) ,the marginal cost 
of enforcement to the industry is assumed to be non-
creasing while from (3-4-23) it follows that 3Q/3L < O. 
e 
Given these assumptions and results, a sufficient condition 
for A < 0 is that a 2 Q/3L 2 > 0 and that (A3-3-2) holds in the 
e 
case of regulation by sales tax. That is A < 0 if the margi-
nal ef iveness of resources devoted to enforcement in 
reducing the regulated equilibrium output of the industry 
decl s as the level of enforcement rises at any given tax 
rate and the price responsiveness of the demand curve does not 
great increase as quantity rises. 
From (3-5 25) 
(A3 
a2 w 
t 3 2 Q t 
-2) N= [hl(Q(.),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),y)-C (Q(.))]at 2 -
+ [[hll(Q(,) ,Y)Q(.) +2hl(Q(.),Y)-C"(Q(.))]~~J ~~ 
Following the discussion of the component terms of 
(A3-4 1) and that, from (3-4-24), 3Q/3t ~ 0 at optimal tax 
rates, a cient condition for N < 0 is that 3 2 Q/at2 > 0 
and 3 2 w
t
/at 2 > O. That is N < 0 if the impact on the regu-
lated equil ium output level of successive increases in 
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the tax rate at any given level of enforcement decreasing, 
and the marg cost to the industry of the tax 
rate is non-decreasing as is assumed with re to 
(3-4-25) . 
Given that A and N are negative, in order for 
(3-5-24) and (3-5-25) to be satisfied, it is necessary that 
Band M are positive. From (3-5-24) 
(A3-4 3) B [hl(Q(.),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) 
Following discussion of the component terms of (A3-4-l) 
a necess condition for B > 0 is that at st one of 
a 2 Q/a at, a 2 wt /aLe at is negative. Using (3 4-3), (3-4-9) 
and (3 4 12) 
(A3-4-4) 
where Gll,Gl,G22 > 0, G2 < O. 
The signs of the other component terms of (A3-4-4) 
are as previously established and in addition it is assumed 
that a 2 x/at 2 ~ O. If a 2 Q/aL at < 0 the sign of 
e 
a 2 wt /a at is ambiguous. This suggests B > 0 only if 
3 2 Q/ at < 0 which implies that increases in enforcement 
and ases in the tax rate are mutually reinforcing 
deterrents against illegal behaviour. 
Assumptions must also be made about the components of 
the parameter coefficients in (3-5-24) and (3- 25). Using 
4-12) 
(A3-4 5) aL a b 
e 
== wI (L ) > 0 
e 
and using (3-4-12) and (3-4-3) 
(A3-4-6) 
(p·w 
t 
8L 8a 
e 
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From (3-4-9) 8T/8L lS non-negative so that, using (3-4-3), 
e 
8 2 wt /8Le 8a < 0 if 8EP t /8Le > 0 and 8
2 wt /8Le 8a > 0 only if 
the marginal expected fine payments which result from an 
increase in enforcement are sufficiently negative. 
From (3-4-25) and (3-4-26) 
(A3-4-7) 
Using the assumptions in the text that 8EPt/8t > 0 and that 
this outweighs any negativity in 8T/8t, 82 wt /8t8a < O. 
From (3-5-24) the coefficient on the change in income 
parameter is 
8 2 w 
_ ,8 2Q t (A3-4-8) F- [h1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C (Q('))]8L 8Y- 8L 8Y 
e e 
+ [[h1l (Q (. ) ,Y) Q (.) + 2hl (Q (. ) ,Y) - C" (Q (. ) ) ] ~~ 
J8Q + h 12 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h2 (Q(·),Y) 8Le 
From (3-4-12) 
(A3-4-9 ) 8L 8Y 
e 
Using (3-4-3) and (3-4-9) 
8 2 wt (A3-4-10) 8L 8Y= 
e 
From previously derived results and assumptions, 
> 0 while ~~ ,G2 < 0 and Tll = o. 
e 
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If the change in income does not affect the productivity of 
the regulatory instruments then aZQ/aL ay = 0 and 
e 
aZX/aLeay = O. In this case ifaX/ay < 0 then aZwt/aLeaY < 0 
but ifaX/ay > 0 the sign of aZwt/aLeay is ambiguous. If, 
however, the change in income does affect the productivity of 
the regulatory instruments, the sign of aZwt/aLeay is ambi-
guous irrespective of whether the effect is to improve 
instrument productivity or reduce it. 
From (3-5-25) the coefficient of the change in income 
parameter is 
(A3-4-11) a2 Q T= [h1(Q(·),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C' (Q(.))]atay 
+ [[hl1(Q(O),Y)Q(.) +2h1 (Q(.),Y) -CII(Q(o))]~~ 
]
aQ 
+ h 12 (Q(o),Y)Q(o) +h2 (Q(·),Y) at 
Using (3-4-25) and (3-4-26) 
(A3-4-12) 
The component terms of the right-hand side of (A3-4-12) are 
qualitatively identical to those of (A3-4-10) and hence the 
conclusions concerning the sign of a 2 wt /atay are the same 
as for a 2 wt /aLe ay. 
From (3-5-24) the coefficient on the parameter repre-
senting the state of enforcement technology is 
(A3-4-13) a2 Q E= [h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C'(Q(.))]aL a 
e ~ 
294 
> Rearranging (A3 4-13) and using Lemma 3-4 1, E 0 if and 
< 
only if 
(A3 4-14) jJ 
< 
> 
hand s 
[[h11 (Q(O),Y)Q(.) +2hl (Q(·),Y) -CII(Q(.»l~~J~e 
[h1 (Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) C'(Q(.»J 
Following Lemma 3-4-1, the denominator of the right-
of (A3-4-14) is negative. Using ( 3-2) and 
that, from (3 23), aQ/aL < 0, together with 
e 
assumption 
in (A3-l-B) that aQ/a~ < 0, it follows that the second term 
in the numerator of the right-hand side of (A3 4 14) is 
negat From (3 4-12) using (3-4-3) and (3 9) 
(A3-4-1S) := 
a2 EPt 
aL ajJ 
e 
aQ dQ a 2Q 
(1 a) [GIl aL a + G1 aL a e jJ e jJ 
+ G ax ax + G 
22 jJ 2 
+ ( 
The assumptions on the component terms of the right-
hand side of (A3-4-1S) are that an improvement in the state 
of enforcement technology increases the expected penalty 
at any illegal behaviour level with given values of the 
policy instruments, increases the absolute values of the 
marginal expected penalties with respect to enforcement 
level, and tax rate at any given illegal output level and 
encourages more truthful tax declarations. Thus 
> O. As before the assumption that TIl = 0 
re ects the fact that tax revenue ses at a constant 
rate with declared output at any given tax rate. Given the 
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ion that an improvement in the state of 
technology improves the marginal effectiveness of 
ment in restricting industry output, so that 8 2 Q/ 8jJ < 0, 
the of (A3 4-15) is ambiguous. 
If ()2W /oL O)..L > 0 then the right-hand side of 
t e 
(A3-4 14) is negative. The more negative the term 
8 2 Q/Cl ()jJ becomes, the less positive is Cl2Wt/8 CljJ and 
hence the less negative is the right-hand side of (A3 4-14). 
There ,from (A3-4-14), E > 0 if 8 2 Q/ClL 8jJ is 
e 
iently 
negat Here as in the CT case of an output quota the 
relat of the terms 82Q/8L CljJ and ClQ/djJ are a~so 
e 
important. An increase in the absolute magnitude of ClQ/CljJ, 
which re the improvement in deterrence at any given 
policy combination of enforcement and tax rate, increases 
the pos iveness of Cl2wR/ClLedjJ and the negativeness of the 
second term in the numerator of the right-hand side 
(A3-4-14), and hence increases the overall negativeness of 
the right-hand side of (A3-4-14). 
From (3-5-25) the coefficient of the parameter 
reflecting the state of enforcement technology is 
(A3-4 16) s 8 2 [h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) +h(Q(.),Y) -C' (Q(.»] 
+ [[hI1(Q(O),Y)Q(o) +2h1 (Q(.),Y) -C"(Q(.»] jJ] 
> Rearranging (A3-4-16) using Lemma 3-4-1, S < 0 if and only 
if 
(A3 4-17) 
[[hll (Q (. ) ,Y) Q (.) + 2hl (Q (. ) ,Y) = CIf (Q (. ) ) ] ~~] ~~ 
[h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) - c' (Q(.»] 
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Following Lemma 3-4-1 the denominator of the right-
hand side of (A3-4-17) is negative. Using (A3-3-2) and 
assuming as above that dQ/d~ < 0 while, following Proposition 
2-5-1 and (3-4-24), dQ/dt < 0, the second term in the numera-
tor of the right-hand side of (A2-3-17) is negative. 
Using (3-4-25) and (3-4-26) 
(A3-4-18) 
Given the signs on the component terms of (A3-4-18) pre-
viously derived and the assumption that an improvement in 
the state of technology increases the marginal effectiveness 
of the tax rate in restricting output so that d2Q/dtd~. < 0, 
the overall sign of (A3-4-18) is also ambiguous. 
If d2Wt/dtd~ > 0 then the right-hand side of (A3-4-17) 
is negative. The more negative the term d2Q/dtd~ becomes, 
the less positive is d2Wt/dtd~ and hence the less negative 
is the right-hand side of (A3-4-17). Therefore, using 
(A3-4-17), S > 0 if d2Q/dtd~ is sufficiently negative. As 
in previous cases the relative sizes of d2Q/dtd~ and dQld~ 
are also important. An increase in the absolute magnitude 
of dQ/d~ increases the negativeness of the right-hand side 
of (A3-4-17) and thus reduces the likelihood that S > 0 for 
any given value of d2Q/dtd~. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REGULATION OF A COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE: 
THE OPEN-ACCESS FISHERY* 
4 1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two, a partial equilibrium model of regu-
lation for the case of a competitive negative-externality 
ing industry was derived. The concept of a regulated 
ibrium was defined and illustrated using the examples 
of an output quota and a unit rate sales tax. In each case 
the regulatory instrument was enforced by means of an 
expected monetary penalty. The analysis also examined the 
effects on a regulated equilibrium of changes in the s 
of the regulatory instrument and in the level of enforce-
ment. In Chapter Three the characteristics of the regu-
lated equilibrium that emerges from all possible regulated 
equilibria, which comprise the form and level of the 
regulatory instrument used, the regulated equilibrium out-
put level, and the amount of enforcement, were shown to 
depend on the objectives of the regulator. In principle 
then, it is possible to infer a regulator's objectives 
from the observable characteristics of a regulated equili-
brium. It was shown that the most differentiated 
behaviour emerges over the use of output quota as a regu-
latory instrument. Here the model is appl to the 
problem of the regulatory control of a common property 
externality. 
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The common property externality is a long recognised 
phenomenon in economics and has been frequently cited as 
one of the prime cases of apparent market failure. A 
\videly used example of this phenomenon, particularly in the 
historical literature, is that of the open-field agricul-
tural system found in pre-feudal Europe. This is the 
traditional "tragedy of the commons" problem in which, 
because prlvate returns to herd expansion exceed private 
costs, but not social costs, overgrazing occurs [Hardin, 
1968; 1244J. 
Several writers have questioned the appropriateness 
of the open-field or common as an example of market failure. 
Dahlman [1980] states that the commons were mainly res-
trlcted to non-arable land over which the community as a 
whole exerclsed usage rights and excluded entry by outsiders. 
Runge [1981] argues that this communal nature of resource 
ownershlp affects the inf~rences that can be drawn and con-
trasts It with the lications for resource use and allo-
catlon whlch result from open-access. 
Under joint ownership and control, individual 
choices are influenced by expectations of the actions of 
other agents and thus the externality is nons le 
[Runge, 1981; 599]. W h a non-separable externality, 
individual marginal cost functions are affected by the 
actions of all other agents so that the game theoretic 
Pareto inferior equilibrium, which characterises the 
prisoners' dilemma where externalities are separable, is 
possible but no longer the dominant strategy_ He then 
suggests that common property externalities may be viewed 
299. 
as an assurance problem with interdependent choices forming 
a cooperative game where "it is in the interest of each 
(agent) to restrict output if that is the only way to 
get other agents to do likewise." [Runge, 1981; 600]. From 
this approach the operation of commercial agriculture is 
identical in structure to a cartel. The cooperative nature 
of the game in no way obviates the need for internal 
enforcement as each individual agent still has an incentive 
to overgraze unless the private cost to him of so doing is 
greater than the private benefit. 
Dahlman [1980] in analysing the emergence of the 
open-field system within a property rights framework 
alludes to this point. A property right lS a method of 
lnternalizing an externality and confers on its holder the 
abllity to exercise certain rights over a resource, the 
most irnpor'cant of which being the right to exclude. As 
Coase [1960] originally argued, externalities can be 
accounted for by the market provided that the transactions 
costs of doing so are not prohibitive. Installing and 
malntaining a regime of property rights incurs these trans-
actions costs and thus may not occur under market condi-
tions. Dahlman suggests that transactions costs in pre-
feudal non-arable agriculture were such as to facilitate 
the emergence and retention of communal property rights 
over open fields and prohibit the formation of private 
property rights. 
If transactions costs are such as to prevent any 
form of property right over a resource,or the community of 
agents is arbitrarily large, then there is said to exist 
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open-access to the resource in the context of unrestricted 
entry to resource use. In this case, the externality is 
separable, lndividual agent strategy is strictly dominant 
and,as Cheung [1970] derives, over-exploitation of the 
resource, at least in the economic sense, is inevitable. 
It is with this open-access situation, where resource-use 
and allocation inefficiencies exist, that the present 
chapter is concerned. The specific example used is that 
of an open-access fishery. Before the characteristics of 
open-access equilibrium are derived in Section 4-3, a brief 
reVlew of the literature on the economics of fisheries is 
presented in the following section. 
~-2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Much has been written in the area of fishery econo-
mlCS stemmlng mainly from the seminal paper by Gordon 
[1954 1 In which he illustrates the intramarginal dissipa-
tlon of rent between fishing grounds and presents a model 
of the 'bionomics' of a fishery. The literature separates 
into two broad approaches. Gordon's work, and that follow-
ing directly from it, employs a steady-state analysis in 
which the dynamics of the emergence of, and transition 
between, various equilibria are not explicitly considered. 
The papers which stem from Scott [1955], however, emphasize 
these aspects of the problem, examining the implications of 
time, and elaborate models of population dynamics, for the 
optimal management of the fishery. 
Christy and Scott [1965] reformulate Gordon's 
analysis to show diagrammatically the economic interpreta-
tion of overfishing and give comparative static results of 
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parameter changes. They also show that the biological 
concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is not an econo-
mically efficient point for the fishery to operate at as 
the marginal return to input factors at this point is zero. 
Smith [1966] however criticises this result for 
being dependent on the assumptions made about costs and 
argues that the form of the cost and revenue functions is 
not consistent with the optimizations used. In particular 
he shows that with a cost of extraction function independ-
ent of population size, which he asserts is the author's 
assumption, the optimum for a sole owner occurs at the MSY 
while with a fixed output price, free entry ensures that, 
if fishing is profitable at all, entry occurs until the 
fishery is exhausted. These results do not arise if the 
cost function is modified to allow for the likelihood that 
the costs of extraction increase as the population 
declines. 
Turvey [1964] also uses steady-state analysis but 
relaxes the assumption of perfectly elastic demand 
employed in the other models and argues th~t the optimal 
harvest amount must account for consumer surplus in addi-
tion to rent yielded by the resource. Copes [1970] 
extends this analysis and derives a long-run supply curve 
for the fishery from factor cost and stock/yield relation-
ships. This allows the problem to be formulated in 
familiar supply/demand terms and provides a useful frame-
work in which to consider regulatory problems and 
objectives. 
The majority of these analyses are conducted at the 
industry level but Anderson [1976] demonstrates the 
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incentive linkages that exist for the individual firm and 
how their responses are incorporated into the industry 
results. Anderson [1977] also provides a broad overview 
of this branch of the literature producing further compara-
tive statlc results within the Christy and Scott formula-
tion and discussing the implications of time and discount-
lng for the static optima. 
Consideration of time allows for a more explicit 
examinatlon of the dynamics of the system. Scott [1955] 
in an early revision of Gordon includes a discussion on 
the lmplications of short-run and long-run time horizons 
for declsions made about fishery management. In the long-
run case, the optimal policy objective is shown to be 
that output level which maximizes the net present value of 
the stream of factor returns to the fishery given the 
approprlate discount rate. 
Current extraction affects current stock levels, 
populatlon growth, future stock levels and hence future 
extractlon possibilities. Viewed in this manner, the fish 
population is analogous to a capital stock and thus 
capital theory may be applied to the analysis of optimal 
extraction. A reduction in current harvest which boosts 
population growth is then an investment activity. 
These models [Clark and Munro, 1982; Quirk and 
Smith, 1970] employ sophisticated optimal control and 
dynamic programming techniques. In a simple linear control 
model, optimal extraction is characterized by the equiva-
lent of the familiar "golden rule" where the own rate of 
return to the fish stock, consisting of its marginal 
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physical product at the current stock level together with 
the marginal stock effect of harvest, equates with the 
social discount rate [Clark and Munro; 37-38]. They must 
also of necessity consider the complicated dynamics of the 
stock/yield relationships. Smith [1968, 1969] illustrates 
these properties giving conditions for the stability of the 
system and for the emergence of steady-state sustainable 
equilibria. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, the 
fishery is assumed to exhibit stability and thus the steady-
state approach is used. While dynamic properties are 
lmportant in a model of renewable natural resources, the 
steady-state assumptions simplify the analysis and facili-
tate a clear comparison of differing regulatory objectives. 
Leavlng aside complications such as "mesh" externa-
litles caused by different net mesh sizes affecting the 
age structure of the population and "crowding" externalities 
resultlng from vessel congestion in a concentrated fishing 
ground [Smith, 1969; 181], the essential feature of the 
fishery is the stock externality which results from the 
stock/yield relationship. A fish taken at the margin alters 
stock size present and future, as demonstrated below, caus-
ing an external diseconomy to other input factors involved 
in the industry. This is the essence of the traditional 
tragedy of the commons argument and reflects a divergence 
between individual and collective marginal costs. 
The following section presents the simple population 
dynamics of a fishery as contained in the literature cited 
above. These, when combined with demand conditions and 
304. 
production costs, generate the unregulated competitive 
equilibrium in the open-access fishery. This equilibrium 
is derived and its properties examined. 
~-3 EQUILIBRIUM IN AN OPEN-ACCESS FISHERY 
Within the fishery at any point in time there is a 
fish stock or population size denoted by S. S == dS/dt is 
the change in stock size over time. As with any natural 
population, additions to the stock occur through births 
while reductions follow from mortality. The difference 
between these two figures gives the net growth in population 
(G) WhiCh is assumed to be a function of stock size with 
the following properties: 
(4-]-1) G == g(S) g(O) == g(S) == 0, S > 0; 
gl(O) > 0, gl(S) < 0, g"(S) < 0 
The possibility of a positive minimum population 
survivability threshold is precluded by the assumption 
g(O) = O. There is however a maximum biologically sustain-
able population S > 0 such that g(S) == 0 also. For posi-
tive stock levels between these two bounds, growth is 
positive and variable. At small stock levels, net popula-
tion growth increases with stock size while at larger 
levels, growth is positive but decreasing. This is because 
mortality rises more quickly than births [Smith, 1966; 1342] 
and therefore g"(S) < O. Consequently, there is a certain 
stock level sO such that net population growth is maxi-
o 
mized and gl(S ) == O. This is the population level that 
biologists refer to as that of maximum sustainable yield. 
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The growth function then has an inverted IU' shape as shown 
in Figure 4-3-1 below. 
Figure 4-3-1: 
9(S),F(L,S)I· 
8=0 
Sustainable yield curve 
.- - - - - - - - - - =-,.;:-:::..-=-........ --
-- -'- - -- - - - - - --
o 
S 
This function g(S) gives the change in population 
under natural conditions. The introduction of fishing 
S 
activity,however,also impacts on stock size. The economy 
is assumed to have labour as its single variable factor of 
production. The amount of fish caught (X) is a function of 
labour employed in the fishing industry and the size of the 
fish stock. Thus 
(4-3-2) X F(L,8) : FL > 0, FLL < 0, F8 > 0 F(L,O) o 
The change in the fish population in any period is 
given by the difference between the natural population 
growth and the fish harvest in that period. 
(4-3-3) S = g(8) - F(L,8) 
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As mentioned above, the analysis here is confined to 
the ste state case where S = 0 and the stock size is 
constant over time. In the steady-state therefore, using 
(4-3-3) 
(4-3-4) F( L, S) I . g(S) X(S) 
Is o 
The steady-state catch as a function of stock s e then is 
also shown by the inverted 'U' curve in F 4 3-1 above. 
The catch function as defined in (4-3 2) exhibits 
dimlnishing returns to labour, given a f stock level, 
and lS affected parametrically by changes in stock size. 
Hence for a given amount of labour, L, an increase in the 
~ish stock increases the size of the technologically 
rcaslble catch. This is illustrated in Figure 4-3-2 where 
(4-3-4) 
x 
F(L,S2)----
F(L,S3)------
F(L,S4) 
o 
F(L,S.) > F(L, S. 1) 
1 l+ 
L 
i 1,2,3- S. > S. 1 
' 1 l+ 
F (L, S1) 
F( L, S2) 
F( L, S3) 
L 
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The catch functions in Figure 4-3-2 illustrate tech-
nical possibilities but do not account for biological 
feasibility. They are short-run production functions 
which can be related to sustainable yields through the 
information contained in Figure 4-3-1. Each of the stock 
sizes, Sl"'. ,S4' has a corresponding sustainable yield of 
amount g( Sl)'···· .g( S4)· Figures 4-3-1 and 4-3-2 can then 
be combined to give a relationship between sustainable 
yield and the labour employed in the fishery shown in 
Figure 4-3-3 below. 
figure 4-3-3: Sustainable Harvest Function 
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The production function F(L,SO) in Figure 4-3-3 
corresponds to the MSY stock Slze. Following Figure 4-3-1 
and using (~-3-4) there is a steady-state harvest size X ° 
S 
assoclated wlth this stock level. Point 'A' then shows the 
technically efficient labour input, LO, required for the 
° steady-state catch level X ° = g(S ). S Figure 4-3-1 also 
demonstrates that there are two stock sizes which generate 
any smaller, strictly positive, sustainable yield. For 
example, stock sizes Sl and S2 both produce a steady-state 
catch of Xs 
1 
Xs with Sl and S2· 
2 
Given the respective 
short-run production functions,however, these catches are 
technlcally consistent with different factor input levels 
L1 < L2 · This is shown by points Band C in Figure 4-3-3. 
The dynamics of the relationship between short-run 
catches and steady-state yields can also be seen from this 
diagram. From an initial steady-state equilibrium at point 
B, wlth stock level S2 and labour input L2 , assume that 
labour input to the fishery is reduced to level L1 . From 
the short-run production function, this implies a smaller 
catch Slze associated with point D. The reduced catch 
allows greater net population growth and increases stock 
levels until point C is attained where the stock size Sl 
is such as to produce a sustained catch level technically 
consistent with the labour input L 1 .
1 
Much analysis has been based on this sustainable 
yield curve OCAB or its revenue equivalent. Under the 
fixed demand price assumption the sustainable revenue curve 
has the same shape as that in Figure 4-3-3 [Christy and 
Scott, 1965; 7J. With a negatively sloped linear demand 
curve, its shape depends on whether the maximum sustainable 
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yield X 0 lS greater than or less than the 
S 
ity at 
which demand lS unitary price elastic. If greater than, 
the possibility of multiple equilibria further complicates 
the results (Anderson, 1977; 82]. 
This sustainable revenue curve, when combined with 
the industry cost curve, which is usually taken to be 
linear by the assumption of constant long-run marginal cost, 
shows that open access leads to over-exploitation of the 
resource. This overfishing may be in the economic sense, 
\vhere product factors are invested to the extent that 
zero resource rent is yielded, and/or in the biological 
sense wlth respect to the maximum sustainable yield 
[Chrlsty and Scott, 1965; 8]. Figure 4-3-4 below illus-
trates the situation. 
C( L) 
I 
A ---- .... ----~- .. 
o 
F G B H L 
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Curve OCEH shows sustainable revenue RS as a function 
of labour input to the fishery. The open-access competitive 
equilibrium occurs at E with a total labour input of 
OB > OG where OG is the technically efficient amount of 
labour requ~red to harvest the MSY. At E, total revenue 
and total cost are equal at level OA and hence no surplus 
is generated in the fishery.2 
The open-access equilibrium at E contrasted with 
po~nt C. At C, marginal revenue and marginal cost are 
equated and resource rent is maximized at CD. is the 
po~nt that would be chosen by a sole owner of the fishery 
and can be achieved by restricting labour input to OF. 
A more interesting analysis, which permits a direct 
compar~son of results from output and input restrictions, 
uses the sustainable yield curve from Figure 4 3 3 in a 
four quadrant diagram to derive a total cost curve [Copes, 
1970; 70J. This is derived in Figure 4-3 5 overleaf. 
Quadrant two shows total factor cost in relation to 
factor inputs. Assuming competitive factor markets, incre-
ments to total factor cost represent marginal opportunity 
costs of the factors in alternative uses. It is variously 
shown as linear [Anderson, 1977~ 81] or, as in this case, 
a continuously increasing function (Copes, 1970; 70]. The 
sustainable yield curve from Figure 4 3 3 is shown in 
quadrant four. Combining these gives the total cost of 
output in quadrant one. The derivation of this relation-
ship is as follows. 
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Figure 4-3-5: Sustainable total cost curve 
Total factor cost 
c 
Derived total cost 
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I 
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L1 
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Sustainable yield 
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Point A in quadrant fou~ is associated with stock 
level Sl' From Figure 4-3-3 this gives a sustainable 
harvest of X which requires L1 units of labour to produce. 
Sl 
The total cost of this is shown as c 1 by point E on the 
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total factor-cost function which in turn gives point H on 
the derived total output-cost function in quadrant one. An 
increase in labour input to F raises total input costs to 
cO. Here the labour input LO is consistent with a smaller 
population size sO which generates the MSY of X ° giving 
S 
point J in quadrant one. Further increases in labour 
inputs act to increase costs but decrease sustainable out-
put leading to a situation such as points G, 0 and K. 
From the derived total cost function, marginal and average 
cost curves can be found. Average cost rises throughout 
lrrespective of whether the total factor cost function is 
linear or increasing because of the steady-state stock/ 
Yleld relationship while marginal cost is positive and 
~bove It until the MSY output level. 
Quadrant one in Figure 4-3-5 shows that each catch 
level other than the MSY is associated with two distinct 
levels of total cost and hence with two levels of average 
cost also. This produces a backward-bending average cost 
curve which is shown in Figure 4-3-6 overleaf. 
Under open-access fishing, competition ensures that 
factors enter the industry until the marginal opportunity 
cost of production equals the market price and no rent is 
yielded from the resource. Long-run competitive equili-
brium output then occurs where long-run average cost is 
equated with the market price. As output prlce changes, 
the long-run average cost curve in Figure 4-3-6 traces out 
the long-run, or steady-state, supply curve for the open-
access fishery. The dynamics which generate this long-run 
supply curve are similar to those underlying Figure 4-3-3 
Figure 4-3-6: 
MC,AC 
Steady-state supply curve 
AC MC r 
I 
I 
MSY 
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Q 
and follow from the impact of stock changes on harvesting 
costs [Dnes, 1985; 163-164]. 
Beginning from an equilibrium position at point A, 
the possibility of economic profits resulting from a price 
rise to Pl,induces entry. Of itself, this would move the 
fishery to point B on the short-run marginal cost curve. 
This point,however,corresponds to a catch level greater 
than the sustainable yield and the resultant population 
effects act to increase average fishing costs. This pro-
cess continues until a new zero profit steady-state equili-
brium is reached at E where the stock size and extraction 
costs are consistent with the new price level. 
314. 
The upward sloping dashed line in Figure 4 3 6 repre-
sents long run marginal cost. As shown, this is well 
defined f r the upward sloping segment of the supply curve 
however lt becomes undefined at the MSY and for 
the backward sloping portion of the curve. 
This backward sloping nature of the supply curve 
raises the possibility of multiple equilibria if confronted 
by a negatively sloped linear demand curve. The stability 
and dynamlcs of these various equilibria under conditions 
of statlc and changing demand are analysed in Copes [1970: 
72 75], For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed 
, 
that conditlons are such as to exclude multiple equilibria. 
Wlthin the context of this model Copes [1972; 146 
1491 derlves socially optimal levels of output for downward 
sloplng and perfectly elastic demand curves. Depending on 
the lnltlal position, these may suggest an expansion of 
output from the open access equilibrium level, but they 
necessarl involve a reduction in factor input to the 
fishery. 
Superimposing a downward sloping demand or average 
revenue function and its corresponding marginal curve on 
the long-run average and marginal cost curves from Figure 
4-3 6 allows this derivation. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4-3 7 overleaf. 
Initially it is assumed that the intersection of 
supply and demand occurs on the upward sloping segment of 
the supply curve. This point shows the open-access 
competitive equ ibrium where price equals average cost and 
the resource Ids zero rent, market revenue being fully 
absorbed by tion costs. 
p 
A 
B 
N r 
I 
I 
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I 
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J 
o 
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Fi 4-3-7: C librium 
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The consumer surplus of AE F provides a net social 
c 
benefit from the fishery but the output level of Q at 
c 
point E represents an overinvestment in fishing activity 
c 
in terms of the maximization of social welfare. The demand 
curve represents the marginal soc revenue from fishery 
output and, in the absence of any d ity between private 
and social opportunity costs of labour, the marginal cost 
curve also shows marginal soc costs. 
The socially optimal output from the fishery is then 
6 which corresponds to E where marginal social revenue and 
marginal social cost are equated. involves a reduction 
316. 
in output of Q units and an increase in market price 
which creates a d gence between market revenue and pro-
duction cost. This amount of NEHG accrues to the resource 
in the form of rent and may be appropriated in a number of 
\'lays. The change ~n market price reduces consumer surplus 
by NEE F but this ~s outweighed by the increase in rent, 
c 
the soc~al 0 imum being the quantity where the sum of the 
two is maximized. 
The remaining point EM represents the optimal output 
level for a sin resource owner or producers' monopoly. 
At th~s po~nt, marginal revenue equals marginal cost and 
resource rent is maximized at amount BVKJ. 
Copes further modifies this model to allow for 
d~fferences ~n opportunity costs between intramarginal 
factor ~nputs. This creates a distinction between private 
and soc~al costs. "Social" average and marginal cost 
curves are constructed by subtracting out the producer sur-
plus from the market curves. This separates the objectives 
of producers and resource owners, and enables the deriva-
t~on of optlmal output levels for differing interest groups 
[Copes, 1972; 154 159]. Assuming no such divergences, 
Figure 4 3-7 shows the equilibrium and/or optimal output 
levels which correspond to various market structures as 
derived above. 
4-4 THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON AN OPEN-ACCESS FISHERY 
Beginning from the competitive open-access equili 
brium at E in F 
c 
4-3 7, in a world of costless regu-
lation and complete compliance, either of the remain 
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A 
two points, E and EM' can be attained by an appropriate 
regime of taxes and/or quotas, the exact m nding on 
the incentives of the agents and regulator invo 
[Anderson, 1977; Clark, 1982; Scott and Sout , 1970]. 
The informational requirements of a tax and a quota are 
essential the same in all cases [Mirman and r, 1985; 
732, and Weitzman, 1974; 478] and a tax and tradeable 
output quota which both achieve any given regulated equili-
brium output level are identical in terms of economic 
efficiency [Clark, 1982; 283]. 
Regulation in practice however is neither costless 
!lOr mer~ts perfect compliance. Compliance occurs only as 
a result of a rational decision concerning the private 
costs and benefits of so doing. Without penalties to deter 
non-compliance, and excluding the case of monopoly owner-
ship of the resource, individual profit-maximizing beha-
v~our w~ll result in the open-access competit equilibrium 
harvest lrrespective of any regulatory measures introduced. 
The regulatory agency in deciding what controls, if any, to 
impose, must offset the costs incurred in the enforcement 
process against the benefits which are apparent in Figure 
4-3-7. 
The regulator is assumed to control both inputs to 
and outputs from the fishery by means of tradeable output 
quotas. Quotas may be issued at the industry level and 
auctioned to individual operators or given directly to 
individual f on the basis-of historical outputs and 
then traded if Indeed, all initial arbitrary 
quota assignments are equivalent on efficiency grounds 
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given tradeability and perfect capital markets. Their 
implications for income distribution, however, are not, and 
this can be an important factor in determining the method 
to be used. 
The regulatory model used here is essentially the 
same as that introduced in Chapter Two. It is assumed, at 
the aggregate level, that the regulatory agency imposes a 
quota of R units which is less than the competitive open-
access output level and remains binding on industry dec i-
sions. The quota is enforced by means of a constant unit 
rate fine levied on production in excess of individuals' 
quota holdings. Not all violations are necessarily 
detected however. The probability of detection and prose-
cution (p) is assumed to be a function of the labour 
devoted to enforcement, similar in form to production func-
tions elsewhere in the economy. Thus 
(4-4-1) p=p(L ); 
e 
pi> 0, p" < 0; p(O) = 0, p(L ) = 1 
e 
where Le is the amount of labour devoted to enforcement, 
and 
(4-4-2) o < L < L < L 
e - e 
where Le is the minimum level of enforcement which ensures 
a probability of detection of unity. It is assumed that it 
is not necessary to devote all of the economy's resources 
to enforcement activities in order to ensure that all vio-
lations are punished. The expected penalty payable at any 
level of illegal production (Q-R) is then a function of 
the unit rate fine (f) and the amount of labour devoted to 
enforcement. 
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(4-4-3) 
= EP(Q,R,f,O) =EP(k,k,f,L
e
) = 0, o < k < Q 
c 
Following the analysis of Chapters Two and Three, it is 
assumed that the fine is given in the regulator1s enabling 
statute. The regulator then controls the expected penalty 
by varying the size of its enforcement effort. 
The expected penalty shown in (4-4-3) is some con-
stant unit-rate amount which, given the value of the unit-
rate fine, is uniquely determined by the level of enforce-
ment activity. Given this expected penalty, rational 
profit-maximizing agents consider the expected costs and 
benefits of exceeding their quota and a regulated equili-
brium occurs when the supply and demand decisions of 
individual agents within the regulatory environment are 
equated. The regulated equilibrim output level (Q) is 
therefore a function of the size of the quota and the level 
of enforcement activity. This is defined for fixed values 
of some as yet unspecified parameters contained in the 
parameter vector Z. This vector contains factors such as 
the level of consumer income which affect the demand and/ 
or supply curves for the regulated product and hence alter 
the regulated equilibrium at any value of the policy 
variables. 
(4-4-4 ) 
Thus 
Q = Q(L ,R,Z) 
e 
The effect of introducing regulatory controls into the 
fishery can be determined from an examination of the pro-
perties of (4-4-4). 
Following section 2-6, the expected penalty becomes 
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an additional cost of production for any output produced by 
the industry regardless of whether or not individual 
fishermen exceed their quotas. If a quota is exceeded, the 
illegal output incurs the expected unit fine in addition to 
the normal technical costs of production. As the quota is 
tradeable, production cost for all infra-quota units is 
sim~larly affected. This increased unit cost reflects the 
minimum amount payable for illegal production or the maxi-
mum amount paid to acquire the legal right to produce and 
consequently represents the opportunity cost of any level 
at product~on in the regulated environment. 
USlng the argument of the previous paragraph, the 
uverage cost of production at every level of output rises 
by the amount of the per-unit expected penalty A. From 
( -i -4 -3 ) 
(4-4-5) A(f,L ) = f.p(L ) 
e e 
Recalling the free entry or open-access assumption, competi-
tlve equilibrium occurs when price equals average production 
costs and the industry earns zero profit. In the regulated 
envlronment therefore 
(4-4-6) p + A(f,L ) 
e 
where P is the supply price at any output given the size of 
the unit rate ed penalty and C(Q) is the cost func-
tion derived from the interaction between labour input and 
stock size which es the average cost curve in Figure 
4-3-7. 
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(1) Regulation of a "Low-Cost" Fishery 
PROPOSITION 4-4-1: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped market 
demand curve is subject to a strictly 
binding and tradeable output quota 
Proof. 
enforced by means of a constant flat-
rate per unit expected monetary penalty. 
Asssuming that the open-access equili-
brium in the unregulated environment 
occurs in the positively sloped region 
of the industry average cost curve: 
(i) An increase in enforcement, such 
(ii) 
that the expected penalty rema~ns 
binding on behaviour,3 increases 
market equilibrium price and 
reduces the regulated equilibrium 
output level of the fishery. 
A change in the size of available 
quota, such that the quota does 
not exceed the regulated equili-
brium output level consistent with 
the amount of enforcement, has no 
effect on the regulated equilibrium 
of the fishery. 
(i) The regulated equilibrium output level of the fish-
ery in (4-4-4) emerges at the price which equates 
the industry's penalty-inclusive supply with market 
demand. Thus at the regulated equilibrium 
(4 4 7) 
(4-4-8) 
(4 4-9) 
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QS(P(f,L ),L ,R} - QD{P(f,L )) = 0 
e e e 
S 
where Q represents the industry supply curve which 
corresponds to the AC curve in Figure 4 3 7 and QD 
represents the market demand curve faced by the 
. d 4 In ustry. 
Totally differentiating {4-4-7} 
ClP 
L 
e 
Holding the 
reveals that 
+ 
ClQS 
aL 
quota 
ClP 
ClL 
e 
e 
ClQS ClQD 
+ aR -ap-
constant and 
gives 
ClP 0 
aL 
e 
rearranging ( 4 4 8) 
From the right-hand side of (4-4-6), an increase in 
the level of enforcement activity raises the 
penalty-inclusive average cost of production at any 
output level. From individual profit maximizing 
behaviour, the supply price at any output level r s 
by the amount of increase in the expected penalty 
rate or alternatively supply falls at every market 
price for which it is strictly positive and hence 
a /Cl < O. Following the assumptions of the 
ition, and D ClQ /ClP < O. Using these 
results in (4 4-9) reveals that ClP/aL > 0 and there-
e 
fore an increase in enforcement, such that the 
expected penalty remains binding on behaviour, 
increases market equilibrium price. 
The regulated equilibrium of the fishery lies some-
where on the market demand curve. Multiplying (4 4 9) 
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by the price responsiveness of demand then, given 
the assumption that the demand curve ne ively 
sloped, shows that the increase in enforcement 
reduces the regulated equilibrium output of the 
fishery. 
(ii) From (4-4-6) the industry supply price is indepen-
dent of any change in the size of the output quota 
provided that the quota does not exceed the regu-
lated equilibrium output level of the fishery gener-
ated by the level of enforcement activity. Follow-
ing on therefore, from (4-4-8), holding the level of 
S 
enforcement constant, 3Q faR = 0 and neither the 
market price nor the regulated equilibrium output 
level of the fishery are affected by a change in 
available quota such that the expected penalty 
remains binding on behaviour. 
o 
Result (il of Proposition 4-4-1 demonstrates the 
deterrent effect of enforcement within the fishery and 
corresponds to the similar effect derived in Proposition 
2 6-2 in the case of the regulation of a negative-external y 
generating industry. The result here is illustrated in 
Figure 4 4 1 overleaf. 
Beginn 
brium at , a 
from the unregulated open-access equili-
policy consisting of some quota level R < Q 
c 
and an expected penalty A, which corresponds to some level 
of enforcement and given unit-rate fine and which is bind-
ing on behaviour in conjunction with the quota level R, 
introduced. The expected penalty increases the average 
cost of production at every quantity shifting the supply 
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curve vertically by the amount of the per un expected 
Q 
penalty A. The intersection of the demand curve and the 
penalty-inclusive supply curve gives a ed equilibrium 
at E1 . Market equilibrium price rises to P l and quant y 
falls to Ql' the precise effects be 
price responsiveness of the curves. 
dependent on the 
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Any change In the quota level R, such that R < Ql' 
does not affect the regulated equilibrium of the fishery 
because it leaves the marginal expected penalty unchanged. 
This is analogous to result (ii) Proposition 2-7-2. Recall-
lng that all units of output incur the additional cost of 
the expected penalty, the area OAE 1B, which corresponds to 
AKJT in Figure 2-7-1, shows the aggregate value of expected 
penalty at the regulated equilibrium output level. The 
size of the quota then determines the distribution of this 
amount between rents which accrue to quota holders and 
fines paid for illegal production. 
(2) Regulation of a "High-Cost" Fishery 
As shown in the derivation of Figure 4-3-6, there 
are two methods of producing any steady-state catch other 
than the MSY which differ in the amount of factor input 
and hence in the level of total production cost. Figure 
4-4-1 illustrates the effect of an output quota on a "low-
cost" open-access fishery. It is possible, however, that 
demand and cost conditions are such as to produce an unregu-
lated open-access equilibrium in the backward-bending por-
tion of the supply curve. 
a "high-cost" fishery. 
This case is described here as 
PROPOSITION 4-4-2: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped market 
demand curve is subject to a strictly 
binding and tradeable output quota 
enforced by means of a constant flat-
rate per unit expected monetary 
penalty. Assuming that the open-access 
Proof. 
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in the 
ment occurs in the nesatively sloped 
backward-bending portion of the indus-
try supply curve is more negative than 
that of the demand curve: 
(i) An increase in enforcement, such 
that the expected penalty remains 
bindin on behaviour 5 reduces 
market equilibrium price and 
increases the resulated equili-
brium output level of the fishery. 
Thi s until the level f 
enforcement which senerates a 
regulated equilibrium at the MSY 
is attained. 
(ii) A chanse in the amount of avail-
able quota, such that the quota 
does not exceed the regulated 
equilibrium output level consis-
tent with the amount of enforce-
lated equilibrium of the fishery. 
(i) The assumption concerning the relative slopes of the 
demand curve and the backward-bending portion of the 
industry average cost curve, which from the open-
access assumption is the long-run supply curve of 
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the fishery, is sufficient to ensure that any open-
access equilibrium which occurs on the backward-
bending ion of the supply curve is unique. 
From (4-4-9) the effect of a change in enforcement 
on the market equilibrium price is 
(4-4-10) ClP 
The assumpt of a negatively s market demand 
curve ensures that ClQD/ ClP < 0 as, by the assumption 
that open-access equilibrium occurs in the backward-
bending portion of the supply curve, is ClQS/ClP also. 
The sign of the denominator of the right-hand side 
of (4-4-10) then is not unambiguous. From the 
assumption contained in the Propos ion concerning 
the rela slopes of the supply and demand curves 
however, 
(4-4-11) d S o > 
and hence the denominator is posit 
From (4-4-6), using (4-4-1) and (4 4-5), an increase 
in enforcement increases the size of the unit rate 
expected pena and thus raises the supply price 
at any output level. Given that the supply curve 
is negatively sloped in the neighbourhood of the 
unregulated open-access equilibrium, this is equiva-
lent to a rightward shift in the supply curve at the 
given market and hence ClQS/a > O. Using 
(ii) 
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these results ln (4-4-10) reveals that 8P/8L < 0 
e 
and an increase in enforcement, such that the 
expected penalty remains binding on behaviour, 
reduces the market equilibrium price in the fishery. 
Multiplying (4-4-10) by the price responsiveness of 
demand then shows the consequent rise in the regu-
lated equilibrium output level which occurs as a 
result of the increase in enforcement. 
Given that, by assumption in the model, the quota 
does not exceed the unregulated open-access equili-
brium output level of the fishery, the expected 
penalty remains binding on behaviour for all levels 
of enforcement such that the regulated equilibrium 
occurs on the backward-bending portion of the indus-
try supply curve. This is the case until the MSY is 
attained. Hence, from (4-4-10), increases in 
enforcement reduce market equilibrium price and 
raise regulated equilibrium output until the level 
of enforcement which generates a regulated equili-
brium at the MSY is reached. 
The quota, being constrained to be no greater than 
the unregulated open-access output level, is 
strictly less than any regulated equilibrium that 
occurs on the backward portion of the supply curve. 
Given therefore that the marginal expected penalty 
is constant and independent of the quota size, it 
follows from (4-4-6) and (4-4-8) that neither the 
market equilibrium price nor the regulated equili-
brium output level are affected by a change in the 
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amount of available quota. 
o 
Result (i) of Proposition 4-4-2 is contrary to the 
deterrent effect of enforcement. The analysis of Section 
2 7 revealed that this type of result could occur with 
forms of the expected penalty which violated the concav y 
of firms' profit functions. Here the result emerges 
the dynamics of the stock/yield relationship. Beginning 
from a "high cost" open-access equilibrium, which corres 
ponds to a point such as B in Figure 4-3-3 or D in Figure 
4-3-5, the increase in penalty-inclusive production cost 
~educes the labour input to the fishery and hence reduces 
the short-~un harvest. This allows the stock level to 
build up until a new regulated equilibrium is reached at a 
h output level. Figure 4-4-2 illustrates the situa-
t ion. 
For the backward-bending portion of the supply 
curve, the corresponding marginal cost curve is negative 
apart from the vertical axis intercept at X which shows 
the cost of producing the initial (or final) unit of out-
put and is an extremely large positive amount. 6 As in the 
case of the low-cost fishery shown in Figure 4-4-1, mar-
ginal cost becomes undefined at the maximum sustainable 
ld. 
Beginning from the unregulated open-access equili-
brium at , the introduction of an output quota R, such 
that R < Qc' and some level of enforcement Lei leads to a 
vertical sh t in the industry supply curve from AC O to 
In the region where the supply curve is negatively 
P, AxCt 
A 
Pc 
P 1 
B 
o 
330. 
Fi 4-4-2: The effect of 
------------------~~--------~----~~ 
- -
-
quota on a "high-cost" open-access fishery. 
\ 
E 
c 
- - = -:. -:.. ---: = "'::. ----.--..= -=.,.--------
/ 
Q Q MSY 
c 1 
Me 
D 
Q 
331 
sloped this leads, in effect, to a rightward in the 
regulated supply curve at every price level. A new regu-
lated equilibrium is established at E10 Market pr has 
fallen from to PI and the output from the fi has 
lncrea Extending the argument, there 
is some expec penalty, shown on Figure 4-4 2 as the 
unit rate HJ, which generates a regulated equ ibrium at 
the maximum sustainable yield output level. Th regulated 
equilibrium occurs at point H in Figure 4-4 2. 
Rec ling again that all output incurs the unit rate 
expec penalty, the area OBFG, which corresponds to 
OAEIB in Figure 4-4-1, shows the aggregate size of the 
expected penalty at the regulated equilibrium output level. 
Any c in the amount of available quota serves to re-
distribute this amount between rents to quota ho sand 
fines id for illegal production. Given the assumption 
that the quota does not exceed Q , fine payments at any 
c 
regulated equilibrium output level such as Q1 will be 
strictly positive. 
Proposition 4-4-2 and Figure 4 4 2 apply to the 
regulation, by enforced output quota, of a "high-cost" 
open-access fishery. Further increases in enforcement, 
beyond the level which generates a regulated equilibrium at 
the MSY, produce regulated equilibr on the upward-sloping 
portion of the penalty-inclusive indus supply curve. 
Here the analysis of Proposition 4-4-1 and Figure 4-4-1 
appl s. 
Section 4-4 has derived the concept of a regulated 
equilibrium in an open-access fishery subject to an output 
quota enforced by means of a constant unit-rate expected 
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monetary penalty and examined the effect of changes in 
latory pol y on this equilibrium. In the following sec 
tions the analysis examines the characteristics of optimal 
regulatory policy under differing assumptions concerning the 
object s of the regulator. 
Following Chapter Three, two regulatory hypotheses 
are tre ; the Naive Public Interest (NPIT) hypothes 
and Capture Theory (CT) approach. It assumed that 
NPIT regulator seeks to maximize social wel whereas 
CT regulator acts so as to maximize industry profits. 
In a world of costless regulation and perfect compliance a 
~PIT regulator would operate the fishery at E in Figure 
~ 3 7 while a CT regulator would restrict output to the 
pure monopoly level QM" As earlier stated, however, regu-
latlon is not costless and neither is compliance complete. 
The regulator must therefore compare costs and f s in 
determining its optimal regulatory policy. 
4-5 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REGULATOR: NPIT REGULATION 
The necessity for enforcement of a regulation ensures 
that there is a resource cost (w) associated with control-
ling the output of the fishery. Following 3 2 2, this is 
given as 
(4 5-1) W :::: W(L ) 
e 
W(O) = 0 I wl(L}> 0, W"( ) > 0 
e 
The marginal resource cost is positive and slng 
in the level of enforcement activity. It is assumed that 
this resource cost is funded by a poll tax of some form, the 
contributors to which are as yet unspeci Any fine pay-
ments incurred by the industry, or rents which accrue to 
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quota holders, represent transfer payments within the 
economy and, as such, are irrelevant to the decisions of 
the NPIT regulator. The marginal cost curve Me in Figure 
4-3-7 then represents social marginal cost in a regulated 
"low-cost" fishery and is used to determine the NPIT-
optimal regulatory policy. 
The analysis of the costs and benefits of regulation 
lS based on an examination of its effects on consumer and 
producer surplus as defined in the Marshallian tradition. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4-5-1 in the case of NPIT 
regulation of a "low-cost" fishery. 
Beginning from the unregulated open-access equili-
brium point E , a policy consisting of a quota R < Q and 
c c 
an expected per unit penalty of ~ is introduced. This 
expected penalty increases the average cost of production 
at every quantity, shifting the supply curve vertically by 
the amount .\. The intersection of the demand curve and the 
penalty-inclusive supply curve produces a regulated equili-
brium at a point such as El , the precise effect on price 
and quantity being dependent on the price elasticities of 
the curves. 
At Ec' consumers enjoy a surplus of amount AEcK 
while producers earn profits of OKI on early units but 
suffer losses of IFE on subsequent units. 
c 
These amounts 
of producer surplus exactly offset each other by the open-
access assumption of zero profit. The shift to E1 reduces 
consumer surplus to AE1B and increases producer surplus to 
OBJ - JGE 1 , resulting in a net welfare gain of the shaded 
This aggregate welfare gain in restricting 
output from Q
c 
to Ql must be compared with the aggregate 
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Figure 4-5-1: NPIT Regulation of a "low-cost" 
open-access fishery 
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enforcement cost necessary to achieve the change in output. 
(l) Optimal Policy in a "Low-Cost" Fishery 
The aim of NPIT regulation therefore is to recover 
lost potential aggregate surplus by reducing output from 
its unregulated open-access level. This is given in 
( 4 - 5 - 2) below. 
(4-5-2) Maximize 
L ,R 
e 
Q(L ,R,Z) 
e 
f [h(Q,Y) 
Q 
c 
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subject to R < Q 
- c 
where the restriction R < Q corresponds to the assumption 
- c 
from Chapters Two and Three that the quota is binding on 
behaviour. 
The integral term in (4-5-2) represents the amount 
of recovered potential surplus where 
(4-5-3) h(Q,Y) ; hI < 0, h2 > 0 
is the inverse market demand function, and 
(4-5-4 ) 
is the industry marginal cost curve for a "low-cost" fish-
ery. The parameter Y in (4-5-3) represents the level of 
aggregate consumer income, the condition h2 > 0 reflecting 
the assumption that the output of the fishery is a normal 
good. The parameter ¢ in (4-5-4) represents some factor 
which increases marginal cost at any output level. Finally, 
the term w(L ) is the resource cost of enforcement as 
e 
defined in (4-5-1). 
Following the assumptions contained in (4-5-1), 
(4-5-3) and (4-5-4), and the results of Proposition 4-4-1, 
the NPIT regulator1s objective function in (4-5-2) is con-
cave. The first-order conditions of (4-5-2) then provide 
a maximum. Differentiating (4-5-2) gives 
(4 5-5) 
and 
(4 5 6) 
- WI (L*) < 0 
e 
= [h (Q (L* ,R* ,Z), Y) 
e 
< 0 
< only L* :=: 0 
e 
i < only if R* = 0 
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The simultaneous solution of (4-5-5) and (4- 6) 
gives the NPIT-optimal levels of enforcement and quota, 
L* and R* respectively. Using (4-4-4) this gives the 
e 
NPIT-optimal regulated equilibrium Q* for fixed values of 
the parameters contained in the parameter vector Z where 
(4 5-7) Q* = Q(L~,R*,Z) 
LEMMA 4 1: Suppose that an open-access fishery which 
------
faces a negatively sloped market demand 
curve is subject to a binding output quota 
enforced means of a constant flat rate 
per unit expected penalty which is binding 
on behaviour. At the NPIT-optimal regulated 
t level the demand 
cost. 
Proof. 
The f condition (4-5-5) shows that, at any 
non-zero 1 enforcement which is optimal for the NPIT 
regulator, aVR / = O. Given the assumption that the 
e 
marginal expected penalty is binding on behaviour, then,by 
Proposition 4 1, dQ/dL
e 
< O. From (4-5-1), the marginal 
resource cost of any non-zero level of enforcement is 
positive and therefore w' (L*) > O. 
e 
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Using these results on 
the signs of the component terms of (4-5-5), it is necessary 
for 3V /dL* = 0 that R e 
e 
(4-5-8) h(Q(L*,R*,Z),Y) - C1 (Q(L*,R*,Z),¢) < 0 e e 
and thus any regulated equilibrium which involves less out-
put than the unregulated open-access level, and which is 
optimal for the NPIT regulator, occurs at an output level 
such that marginal production cost exceeds the demand 
price. 
Alternatively, if no enforcement is optimal for the 
~PIT regulator, the regulated equilibrium will coincide 
with the unregulated open-access equilibrium. Given the 
assumption that the open-access output level is socially 
excesslve, condition (4-5-8) holds in this case also. The 
NPIT-optimal regulated equilibrium therefore always occurs 
at an output level where marginal production cost exceeds 
the demand price. 
o 
PROPOSITION 4-5-1: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped market 
demand curve is subject to a binding 
output quota enforced by means of a 
constant flat rate per unit expected 
penalty that is binding on behaviour. 
Assuming that it is optimal for a NPIT 
regulator to enforce the quota; 
(i) NPIT-optimal enforcement occurs 
where the marginal social benefit 
of enforcement is equal to its 
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marginal social cost. It is not 
optimal for the NPIT regulator to 
restrict output to the first-best 
socially-optimal level. 
(ii) Any quota level that does not 
exceed the regulated equilibrium 
output level consistent with the 
NPIT-optimal amount of enforce-
ment, as determined in part (i) 
of the Proposition, is optimal for 
the NPIT regulator. 
Proof. 
(i) The result follows from (4-5-5) and Lemma 4-5-1. 
Using Lemma 4-5-1, the bracketed term [h(.)-C 1 (.)] 
In (4-5-5) shows the unit loss in aggregate surplus 
at any output level in the relevant range. Multi-
plying by the term aQ/aL , which by Proposition 
e 
4-4-1 is negative, gives the value of potential aggre-
gate surplus that is recovered. This represents the 
marginal social benefit of enforcement. 
The remaining term in (4-5-5) is w' (L*). 
e 
This is 
the marginal resource cost of enforcement which, 
following (4-5-1), is positive. Given that other 
'costs' associated with enforcement, such as fine 
payments and quota rentals, are transfer payments 
within the economy, the marginal resource cost repre-
sents the marginal social cost of enforcement. 
Given that the first-order condition (4-5-5) 
requires that aVR laLe = 0 at any non-zero NPIT-
e 
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optimal enforcement level, the above discussion 
shows that the NPIT-optimal enforcement level occurs 
when the marginal social benefit and marginal social 
cost of enforcement are equated. 
At the first-best socially optimal output level of 
the fishery, shown by 6 in Figure 4-5-1, demand 
price and marginal production cost are equal. From 
Lemma 4-5-1 this output level is not optimal for a 
NPIT regulator given the existence of a positive 
marginal resource cost of enforcement. Given that 
the demand price falls with output and that the mar-
ginal cost of production increases with output, the 
NPIT-optimal regulated equilibrium output level, by 
Lemma 4-5-1, occurs at some Q > 6. 
(ii) Following Proposition 4-4-1, with a constant flat 
rate per unit expected penalty, the marginal 
expected penalty with respect to output, and hence 
the regulated equilibrium output level of the fish-
ery, is unaffected by any change in quota such that 
the quota does not exceed the regulated equilibrium 
output level consistent with the amount of enforce-
menta Thus dQ/dR = 0 and, from (4-5-6), any output 
quota, which does not exceed the regulated equili-
brium output level generated by the NPIT-optimal 
amount of enforcement as determined in part (i) of 
the Proposition, is optimal for the NPIT regulator. 
Following Proposition 4-5-1 and Lemma 4-5-1, and 
assuming that it is optimal for the NPIT regulator to 
o 
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control the industry, the NPIT-optimal regulated equilibrium 
Q*, using (4-5-7), occurs at some intermediate output level 
A (4-5-9) Q < Q(Le*,R*,z) < Q
c 
i Le* > 0, 0 < R* < Q(L* R* Z) 
- e" 
which is generated by a unique optimal amount of enforce-
ment coupled with any quota that is binding on behaviour. 
(2) Policy Responses to Parameter Changes in a 
"Low-Cost" Fishery 
The parameters contained in Z are explained in 
Appendix 4-1. The effects of parameter changes on the 
optimal values of these policy instruments, and hence on 
the NPIT-optimal regulated equilibrium itself, can be 
examined by totally differentiating the first-order condi-
tions for a maximum. Given the result from Proposition 
4-4-1 that the regulated equilibrium is unaffected by 
changes in the output quota such that the quota does not 
exceed the regulated equilibrium output level consistent 
with the amount of enforcement, and assuming that the quota 
level can be costlessly adjusted by the NPIT regulator, the 
effect of parameter changes on NPIT-optimal regulatory 
policy can be determined solely by examining the first-
order condition for enforcement. 
Totally differentiating (4-5-5) gives 
(4-5-10) 
where 
AdL* + BdR* + EdY + Fd¢ = 0 
e 
- w" (L ) 
e 
aQ F = [hI ( . ) a¢ 
(j2Q 
+ [h ( .) CI ( • ) ] aL ay 
e 
aQ aQ a 2Q 
CII ( . ) a¢ - Cl2 ( . ) ] aL + [h ( • ) -CI ( . ) ] elL a ¢ 
e e 
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The first parameter change to be considered concerns 
the level of aggregate consumer income. 
(a) The level of consumer income. 
PROPOSITION 4-5-2: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped market 
demand curve is subject to a binding 
output quota enforced by means of a 
constant flat rate per unit expected 
penalty that is binding on behaviour. 
Suppose also that, throughout the para-
meter-induced imal 
enforcement remains such 
that it does not exceed the 
equilibrium output level consistent with 
the amount of enforcement, and that the 
NPIT regulator's objective function V 
is concave in enforcement. 
As that a 
consumer income leaves the 
of the 
instruments an increase in 
income which increases demand for the 
of the fi reduces increases 
Proof. 
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the NPIT-optimal level of enforcement 
if and only if the income-induced 
increase in demand price at the in 
regulated equilibrium exceeds (is less 
than the income-induced c in the 
per unit loss of aggregate surplus on 
the marginal unit of output. 
Given the assumption that VR is concave in enforce-
e 
ment it follows that term A in (4-5-10) is negative. The 
ass ion that the quota does not exceed the regulated 
ilibrium output level consistent with the amount of 
en cement throughout the parameter-induced changes in 
enforcement implies that aQ/aR = 0 and a 2 Q/aL 3R = O. 
e 
There the term B in (4-5-10) is zero. 
Using (4 5-10) with d~ = 0 gives 
(4 5-11) 
given 
dL* 
e E > 0 
A < 
result that A < O. 
if and only if E > 0 
< 
Following Proposition 4-4-1, aQ/aL < 0 while, from 
e 
(A4 1 4), Q(.}/ay > 0 and the increase in aggregate 
income increases the regulated equilibrium of the fishery. 
The assumption that the change in income does not affect 
marg 1 productivity of enforcement means that 
a 2 Q/a 3Y = o. Using this information in (4-5-10) reveals 
that 
(4 5 12) E > 
< 
o if and only if 
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term h 2 (.) denotes, following (4-5 3), 
lncome induced change in the demand price at the in 
regula equilibrium. The term [hI (,)-Cli (,)] shows the 
unit rate of change in the difference between the demand 
pr h(.) and marginal production cost C1 (.). that, 
from Lemma 4-5-1, marginal cost exceeds the demand pr 
over 
bracke 
relevant output range, multiplying th 
term by aQ/ay gives the income-
square-
change in 
the un loss of social surplus on the marginal unit of 
output. Applying condition (4-5-12) in (4 5 11), the 
result of the Proposition clearly follows. 
The result of this Proposition is the same as that 
of part (i) of Proposition 3-3-1 as is its i tation. 
~Iult lying the terms in (4-5-12) by 'dQ/a reveals again 
o 
that the response in NPIT-optimal enforcement to the change 
income depends on the income-induced changes in the 
marg 1 benefit and marginal cost of enforcement to the 
regulator. Here, as in Proposition 3-3 1, the result can 
complicated by incorporating -induced changes in 
t marginal productivity of enforcement. 7 
The second parameter change considered concerns the 
structure of marginal production cost in the fishery. This 
is proxied by the parameter ~ which may represent the state 
of available technology or the mortality rate of the 
fishery. 
(b) The structure of marginal production cost. 
PROPOSITION 4-5-3: Under the as ions in the stem of 
--------------~~~--~----~~----------
Proposition __ , 4-5-2, a change in a 
? roo t . 
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rameter which leads to an increased 
marginal cost of production at any 
but which does not affect 
the marginal productivity of enforce-
ment reduces increases NPIT-
imal level of enforcement if 
Earameter-induced change in the margi-
nal cost of production at the initial 
regulated equilibrium is less than 
(exceeds) the parameter-induced change 
in the per unit loss of aggregate 
surplus on the marginal unit of output. 
Using (4 5 10) with dY o gives 
(4-5-13) = F .:: 0 A < if and only if 
> 
F < 0 
given the results on the component terms of (4-5 10) 
expressed in the proof of Proposition 4-5-2. 
Following Proposition 4-4-1, 3Q/8L < 0 while, from 
e 
Appendix 3-1, aQ/8~ < 0 also. The assumption that the 
change in Q s not affect the marginal productivity of 
enforcement means that 8 2 Q/8L 8$ = o. Using th 
e 
tion in (4-5 10) shows that 
(4-5-14 ) F > 0 
< 
if and only if 
informa-
The term Cl2 (.) denotes, following (4 5-4), the 
parameter-induced change in marginal production cost at 
the initial lated equilibrium. The term [hI (,)-Cll (.)] 
has the interpretation as for the proof of Proposition 4 5-2. 
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Multiplying the square-bracketed term by dQ/a~ gives the 
parameter-induced change in the unit loss of aggregate sur-
plus on the marginal unit of output. Applying condition 
(4 14) in (4 5-13), the result of the Proposition clearly 
follows. 
o 
The argument concerning the parameter ~ is exactly 
the converse of that for the change in income. An increase 
in ~ which raises marginal cost reduces the first-best 
socially-optimal output level for the fishery. This of 
itself leads to an increase in the marginal benefit of 
enforcement at any output level which exceeds Q and thus 
lows NPIT-optimal enforcement activity to be expanded. 
However, the increased cost structure also leads to a 
reduction in the regulated equilibrium output level at any 
given level of enforcement. This reduces the loss of 
aggregate surplus on the marginal unit of output and thus 
acts to reduce the marginal benefit of enforcement. As in 
1 previous cases, these two factors must be weighed 
against each other in order to determine the NPIT-optimal 
policy response. Parameter-induced changes in the marginal 
productivity of enforcement may reinforce or reverse the 
results of the Proposition depending on their sign and 
re magnitude. 
(3) Optimal Policy in a "High-Cost" Fishery 
These results concerning NPIT-optimal regulation of 
an open-access fishery pertain to the situation of a "low-
cost" fishery. In the situation of a "high-cost" fishery, 
illustrated in Figure 4 2, the NPIT regulator's objective 
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lS exactly the same as that in the "low-cost" case; namely 
to maximize aggregate surplus. Thus (4-5-2) remains the 
expression of the NPIT regulator's objective function. 
Following Proposition 4-4-2 and Figure 4-4-2,however, the 
demand price exceeds marginal cost which is negative and 
the effect of enforcement is to increase the output of the 
fishery. In this case the quota acts to reduce factor 
input into the fishery which, given the dynamics in Figure 
8 4-3-3, results In a greater harvest at lower average cost. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4-5-2 overleaf. 
At the initial competitive equilibrium output Q , 
c 
in Figure 4-5-2, consumer surplus is AE B while producer 
c 
surplus is aBE G less the initial loss of XB where X is the 
c 
vertical axis intercept of the marginal cost curve. This 
amount XB exactly offsets the area aBE G by the zero profit 
c 
assumption. Some quota R < Q is imposed. 
c 
Enforcement of 
the quota shifts the average cost curve vertically by the 
amount of the marginal expected penalty producing a regu-
lated equilibrium at El with output of Ql. Consumer surplus 
increases to amount AE1F while producers lose BEcKF and gain 
KE1JG. The net result of these changes lS an aggregate 
gain in welfare of the shaded area GEcE1J. 
In this case, the NPIT regulator's objective func-
tion, (4-5-2), is no longer necessarily concave in enforce-
ment. 9 The first term of the first-order condition (4-5-5) 
again shows the marginal benefit of enforcement. As shown 
in Figure 4-5-2, marginal cost is negative in the region 
for which the supply curve is negatively sloped. At regu-
lated equilibria Q < Q(L ,R) < MSY which occur on the 
c e 
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backward-bending portion of the industry average cost 
curve 
(4-5-15) h(Q(L ,R) ,Y) - Cl(Q(L ,R) ,¢) > 0 
e e 
This gives the per unit amount of potential aggregate sur-
plus. From Proposition 4-4-2 dQ/dL > O. 
e 
Multiplying the 
left-hand side of (4-5-15) by dQ/dL
e 
then gives the margi-
nal benefit of enforcement. From (4-5-8), the derivative 
of the marginal benefit of enforcement with respect to the 
level of enforcement is 
(4-5-16) 
Depending on the relative magnitudes of these two terms .the 
marglnal benefit of enforcement may be increasing or 
decreasing as the level of enforcement activity rises. At 
the t-1SY output level marginal production cost is undefined 
and dQ/dL = O. The marginal benefit of enforcement then 
e 
approaches some finite limit value at the level of enforce-
ment which generates a regulated equilibrium at point H In 
Figure 4-5-2 where output is at the MSY. If this limit 
value exceeds the marginal resource cost of the associated 
level of enforcement, further enforcement is optimal for 
the NPIT regulator. In this case, the regulated equilibrium 
occurs on the upward-sloping portion of the supply curve. 
NPIT-optimal regulatory policy then proceeds as for Propo-
sition 4-5-1 in the case of a "low-cost" fishery. If, how-
ever, the marginal benefit of enforcement is decreasing, 
or increasing at a slower rate than the marginal resource 
cost, it is possible that the NPIT-optimal regulated 
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equil ium occurs on the backward-bending port n of the 
industry supply curve. 
Following Proposition 4-4-2 any quota which s not 
exceed the regulated equilibrium output 1 consistent 
with t amount of enforcement does not affect the regu-
lated il ium output level. Given that, as in the case 
of a " st" fishery, the NPIT regulator is 
as to the distribution of the rental value of t 
ifferent 
quota 
between f s and rents accruing to holders of quota, any 
quota which does not exceed the regulated equ ium 
output level consistent with the NPIT-optimal 1 of 
enforcement is optimal for the NPIT regulator. 
With a quota which by assumption does not exceed the 
unregulated open-access equilibrium this condition is 
satisf d all regulated equilibria which occur on the 
backward- nding portion of the penalty-inclusive 
supply curve and for all those which occur on the upward-
sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive industry supply 
curve at output levels that exceed the unregulated open-
access equil ium output level. Given that the quota can 
be costlessly adjusted by the regulator the condition con-
tinues to hold at all regulated equilibria which occur on 
the upward-sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive indus-
try supply curve at output levels less than the unregulated 
open-access equil ium output level. 
These results are summarized in the following Propo-
sition. 
PROPOSITION 4 5-4: 
(4 ) A 
under the as 
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tions in the stem of 
sition 4-4-2 the NPl imal 
uilibrium in the case of a 
"h cost" f occur on either 
the downward-sloping or upward-sloping 
tions of the -inclusive 
industry supply curve or at MSY 
level of output. Any quota 1 which 
does not exceed the i-
brium level consistent with the 
NPlT-optimal amount of enforcement lS 
that the output quota is costlessly 
ad ustable lator the charac-
teristics of the NPI lated 
equilibrium in any particular fishery 
and its associated output vel depend 
on the levels and rates of of 
the marginal cost and marginal benefit 
of enforcement. 
ison of lation in a "Low-Cost" and 
"High-Cost" Fishery 
In the case where the NP 1 regulated equili-
brium for a "high-cost" fishery occurs in the upward-
s portion of the penalty inc Ius industry supply 
curve, the associated output level will, in general, differ 
from that which is optimal for the NPlT regulator in a 
similar "low-cost" fishery. 
PROPOSITION 4-5-5: 
Proof. 
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Suppose that two fisheries have identi-
cal cost structures but that one fishery 
is a "low-cost" fishery as for Proposi-
tion 4-4-1 while the other is a "high-
cost" fishery as for Proposition 4-4-2. 
Suppose also that at any given quantity 
the demand price in the "high-cost" 
fishery exceeds that in the "low-cost" 
fishery. 
(i) In a world of costless enforce-
ment the socially-optimal output 
level in the "high-cost" fishery 
exceeds that of the "low-cost" 
fishery. 
(ii) Suppose that enforcement is 
costly and that the NPIT-optimal 
regulated equilibrium in the 
"high-cost" fishery occurs on the 
upward-sloping portion of the 
penalty-inclusive industry supply 
curve. If the marginal product-
ivity of enforcement is similar 
in both fisheries the NPIT-
optimal regulated equilibrium out-
put level in the "high-cost" 
fishery exceeds that in the "low-
cost" fishery. 
(i) As shown, with reference to Figure 4-3-7, the 
socially-optimal output level in a world of costless 
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enforcement is that output level which equates 
marginal social revenue, or demand price, with margi~ 
nal social cost which 1n this case 1S glven by the 
private marginal cost of production. Thus, using 
(4-5-3) and (4-5-4), at the socially-optimal output 
level Q 
(4-5-17) 
Following the assumption in the Proposition concern-
lng relative demand pr1ces 
(-1-5-18) 
. HC LC 
at any given quant1ty, where h (.) and h (.) are 
the demand prices in the "high-cost" and "low-cost" 
fisheries respectively. From (4-5-17) and (4-5-18) 
therefore, at the socially-optimal output level of 
the "low-cost" 
(4-5-19) 
"LC fishery Q 
Given the assumptions of (4-5-3) and (4-5-4) concern-
ing the slopes of the demand and marginal cost func-
tions, equality between the demand price and marginal 
cost in the "high-cost" fishery is reached at some 
higher output level and thus 
(4-5-20 ) 
(ii) NPIT-optimal regulation in a world of costly enforce-
ment is determined according to the first-order con-
ditions (4-5-5) and (4-5-6). Given that the quota 
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can be costlessly adjusted to remain binding, the 
NPIT-optimal output level can be determined from 
(4-5-5) only. 
From (4-5-5) any positive level of enforcement that 
is optimal for the NPIT regulator equates the mar-
ginal benefit of enforcement with its marginal cost. 
Following Proposition 4-4-2, the attainment of a 
regulated equilibrium at the MSY 1n the "high-cost" 
fishery requires a certain level of enforcement. 
Further enforcement is necessary to generate a regu-
lated equilibrium on the upward-sloping portion of 
the penalty-inclusive supply curve. Given this, 
the amount of enforcement associated with any output 
level, such that regulated equilibrium occurs on the 
upward-sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive 
supply curve in each fishery, 1S greater for the 
"high-cost" fishery than for the "low-cost" fishery. 
Using (4-5-1) then 
(4-5-21) ::: Wi 
HC LC 
where Land L are the amounts of enforcement 
e e 
required to generate any such output level in the 
"high-cost" and "low-cost" fisheries respectively. 
Given (4-5-18) and the assumption of identical 
costs 
(4-5-22) HC h (Q(.),Y)-C 1 (Q(.),<)J) 
LC 
> h (Q(.) ,Y)-C 1 (Q(.) ,<)J) 
where, by Lemma 4-5-1, both sides of (4-5-22) are 
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negat Multiplying each side of (4 5 22) by 
their re tive marginal productivity of enforce-
ment (aQ/3 ) gives the marginal fit of enforce-
ment at the output level Q in each fishery. Given 
the assumption of similarity of marg 1 productivi-
ties, that lS, 
3Q 3Q 
(4-5-23)~LHC "" 3LLC 
e e 
where ~ denotes approximate equality, t inequality 
in (4-5-22) dominates any slightly higher marginal 
productivity that may exist in the "low-cost" case. 
At any g n quantity therefore, the marginal 
bene f 0 f enforcement in the "high-cost" fishery 
is less than that in the "low-cost lO f Given 
this and the comparison of marginal costs iri (4 5-21), 
the concavity of (4-5-2) implies that an output 
level that is imal for the NPIT regulator in the 
"low-cost" fis y necessitates the use of more 
enforcement than is NPIT-optimal in the case of a 
"high-cost" fishery. Using the result of Propos 
tion 4-4-1 that 3Q/3L < 0 when the regulated il 
e 
brium occurs on the upward-sloping portion of the 
penalty-inclus supply curve, the result 
necessarily llows. 
IJ 
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4-6 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REGULATOR: CT REGULATION 
A captured regulator is motivated by the profits of 
the regulated industry within the regulatory environment 
and thus is concerned with the distributional effects of 
its policies. As in Chapter Three, it is assumed that the 
industry is required to fund some portion (b) of the 
~esource cost of enforcement. The marginal resource cost 
to the industry of enforcement is then 
(4-6-1) bw'(L ) > 0 
e 
o < b < 1 
In addition to this the industry incurs penalty 
payments on lllegal output. Using (4-4-3) and (4-4-5) and 
ussumlng that some portion (a) of fine payments are redis-
trlbuted to the industry, this cost denoted by EP I is 
(4-6-2) EP r [l-ajA(f,L )[Q(L ,R,Z)-RIj e e O<a<l, 
\'/here R r is the iJ.moun t of available quot a (R) initially 
ullocated to members of the industry and A(f,L ), as defined 
e 
in (4-4-5), is the per unit expected penalty which is 
increasing in both the fine rate and the extent of enforce-
ment. The total cost of enforcement to the industry, 
denoted by w(Le,R I , R,a,b) is 
(4-6-3) W(Le,R1,R,a,b) 
(1) Optimal Policy in a "Low-Cost" Fishery 
Industry profits in the regulated environment are 
given by the difference between revenues and the cost of 
production together with the cost of regulation. The CT 
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regulator is assumed to maximize the value of regulated pro-
fits TI R . The CT regulator1s objective function is then 
e 
(4-6-4) Maximize TIR 
Le,R1,R e 
h(Q(L ,R,Z),Y)Q(L ,R,Z) 
e e 
- C(Q(L ,R,Z)¢)-w(L ,R1,R,a,b) 
e ' e 
LEMMA 4-6-1: Suppose that an open-access fishery which 
faces a negatively sloped market demand curve 
is subject to a binding output quota enforced 
by means of a constant flat rate per unit 
expected penalty that is binding on behaviour. 
A CT regulator ensures that all available 
quota is allocated to members of the industry. 
Proof. 
Differentiating (4-6-4) with respect to the amount 
of avallable quota allocated to members of the industry, 
(~-6-S) [l-a]\(f,L ) > 0 
e 
substltuting from (4-6-3) and (4-6-2). This shows that an 
increase in the amount of available quota allocated to 
members of the industry increases their profits in the 
regulated environment. Hence a captured regulator will 
always ensure that the maximum possible quota, that is, all 
available quota, is allocated to members of the industry 
and thus Rr = R. 
As explained in Section 4-4 the net per unit fine 
rate [l-a]\(f,L ) is the trading price of the quota. The 
e 
D 
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initial allocation of quota confers a rent upon the holder 
equal to this amount. Lemma 4-6-1 therefore shows that a 
CT regulator, in allocating any given quota, seeks to maxi-
mize the rents which accrue to members of the industry 
from the iniLial allocation of such quota. 
Given that RI = R, CT-optimal regulatory policy can 
be determined by considering enforcement and aggregate quota 
only. Differentiating (4-6-4) gives the first-order con-
ditions 
(4-6-6) 
(4-6-7) 
aL 
e 
aR 
aQ [ h 1 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + h ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -C 1 ( Q ( . ) , cjl ) ] aL 
aw 
aL 
e 
< 0 < only if L 
e 
o 
e 
aQ 
= [h 1 (Q( .),Y)Q( .)+h(Q( .),Y)-C 1 (Q( .),cjl)]a-R 
aw < 0 
a R > < only if R = 0 
-
> only if R Q(L ,R,Z) 
e 
Assumlng that (4-6-4) is concave, (4-6-5) and (4-6-6), when 
solved simultaneously, generate the CT-optimal level of 
enforcement L and quota size R. 
e 
PROPOSITION 4-6-1: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped market 
demand curve is subject to a binding 
output quota enforced by means of con-
stant flat rate per unit expected 
penalty that is binding on behaviour. 
Assuming that the unregulated open-
access equilibrium occurs on the upward 
sloping portion of the industry supply 
Proo f. 
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curve, that it is optimal for the CT 
regulator to enforce the quota, and that 
the level of the quota can be costlessly 
and instantaneously adjusted by the 
regulator; 
(i) CT-optimal enforcement occurs where 
the marginal benefit of enforcement 
to the industry is equal to its 
marginal cost to the industry. It 
is not optimal for the CT regula-
tor to restrict output to the pure 
monopoly profit maximizing level. 
(ii) The CT-optimal quota size is equal 
to the regulated equilibrium out-
put level consistent with the CT-
optimal amount of enforcement as 
determined in part (i) of the 
Proposition. 
~he result of part (ii) of the Proposition will be 
used in the proof of part (i). 
proved first. 
Part (ii) is therefore 
(ii) following part (ii) of Proposition 4-4-1, a change in 
the level of output quota, such that the quota does 
not exceed the regulated equilibrium output level con-
sistent with the amount of enforcement, leaves the 
regulated equilibrium output level unchanged. Thus 
3Q/3R = 0 and the first term on the right-hand side 
of (4-6-7) is also zero. 
From (4-6-7) using (4-6-3), (4-6-2) and Lemma 4-6-1 
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(4-6-8) 
This shows that an increase in quota such that the 
quota level does not exceed the regulated equilibrium 
output level consistent with the amount of enforce-
ment acts to increase industry profits in the regu-
lated environment. A captured regulator will there-
fore maximize the amount of available quota such that 
this condition holds. Thus the CT-optimal quota will 
be equal to the regulated equilibrium output level 
consistent with the CT-optimal amount of enforcement 
as determined in part (i) of the Proposition. 
(i) The bracketed term in (4-6-6) shows the difference 
(4-6-9) 
between marginal revenue and marginal production cost 
in the regulated environment. Given that the unregu-
lated open-access equilibrium exceeds the pure mono-
poly profit-maximizing level where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost, this term is negative in the 
output region considered. This difference between 
marginal revenue and marginal cost represents the per 
unit amount of potential monopoly profit to be rea-
lized by regulation. Multiplying this by aQ/aL
e
, 
which by Proposition 4-4-1 is negative, gives the 
marginal benefit of enforcement to the industry. 
The remaining term in (4-6-6) represents the marginal 
cost of enforcement to the industry. Following part 
(ii) of the Proposition and Lemma 4-6-1, 
~ ~ ~ - ~ 
Rr = R : R = Q(Le,R,Z) 
where Rr is the amount of available quota initially 
allocated to incumbent members of the industry. 
Given the assumption that it is institutionally 
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costless to adjust the level of available quota, and 
that any such adjustment can be instantaneously 
accomplished, profit-maximizing behaviour by the CT 
regulator ensures that (4-6-9) holds at all times. 
Using (4-6-9) in (4-6-2) shows that the expected 
penalty payments incurred by members of the industry 
are zero and hence the only cost of enforcement to 
the regulator is the resource cost as given in 
(4-6-1) . Differentiating (4-6-3) with respect to 
the level of enforcement then gives 
(4-6-10) dW dL 
e 
= bw' (L ) 
e 
> 0 
following the assumption in (4-6-1) that the margi-
nal resource cost of enforcement is positive. 
Following (4-6-6), CT-optimal enforcement occurs 
where 3TIR IdLe = o. Given the interpretations in the 
e 
preceding paragraphs, this then requires equality 
between the marginal benefit and marginal cost of 
enforcement to the industry. At the pure monopoly 
?rofit-maximizing output level, marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost and hence the first term of 
(4-6-6) is zero. Given the result of (4-6-10) that 
the marginal cost to the industry of enforcement is 
positive, it is clearly not optimal for a CT-
regulator to restrict the output of the fishery to 
the pure monopoly profit-maximizing level. 
o 
The situation of CT regulation of a "low-cost" open-
access fishery is illustrated in Figure 4-6-1 below. 
p 
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o 
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As bGfore, the initial open-access equilibrium is at 
E. The imposition of an enforced quota again shifts the 
c 
supply curve vertically by the amount of the expected 
penalty. Given that the quota is allocated entirely to 
members of the industry, the original marginal cost Curve 
can be used to analyse the costs and benefits of regulation 
to the industry. 
The quantity restriction and the resultant price 
rlse unambiguously reduces consumer surplus but that is 
irrelevant to the objective of the CT regulator. At Ec l 
the profits of OAB made on the initial units are cancelled 
out by the loss of BFJ resulting in zero profit. The reduc-
tlon in output to Q2 results in a net gain to the producers 
of the shaded area HFJG. 
(2) Policy Responses to Parameter Changes in a 
"Low-Cost" Fishery 
Following Proposition 4-6-1, the CT-optimal regu-
1ated equilibrium output level, Q = Q(L ,R,Z), occurs at 
e 
some intermediate level 
(4-6-11) - -L > 0, R 
e 
-Q 
The effects of parameter changes on the CT-optimal regu-
latory policy associated with this regulated equilibrium 
can be examined by totally differentiating the first order 
conditions (4-6-6) and (4-6-7). Totally differentiating 
(4-6-6) gives 
(4-6-12) 
where 
-ADL + BdR + EdY + Jd¢ + Sda + Tdb 
e 
o 
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A r hI ( Q ( • ) I Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( 0 ) , Y ) -c 1 ( Q ( • ) , cp ) ] 
+ [rhl1(Q(O),YlQ(o)+2hl(Q(ol,Yl-Cll(Q(o),CP)]aL ]~~ 
e e 
B [ hI ( Q ( . ) I Y 1 Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 1 ( Q ( • ) , ¢ ) 1 ~~ 
E 
J 
aQ aQ [- 1 + [ h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 hI ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 11 ( Q ( 0 ) , ¢ ) ] aR aLe 
r hI ( Q ( • ) I Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 1 ( Q ( • ) , ¢ ) l-"'--=-- azw ClL ClY 
e 
[ 
ClQ 
+ [ h 11 ( Q ( 0 ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 11 ( Q ( • ) I ¢ ) ] aY 
r h 1 ( Q ( • ) I Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( 0 ) , Y ) -c 1 (Q ( 0 ) , ¢) J-:-::--?-¢ 
S :::: -
a 
T ::::: 
and totally differentiating (4-6-7) g S, 
- -(4-6-13) MdL
e 
+ NdR + FdY + Kd¢ + Uda + Vdb = 0 
where 
M 
N 
F 
K 
u 
v 
a2 Q [h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 1 ( Q ( • ) , <jJ ) 1 a Ra L 
e 
a2 Q a2 w [h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 1 (Q ( • ) , <jJ ) 1 a R 2 - a R 2 
[ 
aQ] aQ + [ h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 hI ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 11 ( Q ( • ) , <jJ ) 1 aR aR 
a2 Q a2 w [h 1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),Y)-C 1 (Q(·),<jJ)laRay - aRay 
[ 
aQ 
+ [h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 hI ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 11 ( Q ( • ) , <jJ ) 1 aR 
1 aQ + h I2 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h 2 (Q(·),Y) aR 
a2 Q [ hI ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + h ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 1 ( Q ( • ) , <jJ) 1 a R a <jJ 
[ 
aQ 
+ [ h 11 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) Q ( • ) + 2 h 1 ( Q ( • ) , Y ) -c 11 ( Q ( • ) , <jJ ) 1 a¢ 
364. 
The preceding analysis has shown that, at any given 
vector of parameter values, it is always optimal for the CT 
regulator to set the quota equal to the regulated equili-
brium output level consistent with the optimal level of 
enforcement. In this situation no quota violations occur 
and no fines are incurred by the industry. It is not 
optimal for the regulator to enforce a quota which exceeds 
the regulated equilibrium output level consistent with the 
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level of enforcement because in that case the marginal pro-
ductivity of enforcement is zero. Neither is it optimal to 
have a quota which is smaller than the regulated equili-
brium output level consistent with the optimal level of 
enforcement for in that case the industry incurs a net loss 
of profits through the payment of fines. 
Given that the CT-optimal quota is set so that no 
violations occur, and assuming that the quota can be cost-
lessly and instantaneously adjusted by the regulator, this 
condition continues to hold in the case of parameter-
induced changes in CT-optimal regulatory policy. The 
optlmal level of enforcement then is the only freely deter-
mined policy variable while the quota level is automatically 
adjusted by the regulator to remain consistent with the 
condition required for optimality given in part (ii) of 
Proposition 4-6-1. 
The first parameter change to be considered concerns 
the level of aggregate consumer income. 
(a) The level of aggregate consumer income 
PROPOSITION 4-6-2: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped market 
demand curve is subject to a binding 
output quota enforced by means of a 
constant flat rate per unit expected 
penalty that is binding on behaviour. 
Suppose also that the unregulated open-
access equilibrium occurs on the posi-
tively sloped portion of the industry 
supply curve, that the quota, being 
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costlessly and instantaneously adjust-
equilibrium level consistent with the 
amount of enforcement so 
tion occur that the CT 
objective function TI concave in 
enforcement, and that the CT-optimal 
regulatory policy at some fixed vector 
of parameters involves strictly posi-
tive levels of enforcement and quota 
in accordance with Proposition 4-6-1. 
Assuming that a change in aggregate 
income leaves the marginal productivity 
of the regulator's policy instruments 
unchanged, an increase in aggregate 
consumer s demand 
for the output of the fishery, reduces 
(increases) the CT-optimal level of 
enforcement if the combined effect of 
the income induced increase in demand 
price and change in the price responsive-
he initial 
exceeds (is less than) the income-
induced change in the per unit loss of 
industry profit on the marginal unit of 
output. Ceteris paribus, the increase 
in income is more likely to lead to an 
increase in enforcement if it reduces 
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the price responsiveness of demand than 
if it increases it. 
Proof. 
Recalling, from part (ii) of Proposition 4-4-1, that 
a change in the level of quota, such that the quota does 
not exceed the regulated equilibrium output level consis-
tent with the amount of enforcement, leaves the regulated 
equilibrium output level unchanged so that 3Q/3R = 0, it 
follows in (4-6-12) and (4-6-13) that 3 2Q/3R3L = 3 2Q/3L 3R 
e e 
Given that the quota is continuously set at the regu-
1ated equilibrium output level so that no violations occur 
It follows from (4-6-2) and (4-6-3) that the only cost of 
enforcement to the regulator is the resource cost and 
therefore 3w/3R = 3 2w/3R3L = 3 2w/3R3Y = 3 2w/3R2= O. 
e 
When the above conditions are substituted in 
(4-6-13) the terms in M, Nand F are all zero. Therefore, 
uSlng (4-6-12) and (4-6-13) with d¢ = da = db = 0 shows 
that 
(4-6-14) 
-dL 
e 
dY"" ~ ~ 0 if and only if E ~ 0 
given that A < 0 from the concavity in enforcement of 
(4-6-4). 
Following the assumption that a change in aggregate 
consumer income does not affect the marginal productivity 
of the regulator's policy instruments, the component term 
3 2Q/3L 3y in (4-6-12) is zero. 
e 
From (4-6-12) then 
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(46-15) E [
dO [ h 11 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + 2 hI ( 0 ( . ) , Y ) -c 11 (0 ( . ) , <l> ) ] ay 
+ h 12 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + h2 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) ] d 
Rearranging (4-6-15), E ~ 0 if and only if 
(4-6-16) h I2 (Q(,),Y)Q(.)+h2 (Q(.),y):; 
dQ [ h 11 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) Q ( . ) + 2 h 1 ( Q ( . ) , Y ) -c 11 ( Q ( . ) , <l> ) ] ay 
Following Appendix 4-1, an increase in income,which 
increases demand for the output of the fishery, acts to 
lncrease the regulated equilibrium output of the fishery 
and thus dQ/dY > O. From (A4-2-3) it is assumed that 
[h11(Q(·),Y)Q(.) + 2h 1 (Q(·),Y) - C11 (Q(.),CP)} < 0 while, 
followlng (4 6-10), the marginal cost of enforcement to the 
lndustry compr s only the marginal resource cost of such 
enforcement which is unaffected by changes in the level of 
aggregate consumer income and hence d 2 W/dL dY equals zero. 
e 
Given these results, and those of previous discussion, the 
right-hand side of (4-6-16) is some positive number. 
The square bracketed term on the right-hand side of 
(4-6-16) shows the unit rate of change in the difference 
between marginal revenue and marginal cost. Given that, 
following the proof of Proposition 4-6-1, marginal revenue 
is less than marginal cost over the relevant output range, 
multiplying this square bracketed term by dQ/ay gives the 
income-induced change the unit loss of industry profit 
on the marginal unit of output. 
On the left-hand side of (4-6-16), the term 
h2 (Q(.J ,Y) denotes income-induced change in demand 
369 • 
price at the initial regulated equilibrium quantity which, 
following the assumption of the Proposition, is positive. 
As previously derived, the effect of a change in income on 
the slope of the demand curve is given by h 12 (Q(.) ,Y). If 
this term 1S negative (positive), an increase in income 
increases (reduces) the absolute value of the slope of the 
demand curve or alternatively reduces (increases)the price 
responsiveness of demand. 
Given the above results and definitions, using 
(4-6-16) in (4-6-14) reveals the validity of the Propos i-
tion. From (4-6-14), the increase in income leads to an 
increase in CT-optimal enforcement and a concomitant 
decrease In the optimal quota level if and only if F > O. 
Followlng (4-6-16) this inequality is more likely to hold 
if h 12 (Q(.),Y) < 0 than if h 12 (Q(.),Y) > O. Ceteris 
paribus, therefore, the increase in income is more likely 
to lead to an increase in the level of CT-optimal enforce-
ment if it reduces the price responsiveness of demand than 
if it increases it. 
o 
The result of this Proposition is similar to that of 
part (i) of Proposition 3-5-1 as is its interpretation. 
Recalling that a 2 wjaL ay = 0, multiplying the terms of 
e 
(4-6-16) by aQjaL reveals that the response in CT-optimal 
e 
enforcement to the change in income depends on the income-
induced changes in the marginal benefit and marginal cost 
of enforcement to the regulator. Again, the result con-
cerning the income-induced change in the price responsive-
ness of demand is motivated by the fact that the CT regu-
lator is essentially acting as a monopolist in restricting 
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output and that the less price responsive is demand, the 
greater is the scope for profitably exerc ing monopoly 
power. 
Following part (ii) of Proposition 4 6 1 the CT-
optimal quota set at the regulated equilibrium output 
level generated by the new CT-optimal level of enforcement 
at the new level of aggregate income. Of itself, as shown 
in Appendix 4-1, an increase in aggregate income increases 
the competitive equilibrium output level of a low-cost 
fishery and hence also the regulated equilibrium output 
level at any level of enforcement. If as a result of an 
increase in income it is optimal for the regulator to 
reduce enforcement activity the regulated equilibrium out-
put level unambiguously increases and hence so too does 
the CT-optimal quota to match. If, however, it is optimal 
for the regulator to increase enforcement activ y in res-
ponse to an increase in aggregate income the effect on the 
regulated equilibrium output level and hence the CT-optimal 
quota level ambiguous and depends on the precise func-
tional forms of the demand and cost curves for the fishery 
The second parameter change considered concerns the 
structure of marginal production cost in the fishery. Here, 
as in Proposition 4 5 3 for the case of NPIT regulation, 
this is proxied by the parameter ¢ which may represent the 
state of available technology or the mortality rate of the 
fishery. 
( b ) 
PROPOSITION 4-6 3: 
Proposition 4-6-2; 
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(i) A change in a parameter which leads 
to an increased marginal cost of 
production at any output level, 
but which does not affect the 
marginal productivity of enforce-
ment, reduces (increases) the CT-
optimal level of enforcement if 
and only if the parameter-induced 
change in the marginal cost of 
production at the initial regu-
lated equilibrium is less than 
(exceeds) the parameter-induced 
change in the per unit loss of 
industry profit on the marginal 
unit of output. 
( ii ) Assuming that a change in a para-
meter which increases the marginal 
cost of production at any output 
level also improves (reduces) the 
marginal productivity of enforce-
ment, if the parameter-induced 
change in the marginal cost of 
production at the initial regu-
lated equilibrium exceeds (is 
less than) the parameter-induced 
change in the per unit loss of 
industry profit on the marginal 
unit of output. the change in the 
parameter increases (reduces)the 
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CT-optimal level of enforcement. 
If, however, the parameter-induced 
change in the marginal cost of 
production at the initial regu-
lated equilibrium is less than 
(exceeds) the parameter-induced 
change in the per unit loss of 
industry profit on the marginal 
unit of output, the effect of the 
parameter change on CT-optimal 
regulatory policy is ambiguous. 
Proof. 
(i) Using (4-6-12) with dY = da = db = 0 gives 
(4-6-17) 
-dL 
e 
dcp if and only if J > 0 < 
given that A < 0 by the concavity In enforcement of 
(4-6-4) and that, as derived in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4-6-2, B = o. 
Following the assumption that the parameter change 
does not affect the marginal productivity of enforce-
ment, a2 Q/3L 3cp = 0 and, from (4-6-10), 32 w/3L 3cp is 
e e 
also equal to zero. From (4-6-13) then 
(4-6-18) J = [[h11(Q(.),Y)Q(.)+2h1(Q(.),Y)-C11(Q(.)'<I»1~~ 
- C12(Q(·),CP)J~~ 
e 
Rearranging (4-6-18), J ~ 0 if and only if 
(4-6-19) C12 (Q(·),Y) ~ [h I1 (Q(.),Y)Q(.)+2h l (Q(.),Y) 
3Q 
- CII (Q(.) ,<I»l~ 
From the discussion in Appendix 4-1, 3Q/3cp < 0 while, 
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following (A4-2-3), it is assumed that 
[h1l(Q(·),Y)Q(.) + 2h 1 (Q(·),Y) - C11 (Q(.),$)] < O. 
The right-hand side of (4-6-19) is there some 
itive number. The interpretation of the 
eted term is as in the proof of Proposition 
4-6-2. Multiplied by aQ/a$, it gives the parameter-
induced change in the per unit loss of industry 
fit on the marginal unit of output. The term 
C12 (Q(.) ,$) on the left-hand side of (4-6 19) denotes, 
llowing (4 5-4), the parameter-induced change in 
marginal production cost at the initial regul 
ilibrium. Given these results and interpretations, 
lying (4-6-19) in (4-6-17) reveals the validity of 
the Proposition. 
(ii) If the parameter change affects the marginal produc-
tivity of enforcement, the term in a 2Q/dL d$ is non 
e 
zero. Manipulating J from (4-6-12) reveals that this 
results in the subtraction of the term 
(4-6-20) 
from the le -hand side of (4-6-19). 
n the result that marginal revenue 1S less than 
marginal cost in the relevant output range and that 
dQ/d < 0, the sign of the term in (4-6-20) varies 
ct with that of d 2Q/dL
e
d$. If the parameter 
change serves to increase the marginal productivity 
of enforcement a 2Q/ dLe a $ < 0 and hence (4 -6-20) is 
ve. From the above argument, the left-hand 
of (4-6 19) becomes more positive. If, in the 
absence of this effect, the "greater than" inequality 
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prevailed in (4~6-l9), so that the effect of the 
parameter change was to increase CT-optimal enforce-
ment, the inclusion of a parameter-induced improve-
ment in the marginal productivity of enforcement 
reinforces the result. Alternatively, if the oppo-
site inequality prevailed in (4-6-19) so that the 
effect of the paramater change, in the absence of 
any parameter-induced change in the marginal product-
ivity of enforcement, was to reduce CT-optimal 
enforcement, the inclusion of such a modification 
would create ambiguity in the result. The validity 
of the Proposition in the opposite case where the 
parameter change reduces the marginal productivity 
of enforcement can be established using the same 
argument with the inequalities reversed. 
o 
The results here concerning the parameter ~ are the 
converse of those of Proposition 4-6-2 relating to a change 
in the level of aggregate consumer income. An increase in 
¢ which raises marginal cost reduces the pure monopoly 
profit-maximizing output level of the fishery from its ini-
tial level as shown by QM in Figure 4-6-1. This by itself 
would lead to an increase in the marginal benefit of enforce-
ment at any output level exceeding QM and thus stimulate an 
increase in CT-optimal enforcement activity. However, the 
increased cost structure also leads to a reduction in the 
regulated equilibrium output level of the fishery at any 
level of enforcement. This reduces the loss of industry 
profit on the marginal unit of output thus reducing the 
marginal benefit of enforcement. The CT-optimal policy res-
ponse is determined by a comparison of the magnitUdes of 
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these two effects. As evidenced by part (ii) of the 
Proposition, parameter-induced changes in the marginal pro-
ductivity of enforcement may reinforce or reverse the 
results in part (i) of the Proposition depending on their 
sign and relative size. 
As stated above, an increase ln the cost structure of 
a "low-cost" fishery reduces the competitive equilibrium 
output level of the fishery and hence also the regulated 
equilibrium output level at any level of enforcement. If,as 
a result of the increase in the cost structure, it is optimal 
for the regulator to increase enforcement activity, the regu-
lated equilibrium output level is therefore unambiguously 
reduced and hence, following (4-6-9), so too is the CT-
optlmal quota. If, however, it is optimal for the regulator 
to reduce enforcement activity in response to an increase in 
the cost structure parameter ¢, the effect on the regulated 
equilibrium output level and hence the CT-optimal quota 
level is ambiguous and, as in the case of the aggregate 
income parameter, depends on the exact functional forms of 
the supply and demand curves of the fishery_ 
The final parameter changes examined here are the 
distributional parameters concerning the redistribution of 
fine revenues and the proportional funding requirements of 
the resource cost of enforcement. 
(c) Changes in distributional parameters 
PROPOSITION 4-6-4: Under the assumptions contained in the 
stern of Proposition 4-6-2; 
(i) A change in the proportion of fine 
payments that are redistributed to 
members of the industry has no 
effect on the CT-optimal levels of 
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enforcement and tao 
(ii) An increase in the 
the resource cost of enforcement 
that the indu ired to 
fund leads to a reduction in the 
CT-optimal enforcement level and 
a concomitant increase in the CT-
optimal quota. 
Proof. 
( i) Using (4-6-2) with dY = d~ = db o gives 
(4-6-21) s > 
- - - 0 A < if and only if s ~ 0 < 
(ii) 
given that A < 0 by the concavity in enforcement of 
(4-6 4) and that, as previously ived, B = O. 
Following the assumption that the quota is contin-
uously set so that no violations occur, in (4-6-3), 
the only cost of enforcement to the regulator is the 
resource cost. This is unaf by changes in the 
parameter 'a' and hence, from (4-6 10), 32 w/3L 3a 
e 
= O. Using this result in (4-6 21), given the defini-
tion of S from (4-6-12), reve s that dL Ida = o. 
e 
G n that the CT-optimal level of enforcement 1S 
unchanged, the regulated equili ium output level 
remains unaltered and so too, llowing (4-6-9), does 
the optimal level of quota. CT-optimal regulatory 
pol is therefore unaffected by changes in the 
r r a' . 
Us (4-6-12) with dY = d¢ = da = 0 gives 
(4-6-22) dL T > e = _ _ < a if and only if T ~ 0 A 
g the results on terms A and B as in part (i) 
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of the Proposition. 
From (4-6-10) ,which follows from (4-6-3) glven the 
assumption on quota size, 
(4-6-23) WI (L ) > 0 
e 
Using this result in (4-6-22), given the definition 
of T from (4-6-12), reveals that dL /db < 0 and hence 
e 
that an increase in the proportion of the resource 
cost of enforcement that the industry is required to 
pay reduces the CT-optimal level of enforcement acti-
vity. Following Proposition 4-4-1 this parameter-
induced reduction in enforcement results in an 
increase in the regulated equilibrium output level 
and also, given (4-6-9), in a matching rise in the 
CT-optimal level of quota. Hence an increase in the 
proportion of the resource cost of enforcement that 
the industry is required to pay causes a relaxation 
in CT-optimal regulatory policy for the fishery. 
o 
Proposition 4-6-4 is intuitively obvious. The result 
that a ceteris paribus increase in the marginal cost of 
enforcement to the industry reduces CT-optimal enforcement 
follows immediately while result (i) stems from the fact 
that a captured regulator ensures that there are no fine 
revenues to be redistributed. 
(3) Optimal Policy in a "High-Cost" Fishery 
These results refer to the CT regulation of a "low-
cost" fishery. In the case of a "high-cost" fishery, 
illustrated in Figure 4-6-2, the objective of the regulator 
remains the same; to maximize industry profit as expressed 
in (4-6-4). However, at all regulated equilibria which 
p 
X 
A 
Figure 4-6-2: 
o 
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CT regulation of a "high-cost" open-
access fishery. 
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occur on the backward-bending portion of the penalty-
inclusive industry average cost curve, marginal revenue 
exceeds marginal cost, which is negative, and, following 
Proposition 4-4-2, 3Q/3L > O. 
e 
At the initial competitive equilibrium output Q in 
c 
Figure 4-6-2 producer surplus is zero. Marginal revenue, 
however, exceeds marginal cost and therefore industry out-
put can be profitably expanded. Given the dynamics of the 
fishery as outlined in Section 4-3, this expansion can be 
accomplished through the imposition and enforcement of a 
binding output quota. Figure 4-6-2 illustrates such a quota 
set at some level R < Q
c 
and enforced by a marginal expected 
penalty of magnitude JT = KS. This generates a regulated 
equllibrium at E1 with output Q1 and results in an increase 
in industry profit of the diagonally shaded area BFGH. 
Given, however, that the quota must initially be set at some 
output level less than that at the unregulated open-access 
equilibrium in order to affect behaviour and is constrained 
by assumption not to exceed the unregulated equilibrium out-
put level, the industry will incur expected penalty pay-
ments on illegal output. Allowing for a proportion 0 < a < 1 
of these payments to be refunded to members of the indus-
try, net industry profit will be smaller than that des-
cribed above by an amount (1 - a) times the vertically 
shaded area JKST. 
The objective function of the CT regulator (4-6-4) 
in the case of a "high-cost" fishery is no longer unam-
biguously concave. The marginal resource cost of enforce-
ment to the industry is unaffected by the distinction 
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between "high-cost" and "low-cost" fisheries. The first 
term of the first-order condition (4-6-5) again shows the 
marginal benefit of enforcement. As shown in Figure 4-6-2, 
marginal cost is negative in the region for which the supply 
curve lS negatively sloped and, as stated above, at regu-
lated equilibria which occur on the backward-bending portion 
of the long run penalty-inclusive supply curve, 
(4-6-24) hI(Q(.) ,Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.) ,Y) - Cl(Q( .)'¢) > 0 
This gives the per unit amount of potential industry profit. 
Multiplied by dQ/dL , which from Proposition 4-4-2 is posi-
e 
tive, it represents the marginal benefit of enforcement. 
The fine payments incurred by the industry in a 
"high-cost" fishery represent an additional complication. 
Using (4-6-2) and (4-6-3) 
(4-6-25) dw 3L bw I ( L e ) + ( 1-a) [A ( f , L e ) ~ ~ + [Q ( . ) - R ] ~ ~ ] > 0 
e e e 
glven that, as previously defined, all component terms are 
positive. Differentiating (4-6-5) with respect to enforce-
ment, using (4-6-25) gives 
d
2
TTR [ 
(4-6-26) aLe~ = [h ll (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+2h l (Q(·),Y) 
aQ ] aQ 
-Cll(Q( .)'¢)]a-L aL +[hl(Q( .),Y)Q( .)+h(Q( .),Y) 
e e 
a 2Q " a 2Q 
-Cl(Q( .),¢)]~+bw (Le)+(l-a)[A(f,Le)~ 
e e 
o A aQ 
+ 2 oL 3L 
e e 
+ [Q(. )-R]:~\] 
e 
Depending on the relative magnitudes of the first two com-
ponent terms of (4-6-26) the marginal profitability of 
enforcement may be increasing or decreasing as the level of 
enforcement rises. As previously stated, at the MSY margi-
nal production cost is undefined while oQloL O. 
e 
Together these two properties imply that the marg al pro-
fitability of enforcement approaches some finite limit value 
at that level of enforcement which generates a regulated 
equilibrium at N in Figure 4-6-2 where output is at the 
MSY level. If this limit value exceeds the marginal cost 
of the associated level of enforcement, further enforcement 
will be undertaken by a CT regulator. In this case, CT-
optlmal regulatory policy proceeds as in Proposition 4-6 1 
for the case of a "low-cost" fishery, and the regulated 
equllibrium will occur on the upward-sloping portion the 
penalty-inclusive supply curve. If, however, the marginal 
benefit of enforcement is decreasing, or increasing at a 
slower rate than the marginal cost to the industry of 
enforcement, is possible that the CT-optimal regulated 
equllibrium occurs on the backward-bending portion of the 
penalty-inclusive industry supply curve. 
The interpretation of the first-order condition with 
respect to quota size (4-6-7) is as for the "low-cost" 
f hery. Following part (ii) of Proposition 4-4-1, a 
change in the level of output quota, such that the quota 
does not exceed the regulated equilibrium output level con-
sistent with the amount of enforcement, leaves the marg 
expected pena , and hence the regulated equilibrium out 
put level, unchanged. In the case when the regulated 
equilibrium occurs at some output level which exceeds the 
unregUlated open-access equilibrium level, while, by assump-
tion, the quota is constrained not to exceed the unregulated 
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open-access equilibrium output level, industry profit in the 
regulated environment, as shown in (4 6 8), increases with 
the size of the output quota. The CT-optimal quota is 
therefore set at the unregulated open-access equilibrium 
10 
output level. If, however, it is optimal for the CT 
regulator to enforce the quota to such an extent that the 
regulated equilibrium occurs on the upward-sloping portion 
of the penalty-inclusive industry supply curve at an output 
level less than the unregulated open-access equilibrium 
level, the analys proceeds as for part (ii) of Proposi-
tion 4-6-1 and the CT optimal quota is equal to the regu-
lated equilibrium output level consistent with the CT-
opt~mal amount of enforcement. 
These results are summarized in the following 
Propos~tion. 
PROPOSITION 4-6-5: Under the assumptions in the stem of 
sit ion 4-4-2 the CT- imal 
either the downward-sloping or upward-
sloping portions of the penalty-
inclusive industry supply curve or at 
the industry of enforcement. If the 
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regulated equilibrium occurs at some 
1 which exceeds the 
lated open-access equilibrium level the 
CT-optimal quota is set at the unregu-
lated open-access equilibrium output 
level. If, however, the regulated 
equilibrium occurs on the upward sloping 
portion of the penalty-inclusive indus-
try supply curve at some output level 
less than the unregulated open-access 
equilibrium level the CT-optimal quota 
is equal to the regulated equilibrium 
output level consistent with the CT-
optimal amount of enforcement. 
(4) A Comparison of Regulation in a "Low-Cost" and 
"High-Cost" Fishery 
In the case where the CT-optimal regulated equili-
brium for a "high-cost" fishery occurs on the upward-
sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive supply curve, the 
associated output level will, in general, differ from that 
which is optimal for a captured regulator in a similar 
"low-cost" fishery. 
__ ~~ __ ~~~4 __ -~6_-~6: Suppose that two fisheries have iden-
tical cost structures but that one 
fishery is a "low-cost" fishery as for 
Proposition 4-4-1 while the other is a 
"high-cost" fishery as for Proposition 
4-4-2. Suppose also that at any given 
guantity the demand price, and also the 
Proof. 
f 
384. 
inal revenue in the "h " 
exceeds that in the " 
(i) In a world of costless enfo 
ment the pure monopoly profit-
maximizing output level in the 
" 
"h exceeds that 
of the "low-cost" fishery. 
(ii) se that enforcement is co 
and that the CT-optimal regulated 
ilibrium in the "h cost ll 
fishery occurs on the upward-
sl ion of the 
inclusive industry supply curve. 
If the of 
enforcement is similar in both 
fisheries, the CT-optimal regu-
lated level in 
the " cost" fisher exceeds 
that in the " 
(i) As shown, with reference to Figure 4-3-7, the pure 
monopoly fit-maximizing output level in a world of 
costless enforcement is that output level wh h 
equates marginal revenue with the marginal cost of 
production. Thus, at the pure monopoly prof 
maximizing output level QM 
(4 6-27) h 1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) :C1(Q(.),¢) 
Following the assumption in the Proposition concern-
ing relative marginal revenues at any given quantity 
(4 -6 -28) HC [h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y)] 
> LC [h1(Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y)] 
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where the left-hand side of (4-6-28) and the right-
hand side of (4-6-28) are the marginal revenues in 
the "high-cost" and "low-cost" fisheries respectively. 
From (4-6-27) and (4-6-28) therefore, at the pure 
monopoly profit-maximizing output level of the "low-
cost" 
(4-6-29) 
Given the assumptions of (4-5-3) and (4-5-4) concern-
ing the slopes of the demand and marginal cost func-
tions, equality between marginal revenue and marginal 
co s t in the "high-co st" fishery is reached at some 
higher output level and thus 
(4-6-30) 
(ii) CT-optimal regulation in a world of costly enforce-
ment is determined according to the first-order con-
ditions (4-6-5) and (4-6-6). Following Proposition 
4-4-1, at regulated equilibria occurring on the 
upward-sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive 
supply curve, an increase in enforcement has the 
effect of reducing the regulated equilibrium output 
of the fishery. If the regulated equilibrium of the 
"high-cost" fishery occurs at some output level which 
is less than the unregulated open-access equilibrium 
level the CT-optimal quota, following Proposition 
4-6-5, is equal to the regulated equilibrium output 
level consistent with the CT-optimal amount of 
enforcement. In this case, as in the case of a "low-
cost" fishery, following Proposition 4-6-1, the CT-
optimal amount of enforcement, and hence the CT-
optimal regulated equilibrium output level, can be 
determined from (4-6-5) only. 
From (4-6-5), at any positive level of enforcement 
that lS optimal for the CT regulator, the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost of enforcement are equated. 
Following Proposition 4-4-2, generating a regulated 
equilibrium at the MSY in the "high-cost" fishery 
requires a certain level of enforcement. Additional 
enforcement is necessary to generate a regulated 
equilibrium on the upward-sloping portion of the 
penalty-inclusive supply curve. Given this, the 
amount of enforcement required at any output level, 
such that a regulated equilibrium occurs on the 
upward-sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive 
supply curve in each fishery, is greater for the 
"high-cost" fishery than for the "low-cost" fishery. 
Using (4-6-3) and (4-5-1) then, recalling that in 
this instance, the only cost of enforcement to the 
industry is the proportion of the resource cost that 
it lS required to fund, 
(4-6-31) 
where LHC and LLC are the amounts of enforcement 
e e 
required to generate any such regulated equilibrium 
output level in the "high-cost" and "low-cost" fish-
eries respectively. 
Given (4-6-28) and the assumption of identical costs 
(4-6-32) [h1 (Q(.),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),y)]HC - C1 (Q(.),</l) 
LC 
> [h1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) + h(Q(.),Y) - C1 (Q(.),</l) 
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where, following Proposition 4-6-1, both sides of 
(4-6-32) are negative. Multiplying each side of 
(4-6-32) by their respective marginal productivity 
of enforcement gives the marginal benefit of 
enforcement at the output level Q(.) in each fish-
ery. Given the assumption of similarity of marginal 
productivities, 
(4-6-33) 
the inequality in (4-6-32) dominates any slightly 
higher marginal productivity that may exist in the 
"low-cost" case. At any given quantity therefore, 
the marginal benefit of enforcement in the "high-
cost" fishery is less than that in the "low-cost" 
fishery. Given this, and the comparison of marginal 
costs in (4-6-31), the local concavity in enforce-
ment of (4-6-4) implies that the generation of an 
output level that is optimal for the CT regulator in 
the "low-cost" fishery case requires a greater level 
of enforcement than is CT-optimal in the case of a 
"high-cost" fishery. Using the result from Proposi-
tion 4-4-1 that 3Q/3L
e 
< 0 at regulated equilibria 
which occur on the upward-sloping portion of the 
penalty-inclusive supply curve, the result necessarily 
follows. In the case where the regulated equilibrium 
in the "high-cost" fishery occurs on the upward-
sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive industry 
supply curve but at an output level which exceeds the 
unregulated open-access equilibrium level the result 
holds by definition. 
o 
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4 7 A COMPARISON OF CT AND NPIT REGULATION 
Sections 4 5 and 4-6 presented an analysis of opti 
mal regulatory behaviour under two conflicting hypotheses 
concerning regulatory objectives. It is evident that the 
behavioural implications resulting from these hypotheses 
d fer in several respects, notably in the optimal amount 
of enforcement, the level and distribution of the quota, 
and the response of policy to changes in the value of par-
ticular parameters. The first difference to be considered 
arises in the optimal level of enforcement. 
PROPOSITION 4-7-1: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped market 
demand curve is subject to a binding 
output quota which can be instanta-
neously and costlessly adjusted by the 
regulator and which is enforced by 
means of a constant flat rate r unit 
expected penalty that is binding on 
behaviour. Assumin that the unre 
lated open-access equilibrium occurs 
industry supply curve, that enforcing 
t ion necess ates the use of 
a non-
imal for both 
enforcement ) exceeds the NPIT-
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optimal level ( ) and hence the CT-
optimal regulated equilibrium output 
level is lower than that which is 
optimal for the NPIT regulator. 
Proof. 
Following Proposition 4-4-1, the regulated equilibrium 
is unaffected by changes in quota such that the quota does 
not exceed the regulated equilibrium output level cons tent 
with the amount of enforcement. From Proposition 4 5 1 any 
quota which does not exceed the regulated equil ium output 
level consistent with the NPIT-optimal amount of enforcement 
is optimal for the NPIT regulator while, from Propos ion 
4-6-l. it is optimal for the CT regulator to continuously 
maintain the quota at the regulated equilibrium output level 
consistent with the CT-optimal amount of enforcement. For 
the NPIT regulator then the size of the quota w hin a cer-
tain range is irrelevant while for the CT regulator the 
quota must be continuously maintained at the level such 
that no penalty is incurred. In each case the optimal quota 
is passively determined by the setting of the optimal 
enforcement level in accordance with the appropriate first-
order condition with respect to enforcement and a compari-
son of optimal enforcement levels can therefore be deter-
mined by comparing these first-order ions. 
Given that, in the case of a "low-cost" fishery, both 
regulators' objective functions, (4 5 2) and (4-6-4), are 
concave, taking the NPIT-optimal level of enforcement 
L* > 0 as that level which in (4 5-5) ensuresthat aVR /aL* 
e e e 
0, and substituting in the CT regulator's f -order 
390. 
> 
condition (4-6-6) reveals that L -< L* if and only if 
e e 
(4-7-1) [h 1 (Q(L*,R,Z) ,Y)Q(L*,R,Z)+h(Q(L*,R,Z) ,Y) e e e 
- C1 (Q(L;,R,Z) ,¢) l~~ 
e 
- bw'(L )-[[h(Q(L*,R,Z),Y)) 
e e 
> 
- 0 
< 
Rearranging and simplifying (4-7-1) reveals the con-
dition that L 2 L* if and only if 
e < e 
(4-7-2) 
(l-b)w'(L ) 
< e 
:> - Q(. )3Q/3L 
e 
From Proposition 4-4-1, 3Q/3L < 0 and,from (4-6-1), 
e 
(1- b)w'(L ) > O. The right-hand side of (4-7-2) is then 
e 
some posltive number. Given the assumption that the demand 
curve is negatively sloped, h 1 (.) < 0 and hence,from 
(4-7-2).L > L*. As 3Q/3L < 0, this implies that the CT-
e e e 
optimal regulated equilibrium output level is less than 
that whlch is optimal for the NPIT regulator. 
o 
This result is to be expected. The potential gains 
to producers themselves of controlling the commons exceed 
those to society as a whole. Once again the CT-optimal 
regulated equilibrium is equivalent to the optimal beha-
viour of a cartel that attracts partial funding for its 
operations externally. The result here, however, as was the 
case with its counterpart in Chapter Three, suffers from 
the weakness that to infer the objective of the regulator 
from the observed enforcement activity requires enough 
knowledge to solve the optimization problem of each regu-
lator. This difficulty is also associated with responses 
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to changes in the parameter ~ which affects marginal pro~ 
duction costs. 
Other potential behavioural differences arise in the 
level and distribution of the output quota, in the res-
ponse of the regulators to changes in enforcement funding 
requirements, and potentially in response to a change in 
the level of consumer income. 
Following Proposition 4-5-1, the NPIT regulator is 
indifferent between any output quota that does not exceed 
the regulated equilibrium output level consistent with the 
optlmal enforcement level L*. From Proposition 4-6-1 how-
e ' 
ever, the CT regulator ensures that the quota is allocated 
entlrely to members of the industry and is set at the regu-
lated equilibrium output level consistent with the CT-
optimal enforcement level L. This ensures that no poten-
e 
tial profits are lost through fines incurred on illegal 
behavlour or through forgone quota rentals. 
Secondly, a change in the fund requirements of 
the resource cost of enforcement does not affect the beha-
viour of a NPIT regulator. This is because to the NPIT 
regulator, only interested in aggregate outcome, these 
funding requirements are transfer payments which have 
distributional effects but no aggregate impacts. To the 
CT regulato~ however, a change in funding mechanisms 
represents a change in the cost of gaining profits through 
regulating itself. An increase in the amount of this cost 
that the industry must pay reduces the marginal profit-
ability of enforcement at any non-zero enforcement level 
and thus, as shown in Proposition 4-6-4, reduces the CT-
optimal enforcement level. 
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These results are summarized in the following 
sition. 
4-7-2: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped demand 
curve is subject to a binding output 
quota which can be instantaneously and 
costlessly adjusted by the regulator 
and which is enforced by means of a 
constant flat-rate per unit expected 
penalty that is binding on behaviour. 
Assuming that the unregulated open-
access equilibrium occurs on the 
upward-sloping portion of the industry 
supply curve, that enforcing the regu-
lation necessitates the use of scarce 
resources and incurs a non-decreasing 
inal resource cost and that 
enforcement is optimal for both regu-
lators, the following results occur: 
(i) A CT regulator sets the output 
quota at the regulated equili-
brium output level consistent with 
the CT-optimal enforcement level 
and ensures that the quota is 
allocated entirely to members of 
the industry. Under NPIT regula-
tion no particular quota size or 
pattern of distribution can be 
ed. 
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(ii) A NPIT regulator is unaffected by 
changes in the funding require-
ments for the resource cost of 
enforcement. A change in the 
proportion of the resource cost 
of enforcement funded by the 
industry itself alters the CT-
optimal enforcement level. 
The other postulated difference in regulatory beha-
viour occurs in response to parameter changes. Proposi-
tlons 4-5-2 and 4-6-2 examined the effect of a change in 
the level of aggregate consumer income on the behaviour of 
a NPIT and CT regulator respectively. As shown in the 
Proof of Proposition 4-7-1 a comparison of the optimal 
enforcement levels for the two types of regulator can be 
determined on the basis of a comparison of the regulators· 
respective first-order conditions with respect to enforce-
mente So too, following Propositions 4-5-2 and 4-6-2, can 
a comparison of the response in optimal enforcement levels 
to a change in the level of aggregate consumer income. 
From (4-5-11) and (4-5-12) 
dL* 
(4-7-3) dye ~ 0 if and only if h 2 (Q(·),Y) ~ -[h1 (Q(.),Y) 
while from (4-6-10), (4-6-14) and (4-6-16) 
(4-7-4) 
dL 
e 
dY ~ 0 if and only if h 2 (Q(.) ,Y) 
+ h 12 (Q(·),Y)Q(.) ~ -[h 11 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+2h 1 (Q(·),Y) 
oQ 
- C 11 (Q(·),q,)]a-y 
where dL*/dY and 
e 
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/dY denote the effect of a change in 
aggregate consumer income on optimal enforcement under NPIT 
and CT regulation respectively. While is evident, from 
conditions (4-7-3) and (4-7-4), that the behaviour responses 
of the two types of regulators will differ, as discussed in 
Section 3-7, a valid comparison requires enough information 
to solve the respective optimization problems of the regu-
lator. Here, as there, the complicated nature of beha-
vioural responses is such as to preclude empirical infer-
ence and hence the analysis will not be further extended. 
Differences in optimal behaviour also arise in the 
regulation of a "high cost" fishery. 
?ROPOSITION 4-7-3: Suppose that an open-access fishery 
which faces a negatively sloped demand 
curve is subject to a binding output 
quota which can be instantaneously and 
and which is enforced by means of a 
constant flat-rate 
penalty that is binding on behaviour. 
S also that the unre 
open-access equilibrium occurs on the 
the indus-
ion necessitates the use of 
sources and incurs a non-
resource cost but 
that the objective functions of both 
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re cave in e 
(i) Assuming that optimal regulated 
under NPIT and CT 
hypotheses both occur on the nega-
tively sloped portion of the 
penalty-inclusive industry supply 
curve the NP imal level of 
enforcement ( exceeds (is less 
than) the CT imal level (L e ), 
and hence the NPIT-optimal regu-
lated equilibrium output level is 
than that which 
is optimal for the CT regulator, 
if and only if the enforcement-
induced chan in the market 
value of the existing output level 
is less than (greater than) the 
difference between the inal 
he CT and 
NPIT regulators. If the marginal 
cost of enforcement to the CT 
regulator exceeds that to the 
imal 
librium 
output level, unambiguously 
imal for 
the or. 
(ii) Assuming that the optimal regu-
lated equilibria under NPIT and 
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CT hypothesis both occur on the 
upward-sloping portion of the 
penalty-inclusive sUEply curve 
but at output levels which exceed 
the unregulated open-access equili-
brium output level, the NPIT 
optimal level of enforcement 
) exceeds (is less than) the 
CT-optimal level according 
to the ion as 
ition. If t 
or is less that 
enforcement exceeds the NPIT-
hence the CT-
output level is lower than that 
1 for the NPIT 
than that 
-access 
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Proof. 
(i) Following Proposition 4-4-2 the regulated equili-
brium in a "high-cost" fishery is unaffected by 
(4-7-5 ) 
changes in quota levels such that the quota does not 
exceed the regulated equilibrium output level consis-
tent with the amount of enforcement. From Proposi-
tion 4-5-4 any quota which does not exceed the regu-
lated equilibrium output level consistent with the 
NPIT-optimal amount of enforcement is optimal for the 
NPIT regulator while from Proposition 4-6-5 at any 
regulated equilibrium that occurs at an output level 
which exceeds the unregulated open-access equilibrium 
output level the CT-optimal quota is set at the 
unregulated open-access equilibrium output level~ 
As in Proposition 4-7-1 for the case of a "low-cost" 
fishery therefore a comparison of optimal enforcement 
levels can be determined by comparing the appropriate 
first-order conditions with respect to enforcement. 
Given the assumption that the objective functions 
(4-5-2) and (4-6-5) of both regulators are concave in 
enforcement, taking the NPIT-optimal level of 
enforcement L * > 0 as that leve 1 which, in (4 - 5- 5), 
e 
ensures that aVR /aL~ = 0 and substituting in the CT 
e 
regulator's first-order condition (4-6-6), using 
(4-6-25), reveals that L ~ L* if and only if 
e < e 
[hI (Q(L*,R,Z) ,Y)Q(L*,R,Z)+h(Q(L*,R,Z) ,Y) 
e e e 
- CI(Q(L~'R,Z),ep)J~~ -[bWI(Le)+(I-a)[A(f,Le)~~ 
e e 
+ [Q(L~'R'Z)-Rl~~elJ-[[h(Q(L~'R'Z) ,Y) 
- CI (Q(L~,R,Z) ,ep) 1 ~~e - Wi (Le )] ~ 0 
(4-7-6) 
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Rearranging and simplifying (4-7-5) reveals the con-
dition that Le ~ L* if and only if 
< e 
aQ > 
h 1 (Q(·) Y)Q(·)aL < 
e 
+ bCu'(L)] -w'(L) 
e e 
aQ Interpreting (4-7-6), the term hl (Q(.) 'Y)3L repre-
e 
sents the enforcement-induced change in demand price. 
Multiplied by the original regulated equilibrium 
quantity Q(.), this gives the enforcement-induced 
change in the market value of the existing level of 
output. Following (4-6-25), the composite bracketed 
term on the right-hand side of (4-7-6) shows the 
marginal cost of enforcement to the CT regulator when 
operating on the backward-bending portion of the 
supply curve in a "high-cost" fishery while, from 
(4-5-1) and (4-5-5), w' (L ) is the marginal cost of 
e 
enforcement to the NPIT regulator. Given these 
interpretations of the component terms of (4-7-6) 
and that, as shown in Proposition 4-4-2, JQ/3L
e 
> 0 
in a "h igh-cost" open-acce ss fishery, the initial 
result of part (i) of this Proposition clearly 
follows. 
Following the assumption that the market demand 
curve is negatively sloped, hl (Q(.) ,Y) < 0 and hence 
the left-hand side of (4-7-6) is negative. If the 
marginal cost of enforcement to the CT regulator 
exceeds that to the NPIT regulator, the right-hand 
side of (4-7-6) is strictly positive. Combining 
these two conditions the negative inequality holds 
in (4-7-6) implying that the NPIT-optimal level of 
enforcement is excessive for the CT regulator and 
hence, by Proposition 4-4-2, that the NP 
regulated equilibrium output level exceeds that 
which is optimal for the captured regulator. 
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(ii) In the case where the optimal regulated equilibr 
under both hypotheses occur on the upward-sloping 
port n of the penalty-inclusive industry supp 
curve at output levels which exceed the unregulated 
access equilibrium output level the condition 
in part (i) of the Proposition as stated in ss-
n (4-7-6) continues to hold. Here, however, 
llowing Proposition 4-4-1, increases in enforcement 
the regulated equilibrium output 1 and 
aQ/a O. The left-hand side of (4-7-6) is 
re positive. If then the marginal cost of enforce-
ment to the CT regulator is less than that to 
NPIT regulator the right-hand side of (4-7-6) is 
negative. Combining these two results, the" 
than" inequality holds implying that imal 
enforcement exceeds NPIT-optimal enforcement and 
hence that the CT-optimal regulated equil ium out-
put level is less than that which is opt 
NPIT regulator. 
1 for the 
In the case where the optimal regulated ibr 
under both hypotheses occur on the upward-sloping 
portion of the penalty-inclusive indus ly 
curve at output levels less than the unregulated 
open-access equilibrium output level, is optimal, 
following Proposition 4-6-5, for a c regulator 
to set the quota equal to the regulated equil ium 
output level consistent with the CT-opt 1 amount of 
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enforcement. Following Proposition 4-5-4 any quota 
which does not exceed the regulated equilibrium out-
put level consistent with the NPIT-optimal amount of 
enforcement is optimal for the NPIT regulator. As 
in Proposition 4-7-1 a comparison of optimal enforce-
ment levels can be determined by comparing the appro-
priate first-order conditions with respect to employ-
menta In these circumstances the marginal cost of 
enforcement to the CT regulator consists solely of 
the proportion of the marginal resource cost of 
enforcement that the industry is required to fund. 
Condition (4-7-6) then collapses to that expressed 
in (4-7-1) and the proof of the result follows as 
for Proposition 4-7-1. 
o 
The latter part of result (ii) of the above Proposi-
tion is essentially identical to Proposition 4-7-1 as are 
its interpretation and implications. As explained there, 
observational inference as to the objectives of the regula-
tor on the basis of these criteria requires enough informa-
tion to solve the respective optimizing problems of each 
regulator and hence is not of much empirical use. Result 
(i) and the remainder of result (ii) suffer from similar 
limitations. Following Chapter Three, however, there are 
more discernable behavioural differences. For instance, a 
regulated equilibrium on the upward-sloping portion of the 
penalty-inclusive industry supply curve at some output level 
less than the unregulated open-access equilibrium output 
level at which non-zero penalties were incurred by the regu-
lated industry would imply the existence of a NPIT regulator. 
Regrettably though, the non-existence of penalty payments 
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would not unambiguously indicate the presence of a captured 
regulator. 
re is, however, one further impl ion that can 
be drawn from Proposition 4-7-3. The per unit marginal 
benefit of enforcement to the regulator is the dif rence 
between marginal revenue and marginal cost which, at regu-
lated equil r on the backward-bending portion the 
penal inc sive industry supply curve where marginal cost 
is negat is less than that to the NPIT To 
complicate matters the marginal resource cost of enforce-
~ent to the CT ator is also less than that to its NPIT 
counterpart. The relative magnitudes of optimal enforce-
ment levels then result from a comparison of the marginal 
penalty cost of enforcement for the CT regulator and the 
dif rence in the net, resource-cost inclusive, marg 
benefit of enforcement between the two regulators. It is 
possible that the size of the marginal penalty cost of 
enforcement to the captured regulator could act to preclude 
CT regu t n circumstances when it would be optimal 
a NPIT regulator to enforce a regulated equilibrium on the 
backward-bending portion of the penalty-inclusive industry 
supply curve at some output level higher than that at the 
unregula n-access equilibrium level. Alternatively, 
at regulated ilibria which occur on the upward-sloping 
section of the inclusive industry supply curve at 
output levels smal r than the unregulated open-access 
equilibrium output level, the net marginal benefit of 
enforcement to the CT regulator is greater than that to the 
NPIT regulator. If, therefore, it is optimal for a NPIT 
regulator to control the fishery to the extent that the 
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regulated equilibrium occurs on the upward-sloping portion 
of the penalty-inclusive industry supply curve at some out-
put level smaller than the unregulated open-access equili-
brium output level, it is profitable for a CT regulator to 
expand upon the NPIT-optimal enforcement effort. 
Together, these two observations imply that, In 
certain circumstances, regulatory control which results in 
a regulated equilibrium on the backward-bending portion of 
the penalty-inclusive industry supply curve is inspired by 
NPIT objectives and that a zero-penalty regulated equili-
brium on the upward-sloping portion of the penalty-
inclusive industry supply curve most likely represents the 
work of a captured regulator. Again the effectiveness of 
observational inference concerning the objectives of the 
regulator is somewhat limited in the absence of a priori 
market information. The informational requirements here, 
however, are not as comprehensive as those associated with 
evaluating regulators' behavioural responses to certain 
parameter changes or with determining objectives on the 
basis of comparisons of relative enforcement efforts. 
4-8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter applied the regulatory analysis of 
Chapters Two and Three to the example of an open-access 
fishery. It began by briefly reviewing the literature on 
fishery economics. This review followed the steady-state 
approach which stemmed from the seminal work of Gordon 
[1954]. The most useful reformulation of Gordon's analy-
sis, for the purposes of this chapter, was that of Copes 
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[1970, 1972J who combined factor cost and population stock/ 
yield relationships to produce a long run steady-state 
industry supply curve for the open-access fishery that is 
backward bending over a certain price range. While retain 
ing the central theoretical results of other formulations, 
this allowed the problem to be cast in famil 
demand terms. 
supply/ 
The main characteristic of an open-access fishery 
was shown to be that the unregulated open-access equili-
brium is economically inefficient in the s e of harvest 
and/or in the amount of factor input. analogous 
to the problem of the tragedy of the commons and results 
from a lack of well-defined property rights which means 
that an individual cannot fully appropr e any benefits 
that accrue from voluntary self-limitation of effort. The 
inefficlency of the unregulated open access outcome pro-
vldes the scope for regulatory control of the fishery. 
The model of regulation emp in this chapter was 
more specialized than that of the preceding two chapters. 
Re tory control was exercised through an output quota 
enforced by means of a flat rate per un expected penalty 
which was taken to be an increasing function of the level 
of resources devoted to enforcement activities. This 
combination was chosen because, in Chapter Three, it was 
the combination that generated the clearest contrast 
between regulatory policy under NPIT and CT hypotheses. 
The analysis showed that regulated equilibrium 
output between zero and the maximum sustainable yield 
inclusive could be achieved through the use of an 
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appropriate mixture of quota and expected penalty. A dis-
tinction was drawn between "low-cost" and "high-cost" 
fisheries. As defined in Section 4 4, a "low-cost" fishery 
is characterized by an unregulated open-access equilibrium 
which occurs on the upward-sloping port of the industry 
supply curve. This equilibrium, although economically 
inefficient in terms of harvest size, was shown to be tech-
nically efficient in factor input. A "high-cost" fishery, 
by contrast, was defined as one in which the unregulated 
open-access equilibrium occurs on the backward-bending por-
tion of the supply curve. In this case the initial equili-
brium is not only possibly sUb-optimal in terms of harvest 
size but is also technically inefficient in that the same 
output level could be harvested with a smaller factor 
input. In a "low-cost" fishery subject to a binding out-
put quota, it was determined that an in enforce-
ment reduced the regulated equilibrium output level. In 
the "high-cost" fishery, however, it was demonstrated that 
initial increases in enforcement of some binding output 
quota increase the regulated equilibrium output level. 
This process continues until the maximum sustainable yield 
output level is reached beyond which further in 
enforcement act to reduce regulated equilibrium output. 
Many of the results derived in this chapter are 
analogous to those of C Two and Three although in 
some cases the ambiguit s present there were avo here 
by the use of the more specialized functional form for the 
expected penalty. The f t of these was that, as in 
Chapter Three, because of the cost of enforcement, it does 
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not pay a NPIT or CT regulator to respectively restrict out-
put to the socially optimal or pure monopoly profit-
maximizing output level. 
In the case of a "low-cost" fishery it was shown to 
be optimal for a CT regulator to restrict the output of the 
fishery to a greater extent than would a NPIT regulator. 
This is because competitive behaviour on the commons causes 
injury to those directly involved in the activity more than 
to society as a whole. Consequently the potential for 
appropriation by a CT regulator of the private benefits 
from restricting activity in the fishery is greater than 
that of a NPIT regulator which aims to maximize the welfare 
of society as a whole. This contrasts with the situation 
in Chapters Two and Three where, in the regulation of an 
activity which generates a negative externality, the poten-
tial benefit for a NPIT regulator from controlling industry 
output exceeded that from cartelization by a CT regulator. 
The other results in the "low-cost" case mirrored 
those of Chapter Three. Firstly, while some degree of 
ambiguity may have been reduced here by the use of the flat 
rate per unit expected penalty, the objective of the regu-
lator could not be inferred from the response of regulatory 
policy to a change in aggregate consumer income without the 
possession of enough a priori information to solve the 
optimization problem of each regulator. Secondly, it was 
again shown that a CT regulator will ensure that the out-
put quota is set equal to the regulated equilibrium output 
level and is allocated entirely to members of the regu-
lated industry whereas a NPIT regulator is unconcerned about 
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the size and distribution of the quota, the only proviso 
being that it does not exceed the regulated equilibrium out-
put level consistent with the optimal amount of enforce-
ment. The third result following from the second was that, 
of the two, only a captured regulator is affected in its 
choice of optimal regulatory policy by changes in distri-
butional parameters such as the proportion of the resource 
cost of enforcement that is funded by the industry. 
In the case of a "high-cost" fi the charac-
teristics of optimal regulatory policy and comparisons of 
regulatory behaviour depend on whether the regulated 
equ~libria occur on the upward-sloping or backward-bending 
portions of the penalty-inclusive industry supply curve. 
It was shown that if the optimum output level of each regu-
lator occurs on the backward-bending portion of the penalty-
inclusive industry supply curve, it is profitable for the 
NPIT regulator to devote a greater amount of resources to 
enforcement than is optimal for the CT regulator and hence 
the NPIT optimal regulated equilibrium output level 
exceeds the CT-optimal output level. In this circumstance, 
tory objectives could not be readily inferred from 
the observable policy characteristics of any static 
regulated equilibrium because all equilibria on the 
backward-bending portion of the penalty-inclusive supply 
curve inevitably involved some degree of quota violation 
and incurred penalty payment. It followed from this, how-
ever, that the result concerning the impact of changes in 
distributional parameters held. As was the case in 
Chapter Three, a change in regulatory policy in response 
to a change in the proportion of the resource cost of 
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enforcement that is funded by the industry, or in the 
percentage of fines that are refunded to members of the 
industry, reveals the existence of a captured regulator. 
It was also shown, in the case of a "high-cost" 
fishery, that the marginal benefit of enforcement approaches 
some finite limit value at the regulated equilibrium output 
level corresponding to the maximum sustainable yield. If 
it profitable to do so at this point, further resources 
will be devoted to enforcement raising the per unit 
expected penalty thus reducing regulated equilibrium output. 
In the case where the optimum of each regulator occurs on 
the sloping portion of the penalty-inclusive supply 
curve at some output level less than the unregulated open 
access equilibrium level, comparisons of regulatory beha-
viour and inferences about the objectives of the regulator 
on the basis of such comparisons were shown to proceed as 
for the re 
The an 
ion of a "low-cost" fishery. 
is of this chapter confirmed the central 
results of Chapters Two and Three, any differences being 
recognuable as resulting from the different natures of the 
activities involved. This exercise demonstrated that the 
model of regulation derived in Chapter Two can be applied 
across varying types of recognized market failure and that 
regulatory practices under differently motivated regula-
tors can potent 1 be readily identified in each situa-
tiona Each of the last three chapters, however, has dealt 
with regulation in a partial equilibrium framework only. 
The following chapter returns to the regulation of a nega-
tive externality, 
within a simple 
time produced by a single industry 
equilibrium model of an economy, 
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to determine whether the partial equilibrium results hold 
also in a general equilibrium context. 
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NOTES 
*An earlier version of this chapter was presented as 
a paper at the New Zealand Association of Economists' Con-
ference 1n Wellington, New Zealand, in February 1986. John 
Yeabsley is thanked for helpful comments. 
1. This analysis assumes that the relative slopes of 
the short-run production functions and the steady-
state yield curve S = 0 are such that each produc-
tion function intersects the steady-state yield 
curve only once. 
2. The conditions which provide for the instantaneous 
and continuous emergence of this equilibrium were 
given in Cheung [1970; 58-62]. 
3. "Binding on behaviour" in this instance, and else-
where in the case of a "low-cost" fishery, 1S 
defined to mean that the per unit expected penalty 
does not exceed the difference between the demand 
price and the penalty-exclusive average cost of pro-
duction at the quota level R. The level of enforce-
ment which generates an expected penalty rate equal 
to this difference ensures full compliance with the 
quota. Following Propositions 2-7-2 and 2-6-1 (iii) 
further increases in enforcement beyond this full-
compliance generating level do not affect the regu-
lated equilibrium output level. 
4. The parameter vector' Z in (4-4-4) is a composite 
vector of the parameters which affect either or 
each of QS(.) and QD(.) in (4-4-7). The formulation 
of these functions in (4-4-7) does not include these 
parameters. The omission 
terminology. 
merely for ease of 
5. In this instance, and elsewhere in the case of a 
410 • 
"high-cost" fishery, given that the quota does not 
exceed the unregulated open-access equilibrium 
output level while the regulated equilibrium does, 
any level of enforcement which generates a regulated 
equilibrium at an output level on the negatively 
sloped portion of the penalty-inclusive industry 
supply curve is associated with an expected penalty 
that is "binding on behaviour". At any level of 
enforcement greater than that which generates a 
regulated equilibrium at the MSY output level 
"binding on behaviour" is defined as in Note 3 for 
the case of a "low-cost" fishery. 
6. The vertical axis intercept of the marginal cost 
curve at X shows the total cost of catching all the 
fish in the fishery_ 
7. Note that as Y + 00, the NPIT-optimum, where the 
demand curve and marginal cost curve intersect, 
tends to the MSY level of output whereas the compe-
titive equilibrium, where the demand curve and 
average cost curve intersect, tends to zero output~ 
Thus there is always the need for regulatory control 
of the fishery. 
8. Montgomery [1972] shows how this is accomplished 
through the use of a system of trans 
The result is achieved equally well 
le rights. 
quantitative 
terms whether by means of tradeable licences or 
tradeable output quotas. 
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9. Following Proposition 4-4-2, an increase in en 
ment raises the regulated equilibrium output level 
of a "high-cost" fishery. As the regulated equili-
brium output level approaches the MSY, the two com-
ponents of the first composite term in (4-5-5), 
which represents the marginal benefit of enforcement, 
are affected. The difference between demand 
and marginal cost rises but the impact of the marg 
nal unit of enforcement on output falls. The change 
in the product therefore depends on the relative 
rates of change of these two components. It is 
possible that the rates of change may be such that 
the marginal benefit of enforcement increases more 
quickly than its marginal cost. In this case, the 
NPIT regulator's objective function would be non-
concave over some output range. 
10. This result holds in the case where the quota is 
constrained, by assumption not to exceed the unregu-
lated competitive equilibrium output level. If no 
such constraint was imposed, following (4-6-8), the 
CT optimal quota would, in the steady state, be set 
at the regulated equilibrium output level consistent 
with the CT-optimal amount of enforcement. With a 
regulated equilibrium output level which exceeded 
the unregulated competitive equilibrium level this 
would involve the eventual imposition of a quota at 
some level higher than the initial output level in 
the fishery. In order for the interaction between 
the underlying factor cost and stock/yield relation-
ship necessary to produce the required dynamic 
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response in the fishery to occur, the quota would 
initially have to be set at some level below the 
unregulated competitive equilibrium output level. 
The "no fines" situation in a "high-cost" fishery 
with a regulated equilibrium output level which 
exceeds the unregulated competitive equilibrium 
level is therefore a steady-state result and penalty 
payments are incurred by the industry throughout the 
dynamic adjustment process. 
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ix 4 1. 
Following the similar analysis in Chapter Three, 
several parameters may be assumed to affect the 
equil ium. Two such parameters are used here, the level 
of aggregate income and a technology parameter ~ which 
reflects the structure of marginal production cost. These 
parameters affect the demand and supply curves of the 
fishery respectively. Reformulating (4-4-7) to explic ly 
include these parameters gives 
(A4-1-1) D Q (P(f,L ,Y,~),Y) 
e 
Totally differentiating (A4-1-1) with df = dL
e 
d~ 
= 0 gives 
(A4 -1 2) 
and rearranging 
(A4 1 3) P* ay 
o 
aQD 
o if and only if ay ~ 0 
given the assumptions that aQD/ ap < 0 and aQS/ap > O. 
Given the assumption that the output of the fishery 
is a normal good, aQD/ ay > 0, and hence an increase in 
income raises the market equilibrium price. 
Examining the response of supply to the increase in market 
pr 
ay 
aQS ap* 2: ap* > 
ap < 0 if and only if ay < 0 
given the assumption that supply increases with price. 
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Using the result from (A4-1-3) then, an increase in aggre-
gate consumer income increases the regulated equilibrium 
output level of the industry. 
Totally differentiating (A4-1-1) with df 
o gives 
(A4-1-5) o 
and rearranging 
dL 
e 
(A4-1-6) ao
S 
/ a <b 
aoD aoS 
> aoS < 
< 0 if and only if a~ > 0 
ap ap 
uSlng assumptions as for (A4-1-3). 
dY 
Following (4-5-4), an increase in ~ is assumed to 
ralse the marginal cost structure of the fishery at every 
output level. This causes a reduction in supply at any 
market price for which supply is defined and hence 
aQS / a ~ < O. From (A4-1-6) therefore, an increase in ~ 
lncreases market equilibrium price which, from the demand 
curve, is consistent with a reduction in regulated equili-
brium quantity and thus ao/a~ < O. 
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Appendix 4-2. 
Given the assumption that (4-6-4) concave in the 
level of enforcement, term A, as defined (4-6-12) is 
negative. 
(A4-2-1) a2 Q A = [h 1 (Q(·),Y)Q(.)+h(Q(.),Y)-C 1(Q(·),¢)J-L 2 a e 
Following Proposition 4-6-1, the in bracketed 
term in the right-hand side of (A4-2-1) is negative. It is 
assumed,as in Chapter 3,that the marginal effectiveness of 
enforcement as a deterrent diminishes as the level of 
enforcement rises and thus a 2 Q/aL 2 > O. Using (4-6-3) 
e 
and assuming that the quota is set so that no violations 
occur, from (4 6 10) 
(A4 2-2) bw lt (L ) > 0 
e 
given the assumption as (3-2-2) that the marg 
resource cost of enforcement is increasing in en 
activity_ Finally, from Proposition 4-4-1, 3Q/a < O. 
nt 
Given these results and assumptions on the s of 
component terms in (A4 2 1) it is sufficient for A < 0 that 
(A4-2-3) 
Following the assumptions in(4-5-3) and (4-5-4), hI < 0 
and C11 > O. Cond ion (A4 2-3) is satisfied if and only 
(A4-2-4) h 11 (Q(·),Y) < [C 11 (Q(.),¢)-2h1 (Q(.),Y)]/Q(.) 
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that is, provided that demand does not become signi ly 
more price responsive as quantity increases. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT; A SIMPLE 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS* 
5 1 INTRODUCTION 
417. 
Chapters Two, Three, and Four analysed models of 
regulation and enforcement within a partial equilibrium 
framework. The results derived were shown to be consistent 
wi~h those generally found in the deterrence and crime 
literatures but dependent on the form of expected penalty 
function used. In addition, the characteristics and prop-
ert s of the regulated equilibria were shown to differ 
according to the objectives of the regulator. 
The vast majority of the regulatory literature uses 
partial equilibrium analysis. As argued in Chapter One, 
Section 1 5, examination of the implications of regulation 
within a librium framework, and of the inter-
actions between its costs and benefits when the enforcement 
process is explic ly modelled in this context, appears to 
have been ne ed. 
In light of this, the present chapter extends the 
analysis of the regulation of an externality from Chapter 
Two by embedding the regulated industry within a simple 
general equil 
which is out 
ium model of an economy, the structure of 
in the following section. In each section 
the results are derived in the general framework and illus-
trated in the case where preferences are assumed to be 
Cobb-Douglas. 
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Following the derivation of a regulated equilibrium 
in the economy, the properties of regulated equilibria under 
NPIT and CT regulators are analysed and compared. 
5-2 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN EXTERNALITY 
The economy is assumed to have two final consumption 
goods and one primary factor of production. L. denotes the 
1 
amount of labour employed in industry i, i = 1,2. The 
production technology is Ricardian with a. being the input-
1 
output coefficient in industry i. This gives production 
functions, 
(5-2-1) 
(5-2-2) 
As shown by (5-2-2) the input-output coefficient in 
industry 2 is a function of the labour employed in industry 
1. It is assumed that industry 1 exerts a negative exter-
nality on industry 2 so that an increase in employment and 
output in industry 1 reduces the productivity of labour 
employed in industry 2. Therefore a 2(L l ) > 0 and the input 
requirements for a given level of output in industry 2 rise 
with increased activity in industry 1. 
There is a fixed total L of labour available which 
is assumed to be fully employed between the two industries, 
thus 
(5-2-3) 
substituting for Ll and L2 from (5-2-1) and (5-2-2) 
gives the equation of the production possibility frontier 
(5-2-4) 
Totally differentiating (5-2-4) gives 
(5-2-5) 
and rearranging 
(5-2-6) 
a1(l+a2(a101)02l 
a 2 (a 10 1 ) 
< 
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o 
o 
Equation (5-2-6) shows the slope of the externality-
affected production possibility frontier which is illus-
trated in Figure 5-2-1 below. The dashed line AB is the 
usual Ricardian frontier with slope given by the input-
output coefficients that would prevail in the absence of any 
externality. The solid line AHB is the frontier in the 
presence of the externality_ 
Figure 5-2-1: Production possibilties in the 
presence of an externality 
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From (5 2-1) and (5-2-2), when L1 = 0 no output is 
produced in industry 1 and hence no externality occurs. 
Substituting for a 2 (O) in (5-2-4) shows that the vertical 
axis intercept of the externality-affected front at A is 
then ntical to that of the usual Ricardian front as 
is the horizontal at B. From (5-2-6) however, the absolute 
value of the slope given L1 = 0 is greater than the 
absence of the externality as a 2(O) > O. 
As shown in (5-2-6) the effect of the externality is 
such that a unit transfer of labour from industry 2 to 
industry 1 alters the output of industry 2 not only by the 
marginal product of labour a 2 (L 1 ) but in addition reduces 
the productivity of labour remaining in the indus The 
slope of the production possibility frontier with the 
externality is therefore not constant. 
In Figure 5-2-1 the externality-affected product n 
possibility frontier is drawn convex to the origin giv g 
a product n possibility set that is non-convex. The fron-
tier may be visualized as the outer envelope of Ricardian 
segments each of which is technically possible only at the 
tangent point such as H, the slope of the segment be g 
determined by the level of output of industry one at that 
point. Commencing from point B where Ll = L, successive 
unit reductions in Ll reduce the output of industry 1 by 
the constant amount a 1 The marginal output from indus 
2 however r s as Ll is reduced because the smaller nega-
tive externality has the effect of raising the productiv y 
of all labour employed in industry 2. If,as Ll is reduced, 
the slope of the production possibility frontier is 
increased, then 
(5-2-7) 
(5-2-8) 
Differentiating (5-2-6) gives 
a 2Q 
2 
aQI 
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[ 
a 2 ( a 1 Q 1 ) [a 1 a 2 ( a 1 Q 1 ) Q 2 ] - a 1 [1 + a 2 ( a 1 Q 1 ) Q 2 ] a 2 ( a 1 Q1)] 
- [a2 (a1Q1)]2 
Expression (5-2-8) is positive if and only if the 
numerator of the bracketed term is negative. Examination 
of its component terms shows that a sufficient condition 
for (5-2-7) to be satisfied is that a 2(a 1Q1) ~ o. 
Rearranging and simplifying reveals the necessary condition 
(5-2-9) 
where the right-hand-side of (5-2-9) is some positive 
number. 
With the presence of an externality, the well known 
result is that the competitive equilibrium market outcome 
is not pareto optimal for the economy. Assuming free entry 
with labour as the numeraire, each industry maximizes 
profits at the zero level. Price equals average cost in 
both industries and the relative prices of the two commodi-
ties are 
(5-2-10) 
p* 1 
p* 
2 
where the asterisks denote competitive equilibrium magni-
tudes. 
From (5-2-6) and (5-2-10) it is clear that 
(5-2-11) < 
p* 
1 
P~ 
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At the competitive equilibrium the slope of the pro-
duct ion possibility frontier is steeper than that of the 
economy's budget constraint. Assuming that the consumption 
side of the economy comprises a finite number of individual 
agents and that income effects are identical over the rele-
vant income range, the preferences of these agents can be 
represented by community indifference curves. Equation 
(5-2-11) then implies that, at the competitive equilibrium, 
the rate of commodity substitution of commodity 1 for 
commodity 2 is less than the rate of product transformation. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5-2-2 below. The 
competitive equilibrium occurs at point C where a community 
indifference curve is tangential to a national budget con-
straint with slope - Pi/ P2. 
Figure 5-2-2: Comparison of the competitive 
equilibrium and pareto optimum 
A 
Denoting by U(Q1,Q2) the ut ity function which 
generates the community indifference curves, the pareto 
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optimum for the economy occurs where the utility function 
is maximized with respect to the consumption of both 
commodities subject to the technological and resource con-
straints of production. Forming the Lagrangean 
Assuming an interior optimum which is technically 
efficient and such that all labour is employed, the first-
order conditions are as follows. 
(5 2-13) o 
(5-2-14) = 0 
(5-2-15) o 
(5-2-16) 
-A - A 2 3 o 
Elimination of A1 , A2 and A3 gives 
(5-2-17) 
and rearranging 
(5 2 18) 
aU(Qi*,Q:2*) /aQ l 
aU(Q!*,Qi*) /aQ 2 
aU/aQ2 
a1a2(alQ1Ja2 ::: 0 
a (l+a'{a Q**JQ**) 1 2 1 1 2 
= 
where the double asterisks denote optimal magnitudes. 
That is, the rate of commodity substitution equals 
the rate of product transformation at the pareto optimum 
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which occurs at point G in Figure 5-2 2. With a diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution, the decentral ed competitive 
outcome in the presence of an externality results in an 
excessive output from industry 1 as neither producers nor 
consumers face prices which accurately reflect the true cost 
of their actions. As a consequence, the level of social 
welfare is below that potentially attainable and could be 
improved if indus 1 was forced to contract provided that 
any such reduction involved no other effects. 
The competitive equilibrium is now illustrated in 
the case when preferences are represented by the Cobb-
Douglas direct utility function 
(5-2-19) o < b < 1 
where q. represents the quantity consumed of each commodity. 
1 
Max ing (5-2 19) with respect to q. subject to 
1 
the national budget constraint gives the demand functions 
(5-2-20) {l-b)L q == 2 P2 
Using (5-2-1), (5-2 2) and (5-2-10) in (5-2-20), the compe 
titive equilibrium employment levels in each industry are 
(5-2-21) L* 1 bL , L2: == (l-b)L 
Expression (5-2-21) describes the competitive equil ium 
in the Cobb-Douglas case As in the more general case 
above, the competit equilibrium is not pareto opt 
and hence potent weI gains exist. 
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5-3 REGULATED EQUILIBRIUM 
The simple model of Section 5-2 is now complicated 
by the introduction of a regulatory agency wh 
reduce the output of industry 1. As in the 
brium framework of Chapter Two, it is theoret 
poss Ie, in the absence of enforcement cons 
seeks to 
ial equili-
ions, to 
devise a set of Pigouvian taxes and/or subsid s which 
transform relative prices to those which the pareto 
optimum or, alternatively, by quantitative methods to res-
trict the output of industry 1 to the optimal level. How-
ever, as previously mentioned, this ignores the problem of 
evasion. 
It may be socially optimal to devise such truments 
to remove the divergence between social and private cost but 
it is un ly to be in the private interest of the offend-
ing group. Individual agents optimize with respect to 
private variables and the competitive outcome reflects 
agents' profit maximizing decisions. Any policy which seeks 
to adversely affect this outcome for any individual will 
therefore be i unless there exist either incentives 
for compliance or deterrents to non-compliance. 
Sections 3 2 and 3 4 demonstrate that the most sig-
nificant differences in regulatory behaviour occur when 
quantitat techniques are employed. It was shown in 
Proposition 3-2-1, for the case of an expected penalty func-
tion that str ly convex in output and the extent of 
constraint v ion, that NPIT regulators will not use 
non-zero quotas but it was also shown that the use of this 
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type of quantitative instrument, albeit at the zero level, 
is not dominated by any other instrument type under either 
of the hypotheses on regulatory objectives analysed. For 
this reason, the regulator in the present context is 
assumed to set output quotas for firms in industry 1. 
In the absence of penalties to deter non-compliance, 
as mentioned above, individuals' self interest will result 
in the competitive equilibrium output levels being produced 
in each industry and the quotas will be ineffective. To 
facilitate compliance it is assumed that the regulatory 
agency is able to inflict punishment on offenders against 
the regulation. A regulated equilibrium occurs when supply 
and demand are equated for all commodities and firms have 
maximized their expected profits within the regulated 
environment. 
An industry quota of R units of commodity 1 is 
imposed by the regulatory authority at a value which is 
exceeded at the unregulated competitive equilibrium. Thus 
(5-3-1) 
The quota is enforced by a monetary penalty which is 
proportional to production in exCess of the quota owned by 
the individual firm. This penalty takes the form of a con-
stant marginal fine of a 3 per unit of illegal production. 
Not all offenses are detected however. The probability of 
detection, and successful prosecution, of a firm which 
exceeds its quota is a function f(L ) where L is the 
e e 
amount of labour employed by the regulatory agency. The 
expected penalty per unit of excess production is then 
(5-3-2) o , 0 < f(L ) < 1 
- e 
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Firms are assumed to be risk neutral. Their beha~ 
viour therefore is motivated by the absolute size of the 
expected penalty rather than its component parts. As 
before 
(5-3-3) 
and enforcement requires the employment of scarce, other-
wise productive resources. 
The regulated equilibrium output of industry 1 is 
unaffected by the assignment of quota to individual firms. 
Quotas are tradeable and become an asset which acquires its 
value from the marginal expected penalty which is incurred 
when a firm's production exceeds the share of the industry 
quota that it holds. This becomes important when analyzing 
the output decisions of firms and for defining income. 
With free entry and constant marginal costs the 
size of the individual firm is indeterminate and irrelevant 
so that the effects of the quota can be analysed at the 
industry level. Beyond the quota level R, the cost of 
production rises by the amount of the expected penalty. 
This produces the stepwise supply curve ABFG shown in 
Figure 5-3-1 overleaf. 
With free entry, the expected unit fine becomes an 
additional cost of production whether or not a firm exceeds 
its holding of quota. This is because, allowing for,and 
in excess of,the resource cost of production which is 
u~ffected by the regulatory environment, with a tradeable 
quota, the per unit expected penalty represents the minimum 
cost of producing an additional illegal unit and the maxi-
mum amount paid to acquire a legal right to produce. 
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Figure 5-3-1: Supply and income in the regulated 
environment 
Me,P 1 
P' ::: a + H G 1 1 S 
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I 
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Thus in equilibrium the price of commodity 1 is 
(5 3-4) 
The quota is valuable because it allows its holder 
the right to produce a certain amount of the commodity 
without attracting a penalty_ This confers a rent to the 
initial quota holders of amount a 3 f( )R which is shown on 
F 5 3-1 by area I. At any output Qi > R,which is the 
equilibrium level consistent with the pr Pi,total fine 
payments of a3f(Le)[Qi-R] are incurred. These are shown by 
area II. 
It is assumed that any such fines are redistributed 
to all agents in the economy in lumpsum The only 
other source of income in the economy is labour income. 
Therefore the before tax income of consumers is 
(5 3-5) L + a 3 f(L )R + a f(L )[QI-R] = L + e e e 
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which is independent of the quota. This is consistent with 
Sections 3-2 and 3-4 where it was shown that indus 
librium output given a constant marginal expected 
penalty independent of the quota level and its in 
allocation. The aggregate size of area AHGJ may then be 
invariant to changes in the quota level but the re 
sizes of areas I and II are not. The quota thus has 
important distributional effects which will be discussed 
in Section 5 5. 
As in the partial equilibrium analysis, it is 
assumed that enforcement activities are funded by a lump-
sum tax. From (5-3-5) the after-tax income of consumers 
. 1 
lS 
(5 3 6) 
Free entry ensures that in industry 2 the equ 
pr equals average cost, as without regulation. 
That is 
(5 3 7) 
The demand for commodity 1, D1(Pl,P2'y) depends on 
prices and national income within the regulatory environ 
mente Given the level of enforcement L and the output of 
e 
commod y 1, Ql' the demand for that commodity is 
A occurs when demand and 
supply for commodity 1 are equal. Using (5-3-8), this 
requ s that excess demand is zero. That is, 
(5 3 9) E 
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Labour market equilibrium is contained within the 
budget constraint and Walras law ensures that the market 
for commodity 2 is in equilibrium when (5-3-9) holds. 
It is assumed that excess demand for commodity 1 falls as 
the supply of output from industry 1 rises, thus 
(5-3-10) 
This guarantees a unique solution to (5-3-9), which is 
independent of the quota R. This condition also guarantees 
that the regulated equilibrium output of commodity 1 can be 
expressed as a function of the effort devoted to enforcing 
the quotas and the per unit fine, Q1(a3 ,L e ). From (5-3-9) 
(5-3-11) aD 1 f(L ) + aD1 f(L )Q )/~ (aP1 e ay e 1 aQ1 
Slutsky's equation simplifies the numerator, so that 
(5-3-12) < 0 
That is, an increased penalty for exceeding the quota red-
uces the regulated equilibrium output of commodity 1. 
However, 
(5-3-13) 
Applying Slutsky's equation to the numerator of 
(5-3-13) gives 
(5-3-14) 
Hence 
(5-3-15) < aD1 aD 1 < > 0 if and only if a 3 f' (L e )ap 1 
u - -ay- > 0 
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Examination of (5-3-15) shows that a necessary con-
dition for an increase in enforcement to increase the 
output of industry 1 is that commodity 1 is an inferior 
good. It is sufficient however for 3Q1/3Le < 0 that 
commodity 1 is not inferior. The analysis here uses 
community indifference curves to represent aggregate wel-
fare. This requires the global aggregation of individual 
preferences. For global aggregation of individual prefer-
ences, it is necessary that the commodities exhibit 
unitary income elasticities [Manning, 1986]. Commodity 1 
therefore cannot be inferior and thus sufficiency for 
3Q1/3Le < 0 is assured. 
Further examination of (5-3-9) reveals that the 
regulated equilibrium output of industry 1 is independent 
of the quota level R. This follows from the previous 
discussion of (5-3-6). With a constant marginal expected 
penalty the introduction of a binding quota has a once 
and for all effect in the model assuming it is enforced. 
The character of the economy is transformed from individual 
competitive optimization into constrained maximization 
within a regulatory framework. The one aggregate function 
of the quota level is to set a lower bound on the degree to 
which the economy can be controlled. Thus 
(5-3-16) 
and enforcement determines the range in which the quota 
applies. In the justification of the underlying assump-
tions of this model it was made clear that a binding regu-
latory instrument impinges on individual plans and 
decisions, and must be enforced to secure some degree of 
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effective control. No profit maximizing firm within a 
competitive environment therefore will operate at a lower 
level than their holding of quota allows. 
Using the assumption from (5-3-3) in (5-3-9) impl s 
that 
(5 3-17) 
so that, here, as in the partial equilibrium framework of 
Chapter Three, with no enforcement the regulated i-
brium coincides with the unregulated competitive equili 
brium. 
It is assumed that initial enforcement efforts se 
the probability of detection quickly thus 
(5-3-18) Lim 
L +0 
e 
f'(L ) = 00 
e 
Using this assumption in (5-3-14) gives 
(5 3 19) 
e L =0 
e 
< 0 
so that initial enforcement efforts will reduce the regu-
lated equilibrium output of commodity 1. 
The function Q1 (a3 ,Le ) allows the remaining economic 
variables also to be expressed as functions of the unit 
f and labour devoted to enforcement. 
The modified form of the labour cons from 
(5-2-3) is 
(5-3-20) 
Using this in (5-2-2), substituting for L1 from (5-2-1', 
and for Q1 from above, gives the regulated equilibrium 
output of commodity 2. 
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(5 3-21) 
substituting the expression for regulated equ ium out-
put of industry 1 into (5-3-7) gives 
(5-3 22) 
and into (5-3-6) gives 
(5-3-23) L 
e 
The re ed equilibrium price of commodity 2, and the 
after tax , are expressed as functions of the unit 
fine and t labour devoted to enforcement by (5-3 22) and 
(5 3 23) respectively. 
Dif nt ing (5-3-21) with respect to the unit 
fine and using (5 3-12) gives 
(5-3-24) = 
> 0 
hence an in the unit fine will increase the output 
of the commodity adversely affected by the externality. 
Dif nt ing (5-3 21) with respect to enforcement 
activity gives 
(5-3-25) 
which implies that 
(5-3-26) < 0 if > 0 
while 
(5-3-27 ) 
dQ 1 
> 0 only if d L < 0 
e 
434. 
Interpretation of (5-3-25) shows that additional enforce-
ment of the regulations might alter the output of this 
commodity in either direction although (5-3-26) and 
(5-3-27) provide clues about this effect. 
From (5-3-25) a sufficient condition for enforcement 
to increase the regulated equilibrium output of commodity 2 
is that 
(5-3-28) 
Recalling from (5-2-1) that a 1 is the input-output coeffi-
cient in industry 1, (5-3-28) shows that, if more than one 
unit of labour is released from industry 1 as a result of 
an increase in enforcement, the equilibrium output of 
commodity 2 rises. 
This result is intuitively obvious. A unit increase 
in labour devoted to enforcement reduces the productive 
labour force by one unit. Any reduction in labour employed 
in industry 1, and hence in the output of commodity 1, 
increases the productivity of labour employed in industry 
2. If the reduction in labour employed in industry 1 
exceeds the increase in labour devoted to enforcement 
activities, the net result is an increase in labour 
employed in industry 2 and hence the output of industry 
2 must rise. 
Rearranging the numerator of (5-3-25) reveals the 
necessary and sufficient condition for enforcement to 
increase the regulated equilibrium output of commodity 2. 
dQ2 > 
dL < 0 if and only if 
e 
(5 3-29) < 
> 
Comparing the right-hand sides of (5-3 28) and 
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(5 3-29) shows that it is not necessary for net employment 
in industry 2 to rise in order for the equilibrium output 
of commodity 2 to increase with enforcement act What 
is necessary for dQ2/dLe > 0 is that the output ef of 
any net reduction in employment in industry 2, which may 
occur as a result of increased enforcement activity, is 
more than offset by the efficiency gains in the production 
of commodity 2 caused by the fall in the output of commo-
dity 1 which is generated by such activity. 
For a given unit fine a 3 , the functions Ql(a3 ,L e ) 
and Q2(a 3 ,L e ) define a set of regulated equil There 
is a regulated equilibrium output of each commod y when 
the input into enforcement is known. These equilibria are 
illustrated in Figure 5-3-2 overleaf. 
As in Figure 5-2-2 the production possibility fron-
tier in the absence of regulation, or enforcement, is AB, 
and the unregulated competitive equilibrium at E where 
a community indifference curve is tangential to a relative 
price line. If labour is devoted to ory enforce-
ment, the productive capacity of the economy is reduced to 
some level such as A'B'. Enforcement increases the abso-
lute and relative price of commodity 1 and a new equilibrium 
emerges at a tangency point such as E' which is consistent 
with preferences and technology. E' a regulated 
Q A 
2 
A 
AI 
o 
Figure 5 3-2: Locus of regulated equilibria 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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equilibrium. The set all regulated equilibria is illus-
trated by the locus OEIE. When no enforcement is attempted 
the competitive equilibrium at E is achieved. If all labour 
is devoted to enforcement then nothing can be produced, and 
the regulated equilibrium is at O. The shape of the locus 
consistent with (5 3 26) and (5-3-27). 
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It is convenient to summarize the conclusions of this 
section in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5-3-1: If an externality is regulated by an 
output quota which is enforced by fines, 
then in a regulated equilibrium, the 
prices and quantities of commodities 
depend on the unit fine and the labour 
devoted to regulatory enforcement but 
are independent of the size and distri-
bution of the quotas themselves. 
Increases in the unit fine decrease the 
output of the externality-generating 
industry and increase the output of the 
other corrunodity. Starting from zero, an 
increase in enforcement will reduce the 
output of the externality generating 
industry. It is possible that the 
reverse happens as increased enforcement 
occurs from a higher initial level, but 
then the output of the other commodity 
will fall. 
The regulated equilibrium is now illustrated for the 
case when preferences can be represented by the Cobb-
Douglas direct utility function given in (5-2-19). 
Using the demand function for corrunodity 1 derived 
from the first-order conditions of the maximization of 
(5-2-19) subject to the regulatory budget constraint (5-3-23), 
(5-3-9) becomes 
(5-3-30) 
which impl s that 
3-31 ) 
b(L-L ) 
e 
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effects of changes in the component parts of the 
expe penalty on the regulated equilibrium can now be 
examined. From (5-3-31) 
(5 3-32) 
-b(L-L ) (l-b)f(L ) 
e e 
:::: (a1 + (l-b)a3 f(Le ))2 
< o 
while 
(5-3 33) 
In the Cobb-Douglas case therefore, an se in 
en rcement unambiguously reduces the regulated ibrium 
output of commodity 1. For any binding quota within the 
regulatory framework, an increase in resources devoted to 
enforcement which increases the expected penalty faced on 
il gal production will reduce the equilibrium output and 
employment levels in industry 1 thus lessening the degree 
of violation of the regulatory constraint and reducing the 
, 
externality. 
This result follows immediately (5-3 15) noting 
with Cobb-Douglas preferences aD 1 /3Y is a s ive 
constant. The result is consistent with that widely held 
in the crime literature where it is claimed that an 
increase in the expected penalty reduces activity 
[Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1972, 1973; Stigler, 1970J. It 
sents, within the particular general equilibrium frame-
work used here, an extension of Proposition 2 6-2 where the 
same result is derived in the partial equ i ium context. 
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From (5-3-24) and (5-3-32), as dQ1/da3 < 0, an 
increase in the unit fine raises the regulated equilibrium 
output of industry 2 while, from (5-3-25), increasing 
enforcement may expand or contract the regulated equilibrium 
size of industry 2 depending on the magnitude of dQ1/dLe in 
(5-3-33) . 
Equation (5-3-31) also shows that here, as In the 
general case summarized by Proposition 5-3-1, the regulated 
equilibrium output of commodity 1 is independent of the 
size and distribution of the output quota. 
'rhese results are summarized by the following 
Proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5-3-2: If an externality is regulated by an 
output quota which is enforced by fines, 
and preferences are Cobb-Douglas, then 
in a regulated equilibrium, the prices 
and quantities of commodities depend on 
the unit fine and the labour devoted to 
regulatory enforcement but are indepen-
dent of the size and distribution of 
quotas. Increases in the unit fine 
decrease the output of the externality-
generating industry and increase the 
output of the other commodity. Increases 
in enforcement always reduce the output 
of the externality-generating industry_ 
The output of the other commodity may 
rise or fall with increases in enforce-
ment activity depending on the magnitude 
of the enforcement-induced reduction 
in the output of the externality-
generating industry. 
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This section has illustrated the mechanisms through 
which regulation affects the economy and ived the prop-
erties of regulated equilibria. In the partial 
equilibrium analysis of Chapters Three and Four it was 
shown that the policy mix which the regulatory body employs 
will depend on 
infer those obj 
objectives and that it possible to 
s from the observed combination of 
instruments used in any particular instance. The following 
analysis examines the same contrasting regulatory objectives 
to determine whether the results hold in the context of the 
particular general equilibrium framework used here. 
5-4 REGULATION ACCORDING TO NPIT 
Assume init ly that the regulatory agency is 
operating according to the Naive Public Interest theory of 
regulation. The atory agency then has as its primary 
objective the maximization of social welfare. As each 
agent has an identical utility function, community indiffe-
rence curves apply irrespective of the level and distribu-
tion of after-tax income. Whatever distribution of income 
is optimal, the aggregate utility function should be maxi-
mized. The direct utility function is u(Ql,Q2) and the 
corresponding indirect utility function is v(Pl,P2'y). 
Both of these will be used as they provide alternative 
characterizations NPIT optimal regulation. 
Substituting the regulated equilibrium quantities of 
commodities 1 and 2 into the direct utility function gives 
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utility as a function of the labour devoted to enforcement 
and of the un fine. Recalling the argument of Section 
2-7 that it necessary, in order to maintain marginal 
deterrents which prevent spillovers between c ses of 
offence, to have a well graduated scale of finite fines 
[Stigler, 1970], in the present analysis the un fine will 
be taken as fixed at its value a 3 . Therefore 
(5-4-1) 
This is max 
d ion 
(5-4 2) 
U( 
zed by the regulator. The first-order con-
< only if L* = 0 
e 
The left hand side is the rate of commodity subst ution in 
consumption. The right-hand side is the rate of 
transformation through regulatory enforcement. Geometri-
cally, the NPIT-optimal regulation, assuming an interior 
optimum, found where the set of regulat equilibria is 
tangential to a community indifference curve. In Figure 
5-3-2 this occurs at a smaller output of commod y 1 than 
is produced at the illustrated regulated equilibrium E' . 
Substituting the demand equations found from equa-
tions (5 3 4), (5 3 27) and (5-3-28) into the direct 
utility function lds the alternative indirect utility 
function which also relates utility to enforcement. 
(5-4-3) U( V( v(P 1 (a3 ,Le ), P2(a3 ,Le ), y(a3 ,Le » 
The f t order condition for a maximum is 
Clv ClP 1 Clv ClP 2 Clv Cly (5-4-4) + + < 0 ; < only if == 0 Y . ClL -1 e 
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Rearranging (5-4-4) and using Roy's Ident y reveals 
that 
(5 4 5) 
Therefore 
(5-4-6) 
where n y 
L 
e 
y 
< only if * 
, < only if L* = 0 
e 
o 
is the elasticity of after-tax income 
with respect to enforcement, 9. = P.Q./y 
111 
the share of 
after-tax income spent on commodity i, and np. is the 
1 
elast ity of the regulated equilibrium price of commod y 
i with respect to enforcement. 
c the extreme solution L = L 
e 
never optimal 
since production of both commodities, and hence after-ta~~ 
income and utility, would then be zero. This possibility 
is then excluded from consideration in the following analy-
Gis. 
These results are now summarized. 
PROPOSITION 5 4 1: If an externality is regulated by an 
output quota which is enforced by fines, 
then ass an interior solution, 
imal level of enforcement 
according to NPIT equates the rate of 
commodity substitution to the rate of 
product transformation through regu-
latoryenforcement. Equivalently, the 
optimal level of enforcement equates 
its expenditure-share weighted impact 
on prices to its impact on after-tax 
itu tion in 
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consumption of commodity 2 for commodity 
1 is everywhere exceeded by the rate of 
product transformation through enforce-
ment, or alternatively if the 
expenditure-share weighted impact on 
prices of enforcement everywhere 
exceeds its impact on after-tax income, 
, 
then optimal enforcement is zero. It 
is never optimal to devote the entire 
labour force to enforcement activity. 
As shown by (5-4-2) and (5-4-4) it is possible that 
it is not desirable within the NPIT framework to attempt 
to enforce the regulations. A sufficient condition for 
enforcement to be welfare improving and thus initiated by 
a NPIT regulator is that 
(5-4-7) > -
8Q2 / 8Le 
8Q 1/8 Le L 
e 
o 
which is the case as illustrated in Figure 5-3-2. This 
condition is not necessary as it is theoretically possible, 
depending on the properties of the regulated equilibrium 
locus, for efficiency gains at higher levels of enforce-
ment to outweigh initial reductions in utility. 
NPIT regulation is now examined in the Cobb-Douglas 
case assuming the enforcement process is also Ricardian so 
that fILe) _ Le" Note that 
(5-4-8) < L 
e 
< L 
where L is the level of labour devoted to enforcement 
e 
which generates a probability of detection of unity. It 
is clear that if L = L all offences are detected since 
e 
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none occur. It seems reasonable to assume that alIos 
would be detected if the enforcement effort was rela-
tive to the offence-generating labour force and t fore 
< L. Further increases in enforcement labour beyond the 
level L represent a pure waste of resources and, as such, 
e 
will not be undertaken by a NPIT regulator. 
In the Cobb_Douglas case the indirect util 
tion is 
(5 4 9) 
K 
Y 
where K bb(l_b)l b is a positive constant depending on b. 
Substitut for regulated prices and income from (5-3 4), 
(5-3 22) and (5-3-23) and using the assumption f(L ) = e . 
g s 
(5-4 10) 
where 
(5-4-11) J( 
is the equilibrium employment level in industry 1 
in the Cobb Douglas case given (5-2-1) and (5-3-31). 
The level of social welfare at the unregulated com-
pet ive e I ium sets a lower bound on the level of 
social weI for the economy under NPIT regulation for 
no regulation will be enforced, under NPIT criteria, if it 
fails to at least maintain welfare at its unregulated 
level. 
A fic cond ion for enforcement to be welfare 
improving the Cobb-Douglas is that 
V'tO) > 0 
Substituting for Q1 in the numerator of (5-4-10) 
(5 4 13) VeL ) "" e 
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As shown ln Appendix 4-1, differentiating (5-4-13) 
with respect to enforcement and much manipulation reveals 
that 
(5-414) V' (L ) ~ 0 if 
e < 
> 
and only if ~(Le) < B(L )i O<L <L 
e - e e 
where 
(5 4 15) 
is the elasticity of the input-output coefficient in indus-
try 2, and 
(5-4-16) 
Examination of the properties of B(L ) in Appendix 
e 
5 2 shows that 
(5417) , Bf (L ) > 0 
e 
From Proposition 5-3-2 L1 is decreasing in Leo Therefore 
C:( ) is non-increasing in L if and only if ~(L ) is non-e e 
decreasing in LIe 
shows that V I ( 
(5 4 18) 
This observation together with (5-4-17) 
< 0 for all L > 0 if 
e -
where ~(O) is the elasticity of the input-output coeffi-
cient in industry 2 evaluated at the unregulated competi-
t librium and bL is the unregulated competitive 
equil ium employment level in industry 1 given by 
J(a 3 ,o) from (5 4-11). 
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sion (5-4-18) then places a lower bound on the 
elasticity term for enforcement to occur under NPIT regu-
lation. 
LEMMA 5 4 1 
neces 
occur under a NPIT regulator. 
Proof 
Enforcement occurs under NPIT regulation if and only 
if it raises aggregate \velfare above the unregulated compe-
titive equilibrium level. Expression (5-4-12) s a 
suffic condition for welfare to be raised by en 
manto A necessary condition is that there exists t: (O,L ) 
e 
such that V I ( > O. 
From (5 4 14) V'(L ) > 0 requires that ;( 
e 
) > B ( ) . 
From (5 4 17) it is known that B(L ) is strictly 
e 
ing 
in If ;( is non-increasing in L , which requires 
e 
that (AS 2 13) holds, then, from the monotonicity of both 
functions, ;(Le) cannot exceed B(L
e
) at any level of 
enforcement unless it does so at L = O. 
e 
Therefore ;(0) > B(O) is a necessary and, by (5 4 12) I 
sufficient condition for NPIT enforcement to occur in the 
Cobb-
increasing in 
It 
case given the assumption that ;(L ) is non-
e 
instructive to examine how the condition 
o 
given in (5 4-18) is affected by changes in the parameters 
band L. 
hypothesis ;(0) is non-decreasing in L whereas 
B(O) is strict decreasing in L. The derivation of 
3B(0)/3L and the necessary condition to support the 
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assumption on ~(O) are given in Appendix 5 3. 
A 
Following from this, there exists a unique L such 
that 
(5 4 19) ~(O) ~ B(O) if and only if L ~ £ 
Finally, as shown in Appendix 5-4, as a function of 
b, B(O) positive, increasing and B(O) ~ ro as b ~ 1 
while ~(O) is finite and assumed to be non-decreas 
From (AS-4 2) and (AS-4-7) in Append 5-4 
(5-4-20) ~(O)l = 0 < B(O)\ 
b=O b=O 
while from (AS-4-3) and (A5-4-8) 
(5-4-21) Lim B(O) = ro > ~(O}I 
b~l b=l 
A 
Let b be the smallest value of band b the largest 
volume of b such that ~(O) = B(O). Then 
(5-4-22) ~(O) < B(O) V b: 0 < b < band 6 < b < 1 
If therefore there exists any b € (0,1) such that 
~(O) > B(O) then 
(5 4-23) b < 6 
and enforcement is welfare improving for such b under the 
NPIT hypothesis given Cobb-Douglas preferences. In summary: 
PROPOSITION 5-4-2: 
linear in 
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A 
Moreover, there is a unique L such that 
resources are devoted to enforcement if 
A 
and only if the labour force exceeds L. 
There are unique b, b, b ~ b such that 
no resources are devoted to enforcement 
_ A 
if b < b or b > b. 
All three parts of Proposition 5-4-2 are intuitively 
appealing. Equations (5-4-3) and (5-4-13) are functions 
relating the level of utility to the amount of labour 
devoted to enforcement which, given the values of the para-
meters band L, provide the regulatory agency with complete 
information as to how its enforcement policies affect social 
welfare for any binding quota. Underlying these equations 
is the model structure that any regulation involves a 
tradeoff between efficiency and resource capacity. Under 
the NPIT hypothesis, regulation will not occur unless this 
tradeoff is beneficial for society as a whole. That is, 
the increase in utility which results from the shift towards 
efficient production must outweigh the reduction in utility 
from the lower productive capacity of the economy which 
results from the diversion of labour to enforcement acti-
vities. Thus in Figure 5-3-2 E' lies on a higher social 
indifference curve than the unregulated competitive equili-
brium at E: even though the production possibility set is 
diminished, NPIT regulation is welfare improving. 
In accordance with this argument, the first result 
of Proposition 5-4-2 shows that regulation raises social 
welfare above its competitive equilibrium level if and only 
if the externality generated by industry 1 is sufficiently 
severe to warrant incurring the resource costs of enforce-
ment. This is significant not only when considering the 
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responsiveness of productivity in industry 2 to changes in 
the output of commodity 1 but also with respect to the 
relative sizes of the industries at the unregulated compe-
tit equilibrium. As shown by (5-4-22), if industry 1 
relatively small then the efficiency gains from res 
tr ing its output will be insufficient to offset the 
costs of so doing. 
Secondly, (5-4 19) shows that if the economy is 
small it is too costly to devote resources to enforcement 
of a regulatory control on the externality generat g 
industry. The strength of this result stems from the form 
of the detection function which here is solely dependent on 
the amount of labour devoted to enforcement. In the analy-
sis in Chapter Two it was shown that different forms of 
penalty function exhibit different characteristics. The 
caveat was stressed,however,that all enforcement activity 
requires the use of scarce resources and thus the qualita-
tive impl ions of the present result remain. 
Finally, as shown by expression (5-4-21), if indus-
try 1 is sufficiently important to consumers it ought not 
to be regulated within the NPIT framework. This occurs 
as b+ land the relative size of industry 1 at the unregu-
lated competitive equilibrium increases. Conversely, the 
externality generating industry should be regulated only if 
the indus which it adversely affects is important to 
consumers and the negative externality is sufficiently 
severe. 
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5-5 REGULATION ACCORDING TO CT 
According to the Naive Public Interest Theory the 
level of the quota, as given in (5-3-16),is of no concern 
to regulators other than the consideration of an appropriate 
upper bound. This is because the marginal expected penalty 
used is independent of the extent to which production 
exceeds the quota and so is independent of the quota itself. 
As a consequence, the marginal expected fine is equivalent 
to a non-avoidable unit tax on the output of the externality-
generating industry. It is this which restricts the indus-
try's output. Since the tax rate is independent of the 
size of the quota the regulator is happy as long as the 
quota is binding. If the regulators have explicit distri-
butional goals these will be achieved without regard to the 
quota and its enforcement in the NPIT case. 
As shown in Section 5-3,with reference to Figure 
5-3-1, the level and allocation of quotas has significant 
distributional impacts. All individuals will then be con-
cerned about the distribution of the quotas. The essential 
hypothesis of CT is that members of the regulated industry 
will gain control of the regulatory agency and operate it 
in their own interests. The distribution, size, and 
enforcement, of the quota are then mutually determined. 
This behaviour is motivated by the following objective. 
It is assumed that the CT regulator acts to maximize 
the utility of those agents employed in the regulated indus-
try. The determination of equilibrium prices within the 
regulatory environment was discussed in Section 5-3. 
Before the problem faced by the regulator can be formulated, 
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the income of the interest group must be defined. 
The after-tax income of employees in industry 1 is 
(5-5-1) Yl(a3 ,1e ,R 1 ,R) = 11 + a 3f(1 e )R 1 
11 11 
+ a3f(1e)[QI-Rl~ - 1e 1 
where 11 is the income from employment in the industry, Rl 
is the allocation of quota to firms within the industry, 
and a 3f(1 e )R 1 is the imputed rental value of this quota. 
An additional source of income is the share of these 
workers in the fines imposed by the regulatory agency. If 
fines are redistributed in lumpsum fashion, which is consis-
tent with the assumption made concerning funding of the 
11 
enforcement effort, the term a3f(1e)[Q-Rl~ is added to the 
11 
interest group's income. Finally, the term 1e~ is subtracted 
to allow for the lumpsum tax which pays for the regulatory 
• .. t' 2 agency s actlvl leSe 
Recalling that the regulated equilibrium output of 
industry 1 is a function of a 3 and 1e' so too, from (5-2-1), 
is 1 1 . 
The indirect utility function can be used to evaluate 
the utility of the employees in industry 1. 1et 
The objective of the CT regulator depends on the level of 
enforcement as well as the size and distribution of the 
quota. Here, as in the analysis of NPIT - optimal regula-
tion, the unit fine a 3 is taken as given. Note that neither 
Rl nor R affect the prices. Also 
(5-5-3) 
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since the quota allocated to the industry cannot exceed the 
total quota, while the quota is valuable only if it is not 
greater than the regulated equilibrium output of commodity 
1. Differentiating (5-5-2) with respect to R1 using 
(5-5-1) and (5-5-3) gives 
8v 
(5-5-4) 'I • a 3 f (L ) > 0 o Y1 e 
To maximize the utility of the regulated group then 
R1 = R. That is, the captured regulator will award itself 
all of the quota. Using this gives 
(5-5-5) o 
Therefore R = Q1(a 3 ,Le ). To maximize utility of those 
employed in industry 1 the CT regulator will set the quota 
equal to the regulated equilibrium output. If this is not 
done, then some fines will be collected, and only a part 
of the proceeds will be redistributed to the captors of the 
regulatory agency. To avoid this dilution of the quota's 
value it is set so that it is just observed. 
Even though the quota is not exceeded, enforcement 
of the regulation is still carried out. This is because 
the rents which accrue to the quota holders depend on 
enforcement. 
In view of (5-5-4) and (5-5-5), and using (5-2-1), 
(5-5-1) simplifies to 
(5-5-6) 
Define 
- -(5-5-7) VI (Le) = v(Pl (a 3 ,Le) ,P 2 (a3 ,Le) 'Yl (a3 ,Le )) 
453. 
This is maximized by choosing L. The first-order condition 
e 
for an interior maximum yields, 
(5 5-8) 
a5\ 
where nY1 = aL 
e 
L 
e 
- is the elasticity of after-tax income 
Y1 
for employees of industry 1 with respect to enforcement. 
The remaining variables in (5-5-8) are as in (5-4-6) which 
s the optimality condition in the NPIT case. 
These results are summarized in the following 
Proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5 5-1: A captured regulatory agency will set 
quotas on the externality-generating 
industry equal to its output. No 
offences against the regulations will 
occur, so that no fines will be 
collected. All of the quota will be 
assigned to the industry. Labour will 
be assigned to enforcement so that its 
expenditure-weighted impact on prices 
equals its impact on the income of the 
employees of the externality-generating 
industry. 
The behaviour of the CT regulator is now examined 
assuming that preferences are represented by the Cobb-
Douglas direct utility function given in (5-2-19). 
The corresponding indirect utility function for 
labour employed in the regulated industry is 
(5 5 9) pbp 1- b 
1 2 
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where K bb( I_b)b isa positive constant. 
Substituting from (5-3-4), (5-3-22) and (5 5-6) and 
using the assumption f(1 ) = 1 gives 
e e 
-( 5 - 5 10) V 1 ( L e) =: ----=--:----==----==-::---7----...;;;----
< 1 
e 
The unregulated competitive equilibrium in the Cobb-
Douglas case characterized by (5-2-21). The associated 
utility level for the employees in industry 1 sets a lower 
bound on the ut ity under CT regulation for no 
tion will be enforced under CT criteria if it fa to at 
least maintain the original welfare level within the 
industry. 
A s f nt condition for CT regulation to occur is 
that 
(5-5-11) 
As shown in Appendix 5-5, differentiating (5-5-10) and 
much manipulation reveals that 
(5-5 12) 
where 
-V' ( 1 ) ~ 0 if and only if ~ (1e) ~ B 1 (1e ) 
; 0 < 1 < 1 
e e 
[ l=b] . 
~~~~J] 
] 
From Appendix 5-5 and using (A5-2-6) 
and 
(5 5 15) Lim 8 1 (L ) L +L e 
e 
= Lim 8(L) = 
e L +L 
e 
1 
1-b 
o < 
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< L 
Using (5-5-15) in (5-5-11) gives a sufficient condi 
tion for CT regulation that 
(5 5-16) > (1-b) (a1 + 
Comparison of the right-hand side of (5-4 17) and (5 5 16) 
shows that 
(5-5 17) 
The condition for regulation to be undertaken is t 
more stringent in the CT case than for the NPIT regulator. 
Unfortunately, examination of (A5-6-4) in Append 5-6 
does not yield any unambiguous results about the slope of 
8 1 (Le ). Whereas the converse of (5-4-18) is necessary and 
sufficient for enforcement to occur in the NPIT case, 
assuming that s(Le) is non-increasing in Le' it is theore-
tically possible for enforcement to occur uncer a CT regu-
lator even though the condition given by (5-5-16) is not 
satisfied. 
PROPOSITION 5-5-2: 
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sufficiently large. There is a unique 
Proof. 
such that resources are devoted t 
enforcement only if the labour force 
- "-:::: 
exceeds L. There are unique b, 6, 
- "-
b ~ b such that no resources are devoted 
"-
to enforcement if b < b or b > b. 
Enforcement occurs within CT regulation if and only 
if it improves the welfare of those employed in the regu-
lated industry compared with the level they enjoy at the 
unregulated competitive equilibrium. 
From (5-5-12) then, a necessary condition for CT 
enforcement is that there exists some L > 0 such that 
e 
(5-5-18) 
From (A5-6-1) and (A5-6-2) 
(5-5-19) 8 1 (L ) > 8(L ) e e V L, 0 < L < L e e e 
Therefore, using (5-5-18) and (5-5-19), a necessary condi-
tion for CT enforcement is that there exists some L > 0 
e 
such that 
(5-5-20) ;(L ) > 8(L ) 
e e 
That is, the possibility of NPIT enforcement is necessary 
for CT enforcement to occur. 
8y Lemma (5-4-1) the condition expressed in (5-5-20) 
is satisfied if and only if ;(0) > 8(0) assuming that ;(L
e
) 
is non-increasing in L . 
e 
Therefore, a necessary condition for CT enforcement 
to occur assuming that ;(L ) is non-increasing in L is 
e e 
that 
(5-5-21) ;(0) > 8(0) 
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Expression (5-5-2l) is the converse of (5-4-l8) and 
hence a lower bound is placed on the elast ity term to 
admit the possibility of enforcement occurring in CT 
regulation. 
From (5 4-l9), (5-5-2l) is satisf if and only if 
L > L where L is the size of the labour force such that 
~(O) = B(O}. This ensures that NPIT enforcement will occur 
when L > L. Using (5-5-l9),however, (5-5 18) is not satis-
A 
fied in the neighbourhood of L and hence for enforcement 
to occur in the CT case, it is necessary that the labour-
A A 
force exceed £ where £ > £. 
From (5-4 22), (5-5-21) is not sat fied for any 
b < b or b > b where b is the smallest value of band b 
the largest value of b such that ~(O) B(O). Using 
(5-5-19},however, (5-5-18) is not satisf the neigh-
A 
bourhood of band b and therefore no resources will be 
_ A _ 
_ A _ 
devoted to CT enforcement if b < b or b > b where b > b 
A A A A ~ ~ 
and b < b, b < b. 
These results are again intuitive. With a small 
o 
labourforce, enforcement costs, of which the interest group 
bears a proportionate share, are prohibitive relative to 
the benefits, while as the relative size of the industry 
increases, the ential for garnishing further resources 
from the rest of the economy diminishes. I however, the 
industry is relatively small, there is little scope for 
rental income from quotas and small likelihood of a 
favourable effect on the inter-sectoral terms of trade. 
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5 6 A COMPARISON OF NPIT AND CT REGULATION 
The previous sections have established results con-
cerning the behaviour of a regulatory agency under two 
different assumptions about its objective. In each case 
the agency operates in the same economic environment and 
has available to it the same policy instruments. Differ-
ences in the settings of these instruments, which are the 
level and distribution of the output quota and the labour 
devoted to regulatory enforcements, arise from the differ-
ences in the agency's objective. 
The most visible sign that the regulatory agency is 
ured is that production will never exceed the quota, or, 
equivalently, that no fines are ever imposed on the 
external generating industry. The agency will be con-
cerned about the size of the quota, and will seek to dis-
tribute it to members of the regulated industry. In con-
trast, if the public interest is being served by the 
re ions then the agency will not be concerned about the 
size of the quota, other than with regard to the question 
of an upper bound. Fines will be imposed on the external y-
ing industry for it will in general exceed its quota. 
Since it likely that the regulators' distributional goals 
include equity, in all probability the quota will not be 
exclus ly assigned to the regulated industry. 
Although (5 4 6) and (5-5-8), which define the 
optimal enforcement under NPIT and CT, are similar they 
do not 
opt 
ld the same solution. 
A 
Denote by L the NPIT-
e 
enforcement, and by L the CT-optimal enforcement, 
e 
of the re ions. 
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Equations (5-3-6) and (5-5-6) give the after tax 
regulated incomes of the respective interest groups under 
NPIT and CT regulation. Using Q1(a3 ,L e ) and differentiating 
gives 
(5-6-1) 
and 
(5-6-2) 
Comparing (5-6-1) and (5-6-2) 
(5-6-3) 
From the second order condition for a maximum it 
follows that 
(5-6-4) - < L 
e > 
"-
L 
e 
3Y1 
if and only if 3L 
e 
"-
L 
e 
< 3y 
-
> 3L 
e L 
e 
Equation (5-4-2) implies that 3Q1/3Le < 0 at the NPIT 
optimum. 
Rearranging and simplifying (5-6-3) using (5-2-1) and 
applying the result in (5-6-4) reveals that 
(5-6-5) 
where TJ( Le) == 
- < " L 
e 
- L 
> e 
3Q 1 
3L 
e 
if and only if 
(L-L 1 )L e 
(L-L
e
)L 1 
" 
== L 
e 
-L • 
e 
" L > 0 
e 
L 
e is the elasticity of regulated 
equilibrium output in industry 1 with. respect to changes in 
the level of enforcement. 
This result is intuitively appealing. As the dis-
cussion in section 5-3 showed, with reference to Figure 
5-3-1, enforcement acts to increase the market price of the 
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regulated commodity which in the CT case is captured by the 
regulated industry in the form of imputed quota rentals. 
A 
If at the NPIT-optimal level of enforcement L the effect 
e 
of changes in enforcement on prices and incomes within the 
regulated environment is such that equilibrium output in 
industry 1 is relatively inelastic, with respect to L , 
e 
then it is optimal for the CT regulator to expand the 
enforcement effort. If,however,Q1(a3 ,Le ) is relatively 
elastic, the opposite holds true. The CT regulator is 
essentially acting as a monopolist seeking, among other 
things, to maximize the rental value of the quota. 
The use of resources to enforce the quota within the 
CT framework has as its purpose the assurance of quota rents 
to members of the regulated industry. It is possible there-
fore, from (5-6-5), that optimal enforcement under CT regu-
lation could exceed that under NPIT to such an extent that 
social welfare is reduced below its unregulated competitive 
equilibrium level even though the welfare of those employed 
in the regulated industry rises. 
From (5-6-5),however, if the NPIT-optimal enforcement 
A 
level Le is zero and it is assumed that ~(Le) is continuous 
then ~(O) = 0 and the optimal level of enforcement under 
CT is also zero. If therefore ~(Le) is continuous in Le' 
the possibility of NPIT enforcement is necessary for enforce-
ment to occur under CT regulation. 
These results are summarized by the following Propo-
sition. 
PROPOSITION 5-6-1: A captured regulatory agency will choose 
an output quota just equal to the 
industry output, and assign this quota 
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to members of the industry. If the 
agency is maximizing social welfare it 
care about the 
quota, and its allocation will be more 
general. No fines will be imposed by a 
captured agency, although fines would 
be expected if the agency maximizes 
social welfare. Depending <?,n the 
elasticity of regulated equilibrium 
output in industry 1 with respect to 
enforcement, evaluated at the NPIT 
1 of enf 
o enforcin 
than is socially optimal. Social 
welfare under CT regulation cannot 
exceed that under NPIT regulation. If 
the elasticity of regulated equilibrium 
s continuous then 
would also 
under a NPIT regulator. 
Comparing the behaviour of the NPIT and CT regulators 
in the Cobb-Douglas framework gives the following results. 
PROPOSITION 5 6-2: 
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enforcement, and that preferrences are 
Cobb-Douglas. The NPIT optimal level 
of enforcement exceeds the CT optimal 
level. CT regulation does not reduce 
social welfare below its unregulated 
competitive equilibrium level. The 
ourforce re ired for en 
to occur in the CT case is larger than 
that under NPIT regulation. The cri-
teria on the size of the industry in 
the unregulated competitive equilibrium 
that admit the possibility of enforcement 
are more stringent in the CT case than 
under NPIT regulation. 
Proof 
As shown in the proof of Propos ion 5-4-2, if ~(L ) 
e 
is non-decreasing in L 1 , there is a unique NPIT optimal 
level of enforcement 
(5-6-6) o < L < L e e 
provided that the converse of (5-4-17) holds. At this 
enforcement level, (5 4-13), (5-4-14) and (5-4-15) show 
that 
(5-6-7) 
Given the assumptions on ~(L ) and B(L ) 
e e 
h res-
pect to changes in enforcement levels 
(5-6-8) V L > £ e e 
Expressions (A5 6 1) and (A5-6-2) in Append 5-6 
show that 
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(5-6-9) o < L < L 
e e 
Using this result in (A5-5-6) reveals therefore that 
-(5-6-10) V~ (L ) < 0 
1. e 
A 
V L > L 
e - e 
Expression (5-6-10) implies that if enforcement is profit-
able within the CT framework, then 
(5-6-11) A o < L < L 
e e 
where Le is the CT optimal level of enforcement. 
The remaining results follow from the proof of 
Proposition 5-5-2. 
5-7 CONCLUSION 
IJ 
This chapter has shown, within the particular context 
of a Ricardian economy with a negative externality generat-
ing industry faced with an output quota enforced by means 
of a constant marginal expected monetary penalty, that the 
results derived in Chapters Two and Three in the partial 
equilibrium context extend to a general equilibrium approach. 
The observable differences in behaviour which arise 
from each hypothesis provide, in principle, a way of dis-
cerning the objectives of the regulator from its actions. 
Most important among these are the results concerning the 
size and distribution of the quota which affect expected 
penalty payments and rental income. 
In addition it has been shown that the CT regulator 
chooses the quota size, distribution and enforcement level, 
so as to maximize its rental value allowing for the resource 
cost of enforcement and its effect on relative prices. 
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This provides an extension within the free-entry general 
equilibrium context of the result derived in Chapter Three 
showing that, in a partial equilibrium framework, the CT 
regulator forms a cartel-like situation in the regulated 
industry. 
Finally, the NPIT and CT optimal enforcement levels 
differ according to the elasticity of regulated equilibrium 
output in the regulated industry with respect to changes in 
the level of enforcement. In particular it is possible to 
conceive of a situation where CT regulation reduces social 
welfare below that associated with the unregulated compe-
titive equilibrium. 
If, however, the elasticity of the regulated equili-
brium output of the externality-generating industry is 
continuous, then the existence of enforcement under CT 
regulation implies the potential for NPIT enforcement 
which will, in general, raise social welfare. This result 
together with that which shows the unambiguous rise in 
social welfare that occurs with CT regulation in the Cobb-
Douglas case suggests that a doctrinaire approach to deregu-
lation is misleading and potentially damaging to the economy_ 
While deregulation may improve social welfare when 
the regulatory agency is captured, the possibility exists, 
and seems more likely, that a return to the unregulated 
competitive equilibrium will reduce aggregate welfare. Any 
attempt to deregulate an industry therefore should proceed 
only after a careful evaluation of the operation of the 
regulation concerned. 
More important than blanket emphasis on deregulation 
is monitoring the performance of the regulatory agency. 
465. 
This makes the ability to infer the objectives of a regu~ 
lator from its actions especially significant. With 
resource costs of enforcing a regulation the first-best 
optimum, shown by G in Figure 5-2-2,is unattainable. Any 
NPIT regulation increases social welfare. The NPIT optimal 
level of regulatory activity, which mayor may not coincide 
with the unregulated competitive equilibrium, then produces 
the second-best optimum for the economy. 
In general, CT regulation inevitably results in a 
lower level of social welfare than at the NPIT optimum. If 
CT regulation can be detected from observations of the 
actions of the regulatory agency, the operation of the 
regulation can be transformed to conform with NPIT objec-
tives. This process will likely increase social welfare 
and cannot reduce it provided that the costs of so doing 
are small relative to the potential welfare gains. 
In any event, it would appear that the informational 
requirements and costs of the performance monitoring pro-
cess are similar to those of a well-considered deregula-
tion programme while the potential benefits are greater. 
This suggests a policy of monitoring and improving the 
performance of regulatory agencies, rather than deregula-
tion, if it is desired to increase aggregate welfare in a 
regulated environment. 
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NOTES 
* This chapter is based on a joint paper with R. Manning 
entitled "A simple general equilibrium comparison of 
theories of regulation and enforcement" (unpublished). 
The paper has been presented at the New Zealand Econo-
mists' Association Conference, Dunedin, August 1985, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Seminar Series, Wellington, 
November 1985, and the Australasian Econometrics 
Society Conference, Melbourne, August 1986. Murray Kemp 
and Ross Wilson are thanked for helpful comments. 
1. An interesting interpretation of this tax is that each 
individual is required to devote part of their labour 
to policing the regulation. This gives each agent an 
incentive to check on the compliance of others with 
the aims of the regulatory agency. 1aw enforcers are 
thus kept honest which, as shown by Becker and Stigler 
[1975] is a problem for any regulatory system. 
2. The formulation of regulated after-tax income in indus-
try 1 given in (5-5-1) reflects the free-entry assump-
tion of atomistic individual firms within the industry. 
Each firm then faces the expected penalty cost of break-
ing the law but perceives only an arbitrarily small 
amount of this being returned in the proportional 
reallocation of fine revenue. The unit trading price 
of the quota is then the marginal expected penalty 
If,however,an industry association was acquiring quotas 
on the open market, its demand price from equation 
1-1 (4-5-6) would be a 3 f(1 )[_" __ 1] which represents the net e 1 
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cost of illegal production. Depending on the allocation 
of quotas outside the industry , a bilateral monopoly 
may emerge with a supply price for quotas at a 3f(L e ,. 
The trading price of the quota would then depend on 
the relative strengths of the parties in the bargaining 
process. 
In any event, neither assumption affects the central 
result that a maximizing CT regulator will award the 
industry all of the quota at a level such that no 
fines occur at the regulated equilibrium. 
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Appendix 5-1 
Differentiating (5-4-12) with respect to enforcement 
As the denominator is positive, the sign of the deri-
vative is given by the sign of the numerator. Recalling 
(5-4-8), the range of enforcement levels considered is res-
tricted to L [O,L]. Simplifying the numerator of (AS-I-I) 
e e 
then gives 
(AS-1-2) > Vi (L ) - 0 if and only if 
e < 
Rearranging (AS-1-2) 
> 
Vi (L ) - 0 if and only if 
e < 
a 2 (J) [[a 1 + (I-b) a3LeJ [a 3 (L-Le ) - (a 1 +a3Le) J 
- b(L-Le)a3[a1+(1-b)a3LeJ - (I-b) (L-Le)a3[a1.+a3Le]] 
I [ [a 1+(l-b)a3L] ] > 
+ a 2 (J) a 1b(l-b) (L-Le ) [a1+a 3Le ] a 1
+(1-b)a
3
L
e 
:::: 0 
Rearranging the term in a 2 (J) gives 
(A5-14) a 2 (J) [[a 1+(1-b)a 3Le ] [a 3 (L-Le )-ba 3 (L- )] 
(a 1+a 3Le ) [(l-b)a 3 (L-Le ) +a 1+(1-b)a 3Le ]] 
and simplifying 
(AS 1 S) a 2 (J) [ (l-b)a 3 (L-Le ) [a 1+(l-b)a 3Le ] 
- (a 1+a3Le ) [a 1+(1-b)a 3L]] 
Substituting (AS-1-S) into (AS 1-3) gives 
(AS-1-6) Vi (L ) ~ 0 if and only if 
e < 
a 2 (J)[(1-b)a3 (L-Le ) [a1+(1-b)a 3Le ] 
- (a 1+a 3Le ) [a 1+(1-b)a 3L]] 
[
[a 
+ a 2(J) a 1b(1-b) (L-Le ) [a1+a3Le]-a-1~~~--~-
Further simplification reveals 
(AS 1-7) Vi (L ) ~ 0 if and only if 
e < 
Rearranging (AS-1-7) gives 
(AS 1 8) VI (L ) ~ 0 if and only if 
e < 
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2: 0 
< 
a 2 (J) > 1 a 3 (L-Le ) [a l +(1-b)a 3Le ]] 
a 2 < 1-b-(al +a 3Le ) [a 1+(1-b)a3L] ~] 
Multiplying both sides of (A5 1-8) by L1 and using 
(5-3 32) gives 
(AS 1-9) VI (L ) 
e 
The left-hand side of (AS-1-9) is the e ity of 
the input-output coefficient in industry 2 denoted by ~(Le) 
in (S-4-1S) while the right-hand side is the ion 
8( ) as shown in the text by (5-4-16). 
Appendix 5-2 
Expanding the function B(L ) from (5-4-16) gives 
e 
(A5-2-1) B(L ) = 
e 
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(a 1+a 3Le ) [al+(1-b)a3Ll-(1-b)a3(L-Le) [al+(1-b)a3Lel 
(l-b) (a 1+a 3Le ) [a 1+(l-b) a 3L l 
As the denominator is positive for all L > 0 the 
e 
sign of (A5-2-1) depends on that of the numerator. Expanding 
further 
(A5-2-2) > B(L ) - 0 if and only if 
e < 
> 
- (1-b) (1- b ) a 2 LL - 0 3 e < 
Simplifying terms and substituting in (A5-2-1) gives 
(A5-2-3) B(L ) = 
e 
a 1 (al+a3Le)+b(1-b)a3LLe+(1-b)a3Le[al+(1-b)a3Lel 
(l-b) (a 1+a3Le ) [a1+(1-b)a3Ll 
>OVL iO<L <L 
e -. e e 
Evaluating (A5-2-3) at L 
e 
o gives 
(A5-2-4) B (0) = 
which simplifying yields (5-4-17) in the text. 
Recalling the derivation of (5-4-16) in Appendix 5-1 
(A5-2-5) Lim B(L) = 
L -+L e 
e 
a 1 (a 1+a 3L) +b(1-b) a3 L 2 + (1-b)a3L[al+(1-b)a3Ll 
(I-b) (a 1 +a 3L) [a 1 + (l-b) a 3Ll 
Simplifying and collecting terms gives 
(A5-2-6) Lim 
L -+L 
e 
B(L ) = 
e 
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This result may be seen by direct inspection of (5-4-16). 
(A5-2-7) 
Differentiating (5-4-16) with respect to Le gives 
B I (L e) = - [( a 1 +a 3 L e) [a 1 + ( 1 ~ b) a 3 L 1 • 
[(1-b)a3(L-Le ) - a3[a1+(1-b)a3Lel] 
2 
The sign of (A5-2-7) depends on that of the numera-
tor. Rearranging 
> (A5-2-8) B I (L ) - 0 if and only if 
e < 
(i) 
a 3 [ a 1 + (1-b ) a 3 L 1 [(1-b ) a 3 (a 1 + a 3 L e)[ L - L e 1 
(ii) (iii) 
[a 1+(1-b)a 3Le l - a 3 (L-Le ) [a1+(1-b)a3Lel] : 0 
Term (ii) in (A5-2-8) is clearly negative for all 
L > O. Taking terms (i) and (iii) a sufficient condition 
e 
is 
(A5-2- 9) B'L ) .:: 0 if 
e < 
a 3 (L-Le ) [(1-b) (a 1+a 3Le ) - [a1+(1-b)a3Lel J : 0 
Simplifying the bracketed term gives 
Substituting into (A5-2-8) and (A5-2-9) shows that 
B' (L ) > 0 for all L , 0 < L < L . 
e e e - e 
Differentiating the elasticity term (5-4-15) with 
respect to L1 
(A5-2-11) ~ [a2 (L 1 ) L1 J 
aLl a 2 (L 1 ) 
= [a2 (L1 ) [a2(L1)+a2(L1)L1] -a2(L1)L1a2(Ll)]1 
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The sign of (AS-2-11) depends on that of the numerator. There-
fore 
(AS-2-12) d > dL [~( L ) 1 < 0 if and 0 n 1 y if 
1 e 
Simplifying and rearranging reveals that the necessary con-
dition for ~(Le) to be non-decreasing in Ll is 
(AS-2-13) 
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Appendix 5-3 
Differentiating the elasticity term in (5-4-18) with 
respect to L 
(A5-3-1) 3 [a2 (bL) bL]_ [ II I 3L a
2
(bL) - a 2 (bL) [ba 2 (bL)bL+ba 2 (bL) ] 
- a 2(bL)bLa2(bL)b]/[a 2 (bL)]2 
The sign of (A5-3-1) depends on that of the numera-
tor. Therefore 
(A5-3-2) ~ [~(O)] ~ 0 if and only if 3L < 
Simplifying and rearranging reveals that 
(A5-3-3) -k [~(O)] ~ 0 if and only if 
a" (bL) 2 
> [a 2 (bL) ] 2 
-
< a 2 (bL) 
a 2(bL) 
bL 
From (A5-3-3) a necessary condition for ~(O) to be 
non decreasing in L 1S that 
(A5-3-4) 
From (5-2-9), using (5-2-1) and (5-2-2) and substi-
tuting for the competitive equilibrium employment levels in 
both industries, the necessary condition for the curvature 
of the production possibility frontier as portrayed in 
Figure 5-2-1 is 
(A5-3-5) a 2 (bL) [ (l-b)LJ a 2(bL) < (l-b)L 1+ a 2(bL)a 2 (bL) 
In order to satisfy both conditions, it is necessary 
that 
(AS-3-6) [ai (bL)bL - a 2 (bL)] 
< a
2 
(bL) (l-b)L [a2 (bL) + ai (bL) (1 ) L] 
Re ing, (AS-3-6) gives 
(AS-3-7) 1 [ai (bL)bL-a 2 (bL) - a 2 (bL) 1 - a 2 (bL) (I-b) 
s ifying (AS 3-7) gives 
(AS- 3 8) < 0 
and the condition given in (AS-3-6) holds. 
To satis both the hypothesis on ~(O) and 
assumed curvature property it is necessary that 
(AS-3-9) 
< 
Dif 
(AS-3-10) 
[ai (bL)bL - a 2 (bL)] .::: a 2 (bL) 
ting B(O) with respect to L gives 
[B(O)] 
-(1-b)2a 3 
[(1-b)[a (1-b)a 3L]]2 
< 0 
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and B(O) is obviously decreasing in L as assumed in the text. 
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Appendix S-4 
Differentiating the right hand side of (S-4~lS) with 
respect to b gives 
(AS-4-l) d 8b[B(O)] 
-a [-[a +(l-b)a L]-a L(l-b)] 1 1 3 3 > 0 
which is obviously positive as stated in the text. 
Evaluating the function at its end-points 
(AS-4-2) 
and 
(AS-4-3) 00 
Differentiating the left hand side of (S-4-1S) with 
respect to b gives 
(AS-4-4) 
= 
d as [UO)] 
a 2 (bL) [a; (bL)L + a 2 (bL)bL2] - a; (bL)bL
2 
a; (bL) 
[a 2 (bL)] 2 
The sign of (AS-4-4) depends on that of the numerator. 
Therefore 
(AS-4-S) d~ [~(O)] ~ 0 if and only if 
> 
a 2 (bL) [a2(bL)L+a2(bL)bL2]"< [a2(bL)]2 bL 2 
Simplifying and rearranging reveals that a necessary 
condition for ~(O) to be non-decreasing ln b is 
(AS-4-6 ) 
ai (bL) 
a 2 (bL)': a 2 (bL) bL [a 2 (bL) bL - a 2 (bL)] 
Expression (AS-4-6) is exactly the same as (AS-3-4) and 
therefore the same conclusions apply. 
Evaluating the function at its end-points 
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(AS-4-7) (0 ) 
a 2(0)0 0 
b=O a 2 (0) 
where (0 ) is the value of the input-output coef cient in 
industry 2 the absence of externality. 
(AS-4 8 ) (0) I 
a 2(L)L > 0 :::; 
a 2 (L) 1 
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Appendix 5-5 
Differentiating (5-5-10) with respect to L gives 
e 
(A5-5-l) Vi (Le) 
[KL[(a l +a 3Le )b(a 2 (J) )1-b[al+(1-b)a3Lel] [-b[a l (L-Le ) 
+ a 3LLe 1 + b(L-Le ) [a 3L- a l l] - KL[b(L-Le ) [a l (L-L e ) 
J[ b-l l-b + a 3LLe J b(a l +a 3Le ) a 3 (a 2 (J)) (a l +(1-b)a 3Le ) 
b l-b 
+ (I-b) a 3 (a l +a3Le) (a 2 (J) ) 
b -b 
+ (a l +a 3Le ) (a l +(1-b)a 3 Le )(1-b) (a 2 (J)) a 2(J)-
[ 
-bal (a l + (l-b) a 3L)] II b l-b (a
l
+(1-b)a
3
L
e
)2 I [(a l +a 3Le ) (a 2 (J)) [a l 
+ (l-b) a 3Le lL]2 
The sign of the derivative 1S given by the sign of 
the numerator. The range of enforcement levels as in 
Appendix 5-1 is restricted to Le E [O,Lel. Simplifying 
the numerator of (A5-5-l) gives 
(A5-5-2) Vi (Le) ~ 0 if and only if 
(a 2 (J) ) (a l +a3Le) [a l + (I-b) a3Le J [b (L-Le ) [a 3L-a l 1 
- b [a l (L-Le ) +a3LLeJ] - [b (L-Le ) [a l (L-Le ) + a3LLe1] . 
[ba 3 (a 2 (J)) (a l +(1-b)a 3Le ) + (1-b)a 3 (a 2 (J)) (a l +a 3 Le ) 
(a l + (l-b) a 3L) 1 > 
- a l (a l +a 3Le ) (a2(J))b(1-b)a l +(1-b)a 3 Le <" 0 
Collecting terms in a 2 (J) and rearranging gives 
(A5-5-3) > Vi (Le) < 0 if and only if 
(a 2 (J)) (a l +a3Le) (a l + (I-b) a 3Le) [[ b (L-Le ) (a3L-all 
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(i) 
- b [a l (L-Le)+a3LLel]- b (L-Le ) [a l (L-Le ) + a3LLe1· 
(ii) 
[ba 3 (a l +(l-b)a 3Le ) + (l-b)a 3 (a l +a 3Le )] j' 
(al+a3Le)(al+(I-b)a3Le) 
[
(iii) (a l +(I-b)a3L) ] > 
b ( I - b ) a I (a I +a 3 L e) (a I + (1-b ) a 3 L e ) < 0 
Simplifying term (i) the expression becomes 
Rearranging (A5-5-4) and simplifying gives 
_ > . a 2 (J) > I (A5-5-5) Vi (Le )< 0 if and only 1f a 2 (J) < I-b· 
[
I + b (L-L
e
) [a l (L-Le ) +a 3LLe 1 [ba 3 (a l + (1-b) a 3Le )+(I-b) a 3 (a l +a 3Le)1]. 
(a l +a 3Le )[b[a l (L-Le)+a3LLel-b(L-Le) (a 3L-a l )1 [a l +(I-b)a 3Le l 
[ 
[b[al (L-L
e
)+a 3LLe l - b(L-Le ) (a 3L-a l ) 1 [al+(l-b)a3Le12] 
b(L-L
e
) [a l (L-Le)+a3LLelbal[al+(l-b)a3Ll 
o < L < L 
- e e 
Multiplying both sides of (A5-5-5) by Ll and using 
(5-3-32) gives 
(A5-5-6) 
_ > . a 2(J)L I > I VI' (L )- 0 if and only 1f - ---
e < a 2 (J) < I-b 
[ 
1 + b (L-L
e
) [al (L-Le ) +a 3LLe 1 [ba 3 (a l + (1-b) a 3Le) + (1-b) a 3 (ala 3Le) 1 ] 
(a l +a 3Le ) [b[a l (L-Le)+a3LLel-b(L-Le) (a 3L-a l ) 1 [al+(I-b)a3Lel 
[ 
[b[al (L-L
e
)+a 3LLe l - b(L-Le ) (a 3L-a l ) 1 [al+(1-b)a3Lel ] 
b[a l (L-Le)+a3LLel [a l +(I-b) a 3L l 
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The left-hand side of this expression is the elasti-
city of the input-output coefficient in industry 2 as 
denoted by ~(L ) in (5-4-15) and (5-5-12) while the right-
e 
hand side is the function Bl (Le) shown in the text by 
(5-5-13) . 
The right hand side of (A5-5-6) can alternatively be 
expressed as follows. 
(i) (ii) 
(A5-5-7) Bl (Le) = [ (a l +a 3Le) [[ a l (L-Le ) +a 3LLe l- (L-Le ) (a 3L-a l )]· 
(iii) 
[al+(l-b)a3Lel + (L-L
e
) [a l (L-Le)+a3LLel [ba 3 (a l +(l-b)a3Le ) 
+ (l-b)a3 (a l +a 3Le ) lJ / [(l-b) (a l +a 3Le ) [a l (L-Le)+a3LLel 
(a l + (l-b) a 3L) 1 
Using (A5-5-7) and simplifying 
(A5-5-8) 
while from the right-hand side of (A5-5-6) 
From (A5-5-7), as term (i) is positive for all L > 0, 
e -
upon rearranging terms (ii) and (iii) it is sufficient for 
(A5-5-l0) 
Expanding (A5-5-l0) 
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(A5-5-11 ) ba 2a L + b (i-b) a a 2LL - ba 2a L - b (1-b) a a 2L2 1 3 1 3 e 1 3 e 1 3 e 
+ (i-b) a 3 LL 2 + a 3 + (1-b) a 2 a L + a 2 a L + (i-b) a a 2 L 2 3 ell 3 e 1 3 e 1 3 e 
- a 2a L - a a 2LL - (l-b)a a 2LL - (1-b)a 3 LL2 13 13 e 13 e 3 e 
Collecting terms and simplifying gives 
+ a 1
3 > 0 V L > 0 
e -
Using (A5-5-10), (A5-5-12) then reveals that Bl (Le) 
is strictly positive for all L , 0 < L < L . 
e - e e 
ndix 5 6 
Using (AS-2-1) and (AS-5-71 and simplify 
(A5-6-1 ) ) > B(L I if and only if 
< e 
Rearranging gives 
+ (L )+a 
Simp fying (A5-6-2) reveals 
(A5-6-3) o < L < L 
- e 
which,using (A4-6-1), shows that B1 (Le' > B( ) provided 
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that entire labourforce is not devoted to enforcement 
activi s; a possibility that has previously been excluded. 
Differentiating (A5-5-7) with re t to L gives 
e 
+ ( I (a 3L-a l ) [ba 3 (a 1 + (l-b) a 3Le) + (l-b) a 3 (a1 +a 3Le)] 
+ ( ) [a 1 (L - L e) + a 3 LL e] [b ( 1 - b ) a 3 + (1-b) a 3 1 ] 
+ (L-L
e
) [a l (L-Le)+aJLLel [ba J (al+(l-b)aJLe )+ (l-b)a J (a l 
+ aJLelJ [aJ[a l (L-Le)+aJLLel+(al+aJLe) (aJL-al)l] / 
2 
Unfortunately much tedious manipulation of the 
expression fails to yield any unambiguous results about 
its sign. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Regulation is an area of economic activity that has 
had, and continues to receive, extensive coverage in the 
literature. Many theories have been developed in an attempt 
to explain the existence and practice of regulation. How-
ever, as was evidenced in Chapter One where several such 
theories were reviewed, no single theory explains the 
observed contrasts in regulatory behaviour and no clear 
criteria exist by which to identify a particular regulation 
as corresponding to one theory or another. This, it was 
argued, results from the lack of a consistent theoretical 
basis linking the various approaches together. The con-
struction of such a basis was one of the aims of the 
present thesis. 
Until recently, theoretical models of regulation 
proceeded as if compliance with regulatory constraints was 
perfect and voluntary. The recognition that this is not 
the case in practice leads to the need to model the 
enforcement process. Each of the models developed here 
therefore incorporated a formal theoretical treatment of 
the enforcement process with enforcement being taken as 
neither costless nor complete. 
Accordingly, the analytical section in Chapter Two 
began by developing a partial equilibrium model of a com~ 
petitive negative-externality generating industry in 
which output was regulated by means of either an output 
quota or unit rate sales tax each of which was enforced by 
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means of an monetary penalty dependent on the size 
of output and/or constraint violation and the level of 
resources devoted to enforcement activity. These examples 
were chosen in light of the dispute in the literature con-
cerning the relative merits of "price" and "quantitative" 
regulatory instruments. 
A regulated equilibrium was defined within the model 
as the point of equation between market demand and market 
supply which emerges as the result of individual optimiza-
tion within the regulatory environment. Given the assump-
tion of the model that the industry comprised a finite 
number of identical competitive firms, the regulated 
equilibrium was shown to occur at that output level where 
the marginal ed penalty equated the d between 
the demand pr and marginal cost of production. This 
result, which one of the main results of the enforce-
ment literature, was found to be dependent on the form of 
the expected penalty function. In particular, some func-
tional forms, such as the commonly legislated maximum 
penalty, were shown to severely limit the deterrence capa-
bilities of the regulator. 
The enforcement induced marginal expected penalty 
acts as an unavoidable tax on output and it this II tax" 
which supports the existence of the constraint and which 
generates the regulated equilibrium. The marginal expected 
penalty may be viewed as the "price" of engaging in ille-
gal activity. This is equally true whether regulation is 
by sales tax or output quota. Indeed, it was shown that it 
is possible to design tax/expected penalty and quota/ 
485. 
expected penalty combinations with identical aggregate 
incomes. When illegal behaviour and enforcement are allowed 
for then, there is a sense in which any regulatory control 
works fundamentally through the price mechanism. It was 
also shown that increases in enforcement, assuming that 
the expected penalty remained binding on behaviour, by 
raising the marginal expected penalty at any level of ille-
gal output and associated extent of constraint violation, 
reduce the regulated equilibrium output level of the 
industry. This is the well-known deterrence result. Rang-
ing across all feasible enforcement levels, the associated 
output levels define the locus of regulated equilibria for 
the industry which, in a partial equilibrium model, corres-
ponds to the market demand curve at various quantities not 
exceeding the unregulated competitive equilibrium output 
level. 
Given that any output level not exceeding the unregu-
lated competitive equilibrium is technically feasible with 
some non-negative expected penalty, and that the aggregate 
outcome is independent of the regulatory instrument used, 
it is evident that the regulatory policy employed is depen-
dent on something other than a simple output objective. If 
it can be determined that the characteristics of a parti-
cular regulatory policy correspond to a particular aspect 
of the regulatory process, then, in principle it is possi-
ble to infer the existence of this aspect of the regulatory 
process from the observation of the policy characteristics. 
The assertion of this thesis was that regulatory behaviour 
could be explained in terms of the objectives of the regu-
lator. The second aim of the thesis was then to establish 
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a theoretical structure by which it was possible to consis-
tently explain variations in regulatory behaviour, parti-
cularly in enforcement practice, and to, in turn, infer 
regulatory objectives from observed behaviour. 
Two competing hypotheses concerning regulatory 
objectives were incorporated into the otherwise identical 
model of regulation developed in Chapter Two. These were 
the Naive Public Interest Theory (NPIT) under which the 
regulator is assumed to seek the maximization of aggregate 
social welfare, and the Capture Theory (CT) which, in the 
pure sense as used here, holds that the regulator acts so 
as to maximize the profit of the regulated industry. In 
practice, CT regulation was shown to be somewhat akin to 
the cartelization of the industry with the function of the 
marginal expected penalty being to solve the internal 
chiselling problem inherent in the operation of a cartel. 
The analysis derived and compared the characteristics 
of optimal regulatory policy under each hypothesis and also 
examined the effects of changes in various relevant para-
meters on these policies. It was found that, in general, 
optimal policy differed between the two regulators and that 
these policy differences were dependent on the form of the 
expected penalty function. The source of many of the 
differences was the contrasting distributional aspects of 
the regulators' objectives. A NPIT regulator, concerned 
solely with the aggregate outcome, is indifferent to the 
distributional effects of the various policies whereas the 
behaviour of a CT regUlator, concerned only with a subset 
of economic agents, is largely determined by them. 
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In the case of an expected penalty function that was 
strict convex in both output and the extent of constraint 
violation and contained no fixed rate component, was 
shown that a NPIT regulator would not employ a non zero 
output quota but would regulate the industry by means of a 
unit rate sales tax, the rate of which was no less than the 
marginal expected penalty with respect to output at the 
NPIT-opt regulated equilibrium output level. This 
result was motivated by the necessity to minimize the 
enforcement cost of achieving a given output level in the 
regulated environment. The CT regulator, however, pre-
ferred to control the industry by means of a non-zero 
output quota allocated entirely to members of the regu 
lated industry. 
This contrast in the choice of regulatory instrument 
provides, within the context of the model, a clearly obser-
vable cr erion by which to infer the objectives of a regu-
lator by s actions. Namely it can be concluded that, 
with an expected penalty function that is strictly convex 
in both output and the extent of constraint violation and 
contains no fixed rate component, regulation by means of a 
unit rate sales tax is inspired by NPIT objectives whereas 
a non-zero output quota reveals the existence of a captured 
regulator. 
A s result also holds under the assumption of 
a flat rate per un expected penalty. With this penalty 
structure the marginal expected penalty is independent of 
the extent of the violation. Any change in the size of 
available quota, provided that it remains binding, has no 
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effect on the regulated equilibrium output level. In this 
case it was shown that the NPIT regulator was indifferent 
between a sales tax, the rate of which was not less than 
the per unit expected penalty, and any binding output quota. 
The CT regulato~ again preferred an output quota to a sales 
tax. As in the case of the strictly convex expected penalty 
function, this output quota was allocated entirely to mem-
bers of the regulated industry. In this case, however, 
the CT-optimal policy had the additional characteristic 
that the quota was set exactly at the CT-optimal regulated 
equilibrium output level. With no quota violations, and 
hence no incurred fines, this policy has the feature that 
all expected penalty payments accrue to members of the 
regulated industry in the form of implicit quota rentals. 
Other differences in policy between NPIT and CT 
regulators, while no less real, are not readily identi-
fiable from observed behaviour. Differences were shown to 
exist in optimal levels of enforcement activity and in the 
responses of the regulators to changes in various para-
meters such as the level of aggregate consumer income and 
the state of enforcement technology. In each of these 
cases it was not possible to infer the objectives of the 
regulator from the observation of its behaviour without 
possessing enough a priori information to solve the 
optimization problem of each type of regulator. Of all 
the parameter changes examined it was possible to readily 
distinguish behaviour only in the case of those with 
purely distributional effects. Thus, for instance, a 
change in the level of enforcement activity in response to 
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a change In the proportion of the resource cost of enforce-
ment funded by the industry was shown to reveal the exist-
ence of a captured regulator. 
The majority of the partial equilibrium analysis 
dealt with the regulation of a competitive industry but the 
case of a monopolistic industry was touched upon briefly. 
Unregulated monopolistic control of the industry was 
assumed to result in an output level which, although less 
than the corresponding output level in the competitive 
case, remained socially excessive. In these circumstances 
it was shown that NPIT-optimal regulation, if it occurred, 
was on a scale much reduced from that in the competitive 
case. Any enforcement-induced reduction in output from the 
pure-monopoly profit-maximizing equilibrium level lowers 
industry profit and thus would not be undertaken volun-
tarily by a CT regulator. This raised the possibility of 
strategic regulation whereby a CT regulator might insti-
tute some small degree of control over the industry in an 
effort to preclude more hostile NPIT regulation. It was 
concluded that anything other than token restrictions was 
an indication that the monopoly was not being controlled 
by an unfettered CT regulator. 
The theoretical framework of regulation developed 
in the context of a negative-externality generating indus-
try was then applied to the case of an open-access fishery. 
Using Copes' [1970, 1972] long run steady-state industry 
supply curve which combines factor cost and population 
stock/yield relationships, together with a flat rate per 
unit expected penalty, the analysis showed that the model 
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of regulation developed in the thesis not spec ic to 
any particular market structure or regulatory context. 
The Copes l supply curve is backward-bending over a 
certain output-price range reflecting the that any 
steady-state harvest, other than the maximum sustainable 
yield output level, is associated with two stock sizes and, 
through the technical production function, with two levels 
of factor input also. A distinction was drawn between 
fisheries in which the unregulated open-access equ ium 
was assumed to occur on the upward-sloping and backward-
sloping portions of the industry supply curve. These were 
referred to as "low-cost" and "high-cost" fis res-
pectively. The one peculiarity of the "high-cost" fishery 
case was the perverse "deterrence" result whereby, through 
the interaction of population dynamics and production cost 
considerations, an increase in the enforcement of a bind-
ing output quota resulted in an increased regulated 
equilibrium output level and hence a greater degree of 
illegal behav With the exception of this, and the 
fact that the nature of the common property externality 
which exists in an open-access fishery leads to the opti-
mal degree of control over a "low-cost" fishery for a CT 
regulator exceeding that of a NPIT regulator, the results 
of this analys echo those in the case of the regulation 
of a negat ernality generating industry. 
As stated in the review of the literature, the 
majority of theoretical analyses of regulation are of a 
partial equilibrium nature. Concentration on a particular 
industry or sector of an economy in isolation precludes 
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consideration of the inter-sectoral impacts of regulation 
and the implications, in turn, for the operation of regu-
ory policy of its effects elsewhere in the economy. In 
order to examine such considerations and implications, 
model of the regulation of a negative-externality generat 
ing industry was incorporated within a simple Ricardian 
two sector general equilibrium model of an economy with 
labour as the only factor of production, again using an 
output quota enforced by means of a flat rate per unit 
expected penalty function. Aside from the more general 
results, a Cobb-Douglas utility function was taken to repre-
sent consumer preferences as an illustrative device to 
examine the characteristics of regulatory policy under more 
particular assumptions. 
After the unregulated competitive equilibrium within 
the general equilibrium framework was defined, the opera-
t n of regulation within the model was explained and the 
locus of regulated equilibria derived. This locus, which 
coincides with the unregulated competitive equilibrium when 
no enforcement is carried out, and approaches the origin 
as the entire resources of the economy are devoted to 
enforcement activities, reinforces the fact that regulation 
a costly business and graphically illustrates the trade-
off that exists between the reduction in the productive 
capacity of the economy as a result of enforcement activity 
and the efficiency gains from the enforcement-induced 
contraction in the output of the externality-generating 
industry. The slope of this locus depends on the inter-
act between production technology, demand conditions, 
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and enforcement activity. In particular, if the regulated 
commodity is inferior, it was shown that it was possible 
for an increase in enforcement activity to lead to an 
increase in regulated equilibrium output and hence an 
increase in the extent of constraint violation also. The 
deterrence result therefore does not necessarily hold in 
a general equilibrium framework even with a form of 
expected penalty function for which it does in a partial 
equilibrium context. Non-inferiority was shown to be a 
sufficient condition to generate the deterrence result. 
This was illustrated for the case of Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences. 
The locus of regulated equilibria contains all 
feasible competitive equilibria that can be generated 
within the regulatory environment. The point on this 
locus at which the economy is positioned is determined by 
the objectives of the regulator. Given the possibility of 
inaction, enforcement will occur only if it increases the 
value of the regulator's objective function. In general 
equilibrium, the conditions for viability are intuitively 
appealing. Enforcement is more likely to be welfare 
improving the larger is the labour force, (the larger is 
the labour force the smaller is the proportionate reduc-
tion in the economy's productive resources from a unit 
of labour devoted to enforcement activities), the greater 
is the degree of externality, and the more moderately 
sized is the regulated industry. (A large industry implies 
that the commodity it produces is too highly valued by 
consumers to restrict output despite the adverse effect 
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it has on other industries while a small industry does not 
generate enough damage to make regulation worthwhile.) 
Assuming that enforcement is viable, the NPIT-optimal 
regulated equilibrium was found to occur at the point where 
the slope of the regulated equilibrium locus, which shows 
the rate at which one commodity can be transformed into 
another through the regulatory process, was tangential to 
a community indifference curve. This point will not, in 
general, coincide with the optimal regulated equilibrium 
of the CT regulator seeking to maximize the welfare of 
members of the regulated industry only_ It was shown that 
the relative amounts of enforcement that were optimal for 
the two regulators depended on the elasticity of the out-
put of the regulated commodity in response to enforcement. 
The more inelastic is the regulated commodity to increases 
in enforcement, the more it is likely that optimal enforce-
ment under a CT regulator exceeds that for a NPIT regulator. 
It is possible, therefore, that CT-optimal enforcement 
could'exceed that under NPIT regulation to such an extent 
that aggregate welfare is reduced below its unregulated 
competitive equilibrium level even though the welfare of 
those employed in the regulated industry rises. Addi-
tionally, however, it was found that CT regulation could 
not profitably take place unless NPIT regulation was also 
viable. In the case of CT regulation, therefore, the 
possibility of a welfare non-decreasing transformation to 
NPIT-optimal regulation always exists. 
As was illustrated in the case of Cobb-Douglas 
preferences, there are circumstances in which CT regula-
tion does not reduce aggregate welfare below its 
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unregulated competitive equilibrium level. Combining this 
with the immediately preceding result suggests that a 
policy of deregulat~on per se could therefore be detri-
mental to aggregate welfare. Of greater benefit would be 
the ability to determine the objectives of a regulator so 
that regulatory policy could then be amended as appropriate. 
To this end the observable characteristics of optimal regu-
latory policies found in the partial equilibrium framework 
under the assumption of a flat rate per unit expected 
penalty were shown to hold in the general equilibrium con-
text also. Specifically it was again demonstrated that a 
captured regulator would set the output quota at the regu-
lated equilibrium output level and allocate it entirely to 
members of the regulated industry allowing all penalty pay-
ments to be captured by the industry in the form of 
implicit quota rentals. 
This thesis then has constructed a simple theoreti-
cal model of the regulation of a competitive industry 
explicitly incorporating the necessity for enforcement. 
The concept of a regulated equilibrium was defined and, by 
ranging across all feasible levels of enforcement activity, 
the locus of all regulated equilibria determined. By pro-
viding an explanation of the operation of the regulatory 
process, the model provides a consistent theoretical basis 
by which to explain the theory and practice of regulation 
and on which particular instances of regulation can be com-
pared. It was demonstrated that the model is not specific 
to any particular regulatory situation and is applicable in 
both partial and general equilibrium contexts. 
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Into this otherwise identical model of the regu-
latory process, two hypotheses concerning the objectives of 
the regulator were embedded and the behavioural charac-
teristics of optimal regulatory policy derived for each 
case. Comparison of the results in both partial and general 
equilibrium contexts revealed clear contrasts between the 
policies of the two regulators, some of which were readily 
identifiable. The fact that the optimal regulated equili-
brium of a particular regulator is associated with certain 
observable characteristics implies that, in principle, the 
objectives of a regulator can be inferred from the observa-
tion of regulatory practice. Given the relationship demon-
strated in the general equilibrium context between aggre-
gate welfare levels at the unregulated competitive equili-
brium and at the regulated equilibria associated with each 
type of regulator, the existence of clear and observable 
criteria by which to determine a regulator's objectives 
would enable the monitoring and modifying as necessary of 
regulatory behaviour so as to optimize regulatory perform-
ance over time in terms of society's objectives. 
There are several areas in which the analysis pre-
sented here could be usefully extended. These include the 
application of the model to other areas of "market failure" 
such as external economies of scale and the incorporation 
of further regulatory objective hypotheses such as 
Niskanen's [1968, 1971, 1975] theory of bureaucratic prefer-
ences or a modified extension of the Capture Theory to 
allow for competition in the political process along the 
lines of Becker [1983]. 
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Once the pure form of CT regulation is relaxed it is 
likely that the clear dichotomy between the optima of the 
CT and NPIT regulators would become blurred. This was 
evident in the brief consideration of the regulation of a 
monopoly where the concept of strategic regulation was 
discussed. There the regulatory process was a form of game 
in which a CT regulator would tone down its activities in 
order to disguise its motives and thus preclude more hos-
tile NPIT regulation. A similar process would occur in a 
Becker-type model. Although results would inevitably be 
less clear-cut, in principle the ability to infer a regu-
lator's objectives from observable actions remains albeit 
in terms of a probability-weighted determination from a 
continuum of possible regulatory behaviour. 
In the models developed here, the choice variables 
of the regulator were the level of enforcement and, in 
part, the regulatory instrument. It was evident from the 
analysis, however, that optimal regulatory policy was much 
affected by the form of the expected penalty function. 
Accordingly, another obvious extension would be to allow 
the regulator the choice of the structure and amount of the 
expected penalty. This would likely provide further obser-
vable characteristics by which the objectives of the 
regulator could be inferred. 
The general equilibrium model developed in the thesis 
was relatively simple in structure. A more general treat-
ment of an economy containing many industries and producing 
many commodities would also be a useful exercise. It is 
doubtful, however, whether many of the results would survive 
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such a generalization. The robustness and variety of the 
initial results presented here were due to the strength 
and specificity of the assumptions used. Even with the 
relatively slight degree of generalization involved in the 
development of the simple general equilibrium model it was 
evident that the core of unqualified results was somewhat 
reduced. 
Finally, some degree of empirical investigation is 
required to examine the applicability and validity of the 
theory in practice. This might best be done in the first 
instance with reference to well-documented cases of past 
regulation for which data is perhaps more readily available 
and the predictive performance of the model can be tested 
against known outcomes. Regrettably, the scope of such a 
project was beyond the time and resources available to the 
present study. Once any refinements that proved necessary 
in response to this exercise were incorporated into the 
structure of the model and its validity determined, a 
possible use to the policy maker would be as a form of 
"acid test" to identify regulators which appeared to be 
operating in accordance with objectives other than those of 
society as a whole, and upon whom more detailed scrutiny 
would be warranted. 
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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
REGULATORY OBJECfIVES AND ENFORCEMENT 
ADDENDUMl 
This addendum provides further interpretation and clarification of 
several issues considered in Chapters Two and Three of the accompanying 
h . 2 t eSlS. 
(1) Formulation of the model 
Expression (2-4-8) is not meant as a prior constraint on the model. 
Rather it is a conclusion from the model which follows the assumptions on 
the expected penalty function concerning full reporting and over-reporting. 
Expression (2-4-7) includes a component G(k,k) = 0; that is, no 
penalty is incurred for truthful declaration. This coupled with the 
assumption that no penalty is incurred for over-reporting implies that 
(A-I) 
and therefore 
(A-21 
G(k,n) = 0 'rJ n > k 
G = 0 'rJ x > q and 
x 
G =0 'rJq<x q 
Using (A-I) and (A-2) it then immediately follows from (2-4-14) that 
x* :s q* because for any x > q G = I) and an/ax < o. 
x 
An additional unit of 
declared output that is not actually produced merely results in additional 
tax liability which cannot be optimal. 
The maximization of n(q,x,O::) shown in (2-4-11) is therefore 
unconstrained and the "greater than" inequality shown in (2-4-14) should be 
deleted as it should also in (3~4-18). It is possible, however. to 
conceive of an enforcement structure which would ensure truthful behaviour 
by the firm. Certainty of detection coupled with a unit rate penalty on 
undeclared output which exceeds the tax rate is one such structure. 
In this case 
(A-3) T[ > 0 \;/ x < q and T[ < 0 \;/ x > q 
x x 
For such a penalty structure in the limit as x approaches q from below 
profit can be increased by more truthfully declaring actual output 
resulting in an optimum when output is fully declared. 
(2) Form of the expected penalty function 
One intuitively appealing form of the expected penalty function is 
that the expected penalty is related to the amount of undeclared output. 
That is 
(A-4) G = G(q-x) 
This form is used extensively in the thesis. The word "extent" as used in 
Sections 2-4 through 2-6 and subsequent analysis based on these sections 
should be interpreted as "amount". 
Other interesting forms of the expected penalty function might also 
have been considered. It may. for instance, be thought reasonable for the 
expected penalty to be related to the proportion of undeclared output. 
Alternatively. illegal behaviour by large firms might be thought worthy of 
more stringent punishment than if the firms were small. An argument could 
also be based on the significance or relative size of an industry in the 
economy as a whole. Under these different definitions of the expected 
penalty the validity of the propositions of this thesis would have to be 
considered on a case by case basis. 
z 
Expression (2-4-26) when correctly evaluated at q shows the 
penalty-inclusive marginal cost of producing an additional unit of 
undeclared output. The form of (2-4-27) and the subsequent analysis based 
on it contained in the proofs of Propositions 2-4-2, 2-4-5 and 2-4-8 are 
correct under the condition that 
(A-5) G = - G q x 
One such case occurs with an expected penalty function of the form of 
(A-4). The condition shown in (A-5) need not hold in general, however. 
The general formulation of (2-4-27) is 
o MC(q) = c' (q) + t + G + G q x (A-6) 
Under the general formulation of the marginal cost of producing a unit of 
declared output shown in (A-6) the alternative proofs of Propositions 2-4-5 
and 2-4-8 given in the text of this thesis are justified. A similar proof 
drawing on (2-4-14) and the assumption of convexity of the expected penalty 
function can be used to demonstrate the validity of Proposition 2-4-2 as 
follows: 
Comparing (A-6) and (2-4-26) any output produced is undeclared 
for all q such that G 
x 
immediately from (2-4-14). 
o 
> - t. a condition which follows 
Following (2-4-25) this condition 
holds for at least the initial unit of output. From Proposition 
2-4-1 G < 0 and an increase in output increases the absolute 
xq 
value of the marginal expected penalty with respect to declared 
output. This output-induced increase in G may eventually be 
x 
sufficient to equate its absolute value to the tax rate. Given 
that supply rises with price, at all prices below that necessary 
to call forth the output level at which the absolute value of G 
x 
is equated with the tax rate any output produced will be 
undeclared. 
3 
The proof of Proposition 2-5-1 together with the form of 2-5-1 
and the equilibrium analysis which follows from it is also based on an 
expected penalty of form such that (A-5) holds. Relaxation of this 
condition in other cases admits the possibility of several additional types 
of equilibria beyond those considered in Section 2-5. 
One such possibility, using the terminology of Figure 2-5-1, is an 
equilibrium Q' where 
(A-7) 
such that 
Q* < Q' < QO 
t 
(A-a) I GX' I ::::: t > GQ, ; X' < Q' 
(A-7) and (A-a) together denote an equilibrium (Q' ,X') with some declared 
output at an output level intermediate between that associated with the 
unregulated competitive equilibrium and that associated with full 
declaration. 
Another possibility is an equilibrium Q" where 
(A-9) Q" < Q* 
t 
such that either 
(A-I0) I GX" I < t < G Q" 
in which case X" ::::: 0, or 
(A-ll) I GX" I ::::: t < G Q" ; X" < Q" 
(A-9) and (A-tO) together denote an eqUilibrium (Q",O) with no declared 
output at an output level below that associated with full declaration while 
(A-9) and (A-H) denote an equilibrium (Q'''X'') with partial declaration of 
an output level below that associated with full declaration. 
It is possible, therefore, to have an expected penalty function such 
that the marginal expected penalty with respect to output given that no 
output is declared does not exceed the tax rate yet the equilibrium 
involves partially declared output and it is also possible to have an 
4 
expected penalty function such that the marginal expected penalty with 
respect to output at the equilibrium exceeds the tax rate yet the 
equilibrium involves either zero or partial declaration. In the first case 
the regulator is more concerned with encouraging truthful behaviour than 
restricting output while in the latter case the reverse is true. For the 
purposes of this addendum no further analysis of the properties of these 
possible equilibria is undertaken. 
(3) Redistribution of fine revenue 
The analysis of CT regulation in Sections 3-4 and 3-5 contains a term 
'a' which represents the proportion of fine revenue redistributed to 
members of the regulated industry. The intention of the model is that any 
redistribution of such proceeds occurs in some lump-sum manner and hence 
marginal decisions of firms are unaffected by it. It may be understood 
therefore that (3-4-2) and (3-4-4) represent the net expected penalty 
received by the regulator but not that upon which individual firms base 
their output decisions. It may also be considered that in most situations 
'a' would be zero. 
If, however, 'a' was known in advance to individual firms and proceeds 
were redistributed in other than a lump-sum manner the marginal behaviour 
of firms and hence the regulated eqUilibrium would be affected. In such a 
case the form of terms J in (3-5-1) and U in (3-5-2) would be similar to 
that of terms E and S in (3-5-1) and (3-5-2) repsectively and the form and 
proof of Proposition 3-5-3 would be similar to those of Proposition 3-5-4. 
5 
NOTES 
1 Between the initial completion of this thesis and the writing of this 
addendum Richard Manning tragically and prematurely passed away. This 
thesis is but one humble testimony to his enduring contribution to 
economic thought in New Zealand and beyond. 
2. The author is indebted to Professor Lewis Evans of Victoria 
University of Wellington and Alan Woodfield of the University of 
Canterbury for helpful discussions on the matters considered in this 
addendum. 
6 
